





*Henry Selfe Selfe.*





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NIEBUHR'S  
HISTORY OF ROME.









*Niebuhr*



# THE HISTORY OF ROME

FROM THE FIRST PUNIC WAR TO THE DEATH OF CONSTANTINE.

BY

B. G. NIEBUHR.

IN A SERIES OF LECTURES,

INCLUDING AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE ON THE SOURCES AND STUDY OF  
ROMAN HISTORY.

EDITED BY

LEONHARD SCHMITZ, PH. D.

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TO HIS MAJESTY

FREDERIC WILLIAM THE FOURTH,

KING OF PRUSSIA,

THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PUPIL OF NIEBUHR,

THE GENUINE AND MUNIFICENT ADMIRER OF HIS MERITS,

THIS WORK

IS MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

BY

THE EDITOR.



## PREFACE.

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UPWARDS of thirteen years have now elapsed since the death of Niebuhr, and none of the many courses of lectures delivered by him have yet been published. It must, at first sight, appear strange that those lectures, which, as far as their intrinsic merits and their suggestive nature are concerned, cannot easily be surpassed by any others, should have been neglected so long by Niebuhr's countrymen; and it will probably appear still more strange that the first attempt to rescue these precious relics is made in this country. But there are circumstances which will account for this apparent neglect of a man, whose opinions on subjects of ancient history must be of the highest interest to every scholar. The main cause is the *pietas* which Niebuhr's pupils feel for their great master, and which has deterred them from publishing anything that might possibly place him before the public in an unfair light. This apprehension arises from the condition of the notes which were taken down by his pupils in the lecture-room, and which are the only materials out of which the lectures can be re-constructed, for Niebuhr himself never wrote them down. The difficulty of casting these confused, fragmentary, and sometimes unintelligible, notes into a proper and intelligible form is indeed so great, that this would be of itself suffi-

cient to deter any one from undertaking a task which is far more irksome than that of producing an original work, and which, when accomplished, must of necessity fall short of what it might be.

It is therefore not indifference on the part of Niebuhr's pupils, that has so long delayed the publication of any of his courses of lectures, but simply the anxiety to do justice to his memory, and the difficulties which present themselves at almost every step. The anxiety to be just towards Niebuhr went indeed so far, that when I applied to one of his most eminent pupils to undertake the publication of the lectures on Roman history, or at least to give me his assistance if he declined the task, he declared that no one ought to venture upon such an undertaking, unless he felt that he could do it in the manner in which Niebuhr himself would have done it, if the thought of publishing his lectures had occurred to him. Honourable as this feeling is, still, if we were to wait till any of Niebuhr's pupils could, without presumption, say that he was equal to his master, the lectures would in all probability remain buried for ever. I am as anxious as any one to do justice to Niebuhr, and although I am at the same time very far from believing that I have attained that competency which my late fellow-student regards as the *conditio sine qua non*, I have been induced by various favourable circumstances to undertake the task; and after the completion of the work, which may not be what it ought to be, I have at least this consolation,—that I have made my best efforts; and that I have spared neither time nor trouble to make out of my materials all that could be made of them under the circumstances of the case, and without altering any of



Niebuhr's sentiments and opinions. With regard to the difficulties of accomplishing this, I think I may say that I have felt them more strongly than others who have merely looked at them without actually trying to overcome them; and the reader of the present work will find indications enough of my inability to solve them in all instances. This fact would have deterred me, like other pupils of Niebuhr, from venturing upon the undertaking, had I not been favoured by circumstances, among which I mention with gratitude the advice, encouragement, and assistance of my distinguished friends, Bishop Thirlwall, the Chevalier Bunsen, the Rev. Philip Smith, and Dr. William Smith.

In order to put the reader in a position fully to understand these preliminary remarks, it will be necessary for me to give some account of the materials I had to work upon, and of the principles I have endeavoured to follow. The notes, upon which the present work is founded, were made in the winter of 1828-29 and the summer of 1829, when Niebuhr gave a course of lectures on the History of Rome in the University of Bonn, the last time that he ever lectured on that subject. His intention was to relate the history of Rome from the earliest times to the downfall of the Western Empire, during the winter course of 1828-29: but the time—he lectured five times every week, and each lecture lasted three quarters of an hour—was not sufficient, and he was not able to carry the history further than the reign of Augustus. In order to fulfil his engagement, he continued his lectures in the summer of 1829, in which he related the history of the Roman emperors. The time allowed for this continuation, one lecture every week, proved again insufficient;

and, brief as his sketches of the history of the emperors and the principal events of their reigns were, yet the summer course came to its close just as Niebuhr had finished his account of Constantine the Great.\*

It must be observed that Niebuhr delivered his lectures before young men who were supposed to be acquainted with the leading events of Roman history, or at least to possess a sufficient acquaintance with the ancient languages to read the Greek and Latin works which form the sources of our knowledge. It was therefore not so much Niebuhr's object to fill their memory with all the details of history, as to enable them to *understand* its important events, and to form correct notions of the men and institutions which occur in the history of Rome. Hence some events were passed over altogether, and others were only slightly alluded to, especially where he could refer his hearers to the ancients themselves for accurate and satisfactory information.

Niebuhr, as a lecturer, was a singular phaenomenon; he delivered his discourses extempore, and without having any written notes before him to assist his memory. The form in which he delivered them was that of a familiar and lively conversation with friends, in which he made use of his most varied and inexhaustible stores of knowledge and personal experience to illustrate the subjects of his discourses, and in which he abandoned himself without restraint to the expression of his strong feelings, as they might be called forth by the subjects under consideration. A few harsh expressions which escaped

\* A writer in the *Lebensnachrichten von B. G. Niebuhr*, vol. III. p. 290, erroneously states that the lectures comprised the history down to the fall of the Western Empire.

him under the influence of such passionate feelings have been softened down in the present work, for an expression printed makes a very different impression from what it does when spoken in the heat of the moment. When Niebuhr spoke, it always appeared as if the rapidity with which the thoughts occurred to him obstructed his power of communicating them in their regular order of succession. Nearly all his sentences, therefore, were anacoluths; for, before having finished one, he began another, perpetually mixing up one thought with another, without producing any one in its complete form. This peculiarity was more particularly striking when he was labouring under any mental excitement, which occurred the oftener as, with his great sensitiveness, he felt that warmth of interest in treating of the history of past ages, which we are accustomed to witness only in discussions on the political affairs of our own time and country. The circumstance of Niebuhr delivering his thoughts in that singular manner—a deficiency of which he himself was painfully conscious—rendered it often extremely difficult to understand him; and it may easily be inferred in what a state of confusion the notes were, which were taken down by the students under such circumstances. But, notwithstanding this deficiency in Niebuhr as a lecturer, there was an indescribable charm in the manner in which he treated his subjects: the warmth of his feelings, the sympathy which he felt with the persons and things he was speaking of, his strong conviction of the truth of what he was saying, his earnestness, and, above all, the vividness with which he conceived and described the characters of the most prominent men, who were to him living realities, with souls, feelings, and passions like ourselves, carried his

hearers away, and produced effects which are usually the results only of the most powerful oratory. Would that my materials had enabled me in all cases to preserve these features in the lectures which I am now bringing before the public !

Another circumstance, which gave rise to mistakes and confusion in the notes, was the ignorance of Niebuhr's hearers about a countless number of things which he introduced as illustrations of the history of Rome, and which were taken from the history of countries with whose languages we pupils were unacquainted. Hence proper names were constantly misunderstood or misspelt. Niebuhr moreover, spoke very rapidly; and in addition to all this it must be remembered that students are not trained as short-hand writers, like the reporters of lectures in this country, and that every student notes down as much as he can, or as much as he may think proper or useful to himself, no one being able to write with the same rapidity with which a lecturer like Niebuhr speaks. Some slight mistakes also were made by Niebuhr himself, but these were chiefly such as any one engaged in a lively conversation will make: for example, the name of one person was occasionally mentioned for that of another, dates were confounded, or the order of events was reversed. Sometimes also he forgot to mention an event in its proper place, and afterwards, when the oversight occurred to him, he stated what he had omitted. All such mistakes, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies, I have endeavoured to remedy tacitly, wherever it was possible for me to do so. These corrections could of course only be made by tracing Niebuhr's statements to their sources, both ancient and modern; and I have made them only in cases where they were commanded by positive evi-



dence. There are a few points which I was obliged to leave as I found them, and which I could not consider as mistakes, although the authorities which I had before me seemed to justify the supposition that they were mistakes. But Niebuhr may have had other authorities which were unknown to me. Wherever such a case occurred, I have pointed it out in a note. There are lastly a very few statements which I was unable to substantiate by any authority, but which I have nevertheless preserved, in the hope that they may induce others to search, and with better success than myself.

It would perhaps have been desirable to publish the complete course of Niebuhr's lectures on Roman History at once, but I thought it preferable, on mature consideration, first to give to the world only the lectures on that portion of the history of Rome, which is not contained in the three volumes already before the public, so that the present lectures will form a sort of continuation to his great work. But in determining upon this plan I have added two things, which at first sight may seem to be out of place and inconsistent with my plan,—viz. the twelve Introductory Lectures, and those on the first Punic war, from p. 95 to p. 140. With regard to the Introductory Lectures, it is true, the translators of the first two volumes have prefixed to vol. I. a short introduction by Niebuhr; but that introduction contains only a few general remarks, and was written as early as the year 1810, whereas the twelve Introductory Lectures now published give a complete summary of all that has ever been done for Roman history; they contain some very valuable remarks on both ancient and modern works, and are intended to lay before the student the materials upon which our

knowledge of Roman history is based, and to instruct him about the manner in which he has to make use of them. An account of the first Punic war is contained at the end of vol. III. but that account is only a fragment, and was moreover written as early as the year 1811. These were reasons sufficient in themselves to induce me to publish the lectures on the first Punic war, which also contain discussions upon a variety of things not to be found elsewhere.

When I had made up my mind to set about the task of preparing these lectures for publication, I soon found that my own notes alone would be too insecure a basis to work upon, as no one of Niebuhr's pupils was able, even if he had wished to do so, to make his notes complete and accurate. I therefore procured from Germany as many and as good manuscripts as I could, to correct and complete my own by the assistance of the others. But I am well aware that notwithstanding all this, some of the lectures cannot be complete, considering the small space they occupy in this work, and the fact that, when they were delivered, each occupied the space of three-quarters of an hour. This incompleteness however is only apparent, and affects only the form; for the substance of Niebuhr's discourses is preserved throughout, and there are only a very few instances in which the omission of explanatory matter is perceptible. The students in German universities seldom write down the remarks of the lecturer on things not closely connected with the subject under consideration, although the remarks of a man like Niebuhr, even when they appeared less important to an inexperienced student, were always of the greatest interest and highly suggestive. But I am happy to say that my own manuscript, as well as the others which I have collated, have few omissions of

this kind, and all the students appear to have been well aware of the importance of Niebuhr's remarks on extraneous subjects. The very few lectures in which such omissions occur, are for this reason somewhat briefer than the rest. In a spoken discourse, the introduction of explanatory or extraneous matter always appears to interrupt the context less than in a written or printed discourse. In most cases therefore, where such observations by the way appeared to interrupt the narrative and could be conveniently removed, I have taken them out of the text and put them at the foot of the page as notes. In order to distinguish them from the notes which I have added myself, I have always marked them with Niebuhr's initial—N.

All these lectures are only brief summaries, that is, the results of Niebuhr's investigations. He never gave any other references to his authorities except in the general way in which they occur in the text. Wherever I have been able to find the passages of his authorities, and wherever I thought them useful to the student, I have given the exact references. It would have been easy to multiply their number, but I was not inclined to swell the bulk of the work with a useless display of learning; suffice it to say that I have endeavoured to verify every one of Niebuhr's statements by referring to the ancient as well as modern authorities. I have purposely abstained from giving references to the numberless modern works on the History of Rome or separate portions of it, except in a few cases in which Niebuhr's words seemed to suggest the propriety of doing so, and a few others in which I could refer to Niebuhr's own works. Still less did I feel called upon to controvert opinions of Niebuhr; and it is only

in one or two instances that I have added any remarks of this kind, because in referring to the authorities, statements presented themselves to me at once, which were at variance with Niebuhr's opinion. In these cases however I am very far from asserting that Niebuhr is wrong, and all that I mean to suggest is, that I have not been able to discover the authorities on which his opinions or statements may be founded.

If I have not succeeded in reproducing these lectures in a manner worthy of Niebuhr in all respects, I venture to hope that a consideration of the difficulties with which I have had to struggle, will suggest at least some excuse for my inadequate performance. I have often been on the point of giving up the undertaking altogether in despair, but my love and admiration for Niebuhr, my conviction of the peculiar interest and value of his lectures, and the encouragement of learned friends, always urged me on, and gave me fresh strength to proceed with my task. And now that the work is completed, I would rather see all its defects attributed to my own incapacity, than that any one of them should, through my fault, be imputed to Niebuhr.

L. SCHMITZ.

*London, April, 1844.*



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# THE HISTORY OF ROME.



## INTRODUCTION.

### LECTURE I.

#### EXAMINATION OF THE SOURCES OF ROMAN HISTORY, ITS CREDIBILITY, AUTHENTICITY, AND LITERATURE.

I SHALL endeavour, with the help of God, to relate to you, in one course, the complete history of Rome, during the commonwealth and under the empire: the time I shall devote to it will, I believe, be sufficient; for it is not my intention to follow out my inquiries step by step, but only to give the results and conclusions to which I have come.

In former times, and down to the eighteenth century, Roman history was treated with a full belief in its truth, that is, uncritically, the confusions and inconsistencies of its early periods being endured without uneasiness; and such also was the case during a great part of the eighteenth century. In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries scholars were occupied with the details of history, —chronology, numismatics, and the like: eminent men, as Tillemont, Eckhel, and others, produced admirable works as far as the detail is concerned; but it is only in our days, after scepticism had taken possession of the field,

that history has been subjected to criticism. But, as is usually the case in such matters, these critical researches, after being once set on foot, have become the principal object in Roman history. This may be well for a time, but it must not always be so: there is too much of it already; it is dwelt upon too much, and we must try to counteract this tendency *pro virili parte*.

You may expect, first, a view of the literature of Roman history; secondly, results, and not researches, concerning the early portions of it; and, thirdly, the history of the later times, down to the period when the Roman world assumes a different aspect; and it will be my endeavour to render these later times as clear and distinct to you as I can.

I shall first speak to you of the historians of the commonwealth. They may be divided into great classes, though every thing cannot be classified without taking some artificial or unnatural point of view. The first question which arises is: Are the sources of the earliest history of Rome, down to the time when an historical literature sprang up in the city, worthy of credit? I have already said that there was a time when there prevailed a simple and sincere belief in the authenticity of the ancient historians, when the history of Rome was read like that of the German emperors; and it would have been looked upon as a crime, if any one had ventured to doubt the historical character of Roman history as transmitted by Livy. It is incomprehensible how even very ingenious writers, men far above us, took the details of ancient history for granted, without feeling any doubt as to their credibility. Thus Scaliger believed the list of the kings of Sicily to be as authentic and consistent as that of the kings of France. Men lived in a state of literary innocence. This continued after the revival of learning, so long as history was treated merely philologically, and so long only could it last. But when, in the seventeenth century, in the Netherlands, England, France, and Germany, the hu-


man mind began to assert its rights, and men raised themselves above their books to that kind of learning which we find among the ancients, some few, though not without great timidity, began to point out its incongruities and contradictions. Valla<sup>1</sup>, who was so deeply imbued with the spirit of the ancients, that one of his writings was for a long time believed to be the work of an ancient Roman, was struck by the accounts of Livy, and was the first who proved that there were impossibilities in his narrative. His example was followed by Glareanus, whose remarks irritated Sigonius, and induced him to oppose the ingenious German. At the conclusion of the sixteenth century, Pighius, in the Netherlands, and others, exhibited prodigious learning in compiling, and were in possession of many good ideas, but did not carry them out successfully. The investigations of Perizonius are masterly. Then followed the sceptical works of Bayle and Beaufort: and here we see what always happens, when truth is not separated from falsehood, or when the separation is not carried on after it has been begun, and after the human mind has struck into such paths that it has become impossible to avoid the complete separation. In the seventeenth century Roman history could not possibly be believed with the intense faith of the sixteenth, when men viewed every thing Roman with as much interest and delight, as they looked on their dearest friends. So long as this was the case, Roman history might perfectly satisfy even the noblest minds without any critical investigations. But when the sphere of the human mind became extended, as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Roman history could not possibly escape the general influence, since it

<sup>1</sup> It is one of my most pleasing recollections, that I discovered his tombstone, and induced the chapter of the Lateran to replace it in their church, of which he had been a canon. Italy was at that time far in advance of the rest of Europe: next followed the French, and a short time afterwards the Germans, to whom philology was resigned by the former.—N.

came into contact with other sciences. Sigonius had felt great pleasure in inquiring, whether a man, whose name is otherwise unknown, had been tribune twice or three times: and woe on us, if we treat these men with contempt, as if they had busied themselves with trifles! But men now began to turn their attention to what they could comprehend; they endeavoured to understand what they had before collected; reason began to assert its rights. Had Perizonius pursued the path he had struck into, had he not undertaken investigations of quite a different kind, had he been able to believe in the possibility of gaining positive results, matters would have been far better; but without faith no such results can be gained, as in life a man can accomplish nothing without decision. The consequence was, that these writers saw the history of Rome to be full of contradictions, and could demonstrate that statements of much greater authority overthrew the accounts given by Livy or Dionysius. Beaufort was a man of great talents, but no philologist: he belonged to that light class of sceptics, who feel no want of a positive conviction; thus he went so far as to reject the wheat with the chaff, and to assert that the first four centuries of Roman history deserved no credit. Abbé Pouilly had done the same before him in the *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions*; but Beaufort's undertaking had great influence upon the English and French writers, such as Hume and Ferguson, none of whom was able to enter into the matter so deeply as he had done. Scepticism, originating with Bayle and Freret, now prevailed generally, and men grew ashamed of believing Roman history, as it was transmitted to them. This was an easy method of getting over its difficulties. It is remarkable that the most untenable statements, when not attacked by Beaufort, were never doubted; as, for instance, the seven kings of Rome, the chronology, &c.: the year of the foundation of the city was believed to be as firmly established as any thing could be. They saw the mote, but not the beam, and were at last so much perplexed,

that they believed without knowing why, and rejected what was very well established. After such a state of things a sound criticism must follow, or else the subject is lost.

In fact, it is Livy himself who has brought the history of Rome into disrepute, not merely because he relates things contradictory and impossible, but because he states in the introduction to his sixth book, that a new era and a new life began in Roman history from the destruction of Rome by the Gauls ; that, during the long period previous to this, history was handed down only by tradition, and that all written documents were destroyed in the burning of the city. This statement is only half correct, or rather altogether false, and gives us quite an erroneous idea of the early history. In my next Lecture I shall speak of the sources of Roman history previous to its literature. The first historian we meet with lived in the second Punic war, and yet what a minute account we have in Livy of the preceding times and of the wars with the Samnites ! but of this to-morrow.



## LECTURE II.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.—ANNALS.—TRADITION.—  
LAYS.

THAT there was writing in Italy, even in the earliest period of Roman history, cannot be doubted, for we have coins bearing the name of Sybaris, which was destroyed four years before the establishment of the commonwealth. Hence it cannot be questioned, that writing was common among the Greeks of Italy: why not, then, among the Italians themselves? Another question is, whether writing could be common among the Romans, and the answer to this must depend on another: namely, whether they were acquainted with the Egyptian papyrus; for before its introduction the art of writing cannot have been in very general use. The census at Rome, which could not be taken without a great deal of writing, is a proof that the art was extensively applied. Thus we have no reason to deny, that history was written at Rome previous to the banishment of the kings; and it would be arbitrary scepticism to doubt, that the early Roman laws were written long before the time of the Decemvirs, perhaps under the reign of the second Tarquin, though some refer them to a still earlier period. The art of writing was therefore applied, in all probability, not merely to the purposes of common life, but also to books; and when Livy, speaking of the times previous to the burning of the city, says *per illa tempora literæ raræ sunt*<sup>1</sup>, this is one of those notions, in which he was misled by opinions prevalent in his own age. Authors, in the modern sense

<sup>1</sup> VI. 1.



of the word, that is, such as write for the public,—for making collections of laws is a different thing,—certainly did not exist at all in the earliest times; but when Livy adds, *una custodia fidelis memoriæ rerum gestarum*, he goes too far. We must not take a one-sided view of the origin of an historical literature: we have a parallel to that of Rome in the history of our ancestors; and not here alone, for in Greece Chronographies and Toichographies—annals kept by the priests—are mentioned by Polybius<sup>2</sup>, and this practice continued down to his time. Analogous to these are our *Annales Fuldenses* and others, which sprang up at the end of the seventh century, and afterwards disappeared gradually, for the same reasons which made them cease among the ancients. Such annals were composed of single lines: they would begin, for instance, with the thirteenth year of the reign of king Dagobert, and by the side of this date the events of the year were recorded in the briefest manner possible. They were kept for the most part in churches. We find such annals at different times and among the most different nations; and, indeed, there is nothing more natural, than that a person should make such brief records to assist his own memory. Hence the custom of our ancestors to record in their Bibles every thing of importance which happened in their families; and the same interest which we feel in our families, the ancients felt in the state. Some small towns in Germany still continue to keep such annals: in short, the custom is a very ancient one, and annals existed everywhere in great numbers, where they had not been accidentally destroyed. As the year received its name from the annual magistrates, it was necessary to preserve their names for all kinds of documents. The same custom prevailed among the Romans from the earliest times down to the latest emperors: no document was valid without the names of the

<sup>2</sup> v. 33: οἱ τὰ κατὰ καιροὺς ἐν ταῖς χρονογραφίαις ὑπομνηματίζοντες πολιτικῶς εἰς τοὺς τοίχους.



consuls as the mark of its date. In these annals the banishment of the kings formed an era<sup>3</sup>. The *Annales Pontificum* belonged to this kind of annals: they were authentic and comprehensive documents, the object of which was to record whatever was deemed worthy of remembrance. Cicero says<sup>4</sup>, that they had been preserved from the commencement of the Roman state down to the time of P. Mucius<sup>5</sup>; but this is a rash assertion, which we will not impute to him as an intentional misstatement. We must not, however, allow ourselves to be misled; for though the pontifical annals had doubtless been kept from very early times, it can be demonstrated that those of the most ancient periods were lost. The pontifex maximus had to record every year the principal events, as the names of the magistrates, the wars, and the like, and he inscribed them on a whited tablet, which was exhibited for the inspection of the public in his house<sup>6</sup>, where many may have taken copies for their private use. One thing we must observe here: it is certain, that the pontifical annals, such as they existed in later times, were not the ancient and original ones, but were restored and made up, as well as might be, and that it was only the constant use and regular continuation of them that established the belief that they were transmitted in their original form from time immemorial. These annals were kept as long as there were pontiffs, for the pontiffs were the repositories of the laws and fixed the chronology, and thus were the natural keepers of historical records. But if such annals had existed, comprising the earliest history of the commonwealth from the banishment of the kings, it is inconceivable how they could have recorded the most absurd and contradictory things. Besides, would not Fabius have made use of them? would not Livy have consulted them, where

<sup>3</sup> See vol. i. p. 263.

<sup>4</sup> De Orat. II. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Mucius was consul, B. C. 133.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero, as above. Servius on Virg. *Æn.* i. 373.

he says<sup>7</sup>, that the battle of Regillus was placed by some in the year 255, and by others in the year 258<sup>8</sup>?

Thus, if on the one hand we cannot doubt that the earliest history of Rome was founded on an authentic basis, on the other hand we cannot believe that the pontifical annals were preserved from the earliest times. My own opinion is, that Livy made the abovementioned mistake in the introduction to the sixth book, because he found no annals of an earlier date than the destruction of Rome by the Gauls, and thence drew the sweeping conclusion, that none such existed. We have, however, the most unexceptionable evidence that there were many other and very ancient annals preserved<sup>9</sup>; but that the pontifical annals did not go beyond the burning of Rome by the Gauls<sup>10</sup>, may be seen from the passage of Cicero, in which he speaks<sup>11</sup> of the eclipse of the sun, which happened fourteen or fifteen years before the destruction of the city, and on which Mr. Edward Heis of Cologne has written, at my suggestion, a beautiful and elaborate treatise<sup>12</sup>. This eclipse, which was visible in Gades at sunset, had been mentioned in the pontifical annals as quite a remarkable phenomenon. Now Cicero says, that the preceding eclipses were calculated backwards up to the one, during which Romulus was carried up to heaven. This calculating backward shows, that an attempt was made to supply the loss of actual observations. Such eclipses influenced the regulation of festivals, and were essential parts of the contents of the pontifical books<sup>13</sup>; they would therefore have been recorded, and not have been calculated

<sup>7</sup> II. 21.

<sup>8</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 556; vol. II. p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Vol. II. p. 2, foll.

<sup>10</sup> The house of the pontifex maximus was situated in the lower part of the city, and was probably destroyed. The original of the Twelve Tables likewise perished, and was afterwards restored.—N.

<sup>11</sup> De republ. I. 16.

<sup>12</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 251, note 675.

<sup>13</sup> Compare Cato in Gellius, II. 28.

backwards, if the *annales maximi* had been preserved. This is unsophisticated evidence of what I have said. Servius says<sup>14</sup> that the annals had been divided into eighty books. That this scholion does not exist in the *Codex Fuldensis* is no argument against its genuineness, for I do not see why any one should have fabricated such a statement. In the time of Cicero specimens of these pontifical annals were in the hands of the public: they formed a part of the Roman literature. In the introduction to his work *De Legibus*, he says<sup>15</sup>: *post annales—quibus nihil potest esse JUCUNDIUS*. How they could be called *jucundi* is hardly comprehensible. All the manuscripts of the work are but copies of one and the same, which was discovered in the fifteenth century, and the reading of all is *jucundius*. Ursinus wished to change it into *jejunius*<sup>16</sup>, others into *incomptius*. But an author like Cicero may sometimes use a bold expression which puzzles us, and he may have meant to say, that these annals were delightful to him merely because they were historical records of great antiquity. Whether, however, this was actually his meaning in this passage, is a very doubtful point; but we can make no alteration. From the passages in which Livy mentions the appointment of the magistrates<sup>17</sup> in very short sentences, we may form some idea of the character of these pontifical annals. I believe that the copy which he used began with the year 460, otherwise I do not see why he did not always observe the same practice. These annals first recorded the names of the magistrates, and then the memorable events of the year, and the persons most distinguished in them: I am convinced that according to their original plan they never entered into the details of

<sup>14</sup> On *Æn.* i. 373.

<sup>15</sup> i. 2.

<sup>16</sup> In vol. i. p. 250, Niebuhr seems to have adopted the correction of Ursinus.

<sup>17</sup> For instance, at the conclusion of the tenth book, and in the third and fourth decads at the end of every year.—N.

battles or of other subjects. That which constitutes the real character of history they never possessed in any higher degree than the annals of the middle ages.

It yet remains to be mentioned that Diomedes<sup>18</sup> says, that the *res gestæ populi Romani* are recorded by the scribes (he uses the present tense). Although every thing, which such writers say, must not be subjected to a rigid criticism, still the expression is important: he cannot have wished to deceive, and must have known the truth. Now, when Cicero says that annals were kept down to the time of P. Mucius, I believe that two kinds of annals must be distinguished. The old ones may have ceased then, and yet have been continued in some sense. It is possible that at the time of P. Mucius they were neglected as superfluous, for a literature had then sprung up among the Romans<sup>19</sup>, and, besides this, another mode of recording the events of the day was probably adopted already in the *Acta Diurna*<sup>20</sup>. In these *Acta Diurna* the affairs of the people were recorded every day: they formed a kind of daily newspaper. The acts of the senate (*acta senatus*) were also open to the public and no longer kept secret. Nevertheless the annals may in a certain sense still have been continued. I have been led to suppose this by a fragment of a Roman chronicle of the tenth century in the collection of Pertz. The author of it was Benedict, a monk of the monastery of Soracte. In this fragment many *ostenta* are recorded, and, what is curious enough, in the genuine old language, as for example, *murus de cælo tactus est*. It is this fact, which induces me to consider the circumstance of Diomedes having used the present tense in the abovementioned passage, as one of

<sup>18</sup> III. 480.

<sup>19</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 250.

<sup>20</sup> The *Acta Diurna* are often called simply *Diurna*, from which the modern word journal has been formed. Our system of book-keeping, called the Italian, was known among the Romans.—N. See vol. II. p. 602, note 1319.

great importance. In the work "*De Origine Gentis Romanæ*," first published by Andrew Schottus<sup>21</sup> as a work of Aurelius Victor, the pontifical annals are ridiculously adduced for the settlement of Æneas in Italy<sup>22</sup>. This work is an impudent fabrication<sup>23</sup> by a literary impostor of the fifteenth or sixteenth century. He refers his readers to a number of books which did not exist, and, probably from sheer ignorance, attributes to Cato statements in direct contradiction to those which he actually made, and which we know from Servius.

These pontifical annals, in addition to which many others must have existed and been preserved,—constitute the first source of Roman history, though we are unable to fix the time when they commenced. But they are, after all, only a dry and meagre skeleton of history. Along with them there existed a living historical tradition, comprehending all the details of the history of the past. Such a tradition may have consisted either of narratives transmitted from father to son, and was thus left wholly to memory,—that unsafe repository for historical facts,—or of written compositions. The latter were poetical tales or lays. Here we are entering upon a field, where scholars will never be able to agree so long as they take a one-sided view of the matter. Some believe that the subject of these lays arose out of poetical traditions, as is the case in the legends of Iceland and the northern sagas; others deny that they are the origin of history, and adhere to the written history as it is transmitted to us. I remain unshaken in my conviction, that a great portion of Roman history arose out of songs,—that is to say, a body of living popular poetry,—which extended over the period from Romulus to the battle of Regillus, the heroic age of Rome.

<sup>21</sup> Antwerp, 1579.

<sup>22</sup> In cap. 9. In the same book (c. 7.) we find the pontifical annals also adduced for the arrival of Hercules in Italy.

<sup>23</sup> Compare vol. 11. p. 9, note 11.

It is evident to me, that several portions of what is called the history of this period formed complete and true epic poems. If passages like that of Cicero's, in which he states from Cato<sup>24</sup>, "that among the ancient Romans it was the custom at banquets for the praises of great men to be sung to the flute," have no authority, I really do not know what have any. The three inscriptions on the monuments of the Scipios, written in the Saturnian verse, may be regarded as specimens of ancient songs. The story of Coriolanus, the embassy of his mother, his return and death among the Volscians, which cannot be reconciled with chronology, were the subject of an epic poem. The story of Curtius was another, which has been placed in a time, to which it cannot possibly belong. If persons *will* dispute the existence of such lays as that of the Horatii, I can point out verses in Livy; and although I cannot prove the existence of any verses in support of the lay of the Tarquins, I need only refer to the fact, that such stories are always related in a rhythmical form, and not in prose. Surely those who invented such brilliant stories were not wanting in the *os rotundum* to give them a poetical form. Now, have these songs ever been stripped of their metrical form and resolved into prose? Into this point I will not enter: my conviction, which alone I have to express here, is, that at one time these lays had a poetical form. All that is really beautiful in Roman story arose out of poetry.

<sup>24</sup> Tusc. Quæst. iv. 2; vol. i. p. 254, foll.





## LECTURE III.

DESTRUCTION OF HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS AND THEIR  
RESTORATION. — POPULAR LAYS CONTINUED. — CHRO-  
NICLES.—EARLIEST METHOD OF WRITING HISTORY.

WE often find that all the historical documents of a nation are lost either in consequence of a general calamity or through the tyranny of individuals, and that attempts are afterwards made to restore them. Such was the case in China, when the ancient books were destroyed at the command of an emperor, and afterwards restored from the recollections of aged men<sup>1</sup>: and such was also the case in Rome, when the Sibylline books were restored, as far as was possible, after the Capitol had been burnt in the time of Sulla. There are many instances of the same kind, especially with regard to religious books; and one tradition, which however deserves no credit, relates the same thing of several books of the Holy Scriptures. We may account in a similar manner for the fabulous antiquity of the Egyptians. That the eighteenth dynasty of Manetho is historical, has been firmly established since the gigantic discovery of our age, which has taught us to read the Egyptian hieroglyphics. Previous to this dynasty Egypt was ruled by the so-called Hycsos, under

<sup>1</sup> Schlosser, *Geschichte der alten Welt*, i. i. p. 78, says: Klaproth indeed states that these books were restored from the recollections of aged persons, but he has not stated whether he has any Chinese authority for it. Compare vol. i. p. 251.



whom the ancient documents are said to have been lost. Notwithstanding this the Egyptian annals have seventeen dynasties before the historical one, and make the most extravagant claims to antiquity. The same want of criticism, which Roman history has experienced, meets us in the history of Egypt, and those who do not believe in Champollion's discovery have denied the historical character of the eighteenth dynasty, and rejected the whole history down to the time of Psammetichus as fabulous, merely because they did not see where else to stop. Sound criticism would say: the expulsion of the Hycsos is the boundary, and all that lies beyond is an historical forgery, made by one who attempted to restore the ancient history either at random, or from slender remains, or who found pleasure in the exercise of his invention. Wherever in history we find numbers capable of being resolved into arithmetical proportions, we may say with the greatest certainty, that they are artificial arrangements to which the history has been adapted, as the philosopher exclaimed, when he saw mathematical diagrams in the sand, "I see traces of man." The course of human affairs is not directed by numerical proportions, and wherever they are found, we may, according to a law, which Leibnitz would have laid down as an axiom, declare unhesitatingly, that there is an arrangement according to a certain plan. Such artificial arrangements we find in the Indian and Babylonian eras: large spaces are divided according to certain numerical proportions. Such also is the case with the history of Rome from its foundation down to the burning of the city by the Gauls. For this period 360 years were assumed, which number was taken for granted by Fabius and Polybius, who copied it from a table (*πίναξ*)<sup>2</sup>. Of these 360 years 240 were allotted to the kings, and 120 to the commonwealth. In all Roman institutions the numbers 3, 10, 30 and 12 play an important part; all

<sup>2</sup> Dionysius, i. 74. Compare vol. i. p. 242, note 656.

numerical combinations connected with Rome arise out of multiples of three, which is most frequently multiplied by ten, as 30, 300, 3000. Such also is the number of the 360 houses at Athens in its ancient constitution. Of the 240 years assigned to the kings 120 is the half, and hence the middle of the reign of Ancus Martius the fourth king falls in 120. He is the creator of the plebeian order, and consequently 120 is the date of the origin of the plebeians. Thus we have three periods, each containing ten times twelve years: 120 years previous to the existence of the plebeian order, 120 with plebeians, and 120 without kings. How could it ever have happened that of seven kings the fourth should just fall in the middle of the period assigned them, and that this period should be divided into two halves by the middle of the reign of the fourth king<sup>3</sup>? Here is evidence for those who will judge with reason and without prejudice; even if there were not other circumstances in the history which involve impossibilities, such as the statement that Tarquinius Superbus was a grandson of Tarquinius Priscus<sup>4</sup>. For this whole period then down to the Gallic conquest, we have a made-up history at least with regard to chronology. The restoration may indeed have been founded upon the scanty information gained from the pontiffs, and on the date of the eclipse of the sun mentioned by Cicero. No prodigies are mentioned by Livy before the burning of the city by the Gauls: it is true they are not frequent during the first century after that event, but this only proves that he did not pay any especial attention to them till he had finished the tenth book, after which, and not till then, he had annals as his sources. Dionysius likewise has no prodigies previous to the Gallic conquest.

Yesterday I directed your attention to the fact, that the question concerning the sources of early Roman history has been considered from a false point of view. It is quite

<sup>3</sup> Compare vol. i. p. 252, foll.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. i. p. 372, foll.

a matter of indifference, whether the ancient history existed in the form of poems or in prose, and whether it was written or not. I will only remind you of what we have seen in our own literature. Those who have investigated its real history, know the various changes which our epic poems have undergone. Since we have become acquainted with the fragment first published by Eccard and afterwards by the brothers Grimm<sup>5</sup>, who shewed that it was part of an alliterative poem in a language which is not Franconian but a modification of the Gothic, we see the threads of the whole cycle. Its contents are much more ancient than the time of Charlemagne; in the tenth century a Latin paraphrase of it was made, which is very good considering the time. The original of the Nibelungen must be referred, as Schlegel has shewn very satisfactorily, to the frontiers of Suabia; a bad paraphrase of it was made in the *Heldenbuch*; and at a still later period we find the prose work *Siegfried* constructed out of the same materials. The lay of the Horatii in Livy stands precisely on the same footing as if we had nothing of the Nibelungen but the two lines preserved in Aventinus<sup>6</sup>. The six verses of the lay of the Horatii preserved in Livy are quite sufficient<sup>7</sup>; for the form of the lays, as I have said, is totally indifferent in investigating the origin of the history of Rome. Such lays exist along side of the records of chronicles. The lays in Saxo Grammaticus stand by the side of the Runic records, and he has combined them in such a manner that history is

<sup>5</sup> Niebuhr here refers to the fragment of the lay of Hildebrand, which was first published by Eccard in his *Franc. Orient.* i. p. 864, foll. It was for a long time believed to be a fragment of a prose work in the old idiom of Lower Germany, until its alliterative character was pointed out by the brothers Grimm in their edition of "Die beiden ältesten deutschen Gedichte aus dem achten Jahrhundert." Cassel, 1812.

<sup>6</sup> His real name was John Thurnmeyer; he wrote a chronicle in Latin (1566, in fol.) and afterwards translated it into German.

<sup>7</sup> See vol. i. p. 258.

intermixed with poetical traditions, which cannot be reconciled with one another. I believe that Rhianus did not go to work arbitrarily in his description of the Messenian war, but composed his beautiful epic poem out of old Messenian popular lays. His work, like that of the *Nibelungen*, embraced a long period of time. What this poem related of the war with Sparta and of Aristomenes is absolutely irreconcilable with what Pausanias found in authentic records and in the contemporary songs of Tyræus. Tradition goes on forming and developing itself in such a peculiar and thriving manner, that it becomes more and more estranged from history. Long before the existence of a literature there are men, who, endowed with all the requisites of an historian, write history in the form of chronicles and not unfrequently in the most brilliant manner. We have an instance of this in the history of Cologne. The chronicle of that city is one of the most splendid documents of our literature<sup>8</sup>; and it is to be lamented that we have not got any good edition of it, as there are so many materials still in the archives. Some of the most beautiful portions of it may have been written as late as the fifteenth century. Now we find in this chronicle, among other things of the same kind, the poem of Godefrit Hagen on the feuds of the bishops; it is written by a contemporary and is exceedingly pleasing<sup>9</sup>. The writer of the chronicle, perhaps feeling the beauties of the poem, has made a paraphrase of it in prose and incorporated it in the chronicle: in some passages the rhyme is still preserved and in others but slightly changed. The portion of the

<sup>8</sup> Of this chronicle Niebuhr speaks in several of his letters, but especially in one to Savigny. (*Lebensnachrichten*, vol. II. p. 370 and 373, where Niebuhr calls the author of the poem mentioned below in our text, Gotthard Hagen, instead of Godefrit Hagen.)

<sup>9</sup> A separate edition of it has been published by E. von Groote, Cologne, 1834, under the title, "*Des Meisters Godefrit Hagen, der Zeit Stadtschreibers, Reimchronik der Stadt Cöln aus dem dreizehnten Jahrhundert,*" with notes and a vocabulary.

work, in which we have the poem reduced to perfect prose, forms a strange contrast to the chronicler's simple and meagre records of subsequent periods. Here then we have an instance, how in times previous to the existence of a literature,—for the author who had made several other chronicles did not write for the public,—every thing is constantly changing its character. The earliest history of Russia by Nestor, a monk of the eleventh century, whose work has been continued by monks of the same convent and always in the strain and character of its author, is an instance of a similar kind. As for many of these chroniclers no one knows who they are, nor will any body ever know, and yet if they had lived in a literary age they would have been honourably distinguished.

Such chronicles were undoubtedly written at Rome before the period of its literature, which sprang up when the Romans began to write for the Greeks, in order to rescue their own history from the contempt with which it was looked upon by the latter. All the nations of antiquity exerted themselves to gain the respect of the Greeks, and it was not Alexander alone who said, “How much have I undertaken, Athenians, to gain your praise<sup>10</sup>!” Hence the first Roman authors wrote in Greek and not in Latin; for their countrymen had their chronicles, which every one read for himself and which were written by persons that had no notion of literary fame.

Cicero says, that history had been falsified through the writings in praise of great men, which were preserved in their families<sup>11</sup>, and Livy speaks to the same effect<sup>12</sup>: these praises however were not always mere fabrications, but some were authentic documents of a very early date. The expulsion of the kings falls twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and from that time in-

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch, Alex. c. 60.

<sup>11</sup> Brutus, 16. Compare Cic. de Leg. ii. 24.

<sup>12</sup> viii. 40. Compare Plutarch, Numa, c. i.



numerable historical documents may have been preserved at Rome. When we read in Livy the account of the seven consulships of the Fabii<sup>13</sup>, we have no other choice but believing that we have before us, either an extremely well-contrived fiction, or an historical narrative founded upon ancient documents belonging to the house of the Fabii. In the last books of Livy's first decad we have such accurate accounts of the campaigns against the Samnites, that I have no doubt but that either Q. Fabius Maximus himself wrote for his house the history of the wars, in which he was engaged, because his house was of great historical importance, or that the Fabii possessed numerous documents relating to the early history<sup>14</sup>. This supposition becomes still more probable, if we consider the great intellectual cultivation which we find among the Fabii. One of them, C. Fabius Pictor, was an excellent painter and displayed his art in a temple<sup>15</sup>, and Q. Fabius Pictor, the historian, wrote very beautiful Greek. The Fabii seem to me to have been a learned family, and I believe they had their chronicles long before one of their number wrote a history in Greek.

Now, how did the Romans proceed when they first began to write the early periods of their history? The part previous to the establishment of the commonwealth was composed in accordance with the tables kept by the pontiffs, and these, as we have seen, were made up according to mere numerical combinations. These tables were taken, without any criticism, for authentic documents, and if any one, for instance in the fifth century, wanted to write a history of Rome for his house, he first had recourse to the annals. But at the same time he found the old songs of Romulus, the Tarquins, Coriolanus, Camillus and a number of others. The events they related he inserted where he thought they would fit, little concerned whether they would stand the test of an accurate examination or

<sup>13</sup> Vol. II. p. 175, foll.

<sup>14</sup> Vol. II. p. 8.

<sup>15</sup> Vol. III. p. 356.

not, exactly as we find in the chronicle of Cologne. Such is the origin of the Roman chronicles before the time of their literature. The scepticism therefore is contemptible, which says that the Romans had no history before the time of Fabius.

There were two other kinds of authentic documents, of which an historian might avail himself:—1. The Brazen Tables, of which the greater number was undoubtedly carried away by the Gauls, as the Vandals did at a later period when they conquered the city; but many of these were in the capitol and inaccessible to the Gauls. 2. The old Law Books. It is common to all nations to record old customs and traditional rights historically in the form of single cases out of which they arose: in more ancient times, where authentic documents are wanting, the rules or laws resulting from individual cases are supplied from recollection. Such is the custom throughout the East: the Mohammedan laws consist of such single cases, and the whole of the Koran, so far as the civil law is concerned, is of this description. We find the same character even in the Pentateuch; for where a rule is to be laid down as to the conditions on which daughters can inherit the property of their father, Moses merely adduces a precedent in the case of the daughters of Zelophehad<sup>16</sup>. It was the same with the Roman laws; a number of single cases was recorded in the old law-books<sup>17</sup>, such as the *judicium perduellionis*, which arose out of the story of Horatius who slew his sister.

The history of the Roman constitution back to the time of the kings was quite complete. It cannot have existed any where else but in the pontifical books, from which Junius Gracchanus derived his information, who handed it down to Gaius, and from whom again Lydus made his extracts<sup>18</sup>. These accounts, when carefully examined, agree


<sup>16</sup> Numbers, c. xxxvi. See vol. i. p. 346.

<sup>17</sup> Vol. II. p. 281, foll.

<sup>18</sup> Vol. II. p. 10, foll.



so perfectly with all historical facts, are so free from any thing which might appear doubtful, and are so consistent with one another, that the results of my investigations must lead to the conviction, that we are able to trace the history of Rome and its constitution back to the beginning of the commonwealth as accurately as one can wish, and even more perfectly than the history of many nations in the middle ages. The history of Rome gives a moral confirmation to what has been said by great men respecting the study of nature, that a superficial knowledge makes man atheistical, but that a profound one strengthens his belief in the existence of a God.



## LECTURE IV.

EARLIEST LITERATURE OF THE ROMANS.—APPIUS CLAUDIUS, THE BLIND.—NÆVIUS.—Q. FABIVS PICTOR.

LET no one imagine that the Romans were barbarians, before they adopted the civilization of the Greeks: their works of art and their buildings prove the contrary. That people, which under its kings constructed such gigantic sewers, which had a painter like Fabius Pictor and a sculptor able to produce a work like the Capitoline she-wolf<sup>1</sup>, cannot be conceived to have been without some kind of literature, though, of course, different from that of the Greeks: form is something accidental, and Roman literature may have had its own peculiar beauties. There existed in the days of Cicero a poem of Appius Claudius the Blind<sup>2</sup>, consisting of moral sentiments, of which I have discovered some fragments, and which is of far more ancient date than the beginning of what we now call Roman literature: Cicero despised the ancient literature of his country, and knew it only from hear-say. There also existed a speech against Pyrrhus delivered by the same Appius<sup>3</sup>; and we may be sure that, at a time when such speeches were written, historical composition was not neglected.

But the first work, which may be regarded as a history, and indeed a contemporary one, though agreeably to the taste of the age in a metrical form, was the First Punic War by Nævius. If we had a history of this war like that

<sup>1</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 424.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, Tuscul. IV. 2. Compare vol. III. p. 312, foll.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, Brut. 16. Compare vol. III. p. 313.

of the Hannibalian war by Livy, we should undoubtedly look upon it as the greatest in ancient times. Its vastness and importance are by no means generally known: I hope one day to be able to put it in its true light. Nævius had served in it and described it, as Bernal Diaz did that of Cortez. Nævius wrote in the Saturnian verse, which is characteristic of the age; and he who judges from internal evidence must see, that he only did what all before him had done, and that the history of former days still continued to be familiar to the Romans through the medium of poetry. Godefrid Hagen likewise wrote in poetry on contemporary events, merely because no one was yet accustomed to German prose: prose-works were written in Latin. The history of the conquest of Livonia by the German knights was described a short time afterwards in a poem, which is not yet published<sup>4</sup>. Down to the thirteenth century all traditional history in Germany was transmitted in the form of poetry, and the same was the case with the early period of Roman history. Nævius assuredly wrote his work in the same form, in which he found so many historical events of the past described.

Concerning Nævius and his poems I shall here say but little. The year in which he brought his first play upon the stage, is uncertain: two passages of Gellius<sup>5</sup> contradict each other; but we may suppose it to have been in the year 523, ten years after the conclusion of the first Punic war. Whether the piece which was then performed, or the great poem on the first Punic war, was the first he had written, is also uncertain. Nævius was a Campanian, and it must be supposed there existed at

<sup>4</sup> Niebuhr here alludes to the chronicle of Livonia, written at the end of the thirteenth century by Ditleb von Alnpeke, at Reval. The MS. of it exists at Heidelberg. Cod. 367, fol. 192, foll.

<sup>5</sup> XVII. 21. To what other passage of Gellius Niebuhr here alludes, I have not been able to discover. All the MSS. of the Lectures which I have collated, agree in the statement made in the text, otherwise I should be inclined to think it a mistake.

Capua a much more lively interest for literature than at Rome, where it was gradually developed out of popular poetry. Nævius wrote many plays. His poem on the Punic war was divided, Suetonius says<sup>6</sup>, into seven books and written *continente scriptura*. The verses, though perhaps not distinguished originally,—an experienced reader must have been able to make them out for himself,—may have been indicated afterwards; in inscriptions, as well as in all the fragments we possess of this work, the verses are always marked. Servius, who had read Ennius, seems to have never seen the work of Nævius, and I believe that he merely knew it from old commentators. Hence he says, that Virgil had borrowed the plan of the first books of the *Æneid* from Nævius<sup>7</sup>: he moreover knows, that the landing of *Æneas* in Latium and the foundation of Rome were treated of in it; and we may justly conclude that Nævius represented the hostility between the Romans and Carthaginians, like Virgil, as having arisen from the reception which *Æneas* met with in Carthage and from his unfaithfulness to Dido<sup>8</sup>. As Nævius did not place *Æneas* at so early a period as was done in the times of Virgil, the anachronism with which the latter has been charged, is groundless—blind enthusiasm will never be just towards Virgil, but only sound criticism,—accordingly, he would very properly with old Nævius make the arrival of *Æneas* coincide with the foundation of Carthage. There is yet an immense deal to be done by a commentator on the *Æneid*. Virgil, without contradicting the common opinion, very frequently draws forth from the old poets that which is historically correct, but unknown to others<sup>9</sup>; hence it is only learned scholars and good historians that are able to be his commentators. On the other hand, he does not scruple, as a poet, to let things stand, which are historically irreconcilable; thus

<sup>6</sup> De Illustr. Gram. 2.    <sup>7</sup> Servius ad Aen. i. 98 II. 797, III. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Vol. i. p. 191. foll.

<sup>9</sup> Vol. i. note 980.

Romulus is with him the actual grandson of Æneas; he does not make him descend from the Alban kings, but conceives him to be the son of Ilia, as the older Roman poets did<sup>10</sup>. I am also convinced that the shield of Æneas in Virgil had its model in Nævius, in whose poem Æneas or some other hero had a shield representing the wars of the giants<sup>11</sup>. I suspect that Nævius gave a full account of the *semina odii et belli*, and that he went through the whole history of Rome: that he spoke of Romulus we know<sup>12</sup>.

That Nævius drew misery upon himself through some verses, by which he had offended the proud Metelli, is well known<sup>13</sup>: but no one, I believe, has asked himself, how it was possible to throw a Roman citizen into a dungeon for having written some libellous verses. In addition to this it is said that he wrote two plays while in prison<sup>14</sup>. But if one has been at Rome and seen those awful dungeons in the prison, which were considered by the ancients themselves as the entries of death for those who were to be executed, and into which no ray of light could penetrate, such an account must be incomprehensible. Yet I believe that the difficulty can be removed. We know that Nævius was a Campanian: we know that the greater number of the Campanians lost the Roman franchise, or at least all the advantages of it, on account of their insurrection in the second Punic war. We may therefore suppose, that Nævius being without friends and helpless<sup>15</sup> was given up for his offence to Metellus, as

<sup>10</sup> Servius, on Æn. I. 273.

<sup>11</sup> Vol. I. p. 192.

<sup>12</sup> Servius, on Æn. I. 273.

<sup>13</sup> Gellius, III. 3; Pseudo-Asconius on Cic. in Verr. I. 10 p. 140 ed. Orelli mentions the verse which gave offence to the Metelli: *Fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules*, and adds, *cui tunc Metellus consul iratus versu responderat senario hypercatalecto, qui et Saturnius dicitur*:

*Dabunt malum Metelli Nævio pœtæ.*

<sup>14</sup> Gellius, III. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Compare vol. II. note 105.

a *noxae deditus*, not to be kept in the state prison but in the house of Metellus himself, since there were prisons attached to all the houses of the nobles. Insolvent debtors fell into the same condition of *noxae dediti*, and were kept *nervo et compedibus*<sup>16</sup>. The account of his death at Utica in the year 550, as stated by Hieronymus in the Chronicle of Eusebius<sup>17</sup>, is false, for Utica was then in the hands of the Carthaginians, and remained faithful to them to the last. If he was expelled by the nobles, he certainly did not go to Africa, and we must reject this account the more, since Cicero says that Varro assigned a later date for his death<sup>18</sup>. The year of his death must therefore be considered uncertain. There are incredible contradictions in ancient authors respecting the literary men of the sixth century.

After the second Punic war there were several Romans who wrote the history of their country in the Greek language; and among them we have to mention especially Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius Alimentus. Both were of noble families. Q. Fabius had been prætor. The object of his work was to counteract the contempt, with which the Greeks regarded the Romans. He wrote the history of Rome from its beginning: whether he spoke of Æneas we cannot ascertain, but we have ample evidence of the manner in which he treated of the *primordia urbis*, of Romulus and Remus<sup>19</sup>. Of the earliest times he gave only a brief outline, but as he advanced nearer the age in which he lived, his account became more minute<sup>20</sup>. His real subject, however, was the second Punic war, with which he was contemporary; but he had likewise given a complete account of the first war with the

<sup>16</sup> Vol. i. p. 576. Gellius, xx. 1.

<sup>17</sup> P. 37. Compare Cicero, Brut. 15: His consulibus (Cethego et Tuditano), *ut in veteribus commentariis scriptum est*, Naevius mortuus est.

<sup>18</sup> Brut. 15.

<sup>19</sup> Dionys. i. 79.

<sup>20</sup> Dionys. i. 6.



Carthaginians. We learn from Polybius<sup>21</sup> that he shewed great partiality to his countrymen and endeavoured to justify them in every thing, and when a man like Polybius passes such a censure, we may readily believe him. An indulgent treatment of one's country is just enough, but it was more than indulgence when he attempted to justify his Romans on every occasion<sup>22</sup>.

It is nowhere mentioned into how many books his work was divided, though it was held in an unusually high degree of estimation and is very often referred to by Polybius, Livy and Dionysius. We may be sure that we also possess a great many things borrowed from him, where we do not read his name. Appian, who gave a very different account of the second Punic war from Livy, mentions that Q. Fabius was sent as ambassador to Delphi<sup>23</sup>. Appian knew little of Latin, and was not much of an investigator, and as far as Dionysius of Halicarnassus went, he merely abridged him, so that we may look upon him as representing Dionysius<sup>24</sup>. But for the end of the war against Pyrrhus and the beginning of the first Punic war, when he was no longer guided by Dionysius, he found and used the Greek work of Fabius down to the time when Polybius began. Now as his account of this period perfectly agrees with Dion Cassius, I have no doubt that Dion Cassius also based his narrative here upon that of Fabius. I don't mean to say that he used no other writers, but his acute eye must have recognised Fabius as his best authority<sup>25</sup>. All those invaluable accounts of the early Roman constitution, which we find in Dion Cassius, may be referred to Fabius. The expressions of Dion in describing the civil history of Rome are so careful and accurate, that

<sup>21</sup> I. 14. III. 8. 9.

<sup>22</sup> Vol. II. p. 8.

<sup>23</sup> VII. 27, His words are ἡ δὲ βουλὴ Κοῦντον μὲν Φάβιον, τὸν συγγραφέα τῶνδε τῶν ἔργων, εἰς Δελφοὺς ἔπεμπε. Compare Plutarch, Fab. Max. 18. Livy, XXII. 57.

<sup>24</sup> Vol. III. notes 353 & 844.

<sup>25</sup> Vol. II. p. 12.



we cannot hesitate for a moment in assigning them to Fabius. Thus the *populus* is called by him δῆμος, and the *plebs* πλῆθος or ὄμιλος<sup>26</sup>. Whoever reads the history of Dion Cassius and possesses an accurate knowledge of constitutional terms, will find that every thing is correct, whereas Dionysius makes dreadful mistakes<sup>27</sup>. Fabius then is the father of Roman history, and though his work is lost, we must acknowledge that we are greatly indebted to him for the information we derive from him respecting the constitution and its changes<sup>28</sup>. There have been some censorious critics who have considered it ridiculous, that we in the nineteenth century pretended to know the Roman constitution better than Dionysius in the reign of Augustus; but we only need refer them to Dion Cassius, for we do not pretend to know it better than he did.

There is a literary difficulty about this remarkable man, which in my opinion can never be solved. It arises from an expression of Cicero's in his work "De Divinatione"<sup>29</sup>. He there mentions a "Somnium Aeneae" from the Greek annals of a Numerius Fabius Pictor, of whom no mention is found any where else. The difficulty might indeed be solved very easily, since we know that at the time of Q. Fabius Pictor, whose name is firmly established by the testimonies of Dionysius, Appian and Polybius, several other Romans wrote in the Greek tongue; why then should not a Numerius Fabius have likewise written in Greek? Is it not possible that his writings may have had merely an ephemeral existence like those of so many authors of our own day? To this class of writers the senator Cn. Aufidius

<sup>26</sup> Vol. II. p. 169, note 367.

<sup>27</sup> Vol. II. p. 13.

<sup>28</sup> Vol. II. p. 12.

<sup>29</sup> I. 21, It is true we have only one good MS. of the work De Divinatione, and a number of bad ones of the 15th century, so that the cognomen Numerius might be a mistake, but I do not see how any one could have inserted such a cognomen. N.

must have belonged whose Greek work is only mentioned by Cicero<sup>30</sup>. But in his work "De Oratore"<sup>31</sup>, and in the introduction to the first book, "De Legibus," Cicero speaks of a Fabius Pictor as a writer of Latin Annals, and in the former of these passages he places him between Cato and Piso. None of the ancient authors, neither Livy, nor Polybius, nor any grammarian mentions Latin annals of Fabius Pictor. Gellius<sup>32</sup> indeed speaks of *Annales Fabii*, but without the addition *Pictoris*, and nothing is said as to whether this Fabius wrote in Latin or in Greek. I make this remark because the passage of Gellius has been erroneously adduced to prove that Gellius knew a Fabius Pictor who was the author of Latin annals. There is indeed another Fabius Pictor who wrote *de jure pontificio*<sup>33</sup>, but he has nothing to do with Roman history. Now are we to suppose that all other ancient authors overlooked Fabius, the Latin annalist, and that Cicero alone has preserved his name? My opinion is this. There was a Latin annalist of the name of Fabius Maximus Servilianus, whom Servius<sup>34</sup> and Dionysius<sup>35</sup> mention as an old annalist of great importance and who lived between Cato and Piso, which is exactly what Cicero says of Fabius Pictor. Cicero therefore, I believe, committed a mistake. Every man, says Möser, may err, and even the wisest sometimes in the most incredible manner. Cicero had perhaps merely cast a hasty glance at the annals—he had a dislike for these ancient annals—which bore the title *Q. Fabii Annales*, and when he found a Fabius who lived between Cato and Piso, he added *Pictor*, a name with which he was familiar, where he ought to

<sup>30</sup> Tuscul. Disput. v. 38: Cn. Aufidius praetorius et in senatu sententiam dicebat, et *Graecam scribebat historiam* et videbat in literis.

<sup>31</sup> II. 12.

<sup>32</sup> V. 4.

<sup>33</sup> Nonius, s. v. Picumnus.


<sup>34</sup> ad Aen. I. 3.

<sup>35</sup> I. 7. Compare Macrobian Saturn. I. 16.

have added *Maximus*<sup>36</sup>. We must also remember that Cicero did not possess a very extensive knowledge of the history of his country, in evidence of which I need only mention what everybody knows, that his statement about the self sacrifice of Decius the grandson is a mere fancy of his own<sup>37</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> When a man speaks under great mental excitement, he may easily make a blunder, but when he dictates, it may happen still more easily. It has often happened to me that in referring to a man I pronounced a wrong name and did so repeatedly ; until some one called my attention to it. Another instance of such a blunder in speaking occurred in a letter of Cicero to Atticus (vi. 2). He had called the citizens of Phlius Phliuntii, and Atticus reminded him that they were called Phliasii. Cicero replies, that the mistake had escaped him, and that he knew very well what he ought to have said. The principle of comparing the relations of ancient history with those of our own time, in order to form a more distinct notion of them, should also be followed in the explanation of ancient authors. N.

<sup>37</sup> See Vol. III. p. 505. Cicero, De Finib. II. 19 ; Tuscul. Quaest. I. 37.



## LECTURE V.

L. CINCIUS ALIMENTUS.—C. ACILIUS.—Q. ENNIUS.—M. PORCIUS CATO.—L. CASSIUS HEMINA.—Q. FABIUS MAXIMUS SERVILIANUS.—CN. GELLIUS.—L. CALPURNIUS PISO CENSORIUS.—C. JUNIUS GRACCHANUS.—Q. CLAUDIUS QUADRIGARIUS.—Q. VALERIUS ANTIAS.

L. CINCIIUS Alimentus<sup>1</sup>, who, as we learn from Dionysius of Halicarnassus<sup>2</sup>, wrote the history of Rome in Greek, was a contemporary of Q. Fabius Pictor. It is very instructive to examine such isolated accounts in order to form a correct estimate of the loss of these old writers. We know from two passages of Livy<sup>3</sup> that Cincius wrote on the second Punic war and the early relations of Rome, but it is only from Dionysius<sup>4</sup> that we learn that he wrote a complete history of his country from the earliest down to his own time. He was praetor in the second Punic war, and was taken prisoner by the Carthaginians<sup>5</sup>. Besides his history of Rome he is said to have written on chronology, on the consular power, and on Roman antiquities, which, as Dionysius informs us, he treated as an independent and critical investigator<sup>6</sup>. How much Dionysius may have borrowed from him, cannot be ascertained.

Not long after him C. Acilius wrote Roman annals

<sup>1</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 272 foll.

<sup>2</sup> I. 6.

<sup>3</sup> XXI. 38; VII. 3.

<sup>4</sup> I. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Livy XXI. 38; XXVI. 23. 28. XXVII. 7, &c.

<sup>6</sup> A. Krause, *Vitae et Fragmenta veterum Historicorum Romanorum*, p. 68 foll.

from the time of Romulus down to his own days. This work was likewise in Greek, and was afterwards translated into Latin by one Claudius who is otherwise unknown to us<sup>7</sup>. Acilius too seems to have been an important and respectable writer. Thus the literature of Rome was at that time essentially a Greek one.

It was probably about the beginning of the war with Perseus that Q. Ennius composed a poem under the strange name of *Annales*; but we cannot conceive that he should, like a chronicler, have described the events as they took place one year after another; he was a man of too much poetical genius to write such a foolish work which would have been nothing more than a heap of *versus memoriales*. The number of fragments which are preserved, enables us to form a tolerably clear idea of the work; and if the references which we have, were more carefully given, we might even have an accurate knowledge of the proportions of its parts. But corrupt as a great many numbers in the ancient grammarians are, yet it is clear that the earliest times, the reputed arrival of the Trojans in Latium and the time of the kings, were contained in the first three books. The war with Pyrrhus may with great probability be assigned to the fifth. I do not know whether the verse

Horrida Romuleum certamina pango duellum

which occurs in Merula's collection of the fragments, is genuine, but there can be no doubt that Ennius occupied himself very little with the internal struggles of the Romans. If we examine the later books containing the events subsequent to the first Punic war, which according to Cicero<sup>8</sup> he passed over, we find passages which prove that the war against Hannibal was described very minutely. The account of it began with the seventh book, and the whole

<sup>7</sup> Livy. xxv. 39; xxxv. 14; Cicero, de off. iii. 32; Dionys. iii. 77; Plutarch, Romul. 21.

<sup>8</sup> Brutus, 19.

work consisted of eighteen books<sup>9</sup>. The end of the seventh book brought the history down to his own time. In the eighteenth book Ennius himself intimated that in the year 578 he was still engaged upon writing his work. The whole poem was wanting in symmetry, for in the early times which were despatched very briefly, so that 250 years were contained in one book, a great many things must have been passed over, like the first Punic war. The account of the wars against the Samnites was extremely short. The beautiful history of the kings in Livy may have been taken chiefly from Ennius. He was born in 515 at Rudiae in Calabria<sup>10</sup>, and died in 585 at the age of seventy<sup>11</sup>.

The fragments of Ennius were collected very carefully about the end of the sixteenth century by Hieronymus Columna<sup>12</sup>. This collection contains, with the exception of a few trifles, all that can be gathered from the ancient authors. Soon after Columna, a Dutchman P. Merula published a new edition of the fragments of Ennius<sup>13</sup>, which contained all that Columna had overlooked. The collection and the commentary of Columna are very valuable, but he is exceedingly vain, and pretends to have read Greek authors and scholiasts whose works had certainly not been discovered at that time, so that

<sup>9</sup> We may take it for granted that Ennius himself made the division into eighteen books. The opinion that Q. Vargunteius made it, is founded on a wrong interpretation of a passage in Suetonius (*De illustr. Gram.* 2). I believe that Suetonius merely meant to say that Vargunteius made critical and explanatory commentaries on Ennius, such as Lampadio had made on Naevius.—N.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero, *Tuscul. Quaest.* i. 1; *Brut.* 18; Varro, ap. Gellium, *xvii.* 21

<sup>11</sup> Cicero, *Brut.* 20; *de Senect.* 5.

<sup>12</sup> Q. Ennii, poetae vetustissimi quae supersunt fragmenta, ab Hieronymo Columna conquisita, disposita et explicata, Neapoli 1590. 4°. A reprint of this edition appeared at Amsterdam in 1707.

<sup>13</sup> Q. Ennii fragmenta collegit et illustravit P. Merula, Lugd. Bat. 1595.



afterwards many scholars found themselves not a little puzzled by his assertions. The case of Merula is different. He said that he had gathered a number of verses from a work of L. Calpurnius Piso, a contemporary of Pliny, which bore the title "*De continentia veterum poetarum*." He adds, that Piso in this work compared the early poets with the later ones, and the latter with one another, that the manuscript of it was at Paris in the library of St. Victor, where he feared, it would be stolen. Now what circumstance could have led him to this strange apprehension for which no reason is assigned? He further states that he used the manuscript, and that he discovered that it had formerly been bound up together with a manuscript of Lucan from which it had afterwards been cut away. Now there is indeed in the library of St. Victor at Paris a manuscript of Lucan, from which another one has been torn off,—my friend Immanuel Bekker whose attention I had directed to it, saw it himself—but this proves nothing. It is not improbable that P. Merula either in joke or in earnest wanted to impose upon the public, but he was not able to write such perfect verses as would deceive a good scholar. At least all those which he pretends to have derived from Piso, are suspicious to me, though I do not mean positively to assert that they are something modern. They are hexameters and indeed such as Ennius might have written; but they never carry with them that conviction of genuineness which is so strong in the other fragments of Ennius that we might almost swear and say: this cannot come from a modern author. My opinion therefore is, that we must not place too much confidence in those verses which are said to be taken from Piso.

Not long after Ennius, whom we reckon among the Roman historians, although very little of his has been incorporated with history by subsequent writers, the history of Rome began to be written in Latin prose, and the most important among the works we now meet with



are the "Origines" of Cato. The form which he adopted in this work, shows great originality, and also that the Romans at that time began to entertain just views of their own history and to follow the right way in writing it. Subsequent writers again lost sight of this and became estranged from the early constitution of their country. Cato wrote the history not only of Rome, but of Italy. While he described the gradual increase of the Roman commonwealth, he gave accounts of the nations of Italy as they successively came in contact with it<sup>14</sup>. The Origines consisted of seven books<sup>15</sup>: the first contained the history of the Kings, the second and third carried the history down to the complete subjugation of Italy, the fourth contained the first Punic war, the fifth the second, and the sixth and seventh the subsequent wars down to his own time, that is, to the praetorship of Ser. Galba. He wrote his work at an advanced age, about the year 600. There is a curious prolepsis and anachronism in Livy in the disputes about the Lex Oppia, where the tribune L. Valerius appeals to Cato's Origines against him<sup>16</sup>. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries people had such curious notions respecting every thing written in antiquity, that on account of this passage in Livy, they would not believe that Cato wrote his Origines at an advanced period of his life, and G. Vossius<sup>17</sup> thought it worth while to consider, whether C. Nepos was not speaking of a different work in saying that Cato wrote it as a *senex*.

Little of this work is extant, but what we have is excellent. It is said that once a philologer tried to conjure up spirits in order to obtain from them ancient books

<sup>14</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 8 and note 2; vol. II. p. 8.

<sup>15</sup> C. Nepos, Cato, c. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Livy xxxiv. 5 makes L. Valerius say to Cato: Tuas adversus te Origines revolvam.

<sup>17</sup> De Histor. Lat. I. 5.

which were lost, and if such a thing were possible, the first ancient work to be asked for would be the *Origines* of Cato; for if we had them and the history of Q. Fabius Pictor, we might dispense with all speculations concerning the early history of the nations of Italy. Cato's work was the only one of its kind in the whole range of Roman literature. In reading the descriptions which Livy gives of the wars against the Aequians and Volscians, we are extremely wearied by the intolerable sameness, which is even increased by his repeating the same things over again. The same character is generally, though with great injustice, ascribed to the Roman annalists: but Cato was anything but monotonous or wearisome.

A very short time after Cato and before the destruction of Carthage, the history of Rome was written by L. Cassius Hemina<sup>18</sup>. From many of his historical remarks I conclude that he wrote about Alba according to its ancient local chronology, and that he synchronized with the Greeks, which is a circumstance of great importance. The fourth book of his work bore the title *Bellum Punicum posterius*<sup>19</sup>, from which we may infer that the last war against the Carthaginians had not broken out at the time when he wrote it. He even mentioned the secular festival of the year 608<sup>20</sup>, which may indeed have been just at the end of his work, but I do not believe that it consisted of only four books, though I admit that the number of books into which it was divided, was not very great. Cassius Hemina was one of the old authorities who had derived his information from genuine sources<sup>21</sup>.

From this time forward Roman histories were written by various persons: the Latin rhetoricians who now be-

<sup>18</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 271, and vol. II. p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> Priscian, VII. p. 767 ed Putsch.

<sup>20</sup> Censorinus, de die nat. 17.

<sup>21</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. XIII. 13; XXIX. 1.

gan to spring up, laid down the books which already existed as the foundations for their own works and only made additions from old chronicles which had been neglected by their predecessors<sup>22</sup>. I do not think it necessary, to give you a complete list of these writers of the seventh century or to enter into an examination of their merits; my intention is merely to furnish you with an outline of the literature of the history of Rome, and I cannot therefore mention such writers as are in themselves of little or no importance. To this period belongs Q. Fabius Maximus, whom Cicero, as I remarked before, calls Fabius Pictor. His work seems to have been a very minute history, as he spoke of the capture of Rome by the Gauls in his fourth book<sup>23</sup>. Cn. Gellius<sup>24</sup> also belongs to this period. He was a very prolix and credulous writer; he was only a second rate historian, and no authority, but would to God that we possessed the works of these writers, for who can say whether or not many a valuable old chronicle had been used by them and incorporated in their works!

A writer about whose character I can speak with greater decision, is L. Calpurnius Piso Censorius<sup>25</sup>. His censorship falls in the time between the two Gracchi. It may be that he wrote after the expiration of this office, but it is also possible that the surname Censorius was added afterwards. To judge from the extracts which Dionysius gives from him, he must have been a man of a peculiar character. Before him historians had received the materials just as they were handed down to them by their predecessors, and had not cared whether that which was transmitted to them, was possible or not. They had regarded the events of early Roman history as something belonging to a time which had no connexion whatever with their own

<sup>22</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 8 foll.

<sup>23</sup> Gellius, N. A. v. 4.

<sup>24</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 9. note 11.

<sup>25</sup> Compare vol. I. pp. 235. 237; II. p. 9. foll.; III p. 319.

age. Piso began to look at things in a different light: his object was to divest the ancient stories of all that appeared to him improbable or impossible, and to reconstruct out of the ancient traditions such a history as he thought consistent and in accordance with the natural course of things. This is the same mode of proceeding as has been unfortunately applied in our days to matters of the highest importance. Piso, for instance, calculates that L. Tarquinius Superbus could not possibly have been the son of Tarquinius Priscus, because he would then have been too old when he came to the throne. Therefore Piso, without giving any further reasons for it, makes Tarquinius Superbus the grandson of Tarquinius Priscus<sup>26</sup>. He is surprised at the account that Tarpeia had a monument on the capitol, and forgetting that she was a Sabine, he made her a heroine, and discarded the history of her treachery<sup>27</sup>. He is unable to understand the difference between the Sabine and Latin Romans. The Romans had the ancient legend about the lake Curtius into which Curtius was said to have thrown himself in consequence of an oracle. Piso destroyed this sublime story completely; for as he conceived that a battle could not have been fought on that spot at any other time but in the reign of Romulus, when the sewers did not yet exist, he supposed that some Sabine general of the name of Curtius had sunk in that marshy district together with his war-horse<sup>28</sup>. Such poor and contemptible interpretations are suggested by the same spirit which has actuated some interpreters of the Holy Scriptures, who leave no letter untouched and turn the narratives upside down in order to make out, as they fancy, an intelligible history; but in the latter case this mode of proceeding is more unpardonable than in any other. In the same spirit and for the purpose of making out that the northern sagas

<sup>26</sup> Dionys. iv. 7.

<sup>27</sup> Dionys. ii. 40.

<sup>28</sup> Varro, de ling. Lat. v. 148 ed. Müller. Compare vol. i. p. 237.

are historical, the whole lay of the Nibelungen has been transformed into a war of the Burgundians and connected with the accounts of Roman chronicles of the fifth century. But, fortunately, nobody believes these things. Such was the spirit of L. Calpurnius Piso, a remarkable man, but in a bad way: he may be regarded as the first author of forgeries in Roman history.

C. Junius Gracchanus derived his name from his friendship with the younger Gracchus. Both the Gracchi were men of very deep, intense and warm feelings, and exercised an inspiring influence upon eminent persons; it is, therefore, no wonder that young and enthusiastic men were, as it were, charmed by them. Junius Gracchanus wrote a history of the Roman constitution, in which he gave a chronological account of its changes<sup>29</sup>. The work seems to have been the only one of its kind; it is quoted by Censorinus, Ulpian and other jurists. He appears to have followed in his calculations the æra from the expulsion of the kings. Gaius prefixed an abridgement of the work of Gracchanus to his book on the twelve tables, for he himself did not possess the learning of Gracchanus, and where he is left to himself, he is very often wrong, but his collection is nevertheless extremely valuable. The sources of Gracchanus were probably the ancient law-books, and certainly most authentic ones. I can say with the fullest conviction that all his statements were correct.

In Cicero's youth, at the time when the books *ad Herennium* were written, or rather somewhat earlier, about the year 680, there were two men who wrote a general history of Rome, Q. Claudius Quadrigarius and Q. Valerius Antias. The former began his history with the destruction of Rome by the Gauls, and declared that there existed no documents older than that event<sup>30</sup>, for I have

<sup>29</sup> Compare vol. II, p. 10 foll. and note 251.

<sup>30</sup> Compare vol. II, p. 2 foll.

no doubt that the *Κλωδίδης τις* in Plutarch<sup>31</sup> is our Claudius Quadrigarius. In the first book he spoke of the Gallic war, and had consequently given only a very brief outline of the more ancient times. We must therefore consider him as a man of a critical mind, who would not write about what, according to his conviction, was not historical. He must have written about the time when Cicero was consul, for we find a passage quoted from his work which refers to the servile war<sup>32</sup>. A. Gellius liked him very much on account of his naiveté<sup>33</sup>.

Q. Valerius Antias is the very opposite of Quadrigarius: of all the Roman historians he is the most untrue; in him we can point out manifest falsifications<sup>34</sup>. Livy<sup>35</sup> says that none surpassed him in exaggerations. He knew all the details of the earliest times most accurately, the numbers of the slain, prisoners &c. He was animated by the spirit of falsehood. This is the verdict of Livy<sup>36</sup>, who nevertheless in his first books has passages which he cannot have taken from any one else but Valerius Antias.

<sup>31</sup> Numa, c. 1.

<sup>32</sup> The fragment of Quadrigarius to which Niebuhr here alludes, I have not been able to discover.

<sup>33</sup> A. Gellius, IX. 13; XIII. 28; XV. 1; XVII. 2, and elsewhere.

<sup>34</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 9.

<sup>35</sup> XXXVI. 38: in augendo eo non alius intemperantior est. Compare XXXVIII. 23; XXXIII. 11.

<sup>36</sup> XXXIII. 10; XXVI. 49; III. 5, and passim. Compare vol. I. pp. 237, 501, 526; vol. II. note 570; III. pp. 124, 358.





## LECTURE VI.

C. LICINIUS MACER.—Q. AELIUS TUBERO.—T. POMPONIUS  
ATTICUS.—M. TULLIUS CICERO.—SALLUST.—SISENNA.—  
DIODORUS SICULUS.—DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS.

ALL these annalists had something extremely old-fashioned in their language, which differed from that of the writers of the subsequent period just as much as the German written in the beginning of the eighteenth century from that which became established after the seven years war. At the end of the seventh century of Rome we find only one distinguished annalist, C. Licinius Macer<sup>1</sup>. He was the father of the orator and poet C. Licinius Calvus, a contemporary of Catullus, who flourished about the year 700, so that at the time of Cicero's consulship Macer may have been beyond the prime of life. His tribuneship falls between the first consulship of Pompey and the death of Sulla. Licinius Macer was a remarkable man, and we are able to form an idea of the character of his work from what Livy and Dionysius quote from it. From the quotations in Livy we see that Macer did what only two writers had done before him, the one as an historian and the other as a writer on the constitution, for he derived his materials from documents which he sought and found<sup>2</sup>. Macer may have related a great many things which were passed over by his successors, merely because they could not reconcile them with other accounts which they adopt-

<sup>1</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, IV. 7, 20, 23; VII. 9; IX. 38, 46; X. 9. Compare Dionys. II. 52; IV. 6; V. 74 and *passim*.



ed; for Livy<sup>3</sup> says in more than one place that his statements did not agree with other annals. The treaty with Porsenna was probably mentioned by nobody but Licinius Macer<sup>4</sup>. Pliny speaks of him, as if he had read him<sup>5</sup>; Cicero is dissatisfied with him, and in the introduction to his work “de Legibus” he mentions him disrespectfully. He may be right, for Macer, although he deserved respect as a critical historian, may yet not have been equally distinguished as a writer, which is indeed very probable. If we Germans, for instance, praise Mascov<sup>6</sup> as the first who wrote a history of Germany, we do not thereby mean to assert that his work possesses everything that is required of a history of Germany. But it may also be that Cicero judged unfavourably of him, because he belonged to a different political party<sup>7</sup>. In the struggles which were then going on at Rome, every one thought the lesser evil to be on his own side: some conceived it to lie in the greater power of the government, and others in the full operation of popular freedom; just as is now the case in France, where a calm and unprejudiced spectator cannot join either of the parties unconditionally, or wish to see one gain the upper hand. In such circumstances Cicero may, for a time, have confined his wishes to one party, and been anxious to see the other completely suppressed. I consider the loss of the annals of Macer greatly to be deplored. Whether the abridgement of a speech of Macer among the fragments of Sallust was made from an actual speech of Macer, or whether it was written by Sallust under his name, is uncertain. At

<sup>3</sup> VII. 9; IX. 46; x. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 546 foll.

<sup>5</sup> Hist. Nat. XXXII. 3 and 5.

<sup>6</sup> His history appeared in 1726 under the title: *Geschichte der Deutschen bis zu Anfang der Fränkischen Monarchie*. An English translation of it by Thomas Lediard appeared in 1738, London, 2 vols. 4to.

<sup>7</sup> Cicero, ad Att. I. 4; Plutarch, Cic. 9; Valer. Max. IX. 12. 7.

any rate the great knowledge of the Roman constitution displayed in it renders it worthy of Sallust.

After the consulship of Cicero, while Caesar was in Gaul, Q. Aelius Tubero, a friend of Cicero, wrote a history of Rome which was likewise founded on authentic documents, though, unless he has been greatly wronged, he cannot be compared with Macer in importance.<sup>8</sup> T. Pomponius Atticus wrote Roman annals which seem to have been nothing more than chronological tables<sup>9</sup>. It was not an unusual thing at that time to draw up short historical outlines from the detailed narratives of others, as Cornelius Nepos did after the example of Apollodorus. Thus sciences extend and become contracted again. The annals of Atticus seem to have been valuable, but as we never find them quoted, we may conclude that we possess nothing of them<sup>10</sup>. In the admirable introduction to the work "*De Legibus*" Cicero represents himself as being told by his friend Atticus that his countrymen were looking to him for a history of Rome, and he seems to have done this not from vanity, but because he thought it his duty to write such a work, and because many of his friends had actually expressed such a wish to him. To this suggestion he replies in a manner which shews that he would have liked to undertake the task, but that at the same time he had never entertained any serious thought of doing it. But however this may be, we may without injuring his reputation assert, that had he ventured upon it, he would have attempted something which was beyond his

<sup>8</sup> See Livy, iv. 23; Sueton. *Caes.* 83; A. Gellius, x. 28; xiv. 7 and 8; Servius ad *Aen.* ii. 15; Cicero, ad *Quint. Frat.* i. 1; pro *Planc.* 42; pro *Ligario*, 7 foll.

<sup>9</sup> C. Nepos, *Hannib.* 13, *Attic.* 18; Cicero, *Brut.* 3, 5, and 11; *Orat.* 34; Asconius in *Pison.* p. 13, ed. Orelli.

<sup>10</sup> There are some passages in which the work of Atticus is quoted, and which seem to have escaped Niebuhr, viz. the passages of C. Nepos and Asconius referred to above. To them we may add Ascon. in *Cornel.* p. 76 ed. Orelli.

powers. He was a stranger to the early history of his country<sup>11</sup>, he was more of a statesman than a scholar, and a man of an immensely active and indefatigable character. The task of writing a history of Rome would have required a series of studies for which he had no time. In his work "*De re publica*" we have an opportunity of seeing how little historical knowledge he possessed when he began writing it. He does not seem to have made use of Junius Gracchanus, but to have derived the greater part of his information from his friend Atticus.

Sallust, as he himself says<sup>12</sup>, found the history of his country unwarrantably neglected, although if it had been written, it would have thrown that of the Greeks into the shade. And the Romans had indeed no history of their country, any more than we have one of Germany. Sallust, like Cicero, a man of great activity, had the power of writing it, but as a practical man he preferred undertaking separate portions of it, especially those in which Sisenna did not satisfy him<sup>13</sup>. The object of his Jugurthine war was to show how the Roman world had sunk in every respect through the government of the oligarchs, and how the popular party was developing and gaining strength through the shameful abuse which the aristocratical party made of its victory. His "*Historiae*" began after the death of Sulla and were intended to show the reaction against the institutions of the dictator. They also contained the war against Sertorius. In his account of the conspiracy of Catiline who belonged to the party of Sulla, his object was to show what degenerate villains those aristocrats were, and he suggests that their party had already lost its importance, and that their proceedings were no better than those of robbers. If Sallust had not been satisfied with the history of the other events which were described by Sisenna, such as the Marsic war, he would undoubtedly have written it himself. Much has already

<sup>11</sup> Compare vol. i. note 1040.

<sup>12</sup> Catiline, 7.

<sup>13</sup> Jugurth. 100.

been done for Sallust, but there are yet many laurels to be gained<sup>14</sup>.

The history of the Roman republic was now closed like the temple of Janus. Every one had now gained the full conviction that no remedy could be expected from the forms of the law, but that it was necessary to keep the state together from without like a mass of heterogeneous things, and this conviction had, of course, its influence upon the historians of the age. About the time of Caesar's death Diodorus Siculus wrote his work, but on such a plan that the history of Rome formed only a secondary part of it. Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy wrote about the same time.

In the introduction to his work on the history of Rome, Dionysius gives an account of himself and of the time at which he wrote. He came to Rome after the end of the civil war between Augustus and Antony, and remained there twenty-two years, which he spent upon preparing his work. It was published in the year 745<sup>15</sup>, for it is evident that the passage to which I allude, is not to be understood of the time when he began writing, but of the time when he wrote his introduction and prefixed it to his work. He calls himself a son of Alexander of Halicarnassus, and he came to Rome in the capacity of a rhetorician. His rhetorical works, which belong to an earlier period than his history, surpass all others of the kind in excellence: they are full of the most exquisite remarks and criticisms, and we have therefore the more reason to lament that the texts are so much corrupted. I believe that it is Dionysius whom Suidas mentions under the name of Caecilius, for if he obtained the Roman franchise, he also received a Roman name<sup>16</sup>. A Caecilius is mentioned

<sup>14</sup> Respecting Niebuhr's opinion on the letters addressed to Caesar, which are commonly ascribed to Sallust, see vol. III. p. 342, foll.

<sup>15</sup> Dionys. I. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Atticus too is mentioned under the name of Caecilius, Sueton. Tiber. c. 7, but this occurs seldom.—N.

in the lives of the ten orators which are ascribed to Plutarch<sup>17</sup>, and some have been of opinion that this is the same Caecilius who was quaestor under Verres in Sicily and afterwards wanted to come forward as his accuser; but I suspect that the Caecilius in the lives of the ten orators is likewise Dionysius, for what is attributed there to Caecilius is nothing else than what we find in Dionysius<sup>18</sup>. However I am well aware that this is not a sufficient criterion, since the same things may have been said in books of different writers; but it is at all events probable to me, that Dionysius was frequently called by his Roman name. He wrote his history in twenty books. The first ten are complete; the eleventh is much mutilated, as several leaves are torn away; but we possess extracts from the latter half of the work which were made by Constantinus Porphyrogenitus in his collections "*De vitiis et virtutibus*," and "*De legationibus*." Besides these extracts we have a collection of curious fragments which are very much mutilated, and sometimes quite unintelligible<sup>19</sup>. Their existence had been mentioned by Montfaucon long before their publication by Mai<sup>20</sup>. They contain much valuable matter, but they are in an awful condition. Of the first ten books there are more manuscripts than of any other work, and some of them are very old: the Codex Chiggius which belongs to the tenth century, and the Vatican manuscript are ex-

<sup>17</sup> P. 832. E. Compare Plutarch, Demosth. 3.

<sup>18</sup> This supposition of Niebuhr is contradicted by Quinctilian (III. 1. 16) who mentions Caecilius and Dionysius together as two distinct rhetoricians.

<sup>19</sup> Compare vol. II. note 916; vol. III. note 934.

<sup>20</sup> Mai has published many things with an unfortunate vanity, and in the present instance he never mentioned that the existence of these fragments had been noticed by Montfaucon who had shown him the way. One of Mai's own countrymen, Ciampi, (*Biblioth. Ital.* tom. VIII. p. 225, foll.) has censured him for this want of candour, which however must not prevent our acknowledging our great obligations to him.—N.

cellent. The eleventh book exists only in very few manuscripts, and these are of recent origin, not older than the fifteenth century. The division into books is observed in all of them, as it was in the ancient manuscripts which were made when works were no longer written on rolls, but in codices, and when several books together formed one volume<sup>21</sup>. It is highly probable that the work of Dionysius, like that of Livy<sup>22</sup>, was divided into decads. Now the first volume of Dionysius which contains the first decad, is preserved, and of the second there existed only a few torn leaves when Nicholas V. began to collect libraries. Hence the text of the extant portion of the eleventh book is far more corrupt than that of the preceding ten. The Greek text of Dionysius was first published by Robert Stephens, Paris, 1546. fol., but unfortunately from a very bad manuscript. Previous to that time Dionysius had been very generally read in a Latin translation which had been made by Lapus<sup>23</sup> Biragus (Treviso, 1480.) in the time of Sixtus IV.<sup>24</sup> from a very excellent Roman manuscript. Lapus was like so many others an unskilful translator<sup>25</sup>, but still his work was received and read with great interest, until people discovered how very deficient and incorrect it was. Gla-

<sup>21</sup> In this manner the *Digestum Vetus* comprised in one volume twenty-five books, and the *Digestum Novum* formed a second volume beginning with the twenty-sixth book.—N.

<sup>22</sup> It is an unfounded remark of Petrarch's, that the division into decads was not made by Livy himself.—N.


<sup>23</sup> Lapus is a corruption of Jacobus.—N.

<sup>24</sup> This pope did a great deal for literature; he arranged and collected in his Vatican library all that could be gathered of ancient literature.—N.

<sup>25</sup> The translation of Herodian by Angelus and that of Procopius by Leonardus Arretinus are really excellent; but, generally speaking, the men of that time were not able to translate. Their works however were nevertheless much read and often printed. To us they are of importance in so far as they represent the manuscripts from which they translated.—N.



reanus then corrected it and published a new edition of it at Basel (1532). He himself says that he corrected it in six thousand places. This improved edition was likewise used very much; but as Glareanus had done no more than correcting Lapus, Sigismund Gelenius of Cologne made an entirely new and far better translation, and it was not till after the publication of this new translation that R. Stephens published the Greek text. In 1586 Frederick Sylburg gave to the world his edition of Dionysius, which is the best that has appeared; a more useful one cannot be wished for. He availed himself of the translations of Lapus and Gelenius, but although he had a critical apparatus, and collations from Venetian and Roman manuscripts, yet he did not correct the text, which is greatly to be lamented. His notes are most excellent, and no editor ever did for his author, what Sylburg did for Dionysius. The philological index added to this edition, is unequalled, and the historical one is almost perfect. Sylburg is a man of whom German philology may be proud, but his merits are not yet sufficiently recognised. Whoever has made himself acquainted with his works, must own that he is not inferior to any philologer, not even to the great Gro-novius. He had an eminent talent for divination. He contributed to the Greek Thesaurus of Henry Stephens, but unfortunately we cannot ascertain which parts of the work belong to him. He also distinguished himself by what he did for the Etymologicum Magnum, Pausanias, and Clemens of Alexandria.





## LECTURE VII.

DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, CONTINUED.—LIVY.

AFTER the edition of Sylburg, which was reprinted at Leipzig in 1691, more than a century passed before anything further was done for Dionysius, until the new edition<sup>1</sup> of Hudson in 1704. Hudson had the excellent Vatican manuscript, and gave a collation of it, but did not know what use to make of it. The notes of Sylburg are sometimes omitted, and sometimes given in a mutilated form. Although the edition of Sylburg is incomparably more useful to a scholar than that of Hudson, still the latter gained great celebrity in Germany. Strange prejudices were then afloat respecting editions of ancient authors, and as Clarke's Homer had been reprinted in Germany, so now Hudson's edition of Dionysius was thought worth being reprinted at Leipzig<sup>2</sup>. The publisher requested Reiske to correct the proof sheets, but Reiske was unable to do such a thing without making emendations. He had an

<sup>1</sup> London, 2 vols. fol. Hudson, being the friend of Dodwell, was looked upon as a great philologist, although England possessed at the time the greatest philologist that ever lived in Richard Bentley, but—*obstreperant*. Bentley was a Whig, and the Tories were bent upon keeping him down: the whole University of Oxford conspired against him, but to no purpose. They wanted to set up Hudson as a great philologist against him, though in reality he was but a poor huddler. Reiz and Hudson were men of the same cast: they had the good fortune of holding eminent positions, and although stupid, they were trumpeted forth as wise men and great scholars.—N.

<sup>2</sup> 1774—1777, 6 vols. Svo.

excellent talent for divination, but was too hasty<sup>3</sup>. He had read Dionysius only once before, and while he was correcting the proofs, he made his emendations, and without giving any notice of it, he put into the text the readings of the Vatican manuscript as well as his own emendations, which are sometimes good, but sometimes very bad. Of D. G. Grimm's edition I can say nothing. Dionysius is still waiting for a competent editor.

The circumstance that Dionysius in his rhetorical works shews himself to be a man of sound judgment speaks very much in his favour, and this impression is greatly enhanced by the fact of his having spent twenty-two years upon his work, during which period he learned the Latin language, read the Roman annals and made himself acquainted with the Roman constitution in Rome itself. The first eleven books carry down the history a little beyond the time of the decemvirs; but the whole work contained the history down to the first Punic war, where Polybius began. He called his work *Archæologia*, a name which does not seem to have been used before him. As in the eleven books still extant, he does not carry his history further than Livy does in his first three, as he has two books before he comes to the building of Rome, and again two which contain the history of the kings down to the banishment of Tarquinius Superbus, the minute history of those early periods excites our mistrust in regard to the author's judgment. It is not to be denied that Dionysius had formed a plan which we cannot approve of; he undertook to write a pragmatrical history from the earliest times, and this is a blunder at which we sometimes cannot help smiling; but the longer and the more carefully the work is examined, the more must true criticism acknowledge that it is deserving of all respect. Before

<sup>3</sup> I honour Reiske as a friend of my father, and I cannot let an opportunity pass without praising him, but I cannot on this account conceal his defects.

Roman history was treated critically, Dionysius was neglected, and indeed if any one should wish to decry him, he would not find it very difficult, for there are passages in him, in which the most intolerable common-places, nay, things which are utterly false, are set forth in long rhetorical discussions. But leaving such things out of the question, I say, that we cannot value too highly the treasures we possess in him. Through him we become acquainted with a multitude of facts derived from the ancient law-books, and with institutions which were referred to the kings as their authors: we owe it solely to him that we are not in utter darkness about these things, and about an infinite number of changes in the laws and constitution. The mistakes into which he fell, must be distinguished from the substance of the accounts which he collected. Having once lost the thread with which he might have found his way in the labyrinth, it was impossible for him not to go astray. This would not have happened to him, if he had understood the expressions of Fabius; but he knew nothing of the ancient mode of expressing constitutional relations, and was misled by the meaning which constitutional terms had assumed in his own days. He did not comprehend the happy distinction of Fabius between *δῆμος* (*populus*) and *ῥμῖλος* (*plebs*), and he called the former *πλῆθος* and the latter *δῆμος*<sup>4</sup>. Hence he often finds himself in a painful perplexity, and we see how, from mere ignorance, he torments himself with riddles, when he places the *δῆμος* in opposition to the *δῆμος*, and makes the tribunes disturb the assemblies of the people. But he is determined to find his way, and does not pass over anything, although it may cause him pain. That he is a rhetorician and not a statesman, is indeed but too manifest, and hence his judgment is deficient, though not absolutely bad, for he was an extremely intelligent man. His language is very good, and with a few exceptions it may be

<sup>4</sup> Compare vol. II. notes 417 and 431, and p. 220, foll.

called perfectly pure. But what may be brought against him as a proof of his bad taste are his speeches, in which he imitated the Athenians in such a manner, that he made his heroes speak as if all of them were real Athenians. I read Dionysius at a very early age, and as a young man I studied his *primordia* of the early history of the Italian nations, till the exertion exhausted my strength; but few results were to be gained: I have gone through him more carefully and perseveringly than perhaps any one else: his faults did not escape me, and I thought him far inferior to Livy. I have been censured for wishing to find fault with him, but assuredly no one feels that respect, esteem, and gratitude towards him which I feel. The more I search, the greater are the treasures I find in him. In former times it was the general belief, that whatever Dionysius had more than Livy were mere fancies of his own, but with the exception of his speeches there is absolutely nothing that can be called invented: he only worked up those materials which were transmitted to him by other authorities. It is true that he made more use of Cn. Gellius and similar writers than of Cato, it is also true that he not unfrequently preferred those authors who furnished abundant materials to others who gave more solid and substantial information<sup>5</sup>—all this is true; but he is nevertheless undervalued, and he has claims to an infinitely higher rank than that which is usually assigned to him. He worked with the greatest love of his subject, and he did not, certainly, intend to introduce any forgery. He is not read much now, nor will he perhaps ever be read much.

It was nearly about the time of the publication of Dionysius that Livy began to write his history. It is my conviction that he did not begin earlier, and I here express it after mature consideration and scrupulous investigation. He was born at Patavium in 693 according to Cato, or 695 according to Varro, in the consulship of the great Caesar,

<sup>5</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 11.

and died in his eightieth year, in 772 according to Cato, or 774 according to Varro, that is, the twentieth year after the birth of Christ, so that he saw the early part of the reign of Tiberius. The only circumstances of his early life which we know are, that he commenced his career as a rhetorician and wrote on rhetoric<sup>6</sup>. But these early works were obscured and thrown into the shade by the deep impression which his history made upon his contemporaries. The first decad of his historical work has been called a work of his youth, as if he had written it at the age of about thirty, or even earlier. It has been adduced against this opinion, that he speaks of Augustus as the founder and restorer of all temples<sup>7</sup>, of the closing of the temple of Janus<sup>8</sup>, and of the building of the temple of Jupiter Feretrius<sup>9</sup>, and Dodwell, a man who seldom hits the right point, is perfectly right here when he observes that Livy must have spoken of Spain after its conquest by Augustus<sup>10</sup>. The ninth book was written after the campaigns of Drusus in Germany, for, in speaking of the Ciminian forest, he says, that at that time the roads through it were more impassable and horrible *quam nuper fuere Germanici saltus*<sup>11</sup>, and Ahenobarbus and Drusus were the first who threw the German forests open to the Romans. To these facts we must add the circumstance of Dionysius not mentioning Livy any where. If a work written in such a masterly manner as that of Livy had existed, we should be utterly unable to comprehend how Dionysius could have remained ignorant of it, or have overlooked it. In Livy, on the other hand, and that even in the last books of the first decad, we find several traces of his having read Dionysius. The account which Livy<sup>12</sup> gives of the treachery of Naples, cannot pos-

<sup>6</sup> Quintil, x. 1. 39; viii. 2. 18; Senec. Epist. 100; Sueton. Claud. 41.    <sup>7</sup> Livy, iv. 20.    <sup>8</sup> Livy, i. 19.    <sup>9</sup> Livy, i. 10.

<sup>10</sup> Annal. Vellei. p. 19.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, ix. 36. Compare vol. iii. p. 279, note 485.

<sup>12</sup> viii. 22, foll.

sibly have been taken from Roman annals, it must have been derived from a Greek source. It is also probable, that in his comparison of the power of Alexander the Great with that of the Romans<sup>13</sup>, he had a Greek writer before him who had done the same. The account of the piratical expedition of Cleonymus<sup>14</sup> must likewise have been taken from a Greek writer. I therefore firmly believe that Dionysius had completed his work before Livy finished his first decad, and that the latter made use of Dionysius even before he wrote the eighth book. Nay, it is not impossible that the Greek work of Dionysius may have suggested to Livy the idea of writing the history of Rome in Latin. The liveliness and freshness of the style of Livy's work might indeed be said to be opposed to my supposition, that he wrote it at an advanced period of his life; but such things merely depend upon the personal character of the writer. Let no one say that I allow him too little time to complete his history, for as he was about fifty years old when Dionysius published his work, there still remained thirty years from the time he commenced his history until his death, and the work is not indeed too extensive to be executed in the course of twenty-five years, especially if we take into consideration Livy's method of writing. It is moreover probable to me that he died before he had accomplished his object. We know it to be a fact that his work consisted of one hundred and forty-two books, and that the last of them ended with the death of Drusus. Here we perceive an evident want of symmetry, which with Livy and the ancients in general would be something incomprehensible. The whole plan of the work renders it manifest that it was intended to be divided into decads. If we possessed the second decad, we should see still more clearly that it was Livy himself who made this division. The twentieth book, for instance, must have been of double the extent of the others; and this for no

<sup>13</sup> IX. 18, foll.

<sup>14</sup> X. 2.



other reason but because he would not begin the second Punic war with the twenty-second book, in order that this war again might be brought to a close in the thirtieth, and that the thirty-first might open with the Macedonian war.


If we examine Livy's history with due attention to style and his mode of treating his subjects, we find it extremely unequal. The first book and some parts of the second Punic war are, perhaps, the most beautiful portions of the whole work. The second Punic war is written with particular care, and it contains passages of the most exquisite beauty. In the first decad there are many episodes, some of which are very successfully worked up. The more Livy feels himself free from restraint the more beautiful is his narrative; where he has to record the recurrence of the same or similar circumstances, he himself often grows weary, and writes without any pleasure. From the thirty-first book onward all are far inferior to those in which he describes the second Punic war. In the fourth and fifth decads he gave for the most part a mere Latin paraphrase of Polybius, and he could not indeed have chosen a better guide; but it is evident that he is beginning to hurry onwards to other subjects, and here things happen to him which we rarely meet with in the earlier books: he contradicts himself, his style becomes prolix, and he relates the same things over again. The style of the fragment belonging to the ninety-first book, which was discovered at Rome, is perfectly different from all the other extant parts of his work: repetitions are here so frequent in the small compass of four pages, and the prolixity is so great, that we should hardly believe it to belong to Livy, if we did not read at the beginning of the fragment: *Titi Livii xci*, and if sundry other things did not prove it to be his. Here we see the justice with which the ancient grammarians censured him for his repetitions and tautologies<sup>15</sup>, here

<sup>15</sup> Diomedes quotes a passage from Livy which runs thus: *retro domum, unde venerant*. N.—Similar tautologies however occur in



we see how the writer has grown old and become loquacious, a character so exquisitely pourtrayed by Cicero in his Cato Major, and which may have been very agreeable in personal intercourse with Livy. If we possessed the second decad which was probably far better than the later ones, we should see manifest reasons to account for the loss of the latter; for as they were so much inferior to the first decads, they were never read in the schools of the grammarians, and consequently very seldom or never copied.

the earlier decads also. In xxxvii. 21, we read: *inde retro, unde profecta erat, Elaeam rediit*; in xxxviii. 16: *Leonorius retro, unde venerat, cum maiore parte hominum repetit Byzantium*, and xl. 48: *Convertit, inde agmen retro, unde venerat, ad Alcen*.



## LECTURE VIII.

LIVY, CONTINUED.—HISTORY AND MANUSCRIPTS OF  
HIS WORK.

It is quite manifest that at the time when Livy began his work, he was not intimately acquainted with his subject, although, considering that the history of Rome was at that time extremely neglected, he may, comparatively speaking, have possessed a tolerable knowledge of it, for he had read several of the old books. His reasons for undertaking the task were undoubtedly those which he states in his preface: his delight in history and its substance, and the consolation to be derived from its pages at a time when the Romans were recovering from the evils of their civil wars, and the rising generation required to be refreshed by being led back to the glorious times of old. He seems to have set to work immediately after he had formed the resolution, and with that enthusiastic delight which we generally feel the moment after we have come to the determination to realize a grand idea. In the first part of his work he followed Ennius alone<sup>1</sup>, whence his accounts are consistent in themselves, and not made up of contradictory or irreconcilable statements. But as he went on, he gradually began to use more authors, though their number always remained very limited. In Livy every thing stands isolated, whereas in Dionysius one thread

<sup>1</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 346, foll. and p. 234.

runs through the whole work: Livy took no pains to write a learned history. We must suppose that he, like most of the ancient writers, dictated his history to a scribe or secretary, and the manner in which he worked seems to have been this: he had the events of one year read to him, and then dictated his own history of that year, so that he worked out his history in portions, each comprising the events of one year, without viewing this year either in its connexion with the preceding or the subsequent one. Hence it often occurs that the end of a year appears at the same time as the conclusion of a series of events, and hence we also find very often that the events recorded in one year are irreconcilable with those of the year preceding. These inconsistencies, however, are not unfrequently of very great use to us, since they sometimes give us interesting information concerning events about which there existed different accounts. At first Livy used only few annalists; Fabius<sup>3</sup>, Valerius Antias<sup>4</sup> and Tubero<sup>5</sup> are mentioned; but I doubt whether he had read the *Origines* of Cato, and I cannot say whether he made use of Quadrigarius for the period which followed immediately after the burning of the city by the Gauls. It seems probable to me that he did not make use of the pontifical annals, until he reached the end of the first decad. With Polybius he was unacquainted until after he had begun writing the second Punic war, for had he known the incomparable, critical, and authentic account which Polybius gives of this war, he would not in the first period of it have used Caelius Antipater who wrote the history of it *ex professo*, and who although his narratives were written in a beautiful style, was a wretched historian. The whole description of the siege of Saguntum is probably taken

<sup>3</sup> Livy, I. 44, 55; II. 40; X. 37.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, X. 41, Compare vol. III. p. 358, and Lecture v. p. 41.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, IV. 23. X. 9.

from Caelius Antipater. During this period he does not seem to have made use even of Cincius Alimentus, but on reaching the time when he had to speak of Philip of Macedonia, his attention turned, or was turned by some one, to Polybius, whom he now translated into Latin throughout the fourth decad. When Polybius left him he continued writing his history in the same manner, and he followed his authors, such as Posidonius, the memoirs of Rutilius, Sulla, Theophanes and others, most unscrupulously, and gave what he found in them. At a later period he used, perhaps, the history of the civil wars written by Asinius Pollio. Thus the further he advanced the more he was obliged to enter into details, and the more also did he become conscious of his real calling. Seneca in his seventh *Suasoria* has preserved Livy's description of the character of Cicero, which is excellent. If we compare with this his other narratives one by one, we see the greatness of his talent for narration—which is with us so much valued in the writers of novels—the liveliness of his portraits, and his clear perception of character<sup>6</sup>. In these points he is a master of extraordinary powers; but he is altogether deficient in not having a clear survey or control over his subject, and no great author has this deficiency to such an extent as Livy. For an annalist a clear survey is not necessary, but in a work like that of Livy, it is a matter of the highest importance. He neither knew what he had written nor what he was going to write, but wrote at hazard. His list of the nations which revolted from the Romans immediately after the battle of Cannae<sup>7</sup> is exceedingly incorrect, for it contains nations which did not revolt till several years later, and yet Livy represents their insurrection as the immediate consequence of the battle of Cannae. He shews his want of criticism in the manner in which he relates at the beginning of the second Punic war, the tales of the siege of Sa-

<sup>6</sup> Compare vol. i. p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> XXII. 61.

guntum and the passage of Hannibal across the Alps. The former can have been copied only from Caelius Antipater; and there are things stated in it which cannot possibly have happened. This want of survey is also the cause of his utter incapability of judging of events and of the persons concerned in them: he can never say whether persons acted wisely or foolishly, nor whether they were right or wrong. He had from his early youth belonged to the party of Pompey. At the time when Caesar crossed the Rubico, he was not more than ten years old, and having no distinct notion of the state of things previous to this event, he pictured to himself the preceding period as a sort of golden age<sup>8</sup>. He seems to have been one of those men who never ask themselves whether the disease could have been avoided, and what would have been the result, if such a crisis had not taken place. And the false notions which he thus formed, are applied by him to persons and circumstances with which they have nothing to do.

The tribunes, for instance and all that is connected with them, are in his eyes seditious persons, and he speaks of them in the most revolting terms<sup>9</sup>. When Tarquinius Superbus intended to usurp the supremacy over the Latins and Turnus Herdonius opposed him, which was no more than his duty, Livy<sup>10</sup> calls him *seditiosus facinorosusque homo, hisque artibus opes domi nactus*, and this merely because the man had courage enough to oppose a tyrant more powerful than himself. For such sentiments Livy must have become proverbial: he belonged to the

<sup>8</sup> We see the same thing in France. A friend of mine who is a decided royalist and holds one of the highest offices in France, once told me, that those noblemen who had been boys at the time of the revolution, fancied that the period previous to the revolution, was the golden age of their order and its privileges.—N.

<sup>9</sup> Instances of this occur in IV. 35, 49; V. 2; VI. 27; and a great many other passages.

<sup>10</sup> I. 50.

class of men whom the French call *Ultra*: he idolized the olden times. Augustus called him a Pompeian<sup>11</sup>, and it is a well known anecdote that he forbade one of his grandsons to read Livy. The youth, however, secretly continued reading, and being surprised on one occasion tried to hide the book. But Augustus, who knew that his power was too well established to suffer any injury from a work written by a partizan of Pompey, allowed his grandson to go on reading Livy as much as he pleased.

One cannot speak of Livy without mentioning the *Patavinitas* which Asinius Pollio is said to have censured in him<sup>12</sup>. Cicero distinguished between *urbanitas* as peculiar to men born and brought up at Rome, and the eloquence of men coming from the municipia, and it may be that Asinius Pollio, on some occasion when he heard Livy speak in company, made some such remark, as: "One discovers in his dialect that he has not been brought up at Rome;" just as at Paris one often hears the remark, that it is easy to discover from a person's dialect that he is not a Parisian<sup>13</sup>. But this cannot have been applied to Livy's work, for his language is as perfect and as classical as any other in Roman literature, and much as he differs from Cicero, yet he is not inferior to him in the grammatical correctness and purity of his language. Now if we further consider that Asinius Pollio had been consul thirty years before Livy began writing his history, and that consequently he was some seventy years old when Livy wrote, I must own that it is almost inconceivable to me that Asinius Pollio should have known the work of Livy. I therefore consider this story as one of those numberless false anec-

<sup>11</sup> Tacitus, Annal. iv. 34.

<sup>12</sup> Quinctil. viii. 1. 3.

<sup>13</sup> In reading a French work I can always distinguish whether the author is, for example, a native of Paris or Geneva, and a Frenchman can do this, of course, with still greater certainty. Every Frenchman must be able to recognise that Sismondi's works have something foreign about them. N.



dotes which we find in the works of Macrobius. If Asinius Pollio had lived to see the work of Livy, Pliny would undoubtedly have mentioned him among the *longaevi*.

I need not point out to you the beauties of Livy's style; you know them well enough. What is most fascinating in him, is his amiable character and his kindness. The more one reads him, the more one forgives him his defects, and had we his last books in which he described the events of his own time, his frankness and candour would still more win our admiration and love. His reputation was extraordinary: one man came from Cadiz to Rome merely to see Livy<sup>14</sup>; and this reputation was not ephemeral, it lasted and became firmly established. Livy was regarded as *the* historian, and Roman history was learned and studied from him alone. He threw all his predecessors into the shade, and nearly all those who lived after him confined themselves to abridging his work, as Eutropius did. Livy was the *Stator* of the history of Rome, and after him no one wrote a Roman history except in very brief outlines, such as Florus; but even he used no other sources beyond Livy, except in one passage in which he gives a different account from that of Livy. Others, as Orosius and Eutropius, had read absolutely no history but Livy's; and as regards Orosius it is not even quite certain whether he did not draw up his sketch from some other epitome of Livy. I for one believe that he did compile his history from some abridgment of Livy. The Greeks had no such historian<sup>15</sup>. Silius Italicus, the most wretched of all poets, made only a paraphrase of Livy. I once went through this poetaster very carefully, and the result of my examination was the conviction, that he had taken everything from Livy.

The first and third decads were read in the schools of the grammarians, which generally speaking, not only

<sup>14</sup> Pliny, Epist. II. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 4.

survived the seventh century, but continued to exist in some places, as at Ravenna, down to the eleventh. The principal prose works that were read and commented upon in these schools, were Livy and Cicero's orations against Catiline. All the manuscripts of the first decad of Livy depend upon one single original copy which was written in the fourth century by Nicomachus for Symmachus and his family. There exists no manuscript containing all the books of Livy; those in which we find the first and third decads do not contain the fourth, of which we have no manuscript older than the fifteenth century. Of the first and third decads, however, we have manuscripts as old as the tenth century. The literary history of a work ought not to be given without that of the text. The "*Bibliotheca Latina*" of Fabricius is deficient in this respect, and a work which shall combine the two is yet to be written. At the time of the revival of letters persons began to turn their attention again to Livy; they found the first and third decads in a tolerable number of manuscripts, but the fourth only in a few, and these very mutilated ones. The fourth decad was not brought to light during the first period after the invention of the art of printing; but still we see that it was known and read during the fourteenth century, though several parts of it were wanting, such as the whole of the thirty-third book, and the latter parts of the fortieth, from chapter 37, which was supplied in 1518 from a manuscript of Mainz, while the thirty-third book was still wanting. The last five books, from 41 to 45, were published in the edition of Basel of the year 1531, from a manuscript of the convent of Lorsch (*codex Laurishamensis*) written in the eighth century, which is now at Vienna. The thirty-third book was published at Rome in 1616 from a Bamberg manuscript. Göller of Cologne has lately compared this manuscript and published very valuable readings from it<sup>16</sup>. The *codex Laurishamensis*

<sup>16</sup> The work to which Niebuhr here alludes is entitled: "*Livii*

has likewise been compared very recently, and the last five books have been much corrected.


Thus we have thirty books complete, and by far the greater part of the next five. After the work had gradually been completed thus far, great hopes were excited of discovering the whole; everybody turned his attention to Livy and was anxious to make new discoveries, and many a one allowed himself to be imposed upon by the strangest tales and reports. In the time of Louis XIV, several adventurers came forward, and pretended to know where the missing books of Livy were to be found. Some said that they existed in the Seraglio at Constantinople<sup>17</sup>, others that they were to be found in Chios, and some even pretended to know that there existed a complete Arabic translation of Livy in the library of Fez. But the Arabs never translated historians. We know that at one time there existed at Lausanne a manuscript containing the whole of the fifth decad, but it is now lost. In the year 1772 a real discovery was made by Bruns, a countryman of mine. Attention had not yet been directed to palimpsests (codices rescripti), and he found a manuscript which had originally belonged to the library of Heidelberg, and which contained some portions of the Old Testament, but under it he discovered the words: *Oratio Marci Tullii pro Roscio incipit feliciter*. At first he thought that it was the oration of Cicero *pro Roscio comoedo*. The original writing was not scratched out, but merely washed away, and any one who has some practice in the work can read such manuscripts without using any tincture. He requested a learned Italian, Giovenazzi, to examine the manuscript with him. The latter saw that

liber xxxiii. auctus atque emendatus. Cum Fr. Jacobsii suisque notis ex cod. Bamberg. ed. F. Göller," 1812.

<sup>17</sup> It is true, that some books of the Greek emperors were left behind at Constantinople at the time the city was taken possession of by the Turks, but all of them probably perished in the great fire. N.

it was an oration of Cicero already known and printed, but paid no attention to the excellent readings it contained. Afterwards, whilst Bruns was turning over several pages, they observed some which were written in an unusually neat manner, and which both were admiring, when Bruns happened to see the words *Titi Livii liber nonagesimus primus*. They now read with incredible difficulty (for the means of bringing out the effaced characters distinctly were not yet known) a long fragment of Livy, with the exception of one part where the writing had been scratched away. The discovery of this part was reserved for me. I have completed some words of which parts are cut away in the manuscript<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> This fragment of the ninety-first book of Livy was edited by Niebuhr at Berlin in 1820, in his: *Cicero pro M. Fonteio et C. Rabirio oratt. fragm.*



## LECTURE IX.

LIVY, CONTINUED.—MANUSCRIPTS OF HIS WORK.—CRITICAL  
LABOURS BESTOWED UPON IT.—PLUTARCH.—APPIAN.—  
DION CASSIUS.—(XIPHILINUS.—ZONARAS.)

OUR text of Livy is different in the different decads. As regards the first, you must recollect that all the manuscripts hitherto discovered depend solely on the copy of Nicomachus Dexter, and at the end of the tenth book we read in some manuscripts: *Nicomachus Dexter emendavi ad exemplum parentis mei Clementiani. Victorianus emendabam Dominis Symmachis.* The best among the codices derived from it is the Codex Florentinus. The English manuscripts offer only few various readings. It is unpardonable that there are still so many manuscripts which have never been compared. There are some Harleian manuscripts of modern origin, which have many different readings. One manuscript, the Codex from which Klockius made *excerpta*, shows some very curious differences in its readings. It is altogether so singular that I have often doubted whether the extracts from it are really trustworthy. The palimpsest of Verona agrees on the whole with the Florentine manuscript, and presents scarcely any remarkable difference. Not one of the Paris manuscripts has yet been collated.

The text of the third decad is that of the excellent Codex Puteanus of which Gronovius made use, and which is much sounder than any manuscript of the first decad. For the fourth decad the Bamberg and Mainz manuscripts are the most valuable. The various readings in these are most

numerous, but they have not yet been sufficiently collated and examined. The five books of the fifth decad depend entirely upon the one Vienna manuscript, the Codex Laurishamensis. Much is yet to be done for the text of Livy. The libraries of Italy contain many manuscripts, but the first editions of Livy which were published may be regarded as copies of them. The best editions of Livy are those published in France and Germany. The texts which are commonly used in Italy are, for the most part, bad.

It is astonishing how little criticism has yet done for Livy, and yet it was he on whom the first critical labours were bestowed. Laurentius Valla, a true scholar, wrote scholia upon Livy, various readings, and also some historical disquisitions, which are reprinted in Drakenborch's edition of Livy. After him M. Antonius Sabellius of Venice wrote historical remarks upon Livy, which are not however of great importance. Then came Glareanus, a very ingenious and able man, whose attention was particularly directed to the interpretation of his author, although we often find him engaged in endeavouring to restore the text. He found many incongruities, which he did not scruple to point out in his remarks. After him, many whose names are now forgotten, occupied themselves with restoring the text in the Aldine, Ascensian and Basel editions, and we can only judge of them by what they have done; but the name of Gelenius will not be forgotten. A short time after Glareanus, Sigonius wrote his scholia on Livy, which contain on the whole very good and valuable remarks; but his criticisms are for the most part historical, and chiefly concerning names. In these scholia he constantly shows an ill feeling towards Glareanus, and treats him in a very insulting manner. Glareanus answered his charges as a man whose feelings were hurt, but with no ill-temper. Sigonius indeed advanced the critical treatment of Livy, but at the same time he made several arbitrary alterations which have not yet



been expunged from the text of Livy. His writings are very unequal, and amongst much that is excellent, there are things which are utterly worthless and bad. In drawing up the *Fasti* he made use of Dionysius, whose work was then not yet printed. After him there followed a period of more than eighty years, during which nothing was done for Livy, until at last Gronovius, who was descended from a Holstein family and was born at Hamburg, went to Holland. He gave a new impulse to philology, which he found in a dying condition; if the age had only been an impressible one, the fruits of his exertions would have been splendid. His works are real treasures: he collated manuscripts at an early period of his life, and he constituted the text of Livy in a masterly manner. What raises his works so far above those of all others, is his cautious circumspection and his astonishing grammatical and historical knowledge: he carries the prize away over all that have ever written upon Livy. But in things connected with the constitution of Rome, he does not rank among the first; here he has often misled others, especially in his opposition against Brissonius,—but no man is perfect. What his immediate successors, such as Tanaquil Faber, did, is but of little importance; but the work at last passed into the hands of two Dutchmen, or, properly speaking, Germans, Duker and Drakenborch, who occupy the first rank among all the scholars that have ever edited ancient authors. As some persons are great in poetry, and bad writers of prose, and *vice versâ*, so some were complete masters of the Greek language and feeble in the Latin, and *vice versâ*. Thus Duker is deficient in his knowledge of the Greek language, and his notes on Thucydides are quite worthless; but his knowledge of Latin is profound. Drakenborch has not so much sagacity and ability, but with a limited intellect he possesses good sense: he is of an exceedingly conscientious character, and never indulges in conjectures without the most careful examination of every point. The store of philolo-

gical knowledge he possessed, is astonishing, and his edition of Livy is an inexhaustible mine for those who wish to enter deeply into the study of the Latin language. The index to his notes is useful, but not perfect. He is a true model of the manner in which a work like his ought to be begun and completed: in the first parts of his work he often refers to the last books of his author, a proof of his having studied the whole thoroughly before he began writing.

After Drakenborch nothing was done for the criticism of Livy; Professor Walch<sup>1</sup>, of Berlin, was the first who resumed the task: his emendations are beautiful, and it is greatly to be lamented that he has not given to the world an edition of Livy according to his plan. As little as there is left for a future critical editor of Virgil to add to what has been done already, so much is there yet to be done for Livy, especially for his first decad. It is not impossible that there may still exist manuscripts which have not yet been discovered. The nations of southern Europe have done little or nothing for Livy.

When the Romans ceased to write their own history from the earliest times down to their own age, the Greeks began one after another to undertake the task, though they did it from a somewhat different point of view. Among these I reckon Plutarch, although he wrote only separate biographies. Livy was his principal guide, and for the early times he used Dionysius of Halicarnassus<sup>2</sup>. He worked with great carelessness, and therefore requires to be read with much discretion. He was, moreover, guided by certain moral principles, and particular views of human life, to which he made history subservient.

Some thirty years after Plutarch the work of Appian was written. He was a jurist of Alexandria, and during

<sup>1</sup> The work of G. L. Walch, to which Niebuhr here alludes, is entitled "*Emendationes Livianae*," Berlin, 1815.

<sup>2</sup> Compare vol. III. notes 844 and 872.

the reigns of Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus Pius he lived at Rome, and pleaded in the courts of justice. It cannot, however, be concluded from this, that in pleading he used the Latin language, as at that time the Greek was held in the highest estimation at Rome. Fronto asked and obtained for him the office of procurator to the emperor<sup>3</sup>. He wrote his history in twenty-four books, not according to a synchronistic system, but on the plan of Cato's *Origines*. The first book was called *Ῥωμαικῶν βασιλική*, the second *Ἰταλική*, the third *Σαυνιτική*, the fourth *Κελτική*, the fifth *Σικελική καὶ νησιωτική*, &c. The twenty-first book came down to the battle of Actium, and the twenty-second, entitled *Ἐκατονταετία*, comprised the history of one hundred years, from the battle of Actium down to the beginning of the reign of Vespasian; the twenty-third contained the Dacian and Illyrian wars, and the twenty-fourth the war against the Parthians. Appian is a compiler who, for the history of the early times, chiefly followed Dionysius as far as he went, so that in some measure he now makes up for the lost portion of the work of Dionysius<sup>4</sup>. In his history of the second Punic war, and perhaps in that of the first, too, he followed Fabius. Afterwards he used Polybius, and where he was left by this guide, he followed Apollodorus. The sources which he used, were indeed very good, but he did not know how to use them: he is ignorant and bold. He believed, for example, that Britain lay quite close to the northern coast of Spain<sup>5</sup>, and he places Saguntum on the northern bank of the Iberus<sup>6</sup>. Writers like him do best when they copy from others without thinking, then they will at least be correct; but they should not presume to give a condensed

<sup>3</sup> M. Corn. Fronto, *Epist. ad Antoninum Pium*, 9. p. 13. foll. ed. Niebuhr.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. vol. II. p. 512 foll; vol. III. p. 212. notes 353, 872 and 842.

<sup>5</sup> *De Reb. Hisp.* c. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *De Reb. Hisp.* c. 7. and 10.

abridgment of the works of others. Of the whole work we possess only eleven books complete, viz. vi. Ἰβηρικὴ; vii. Ἀννιβαικὴ; viii. Λιβυκὴ; xi. Συριακὴ καὶ Παρθικὴ; xii. Μισριδάτειος; xiii—xvii. Ἑμφύλια; and xxiii. Δακικὴ or Ἰλλυρικὴ. But what we possess under the name of Παρθικὴ, as a part of the eleventh book, is spurious, as has been shewn most satisfactorily by Schweighäuser<sup>7</sup>. Of the Ἰλλυρικὴ, at first only some fragments were published; the whole of it appeared for the first time complete in the edition of Tollius. Of the remaining books we have the “*Excerpta De Legationibus*” and “*De Virtutibus et Vitiis*.” The account of the Illyrian war yet awaits an able commentator. Excellent materials for a critical examination of the text of Appian are contained in the Latin translation made in 1472, by Petrus Candidus, at the command of the learned Pope Sixtus IV.; the Latin is barbarous, but the translation is literal, and Schweighäuser has made good use of it. There are only three editions of Appian worth mentioning: the one by H. Stephens, the second by Tollius, and the third by Schweighäuser.

About eighty years after Appian, Dion Cassius wrote his work. He was born at Nicaea in Bithynia, in the reign of Antoninus Pius, and belonged to a family which was already in possession of the Roman franchise. His father held most important offices, and it has been supposed that the ingenious orator Dion Chrysostom was his grandfather on his mother's side<sup>8</sup>. He came to Rome at an early period of his life, but it was not till he had reached the age of about forty, that he wrote a history of the reign of Commodus. He dedicated this work to the emperor Severus, who encouraged him to continue his historical labours. If dreams, as he himself says, stimulated him to write the history of the Roman empire, they were certainly sent by good spirits. He was raised to the

<sup>7</sup> In his edition of Appian, vol. III. p. 905 foll.

<sup>8</sup> Reimar, *De vita et scriptis Dionis*, § 3.

consulship under Severus, and a second time under Alexander Severus, A. D. 229. He spent ten years in collecting materials for his work, and twelve more in composing it. The last books seem to have been continuations. According to the judicious calculation of J. A. Fabricius, Dion must have been about seventy years old when he obtained his second consulship, and he probably lived to the age of about eighty. He must have been perfectly master of the Latin language, for he lived at Rome as a senator during a period of from thirty to forty years. He had an interest in, and made himself thoroughly acquainted with, the political history of Rome, a thing which no rhetorician ever did. Livy, for instance, has no idea either of a state or of tactics, and when, as in the 8th chapter of the 8th book, he speaks of battles, it is evident that he has no conception of the most ordinary rules of drawing up the legions in battle array: he had perhaps never seen a legion making its exercises, and hence the arrangement which he describes is utterly impossible<sup>9</sup>. Dion, on the other hand, finds himself at home everywhere, in constitutional matters and the civil law, as well as in tactics. He did not acquiesce in the information he gathered from Livy: he went to the sources themselves; he wrote the early period of Roman history quite independent of his predecessors, and only took Fabius for his guide<sup>10</sup>. The early constitution was clear to him, and when he speaks of it, he is very careful in his expressions. He has great talents as an historian. He has been accused of *κακοῦθεια*, in those parts of his work where he exposes the false pretensions of certain persons to political virtue, and it cannot indeed be denied that he was influenced by bitter feelings; but when in going through the history of the English patriots in the reigns of George I. and George II., we hear

<sup>9</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 98. foll.

<sup>10</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 12; vol. III. p. 426; *Lebensnachrichten* über B. G. Niebuhr, III. p. 187.

their claims to patriotism, and afterwards learn how they hunt after offices, how, notwithstanding their loud assurances of their noble sentiments, they keep up a secret correspondence with the Pretender, we see a state of things analogous to that of Rome in the time of Dion Cassius; and we cannot wonder at his speaking with indignation of patriots, whose reputation was acquired by fraud and hypocrisy. The case would be different if he showed a diabolical delight in proving that virtue did not exist; but when a man drags the mask from a villain, he does what is right; and this is all that Dion Cassius does. I believe indeed that he mistrusted many a man's sincerity, and judged harshly of him in consequence; but at the bottom of all this, there lies indeed a bitter, but yet sound view of human life, and amidst the corruption of his age he could not judge otherwise<sup>11</sup>. He was no friend of tyranny; but a man who, in such circumstances, insists upon destroying by force that which is wrong, only wastes his own strength.

What places Dion in a less advantageous light, is his style, which is neither eloquent nor beautiful. His language is full of peculiarities, some of which are real faults, and shew the degenerate state of the language. Examples of this may be seen in the Index of Reimarus. Dion wrote just as he spoke, and there is in him no affectation or elegance acquired artificially, as is the case with Pausanias. His history was, for a long time, very much read, and was a common source of information concerning the history of Rome. It was continued by an anonymous writer, as we see from the discoveries of Mai, and carried down to the time subsequent to the reign of Constantine. Dion himself divided his work into eighty books and into decads. In the twelfth century of our aera, when Zonaras wrote, there existed only the first twenty books, and the remainder from the thirty-sixth book to the end. In the tenth century, when Constantinus Porphyrogenitus ordered


<sup>11</sup> Compare vol. III. note 846.



*excerpta* to be made from it, the whole work was still extant. In the eleventh century, a monk, of the name of Joannes Xiphilinus, made extracts from the latter portion of the work, from the thirty-sixth to the eightieth book. The part containing the history of Antoninus Pius was wanting. Whether Xiphilinus was not in possession of the first twenty books, or whether he merely passed them over, I cannot say, but I suspect that there existed in the imperial library no more than the first twenty books, and the remainder from the 36th to the 80th book. The first twenty books are now lost, and Zonaras and other writers who lived after his time, testify that from the twenty-first book onward to book 36 no part was left. We possess a fragment, which is believed to belong to the thirty-fifth book, but it belongs in all probability to the thirty-sixth. The part which we have complete, is from the 36th to the 54th book. The 55th and 56th books are mutilated, and those from 57 to 60 still more so, and are full of gaps. Of the first twenty books we have the abridgment made by Zonaras, and from the 36th to the 80th book that of Xiphilinus. Besides these there are fragments of some of the last twenty books. The first of these fragments was published by Fulvius Ursinus from a very old manuscript which cannot have been made later than the eighth century. It is written in three columns, but is in such a mutilated state that only the middle column is legible. Other fragments are preserved in the *Excerpta* of Constantinus Porphyrogenitus "De Legationibus," "De Virtutibus et Vitiis," and "De Sententiis," and also a number of scattered fragments. It is surprising that Zonaras has not, like Xiphilinus, been printed in Reimar's edition of Dion Cassius. Zonaras was a practical man and lived under Alexius Comnenus and Joannes Comnenus. He wrote a history from the creation of the world down to the death of Alexius. The first part is made up from extracts from Josephus, and the second contains the history of Rome from Dion Cassius. He was private secretary to the emperor and con-

mander of the imperial guards. His own judgment is feeble, but still he is not a fool like so many others: he is a sensible and learned man but with limited intellectual powers. His extracts from Dion Cassius are of immense importance; he copied very faithfully, and especially in writing the history of times in which one might expect to find him in the greatest perplexities. But his extracts have been used very little; Freinsheim is almost the only man who availed himself of them for the times on which the history of Livy is lost<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> In the early part of the history of Rome Zonaras borrowed not only from Dion, but also from some lives of Plutarch, such as those of Romulus, Numa, Valerius Publicola; and it is probably this circumstance which led a singular Italian writer to the foolish assertion, that Dion had copied his history from Plutarch, and that the rest was founded on Zonaras! With this view of the matter he made an announcement that he was going to publish a restoration of Dion Cassius. His ignorance is so great that in his announcement he wrote, Βιβλία ὀκτώγιντα. N.



## LECTURE X.

DION CASSIUS, CONTINUED. — THE STUDY OF ROMAN HISTORY IN THE MIDDLE AGES, AND AFTER THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS. — SIGONIUS. — PANVINIUS. — PIGHIUS. — FREINSHEIM. — SCEPTICS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, AND OTHER MODERN WRITERS ON THE HISTORY OF ROME.

THE beginning of the thirty-sixth book of Dion Cassius is incomplete. The Abbé Morelli, an excellent philologist, and one of the most amiable and most learned men of the eighteenth century, while seeking to console himself for the fall of Venice in the year 1797, discovered in its library a complete manuscript of Dion Cassius, which however, through various circumstances, had suffered the greatest mutilations. This manuscript was the mother-manuscript from which all the subsequent ones are but copies. The gaps in it are not indicated by any marks, but all is written continuously as if nothing were wanting. This kind of deception on the part of copyists was not uncommon in the fifteenth century. Of some books of Dionysius one half is wanting in the manuscripts, and in one instance a great part of the middle of a book is left out. Perizonius and others shewed the existence of such gaps, but were not able to point out the exact places in which they existed; for such omissions are sometimes made so cleverly and cunningly, as to render it a matter of the greatest difficulty to hit upon the spot where they occur. Sometimes, however, copyists were more careless; they broke off in one passage and then connected another with it in such a manner,

that there was absolutely no sense in the passage thus made up; but then they knew that books were not always bought with a serious intention to read them<sup>1</sup>.

About the editions of Dion Cassius I shall say but little: the best are, that of R. Stephens, the Basle edition (1558), and that of Fabricius and Reimarus. The text still requires a good deal of correction; and a comparison of the Venetian manuscript, of which Sturz in his edition (1824) has made, I believe, no use, would be very important. The remarks of Fabricius and Reimarus are of extraordinary value, but show little knowledge of the language. We must own that Fabricius was not a great philologer, and Reimarus, his son-in-law, though in other respects a man who deserves great admiration, was even inferior to him. The accentuation is horrible; but, although deficient in philological learning, Reimarus devoted himself with so much attention to the Greek index that it is one of the most excellent we possess. He who wishes to study Dion Cassius, should read this index first. It was made, I believe, after the whole work was completed<sup>2</sup>.

After the time of Dion Cassius the Greeks as well as the Romans confined themselves to making excerpts and compilations. The great works were neglected and lost in the middle ages, and although a small portion of Livy was read in schools for the *provectiores*, still as far as the study of the history of Rome is concerned, people were satisfied with Florus, Eutropius and Orosius, whose sketches were, generally speaking, considered as the sources of Roman history, and were mul-

<sup>1</sup> The new fragments which Morelli discovered were published by him at Bassano, 1798, 8°, and a reprint of them appeared at Leipzig in 1818, 8°.

<sup>2</sup> Philological indexes are extremely useful to a scholar, and they enhance the value of an edition considerably. He who makes a philological index, is led to an infinite number of questions and points of which he would otherwise never have thought.—N.

tiplied in innumerable copies down to the time of the revival of letters; for although, after the fall of the western empire, there were yet some men at Rome and Ravenna who collected and read the old manuscripts which had escaped the destruction of the barbarians, still there were throughout the middle ages no general views, no idea of symmetry, and no striving after anything which did not present itself at once. These facts account for all the frailties of the middle ages. Had not the glossatores been in the same predicament, they might have been able to understand the Laws of Justinian just as well as we understand them. I venture to assert, that no direct quotations from Livy are to be found as early as the time of Priscian, not even from those books of Livy which have come down to our time. Johannes Sarisberiensis alone forms an exception. Those books of Livy which are now lost were probably never read by any one during the whole of the middle ages, except perhaps by some grammarians in Italy. In the fourteenth century, however, a new zeal arose among the Italians. An anecdote, though one that sounds incredible, may shew the ardent zeal with which people at that time read the ancients. An eccentric citizen of Florence was engaged in building a house, and one Saturday, while he was absorbed in reading Livy's account of Cato, his workmen came to receive their wages, and began to quarrel with each other while waiting. He went out immediately and inveighed against them, as if they were a party of the Roman tribunes. Petrarch read the history of the second Punic war in Livy and the Commentaries of Caesar in a manner in which they had certainly not been read since the days of the great Boethius. This zeal gradually dispelled the darkness and barbarism of the time. Few centuries can boast of a greater genius than St. Bernard, but he had not been able to effect anything against the reigning spirit of barbarism. In the fourteenth century the Italians began to look upon themselves with pride as the

direct descendants of the ancient Romans<sup>3</sup>. Ancient manuscripts were eagerly collected, and he who was so lucky as to find an author yet unknown or a fragment of another, was held in high estimation. The letters of Poggius on this subject are really moving: he is zealous and anxious to make discoveries, and his contemporaries, such as Leonardus Arretinus, Bartholomaeus and others, felt the greatest delight in receiving copies of his books. Roman history was then read with incredible interest, but all kept to what was transmitted to them; a few only ventured to make some critical observations here and there. Glareanus, a man of a strange character, but of refined judgment and great intellect, was the first who looked at Livy as an independent investigator. Sigonius, a layman of Modena, and Panvinus, an Augustin monk, acquired considerable merit by what they did for the *Fasti*. Both wrote also on Roman antiquities, in which field their merit is indescribable and their progress gigantic. They dwelt upon the age of Cicero and Caesar, for which contemporary writers furnished abundant materials, but they did not penetrate into the earliest periods of Roman history. Both, though Panvinus more particularly, were but slightly acquainted with Greek literature, and their knowledge of the various epochs of Greek history was very imperfect. Archaeological and antiquarian knowledge was advanced by them in a brilliant manner, and the *Fasti* in particular are much indebted to Sigonius<sup>4</sup>. The *Fasti* have come down to us in separate collections, and, fortunately, also for those times, for which the books of Livy and Dionysius are lost. About the close of the sixteenth century Stephanus Pighius<sup>5</sup> a man

<sup>3</sup> Compare vol. II, Pref. p. XXI.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. II., page 559, note 1239.

<sup>5</sup> He was secretary to Cardinal Granvella, and lived for some time as a priest at Xanten on the Rhine, but he had spent many years in Italy. His commentary on Valerius Maximus is a highly respectable performance.—N.



of great learning, first conceived the idea of restoring the history of Rome in the form of annals, not merely as a supplement of the time for which Livy was lost, but he subjected the history of Livy himself to a critical examination. But the idea of his annals is a mistake. He dwells upon things of secondary importance. If the *Fasti* were preserved complete, they would be important only in so far as we might see, for instance, when the distinction between the patrician and plebeian aediles ceased to be observed, and in so far as we might form conclusions as to the age and life of certain persons from the time of their consulship or praetorship. When a young man I endeavoured to learn the consular *Fasti* by heart, and I believe that Roman youths did frequently so learn them. Many Romans of good memory were able, for example, to state the year of the consulship of Scaevola and Crassus, or of other men, at any time. This would have been a useful exercise for a memory like that of a Scaliger or a Muretus. Pighius, of course, wished to restore the *Fasti* for those times also for which they were lost; and that not only by gathering what he found mentioned, but where he had no authorities, he made up the *Fasti* of what seemed possible or probable to him. For example, when he wants a tribune of the people, he puts in the name of some plebeian quite at random and without any reason whatever; when he wants the name of an aedile, he takes the name of one whom he knows to have been consul afterwards; and in this manner he makes out whole lists of tribunes, aediles, &c.<sup>6</sup> This has been so little heeded that, until recently, there have been scholars who took the *Fasti* of Pighius for authentic records. Gerardus Vossius transcribed many things on no other authority except that of Pighius, and Professor Schubert of Königsberg, in his work on the Roman aediles, has introduced names of aediles which are simply copied from Pighius. But not-

<sup>6</sup> Compare vol. II., p. 559, and notes 1238 and 1297.

withstanding all this, he who writes on Roman history cannot dispense with the work of Pighius: it contains many ingenious combinations, and it has often led me to the discovery, that combinations which I myself had made were wrong. Pighius died before he had completed his task, and the learned Jesuit, Andreas Schottus, of Antwerp, published the work with a continuation by himself, which is far inferior to what Pighius had written.

Towards the end of the Thirty years' war, John Freinsheim of Strassburg wrote his Supplements to the work of Livy<sup>7</sup>. This bold undertaking is executed very unequally<sup>8</sup>. From the 46th to the 56th book Freinsheim was more successful than in the later books; for as he advanced in his work, he became more and more careless, and from the time of the Social war the work is altogether wretched. It is however, notwithstanding this, indispensable for him who studies Roman history. Although Freinsheim was not a first-rate philologist, he is yet one of the ornaments of Germany in those times. That he did not complete such a gigantic undertaking is pardonable enough, but the pretension to replace Livy is altogether a mistake peculiar to the age in which Freinsheim lived. After him, Livy was for a long time neglected.

The first half of the eighteenth century produced the scepticism of Bayle, Pouilly, and Beaufort, which although it had its advantages, yielded no results. The work which the good and worthy Rollin wrote from Livy and the Supplements of Freinsheim, can scarcely be called a Roman history. But all that Rollin ever wrote is pervaded by such a noble and virtuous spirit, notwithstanding his want of judgment, that the French were perfectly right in putting his works into the hands of the young. His history of Rome is written in a readable and pleasing form, but no one in our days can have the patience to go through it. Rollin was deficient in learning, al-

<sup>7</sup> The original edition is printed very incorrectly, and the reprint in Drakenborch's edition of Livy is still worse, or at least just as bad as the original edition.—N.

<sup>8</sup> Compare vol. III. note 847.

though he was not exactly unlearned; but he wrote uncritically, and was indifferent about accurate definitions. Roman history, on the whole, was written in those days as if its events had in reality never taken place.

At the same time, or somewhat later than Rollin's work, a Roman history was written by Hooke<sup>9</sup>, an Englishman, which I am but little acquainted with. The book is not much known in Germany, and does not exist in our university-library. All I can say about him is, that he followed the views of Beaufort, and yet wrote a history of those times in which he believed it to deserve no credit. He does not enter into any of the deeper questions. Still less so does Ferguson: he is a respectable and ingenious writer, but unlearned; he was no scholar, and had no idea of the Roman constitution. His history does not really begin until the time of the Gracchi, when the accounts become more detailed. He wrote pragmatically and with a moral tendency. To those who want to acquire a knowledge of Roman history, the book is worth nothing; he who is not a scholar, may read it in order to prepare himself for a better understanding of the times of Cicero; but he will certainly do better to read Middleton's life of Cicero. The history of Rome written by Levesque is perfectly worthless: he quite agrees with Beaufort, that the whole of the early history consists of fables. From the period down to the first Punic war, he picks out only some isolated events which he treats as historical, and this he does at random without giving any reasons, either to himself or to his readers. The book itself, as well as the spirit in which it is written, is bad. Micali's history is the work of an unlearned man who is biassed by a strange and passionate hatred of the ancient Romans; he makes up a visionary history of the Italian nations with the greatest levity. His hatred of the Romans is often quite unbearable.

<sup>9</sup> Compare vol. II. note 204.

## LECTURE XI.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ROMAN HISTORY AND ITS RESULTS.— REQUIREMENTS OF THE STUDENT OF HISTORY.— AUXILIARY SCIENCES, ANTIQUITIES, GEOGRAPHY.— MAN-NERT.— CLUVERIUS.— D'ANVILLE.— BARBIÉ DU BOCAGE.— REICHARD.—RENNELL.

THE general tendency of philology in Germany must have felt the influence of a critical history of Rome. After many and very fluctuating periods, German philology has acquired, within the last forty years, a decided and definite character: just as certain arts or sciences arrive at a flourishing state, without its being at all possible for us to trace them back to one particular starting point. Philology has been developed simultaneously by several minds who worked independently of one another: it was the character of the age. Men like Lessing, who had eminent philological talents without possessing all the requisites of a philologist, may be said to be the real fathers of our philology: the great movement of the time originated with them. The revival of historical jurisprudence began in the same manner as grammatical philology, with *Probusiones* which were, in reality, far from what they should be. It is wonderful to see how very deficient the first attempts at better things often are, before a clear view of the object is gained. So it was with jurisprudence. During a long period before Savigny wrote, the attempts were of such a character, that if the great men of former ages, such as Donellus, Cujacius, and Duarenus, could have heard their successors, they would have been greatly disappointed and dissatisfied. As it had become necessary for the history of ancient

Rome to be investigated afresh, it was a highly favourable circumstance that jurisprudence had already commenced a critical examination of the original sources. Such investigations concerning past ages could not at once attain the desired end in the immense labyrinth. Those who first began could not be free from prejudices, and were often led astray. This we see in the attempts which have been made to explain the earliest form and constitution of the Roman state, at the time when it was felt, that the opinions which had been previously entertained must have been wrong.

With regard to the ancients it is my conviction that, on the whole, all information on matters of importance as far as it is obtainable, has been obtained, and that it is time to abandon such investigations; it would be very unfortunate, if they continued to be the order of the day. I am further convinced, that it is impossible to overturn the results to which the investigations concerning the institutions and constitutions of the ancients have led us: they are as certain as if we had derived them directly from the original sources themselves. It is with ancient history as it is with the King in the Prophet, who had forgotten his dream: we must not merely interpret what the ancients read, but re-discover what they read; and this may be done with confidence and success. But as our sources are of a limited number, and as these sources have been completed by the results of investigation, there is nothing further that could be wished for, until better sources are discovered. There are other points also, concerning which further investigations cannot possibly be made. I entertain no fear of the results of my enquiries being ever overthrown; all that is still to be gained is of secondary importance, and there is nothing in the ancient sources which has not been found out already. To overthrow the results at which we have arrived, and ever and anon to make the same investigations over again, is an evil: we must make use of what has been gained. I

wish that more attention was paid to the later times, for these are of such a nature that new discoveries may be made at every step; but in order to acquire a thorough knowledge of them, one must be well acquainted with the earlier forms and their changes.

It is as if Roman history ceased to have any interest, where we have contemporary authorities, and as if only those parts were interesting which must be made up by conjectures and combination. But the history of Rome down to the end of the empire is one whole, which begins from the darkest ages, the sources of which are distorted and perverted, since we have them only at the third or fourth hand; but their history may be restored by combination and comparison, and Fabius, Gracchanus, and Macer must form the pillars of it. Scepticism here leads to nothing, and is highly injurious to the human mind.

The study of ancient history requires for its basis, a sound and profound philological knowledge and a ready grammatical tact to serve as a guard against groundless and fanciful etymologies, a well developed and matured judgment to distinguish between what is only possible or probable and evident truth, a knowledge of human and political affairs, of social relations in general, and of occurrences which have taken place at different times and in different nations, according to the same or similar laws, but, above all things, conscientiousness and candour. We have to bear in mind what was said after the revival of letters by men of all creeds, that learning is the fruit of piety, in order that, by the sincerity of our hearts, by knowledge of ourselves, and by a conscientious walk in the sight of God, we may guard ourselves against the desire to appear what we are not, that we may never forgive ourselves the slightest deviation from the truth, and that we may never consider a result of our investigations which flatters our wishes, as truth, so long as there is in our conscience the slightest feeling of its being wrong. But this is not the place to discuss these preparatory



requirements of the student of history: they belong to a higher science which teaches us how to learn and to cultivate our minds, though they find a direct application in all historical matters, as veracity is but too often set aside, and appearance is all that is aimed at. Hypotheses which flatter the author or have a brilliant appearance are set forth as truth; and how many instances might not be mentioned in which writers have stolen the ideas of others and given them to the world as their own, in order to shine with them! This practice is unfortunately carried on in all its variations, from the most secret and hidden plagiarism to the most manifest robberies: for when conscience is once seduced, it knows of no scruples. But the sin is always essentially the same. The ancients exhort us to be conscientious, and we ought to follow their counsel; we must feel that the reputation of past ages depends upon us, and that we commit a crime, if we impair that reputation by giving praise or censure where they are not deserved.

Every one must see that our own personal views and opinions can be of little avail in history, if they are not in accordance with things and relations which really existed. Hence we must have an accurate knowledge of the nature of the countries whose history we are studying, of the internal condition of a nation, of its political constitution, its religion &c. If, therefore, Roman antiquities should at any future time be written and worked out into a definite and independent science, they must, like ancient geography, serve as an introduction to the study of Roman history. The earlier works on Antiquities are the best, the modern ones are bad. As regards ancient geography, we still want a good chorography of ancient Italy. The work of Mannert can be recommended only with very great restrictions. Notwithstanding all that we may find fault with in the detail of the works of Cluverius, his "*Italia Antiqua*," and his "*Sicilia, Sardinia, et Corsica Antiqua*," are gigantic produc-

tions and excellent in the highest degree. But copies of them are so scarce and costly that I can hardly look upon them as works to refer you to. If we examine them from the point of view from which Cluverius worked, we shall find little to add to what he gives. What he says about the earliest nations of Italy, is the weakest part of the book, but the nature of the countries, if we make some allowance for the time in which he lived, is described in the most admirable manner. The only maps which I can recommend, are those of D'Anville, though I do not mean to say that there are no faults at all in them. D'Anville was a genius who knew how to make use of everything, and who possessed the sagacity to discover very soon, whether the statements he had before him deserved credit or not. Proofs of this may be seen in his works on modern geography; for instance, in his geography of Africa, where he had only few more resources than his predecessors. It is with him as with a talented artist, who produces greater effects by a simple apparatus than others with the most abundant materials. All the improvements in the instruments of sculptors have not enabled them to produce anything so perfect as the works of the Greeks, whose instruments were far more simple than ours. The maps of D'Anville are excellent, though some points might be made more exact, and that of Gaul cannot be surpassed in correctness; that of Greece is imperfect, especially Epirus, for there were at the time no other maps except the bad Venetian ones, of which D'Anville himself complains, and the interior of the country was never visited by travellers. As regards the outlines of Greece, it is remarkable that D'Anville drew those of Peloponnesus from the description of Portelane, and some maps of the Mediterranean. Barbié du Bocage, his pupil, was a talented man, but he was in an unfavourable position, as he had a predecessor of such extraordinary genius. He remarked, for instance, that D'Anville had placed Patras thirty-two minutes from its real

site, but his discovery met with no favour, and he was obliged to retract his observation, although it was correct. The only fault of any importance in D'Anville's map of Italy is in the neighbourhood of Naples. Otranto and Brindisi are situated twenty minutes further east than the sites assigned to them by D'Anville. The outline of the coast is often very exact; but the whole coast of the Adriatic is drawn too far west. If we compare his maps with those of Delisle, we cannot sufficiently admire his genius which produced quite a new creation; not that it had been his desire to find fault with the works of his predecessors, but he could not help discovering where his predecessors had worked hastily or carelessly. His map of Egypt is an extraordinary production, if we consider that he had nothing but the rude drawings of Arabian and Turkish maps. All that may be said against the maps of D'Anville refers to the imperfection which is only apparent, that they represent the state of a country only at one particular time. He made his division of Italy as it was in the time of Augustus, and he refers all political relations to this time, unless he expressly marks out two distinct divisions, as he does in the case of Gaul. His division of Italy, it is true, places him in contradiction with other divisions, but we must be on our guard, if we should feel inclined to censure him for it. Samnium, for instance, comprises according to Livy a large district which D'Anville makes a part of Apulia, because he represents Italy according to the description of Pliny<sup>1</sup>.

I must caution you against the maps of Reichard<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The reprint of D'Anville's Atlas published by Weigel at Nürnberg (1781—85) is beautiful and cheap. At Düsseldorf a School-Atlas has been published (1820, and a second edition in 1825), which gives the maps of D'Anville on a small scale. It is correct, and costs a mere nothing.—N.

<sup>2</sup> The Atlas of Christ. Theoph. Reichard, of which Niebuhr here speaks, is entitled "*Orbis terrarum antiquus*." It was published at Nürnberg, 1818—27, and consists of fifteen maps in folio.

His map of Italy, costs about six shillings, and none can be worse. He is quite an ignorant man, and places which have never existed are marked in his map as towns of great importance. In the Roman Itineraries the post-stages are mentioned, which were not towns, but merely points at which horses were changed. Places of this kind are, for instance, Sublanuvium (Lanuvium was situated on a hill) and Subaricia, which Reichard metamorphoses into large towns. A point at which a road branched out into two, was called *ad bivium*, and of this Reichard makes a considerable town, Atbirium. Aquila, a town founded in the middle ages, bears a Roman name, and is therefore forthwith represented as an ancient Sabine town. Some places mentioned by Roman writers as belonging to the immediate neighbourhood of Rome, such as Politorium, Medullia, and Tellene, which were conquered and colonized by the Romans, and of which we can only conjecture in what direction they lay, are placed by Reichard at random, and on spots where they cannot have existed—a just punishment for falsehood. He makes the Volscians extend as far as the mouth of the Tiber, although no Roman author mentions that their territory extended further than Antium. Numberless faults of this kind might be collected; but I have not been able to overcome the disgust which prevented my going through the whole. Reichard's atlas owes the favourable reception it has met with, only to the beauty with which the maps are executed, and to the audacity of its author. We must confess, that in geography properly so called we have no one who can be compared with D'Anville. My father, who was certainly a competent judge in these matters, entertained the most sincere admiration for him. Major Rennell was a great man, but he did not possess the unerring tact of D'Anville, and always drew middle results. Further discoveries in Africa will show, for instance, that Rennell has assigned a wrong place to Timbuctu, although D'Anville with fewer resources had given it its proper place.

## LECTURE XII.

## IMPORTANCE OF THE HISTORY OF ROME.


THE importance of the history of Rome is generally acknowledged, and has never been disputed. There may be persons who, in regard to ancient history in general, entertain fanciful opinions and underrate its value, but they will never deny the importance of Roman history. For many sciences it is indispensable as an introduction or a "preparation. As long as the Roman law retains the dignified position which it now occupies, so long Roman history cannot lose its importance for the student of the law in general. A knowledge of the history of Rome, her laws and institutions, is absolutely necessary to a theologian who wishes to make himself acquainted with ecclesiastical history. There are indeed sciences which are in no such direct relation to Roman history, and to which it cannot therefore be of the same importance; but whoever wishes, for instance, to acquire a perfect knowledge of the history of diseases, must be intimately acquainted with Roman history, and without it many things will remain utterly obscure to him. Its immense importance to a philologist requires no explanation. If philologists are principally occupied with Roman literature, the Roman classics in all their detail must be as familiar to them as if they were their contemporaries; and even those whose attention is chiefly engaged by the literature of the Greeks cannot dispense with Roman history, or else they will remain one-sided, and confine themselves within such narrow limits as to be unable to gain a free point of view. Let Greek philology be ever so much a man's real

element, still he must know in what manner the Greeks ended, and what was their condition under the Roman dominion. The consequence of this necessity having never yet been duly recognized is, that the later periods of the history of Greece are still so much neglected. If, on the other hand, we look at the history of a country by itself, as a science which, independent of all others, possesses sufficient intrinsic merits of its own, the history of Rome is not surpassed by that of any other country. The history of all nations of the ancient world ends in that of Rome, and that of all modern nations has grown out of that of Rome. Thus, if we compare history with history, that of Rome has the highest claims to our attention. It shows us a nation, which was in its origin small like a grain of corn; but this originally small population waxed great, transferred its character to hundreds of thousands, and became the sovereign of nations from the rising to the setting sun. The whole of western Europe adopted the language of the Romans, and its inhabitants looked upon themselves as Romans. The laws and institutions of the Romans acquired such a power and durability, that even at the present moment they still continue to maintain their influence upon millions of men. Such a development is without a parallel in the history of the world. Before this star all others fade and vanish. In addition to this, we have to consider the greatness of the individuals and their achievements, the extraordinary character of the institutions which formed the ground-work of Rome's grandeur, and those events which in greatness surpass all others: all this gives to Roman history importance and durability. Hence we find, that in the middle ages, when most branches of knowledge were neglected, the history of Rome, although in an imperfect form, was held in high honour. Whatever eminent men appear during the middle ages, they all shew a certain knowledge of Roman history, and an ardent love of Roman literature. The revival of letters was not a little promoted by this dis-



position in the minds of men: it was through the medium of Roman literature that sciences were revived in Europe, and the first restorers were distinguished for their enthusiastic love of Roman history and literature; Dante and Petrarch felt as warmly for Rome as the ancient Romans did. Valerius Maximus was considered the most important book next to the Bible throughout the middle ages: it was the mirror of virtues, and was translated into all the languages of Europe. Rienzi, the tribune, is said to have read all the works of the ancients. At the tables of the German knights stories used to be read aloud and alternately, which related either the events of the Old Testament or the heroic deeds of the Romans. This partiality for Roman history continued after the revival of letters, and although it was often studied in an unprofitable manner, still every one had a dim notion of its importance<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Here the Introduction breaks off, and the remaining part of this lecture forms the beginning of Niebuhr's account of ancient Italy, which may be read more fully in vol. I.





# THE HISTORY OF ROME.

FROM

## THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.<sup>1</sup>

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### LECTURE I.

EVENTS WHICH PRECEDED AND LED TO THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.—THE CAMPANIAN LEGION.—MAMERTINES.—STATE OF SICILY UNDER AGATHOCLES AND HIERO.—BEGINNING OF THE WAR.

THE punishment inflicted by the Romans on the Campanian legion stationed at Rhegium is an event of the utmost importance, as it brought the Carthaginians in conflict with the Romans. Campania contributed one legion to the Roman armies, and was on terms of perfect equality with Rome according to the ancient right of *municipium*,<sup>2</sup> although Rome had, in reality, decided advantages over it. When the Romans sent eight legions against Pyrrhus, one of them was composed of Campanians,<sup>3</sup> and was placed as a garrison at Rhegium.<sup>4</sup> The fear of the Bruttians

<sup>1</sup> The history of Rome from the earliest times down to the end of the First Punic war is contained in the first three volumes; but the account of this Punic war is repeated here for reasons stated in the Preface. The substance of the history contained in the first three volumes, excluding the first Punic war, was condensed by Niebuhr in fifty-one Lectures.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> Vol. III. p. 144.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. III. p. 464; II. p. 58, with the note of the translators.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. III. p. 477.

had, in former times, induced the Greek towns of Italy to entertain friendly relations with Rome; but after the arrival of Pyrrhus in Italy their fidelity was more than suspicious, and it was found necessary to secure them by garrisons. Several Greek towns got rid of their garrisons by treachery, and their example was followed by the inhabitants of Rhegium; at least Decius Jubellius, the commander of the Campanian legion, charged them with this crime,<sup>5</sup> and exacted a truly Satanic vengeance: the men were massacred, the women and children were sold as slaves, and the city thus fell into the hands of the soldiers. About eight years before this occurrence, the Mamertines, Oscan mercenaries and kinsmen of the Campanians, had done the same at Messana, and their common crime now united them together still more closely. The Romans themselves took no part in these horrors, and, after the war was over, they marched against Rhegium. Had those vagabond soldiers delivered up to the Romans their guilty leaders, they might have escaped with a mild punishment; but their crimes had thrown them into a state of savageness, and they thought it impossible that the Romans should pardon their conduct. They consequently determined to offer resistance to the last, and indulged in the hope that they might, after all, maintain themselves with the aid of the Carthaginians. But the Carthaginians hesitated, perhaps on account of their alliance with Rome; for the memorable treaty which had been concluded between the two states after the expulsion of the Tarquins, had been renewed several times<sup>6</sup>, especially with regard to the boundary of their dominions in Sicily and Sardinia. At the beginning of the war with Pyrrhus they had entered into a formal alliance which had not existed before<sup>7</sup>, and which bound them to mutual assistance; and neither of the two states was allowed to conclude peace with Pyr-

<sup>5</sup> Vol. III. p. 480.

<sup>6</sup> Vol. III. p. 86, foll.

<sup>7</sup> Vol. III. p. 506.

thus without the consent of the other. When Pyrrhus was in Sicily, both nations were jealous of each other; and when in the second year of the war with Pyrrhus a Carthaginian fleet of 120 vessels appeared before Ostia to assist the Romans, it was dismissed with thanks without being used<sup>8</sup>. After Pyrrhus had quitted Italy, and while the war against Tarentum was still going on slowly, a Carthaginian fleet cast anchor in front of the harbour of Tarentum to assist the town against the Romans<sup>9</sup>. The Carthaginian admiral entered into negotiations with Milo, which, however, only accelerated the peace with the Romans, and Milo availed himself of the opportunity of obtaining several thousands of gold-pieces more. The Carthaginian admiral ought to have acted on this occasion with more decision; but the affair was too serious and hazardous for a Carthaginian general, who, unless favoured by fortune, would have fallen a victim. The siege of Rhegium lasted a long time, but the Carthaginians did not interfere. The Romans concluded a treaty with Hiero of Syracuse, which was the first treaty of Rome with a Greek state beyond the boundaries of Italy. Hiero supported the Romans with energy<sup>10</sup>; for his great object was to recover Messina, and to expel the Mamertines, which could be effected much more easily if Rhegium fell first, and might have been effected indeed, if the war had been prosecuted more speedily. But some time passed away, and the assistance which Rome had received from Hiero was lost sight of.

The reign of Agathocles had been long and victorious; but it was a terrible time, and the reign of Dionysius was, comparatively speaking, looked upon as having been an age of justice. Agathocles was a man of no ordinary talents, but he was a monster. His reign, although sometimes surrounded with splendour, was for Syracuse a period

<sup>8</sup> Vol. III. p. 506.

<sup>9</sup> Vol. III. p. 538, foll.

<sup>10</sup> Vol. III. p. 541 with note 981.

of the greatest misery. He lavished the marrow and the heart's blood of the country, while he surrounded himself with the splendour of magnificent palaces and the like, and the island became desolate. His wars are memorable on account of their awful calamities, but, as his adversaries had likewise severe reverses, these wars still cast some lustre upon his reign. His peace with Carthage was concluded on tolerable terms, although it did not answer his previous expectations. Agathocles was one of those men who suffer the punishment of their crimes even in this world. Contentions divided his family, and it can scarcely be doubted that he was poisoned by his own son, or grandson; he was burnt half-alive, as the poison acted too slowly, and his whole family was at last extirpated. The curse which rested upon the house of Lysimachus passed over to that of Agathocles. After his death the island fell into complete decay: Syracuse was torn in pieces by the tyrant Ictas, and Messana fell into the hands of the Mamertines. The horrors which these mercenaries perpetrated resemble those which were committed in the Netherlands in 1576, where bands of mercenaries plundered whole towns, in order to pay themselves their hire: such, for instance, was the fate of Maestricht. After Pyrrhus had left Locri, the whole island appeared to be in a state of dissolution. Not long after this, however, Hiero, then a young man, was at the head of the Syracusan army, and the soldiers, fortunately for Syracuse, proclaimed him king. He was a great man, and the best king they could have wished for. In his reign, which lasted upwards of fifty years, the first Punic war broke out. The strength of his little kingdom became, of course, much exhausted by the support he gave to the Romans, although he reigned with the greatest wisdom and economy. He made a gentle use of his power, ruled like a citizen over his equals, and never insulted the feelings of his subjects<sup>11</sup>. The last twenty years of his

<sup>11</sup> Vol. III. p. 561, foll.



reign were very prosperous, and Syracuse began to recover from its sufferings<sup>12</sup>. But notwithstanding all this, Syracuse, after the death of Hiero, was still a very decayed place. Hiero had in his youth been of a warlike disposition, but this afterwards vanished almost entirely. Carthage had extended her dominions, had gained possession of Agrigentum, and advanced as far as Gela and Camarina, so that she now occupied as great a portion of the island as after the first peace with Dionysius. Hiero was anxious to expel the Mamertines from Messana and take possession of the town; he would then have been a neighbour of the Romans, and he hoped that he might be able to fall back upon them, if the Carthaginians should become too powerful in the island. His external relations to Carthage, however, were at that time of a friendly nature, and there is little doubt that an actual peace had been concluded between Carthage and Syracuse.

When Hiero had, by an excusable stretch of power, got rid of his old mercenaries, and had firmly established his authority, he undertook the war against the Mamertines<sup>13</sup>, who had extended their sway over almost the whole of the north-eastern part of the island. Hiero was successful, and was supported by the Carthaginians, with whom he still kept up a good understanding. Messana was besieged by both in concert, and under these circumstances the Mamertines saw no means of escape. It was the wish of Hiero to destroy them; but the Carthaginians had not the same interest in so doing, and merely wished to expel them from the island; for as they were Oscans and Italicans, and of the same race as the Romans, the Carthaginians mistrusted them, and feared lest they should open to the Romans the way into Sicily, which they themselves were anxious to keep clear of an Italian population. It was, more-

<sup>12</sup> Vol. III. p. 617.

<sup>13</sup> The beautiful idyl of Theocritus, called *Charites*, or *Hiero*, (xvi.) refers to this war. N.—Compare vol. III. p. 562.

over, the intention of the Carthaginians, in case of success, to keep Messana for themselves, and to use Hiero as their tool<sup>14</sup>. The Romans had, in the meantime, punished their faithless allies, and compelled the legion besieged at Rhegium to surrender. Of the 4000 men of the legion, 300 only survived: they were sent to Rome and beheaded<sup>15</sup>. A few years after this, the Mamertines solicited the assistance of the Romans. This was, as Polybius would express it, an ἄτοπον, or something the absurdity of which must strike every one. The Romans, who had just punished their own allies for the same crime of which the Mamertines were guilty, at first scrupled and refused to comply with their request; but the daemon of ambition had already taken possession of their minds. They reasoned with themselves thus: that they must not take too strict a moral view of the case, and that they could not be made to answer for the sins of the Mamertines. Moreover, they owed it to themselves not to allow the Carthaginians to take possession of Messana and its excellent harbour, which would give them an opportunity of sending a fleet to Calabria without any difficulty; whereas now their nearest port was that of Palermo, from which such an undertaking could not so easily be ventured on. What intentions the Carthaginians entertained in regard to Italy might be inferred from the fact of their having sent a fleet to Tarentum; and if the Carthaginians were allowed to acquire the full possession of Sicily and Sardinia, Rome, for her false delicacy, would soon see the war transferred to her own territory, which would be the more dangerous, as the fleet of the Carthaginians might sail wherever they liked, and would be invulnerable<sup>16</sup>. It was a similar policy that Great Britain adopted against Napoleon. According to a true moral and political principle, against which nothing

<sup>14</sup> The Carthaginians had moral principles which differed from those of the Romans; but it is wrong to say, that *fides Punica* was the same as the Roman *injuria*.—N.


<sup>15</sup> Vol. III. p. 541, foll.    <sup>16</sup> Vol. III. p. 563. Compare Polyb. i. 10.

could have been said, they ought to have endeavoured to put Hiero in possession of Messina. The state of things required a quick resolution, since the Mamertines might easily secure the protection of the Carthaginians, by merely throwing the gates open to them. The senate took no resolution, and rejected the proposal, either from timidity or on account of moral scruples; but the consuls and tribunes brought the matter before the assembly of the people, and here it was decreed that assistance should be sent to the Mamertines. With great exertions a number of light, but probably very clumsy, triremes were built, and carried a Roman army to the neighbourhood of Rhegium to negotiate with the Mamertines, who, as the Romans had been too slow in their movements, had admitted the Carthaginian general with very few Carthaginian troops, or perhaps none at all, into the town. A legate of Appius Claudius went to Messina, and negotiated with the Mamertines, who were glad to obtain a peace which was quite unworthy of the Romans, and the Carthaginian commander was obliged to quit the town. The Carthaginians, although war was not yet declared, had wished to prevent the Romans from crossing over into Sicily; but the Romans were favoured by the current and wind, and crossed the straits in small bodies. When in possession of Messina, they were besieged by the Syracusans and the Carthaginians in separate camps; the Romans sallied forth against king Hiero, their former ally, who offered indeed a powerful resistance; but the Sicilian soldiers could not hold out against the Roman legions, and he was defeated. The Carthaginian governors of the island retreated with their insufficient forces, and the Romans advanced without encountering any resistance. In the following year, when the consuls M'. Otacilius and M'. Valerius Messala landed in Sicily, the Romans appeared before the walls of Syracuse. A number of Greek towns had already opened their gates to them; and when preparations were made to lay siege to Syracuse, Hiero, following the wishes of his people, made

overtures to the Romans, and found a favourable reception, as it was evident that Carthage would not continue to look on while the Romans were making such progress in Sicily. Hiero remained the sovereign of a small state, became the ally of the Roman people, and paid down a contribution of one hundred talents<sup>17</sup>. The alliance thus established between the Romans and Hiero was both offensive and defensive.

The beginning of the first Punic war is usually dated from the passage of the Romans into Sicily, but their alliance with Hiero must be looked upon as its real commencement. The condition of Carthage at that time is very obscure, although much has been written about it. The Carthaginians were an oriental people and of a character widely different from that of the Romans or the Greeks, who for this reason should not be our guides in judging of the Carthaginians. The first Punic war was, on the whole, conducted very awkwardly, and previous to the time when the great Hamilcar Barca appeared in the field, it has nothing that can excite our sympathy in that degree in which it is excited by the wars against Pyrrhus and the Samnites.

<sup>17</sup> Polyb. I. 16. Compare vol. III. p. 569, where Niebuhr follows the account of Orosius (IV. 7), according to whom Hiero had to pay 200 talents.



## LECTURE II.

CARTHAGE.—ITS FOUNDATION.—SKETCH OF ITS HISTORY.—  
ITS DOMINIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.—  
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION, AND NATIONAL CHARACTER OF  
THE CARTHAGINIANS.

EVERYBODY knows that Carthage was a colony of Tyre. We may adopt the statement of Trogus Pompeius, that the building of Carthage took place seventy-two years before the foundation of Rome<sup>1</sup>. This statement is, like many which occurred in Pompeius<sup>2</sup>, of infinite importance, and is in all probability founded upon Phœnician chronicles. It is evident that Timæus had the same statement in view, although he made the foundation of Rome contemporaneous with that of Carthage. Historical works existed at Carthage and were known to the Romans; but after the destruction of Carthage they were given to the kings of Numidia<sup>3</sup>. Whenever we meet with such dates in history, and wish to act in a truly philosophic manner, we must endeavour to understand them with great precision, and accept them with gratitude<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Vol. i. p. 272.

<sup>2</sup> It is, however, strange that Trogus Pompeius did not look into the Phœnician originals themselves, but was satisfied with Greek translations and extracts.—N.

<sup>3</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* XVIII. 5; Sallust, *Jugurth.* 17.

<sup>4</sup> Some time ago I found a wish expressed somewhere by a writer of our nineteenth century to adhere to the old-fashioned chronology which counted the years from the creation of the world. But whoever writes such things, shews that he does not know history, and that he has no notion of the manner in which it should be treated. That system of chronology has become ridiculous by the abuse which has been made of it. If a man now will write a chro-

Carthage was not the first Tyrian settlement in those regions. Utica (in Phœnician *Athica*) had been founded before. The stories about Pygmalion, Elisa, &c., although we look upon them as something more than mere fables, are beautiful and truly poetical legends. Thus much is certain, that the colony of Carthage was established at the time when the power of the Phœnicians was at its height, when they were masters of Cyprus and Thasus. Their settlements in Cythera and other places belong to a much later date than is commonly supposed. I believe that Cadiz existed before the foundation of Carthage. The original name of the latter place was Bozra (a town), in Greek *Byrsa*, derived, it was said, from the mode of purchasing the ground. By the side of Bozra there soon arose a new town, Carthada, (*Carthago*, *Καρχιδών*), just as Neapolis arose by the side of Parthenope. This town remained, perhaps for two hundred years, an insignificant place, and rose very slowly; it was in a state of dependence upon Tyre, and paid tribute to the neighbouring Libyan tribes. The relation between Carthage and its mother-city is a beautiful feature in its history, and Carthage never neglected the duties it owed to its parent Tyre. But the Libyans were hard and oppressive neighbours. The manner in which, and the time when, Carthage began to extend its dominion, are unknown; but in the year 245 after the building of Rome it was in possession of a part of Sicily, of Sardinia, and of Libya, as we see from the treaty which it concluded with Rome. Respecting the early times of Carthage we have only a few statements in Diodorus and Justin, which are evidently derived from Timæus. From

nology, and like Calvisius ascend to the beginning of the world, and according to this plan give us, in his table, for instance, a list of the kings of Attica, it is something more than old-fashioned, it is laughable. I may add here, that a true philologist does not attach any great importance to his being able to state exactly in what month or on what day a Roman emperor ascended the throne: such things are trifles, although in certain instances they may be interesting enough.—N.



Justin<sup>5</sup>, we hear of a civil war in which Malchus, a Carthaginian general, conquered his native town; but I cannot dwell upon any detail, and shall give you only a rapid sketch of the history of Carthage.

About the year of Rome 272, the Carthaginians are said to have crossed over into Sicily with a great army. This expedition is fabulous; I do not mean to say that there was no expedition at all, but its reputed greatness is fabulous. Their defeat at Himera, and the battle of Salamis, are said to have occurred on the same day;<sup>6</sup> but a more correct chronology shews, that Gelo, to whom this victory is ascribed, did not ascend the throne till after the battle of Salamis. The synchronism is altogether visionary, and destroys the whole chronology of the history of Sicily, nor is it possible that the expedition of the Carthaginians can have been so important. The only thing that can be regarded as certain is, that the Carthaginians were defeated, and that for a long time after, they did not think of any fresh attempt against Sicily; but they strengthened themselves in other parts. When the Athenians were in Sicily, the Carthaginians were confined to three points, viz.: Motye, the first Punic settlement in the island, and the two Greek towns of Panormus and Solus,<sup>7</sup> and during the Athenian expedition no mention is made of the Carthaginians. After the unfortunate issue of the Athenian expedition, the implacable enmity of the victorious towns against the allies of the Athenians brought great calamities upon the island. The Carthaginians were invited, and came over with a considerable army. In this campaign, about 350 u.c., Selinus, Agrigentum, Camarina, and Gela were destroyed, and the very existence of the Greeks in Sicily was threatened. Dionysius, however, concluded a tolerable peace, and in some measure restored the former boundaries. In the reign of Dionysius II. the

<sup>5</sup> XVIII. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Diodor. XI. 20, foll.

<sup>7</sup> Thucydides, VI. 2.

war with the Carthaginians was renewed, but Timoleon defeated them. A favourable peace was then concluded, and the western part of Sicily, including Selinus, was ceded to the Carthaginians, and a line from Himera to Agrigentum, (the rivers Himera and Halycus,) marked the boundary which afterwards remained the normal boundary, and was usually restored on the conclusion of a peace. Under Agathocles the Carthaginians besieged Syracuse, but he twice landed with an army in Africa, and confined them in Sicily to Lilybaeum. But afterwards the normal boundary was restored. Soon after the death of Agathocles there followed the war of Pyrrhus.<sup>8</sup>

At the commencement of the first Punic war the Carthaginians were in possession of the western half of the island, and of the north coast as far as Myle and Messana. Their empire in Africa extended as far as the great marshes in the east, and comprised nearly the whole of modern Tunis. Along the coast they had a great number of colonies, and probably in the interior also. The coast of Algiers, as far as the straits of Gibraltar, was covered with fortified factories, or properly speaking, colonies; but in those parts of the coast where the mountains stretch into the sea, they appear to have had no strong settlements.<sup>9</sup> All Sardinia was subject to them, with the exception of the mountainous districts which were inhabited by savage tribes, who then lived in the

<sup>8</sup> Vol. III. p. 511. foll.

<sup>9</sup> The Libyans received a Punic civilization, and adopted the Punic language. Saint Augustin says, that Punic was his mother tongue. The Libyans are a remarkable instance of the great influence of a people like the Carthaginians. It is very probable, that when the Arabs conquered those countries, they found a people there, which, to some extent, was able to understand their language; and this must have greatly facilitated their progress. The idioms of Tunis and Malta are undoubtedly Punic, modified by the influence of the Arabic, and would certainly be a subject worthy to be investigated by orientalist; but, unfortunately, they do not often write about things of any historical importance.—N.

same manner as they do at the present day.<sup>10</sup> There were a few Carthaginian settlements in this island, probably near its excellent harbours. Carthage was also the sovereign of the Balearian islands. In Spain she possessed Granada and Murcia, and Gades was in a state of dependence, although it was treated like a sister.

In regard to the political constitution of Carthage we are quite in the dark. I have made several attempts to see my way clearly, and have read all that has been written upon it, but no certain result is to be gained. It is evident, however, that when Aristotle<sup>11</sup> speaks of a *δῆμος* at Carthage, we must conceive it as a perfect commonalty which was gradually formed out of colonial citizens and Libyans.<sup>12</sup> The *δῆμος* of Carthage consisted of such *συνήλυδες*, Libyans and Punians, who were quite distinct from each other, while the patricians and plebeians of Rome belonged to one and the same nation. The relation between the Punians and Libyans was analogous to that existing between the Lettian and Lithuanian tribes, among whom German colonists settled, or between the Slavonic population about Lübeck and the Germans, the former of whom became completely Germanized. We know that Carthage had a senate, *γέροντες*, which held the reins of government down to the first Punic war. According to Aristotle the *δῆμος* of

<sup>10</sup> They still wear the same dress which Cicero (*Pro Scauro*, c. 2. § 45,) calls *mastrucca*.—N.

<sup>11</sup> *Polit.* II. 8. p. 63, foll. ed. Götting.

<sup>12</sup> There is no prejudice which could seem to be opposed to this supposition. In speaking of Africans, we are apt to think only of negroes, and to forget that the Libyans, or the Amazirgs, as they call themselves, do not differ in their whole physical constitution from the inhabitants of southern Europe. The Libyan tribes had, it is true, a peculiar language; but all the coasts of the Mediterranean, including the main part of Egypt previous to its conquest by the Ethiopians, were occupied by white nations, which, although differing in language, did not find any greater difficulties in assimilating themselves with the Romans, than an Iberian or Celtic population.—N.

Carthage had somewhat more power than that of Sparta, where the people were like the three hundred legislators of Napoleon, who were obliged to submit to his will. At Sparta, the magistrates alone were permitted to speak in the assembly, and the *δῆμος* was silent. The people might, it is true, reject what was brought before them, but it would not have been very advisable to make use of this right. At Carthage, says Aristotle, matters were different, for any one might come forward and speak. Those whom he calls βασιλεῖς,<sup>13</sup> (the suffetes,) had in former times undoubtedly been the highest military officers; afterwards they became a mere administrative authority, and their power was carefully kept distinct from that of the military commanders. Moreover, we find mention of a body which Aristotle calls the Hundred, or the One Hundred and Four, whom he compares to the Spartan ephors. I have shewn elsewhere<sup>14</sup> that this number bears a relation to the fifty-two weeks of the year, just as in the Greek constitutions so many things are connected with the division of the year into twelve months. There were also magistrates, whom Aristotle calls πενταρχίαι,<sup>15</sup> but what they were, we do not know; they are mentioned, together with the council of the One Hundred and Four, who were unquestionably the magistrates before whom kings and generals had to undergo the *εὐθύνη*: perhaps they were a council which had the right to interfere with the administration of the senate and the kings. Aristotle further remarks, that the senate was invested with the entire power of administration and government, and that the decision rested with the people. There existed, however, no representatives of the people to set them in motion, like the tribunes at Rome. The highest offices at Carthage were given ἀριστίνδην and πλουτίνδην, and were *ώνηται*, as Aristotle says.

<sup>13</sup> Polit. as above.

<sup>14</sup> Vol. I. p. 339, note 851.

<sup>15</sup> Polit. II. 8. p. 64, ed. Göttling, if the reading be correct. Our text of Aristotle's Politics is derived from a MS. of the 14th century, and belongs to the most corrupt texts of ancient writers.—N.

This statement agrees with a passage in Polybius,<sup>16</sup> who says that it was customary at Carthage to purchase offices from those who had them to dispose of, without any scruple; a practice which we also find in the smaller cantons of Switzerland, especially in the Grisons, where the office of high-bailiff is purchasable. At Venice, too, the practice was once very notorious, though there the offices were not, indeed, formally sold, but it was a thing understood, that every one should pay for them. At Venice, persons sought the great offices of state as a *provedigione*, to restore their ruined estates. The rich were never punished, not even for murder, but paid down fines, and cartes blanches for murder were regularly sold. Such also was the character of the Carthaginians. They were, it is true, a commercial people, but this should not have deadened their feeling of honour.<sup>17</sup> But sentiments like those which we find in modern times in America, were quite general among the Carthaginians, and were the source of their misfortunes. As far as their wealth reached, they were all-powerful; but their avarice drew upon them the hatred of their neighbours and subjects. Libya had to pay exceedingly heavy taxes, and had, like India, to give up a fourth, and in extraordinary emergencies, half of its produce. To these heavy taxes we must add all that the Carthaginian governors received or extorted. When Aristotle<sup>18</sup> says that the Carthaginians kept the commonalty in good humour by sending them to other towns, not to settle there, but to suck out the blood of their inhabitants, we must own that Carthage was altogether in a very bad condition. Hence the contrast between Carthage and Rome in its better days. Great men, however, such as Hamilcar, Hasdrubal, and Hannibal, succeeded nevertheless in gaining the affections


<sup>16</sup> VI. 56.

<sup>17</sup> A similar spirit prevails in America, where any profit which a person can make is thought lawful.—N.

<sup>18</sup> As above, p. 66.

of the people in subject countries, as in Spain, where, at the time of the second war with the Romans, these men were really popular. Had Mago or Himilco been sent thither, the state of things would have been far different.

The Carthaginians themselves were very unwarlike, and thought that money would indeed be worth nothing, if, notwithstanding their wealth, they themselves should be compelled to serve as soldiers. The armies therefore consisted of mercenaries, and only the cavalry was formed of Carthaginians. Their military system had its advantages as well as its disadvantages. The mercenaries were an evil, but the circumstance that their generals were not magistrates at the same time, had its advantages; for the same general might often be allowed to pursue his plans for a number of years, whereas the Romans allowed their consuls to act during one year only, or at most during a second year as proconsuls. The Carthaginian generals, therefore, were intimately acquainted with their soldiers, and a great general like Hamilcar could accomplish incredible things. Previous to the time of Hamilcar, however, the choice of their generals was often so unfortunate, that it would have been better if changes had been made more frequently.





## LECTURE III.

PHYSICAL NATURE OF SICILY.—DIVISION OF THE WAR INTO PERIODS OR MASSES.—TAKING OF AGRIGENTUM.—ANCIENT SHIPS.—FLEET OF THE ROMANS.—VICTORY OF C. DUILIUS.

IN order to understand the operations during the first Punie war, it is necessary to have a clear view of the physical structure of Sicily. The heart and kernel of Sicily is Mount Aetna, from which a chain of mountains stretches along the coast towards the Apennines, and proceeds through Bruttium as far as Hipponium. The range of mountains in southern Italy belongs, if we consider it geologically, to Sicily, and forms a continuation of Mount Pelorus. The Apennines terminate in the neighbourhood of Hipponium, and are connected with the Sicilian mountains only by low hills, so that the Greeks often entertained the idea of making a canal across the isthmus, which would at present be a very easy undertaking. The range of mountains from Aetna to Messina runs often so close to the shore, that there is hardly a small road between the sea and the mountain. South of Aetna the mountain leaves a considerable plain towards the sea, especially about Leontini. In the south of Sicily, between Syracuse and the western part of the island, there are only low hills. West of Aetna there run chains of mountains which are designated by the names Heraei montes and Nebrodes montes. From Pelorus to Himera the mountains run close by the sea-shore; the sea washes the foot of the mountains, and in many places there is no road at all between the mountain and the sea. An arti-

ficial road might indeed be built, as is the case on Mount Posilipo near Naples; but it has not yet been done. To the west of Himera there is a small extent of flat coast, and the mountains become gradually lower. About Palermo they form a plain, out of which there rises only one hill, which is crowned with the convent of Santa Rosalia. Further west the mountains rise again; and Mount San Giuliano (Eryx) is, next to Aetna, the highest point in Sicily. The south-western portion as far as Agrigentum is for the most part a flat coast; and further east from Agrigentum the mountains are at a considerable distance from the coast, so that if we imagine a line drawn from Agrigentum to Catana, the country south of this line is a perfect plain, which is only interrupted here and there by low hills. By means of this general outline we shall be able, I hope, to estimate the manner in which the war was conducted. Persons have asked, Why did not the Romans, who were in possession of Messina, proceed along the coast to Panormus, which would have facilitated the communication? The answer to this lies in the nature of the country, with which I have become acquainted not through the description of travellers alone, but through paying strict attention to the events of the year 1812, when the English sent an expedition to Palermo. This expedition could not reach Palermo by land, but was obliged to be transported in ships. And as it is now, so it was with the ancients: the communication between Messina and Panormus was not practicable by land.

In order not to fill our heads with a mass of confused detail, we must divide the first Punic war into five periods. The first comprises the first four years, from 488 to 491, during which the Romans carried on the war without a fleet, and the Carthaginians were masters of the sea. The second extends from 492 to 496; the Romans now built a fleet, and were more successful than could have been expected; the Carthaginians were defeated by sea, and Regulus effected a landing in Africa. The third contains

the campaign of Regulus in Africa during the years 496 and 497. The fourth begins with the destruction of the army of Regulus and ends with the victory of L. Caecilius Metellus at Panormus, from 497 to 501. The fifth period is a struggle of ten years, about Lilybaeum and Drepana, from 502 to the victory near the Aegates insulae in 511. During this last period the war was confined to the extremely limited space about Lilybaeum and Drepana; but the diversion which Hamilcar Barca made, and of which we unfortunately know so little, is one of the most brilliant exploits in the history of ancient or of modern warfare, although it is more important in a military than in an historical point of view: it was a military game at chess, which shewed a general who created his own resources and had them under his full control. Wars which have been protracted through a considerable number of years cannot be properly understood, unless they are divided into such separate and distinct masses as I have just made in regard to the first Punic war. The Thirty years' war is generally related without such divisions, and it is for no other reason that people find it so difficult to form a distinct and accurate idea of it.

Respecting the tactics of the Carthaginian mercenaries we know nothing; but it can scarcely be doubted, that each kind of these mercenaries retained its own peculiar weapons and mode of fighting; the Carthaginians themselves, when they did serve in their armies, formed most probably a phalanx; that this was the case with the Greeks and Macedonians who were in their service requires no proof. The Spaniards and Celts fought, I believe, *catervatim*, and wore linen breast-plates. It is certain that the Gauls fought in great masses.

In the year 490, the third of the war, the Romans besieged Agrigentum with two armies.<sup>1</sup> This city was of very great extent, but as a city it was only a shadow of

what it had been 140 years before. A great Carthaginian army had thrown itself within its extensive walls. The Romans besieged them very closely for a period of seven months. At the commencement of the war, the Carthaginian generals were very inferior men, and it was unfortunate for Carthage that Hamilcar Barca came too late, and at a time when it was no longer in his power to recover what had been lost. During the first period the Carthaginians seem to have made little or no use of elephants, and to have shrunk from entering upon an open contest with the Romans. The siege had already lasted for five months, when the Carthaginians sent an army and fifty elephants under Hanno to the relief of the besieged in Agrigentum; but he had not sufficient courage to fight, and he protected himself and his troops in a fortified camp near Heraclea, from whence he hoped to compel the Romans to raise the siege by cutting off their necessary supplies. Thus Agrigentum suffered from want of provisions through the Romans, and the Romans through the Carthaginians. As the latter were masters of the sea, the Romans were much confined by the Numidian horsemen, the Cossacks of the ancients, and on foraging excursions they often sustained great losses; but their perseverance led them to victory. Although the circumstances were unfavourable, they attacked Hanno, who had been encamped for two months, and routed his army. The fall of Agrigentum was now unavoidable. Whether the Romans allowed the besieged to escape in order not to drive the enemy to extremes, or whether the Carthaginians forced their way through the Roman camp in despair, cannot be said with certainty; but the Carthaginian army left the city and made its way through the Roman fortifications: all those who could bear arms followed them; and the rest of the population, the defenceless and the sick, remained behind. The Romans then took the town by storm, and committed all the horrors which usually accompany such a conquest: the soldiers indemnified themselves for the

sufferings and hardships they had endured during the seven months of the siege.

The taking of Agrigentum suggested to the Romans ideas entirely new respecting the objects of the war. At its commencement they had merely wished to have Messana and Syracuse as their dependent allies, but they now cherished the thought which Dionysius, Agathocles, and Pyrrhus had endeavoured to realize, namely, to expel the Carthaginians from the island altogether. But they saw at the same time, that it was impossible to accomplish this without a fleet. Down to the time of the Peloponnesian war, no larger vessels had been built than triremes and penteconters. The penteconters were open boats, but the triremes had decks. One part of the men on board were soldiers, and the other rowers. But these ships had long since been outstripped by others. After the Peloponnesian war, larger vessels were first built at Syracuse, at first quadriremes and afterwards quinqueremes. They were used in the Macedonian fleets, as early as the time of Alexander the Great, and in Sicily, and they afterwards occur during the first Punic war; but the Romans, as well as their subjects, had only triremes<sup>2</sup>. Although the ancients, like the modern Greeks, had excellent sails, their object was to make their ships independent of the wind, current, and waves, like our steam-boats, and they found the power which gave them this independence, in their oars. A quinquereme had 300 rowers and 120 marines; and a triveme with 120 rowers bore the same proportion to a quinquereme, which a steam-boat of twelve horse power bears to one of thirty, and could do as little against it as a frigate or a brigantine can effect against a ship of the line. At the commencement of the war, the Romans had transported their soldiers to Sicily in triremes. It is said, that they had no armed vessels, and it is certain, that they were not acquainted with the art of shipbuilding. The most natural course for the Romans would now have been, to send some

<sup>2</sup> Vol. III. p. 575, note 1052.



shipbuilders to Macedonia or to Egypt, (for they had connexions with Ptolemy Philadelphus) to obtain models; for the ancients, like ourselves, built from models, which is the most natural method, and is also expressly mentioned. But this they did not do. A Carthaginian quinquereme had been thrown upon the coast of Bruttium, and after this model the Romans built 120 ships<sup>3</sup>. They were of a clumsy construction, and in no way to be compared with the Carthaginian ships. In addition to this, the Romans had no sailors, or only a few; and as a fleet of one hundred quinqueremes required 30,000 rowers, they were obliged to man their ships chiefly with slaves and freedmen<sup>4</sup>. The Romans had to learn the service in the fleet, just as in Russia and France those men are obliged to learn the maritime service who come from the inland districts. But what seems to us most ludicrous is, that the men were exercised on scaffoldings: in our days such a method of drilling men would call forth a host of caricatures, and it was laughable indeed. The contrast between a Roman and a Carthaginian vessel was the same as there is at present between a Russian ship of the line, and an English or an American one. But the Romans were great, and devised means by which they overcame their difficulties. If we have to fight against an enemy of superior skill, the only means by which we can hope to conquer him is, to oppose him with greater masses<sup>5</sup>. In

<sup>3</sup> Vol. III. p. 576, note 1053

<sup>4</sup> A different opinion is expressed in vol. III. p. 576.

<sup>5</sup> The great Carnot saw this and rejected the old tactics of lines, which our forefathers had used, and with which the French commenced the wars of the revolution and were deplorably beaten. Carnot was one of the greatest men of modern times: he saw the problem at once, and solved it. He formed the troops into masses, with which he broke in upon the enemy. These masses, if once broken through, would have been lost; but they had confidence, and threw themselves irresistibly upon the thin lines. A whole year passed away before the enemy comprehended this new method. It was with these new tactics that Carnot decided the battle of Bretigny, which forms the crisis of modern history, and the importance of which has



order to make up for the awkwardness of their ships, the Romans attached boarding-bridges to them<sup>6</sup>. It was a simple idea to form wooden bridges which held two or three men abreast; both sides were protected by parapets to prevent the men falling into the water. These bridges were thrown upon the ships of the enemy by the help of a very simple mechanism, and took a firm hold of them by means of grappling irons. When a Carthaginian vessel was thus boarded, the advantage of its greater speed and lightness was lost, and the Romans were able to make use of the soldiers of their legions; and as the Carthaginian soldiers were bad, or at least far inferior to the Roman legionaries, the latter had decided advantages. But the principal object now was, to get so near the enemy's ships as to be able to make use of the boarding machines. In the first attempt at maritime warfare in the year 492, the Roman squadron was lost near Lipara, through the imprudence of its commander Cn. Cornelius Scipio. But a few days after, the Carthaginians had likewise to sustain a heavy loss, for one of their squadrons under Hannibal fell in with the Roman fleet and was almost completely destroyed. The victory of the consul C. Duilius, which soon followed, was decisive. The Carthaginians had, at first, shewn great contempt of the Roman navy; but they soon discovered their delusion, and despair came over them when they saw the sea-fight changed into a land-fight. Thirty-one Carthaginian ships were taken, and many others were destroyed, and the Romans were intoxicated with joy at this brilliant victory. Fortune thus favoured their first enterprise on the unstable element, and henceforth remained faithful to them on it.

never yet been rightly understood. General Hoche made use of the same military system in Lorraine; it was by means of heavy masses that the Americans defeated the English ships, which they could not have done in any other way.—N.

<sup>6</sup> Vol. III. p. 577, foll.

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## LECTURE IV.

VICTORY OF THE ROMANS NEAR ECNOMUS.—THEIR LANDING IN AFRICA, AND THEIR SUCCESS THERE.—REGULUS.—XANTHIPPIUS.—DEFEAT OF REGULUS.—DISASTERS OF THE ROMANS AT SEA.—VICTORY OF L. CAECILIUS METELLUS AT PANORMUS.—CHARACTER OF THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR.

EVERY one knows the great honours with which C. Duilius was rewarded for his victory: he was allowed to be accompanied home in the evening from banquets by torchlight and music, which must otherwise have been forbidden, and the celebrated columna rostrata was erected, with inscriptions recording the details of his victory. Some fragments of these inscriptions are still preserved; but it is not generally known, that the present table which contains them is not the original one,—the antiquaries at Rome are aware of this, but not those of Germany,—for it is a piece of Greek marble, which was unknown in Rome at the time of Duilius. The original column, adorned with the beaks of the conquered ships and the inscriptions, was struck by lightning in the reign of Tiberius, and faithfully restored by Germanicus.

During the three years which now followed, from 493 to 495, the Romans were masters of the sea; and a piratical expedition against Sardinia and Corsica was likewise successful. In Sicily, the Carthaginians still maintained themselves from Selinus to Lilybaeum, and on the whole northern coast of the island from Lilybaeum to Mylae. In the year 496, the ninth of the war, the Romans determined to attack the Carthaginians in Africa. Agathocles had shewn

that they were most vulnerable in their own country. In order to be able to act with the necessary energy, they increased their navy to no less than 330 men of war; which were, according to Polybius, for the most part quinqueremes; the Carthaginian fleet consisted of 350 quinqueremes. Polybius draws attention to the tremendous efforts of this war; and with justice, for as every quinquereme had 300 rowers and 120 marines, the Romans employed about 140,000 men, and had a number of transports for their horses besides. The Carthaginian forces were equally strong, the Roman ships were still awkward, and their success still depended upon their boarding bridges. They sailed along the eastern and southern coasts of Sicily, either because the northern coast was in the possession of the enemy, or because they had to take in provisions at Syracuse. The Carthaginians met them between Agrigentum and Pachynus (near Ecnomus)<sup>1</sup>. The Romans adopted the system of fighting in masses, and divided their fleet into four squadrons. Each consul commanded one, and the third and fourth were commanded by generals whose names are unknown. As they sailed against the enemy, the first and second squadrons formed two straight lines, so that merely two ships (in the form of a *cuneus*) were facing the enemy. But these two lines gradually formed into a right angle which was closed by the third squadron. The fourth was placed behind to protect the transports. This was a manoeuvre which required favourable circumstances for its execution. The Carthaginians, who were stationed nearer to Camarina, had likewise divided their fleet into four squadrons, two of which formed the centre and two were stationed so as to form the wings. With the centre they sailed against the Romans, while the wings sailed around them. The Romans advanced with their first two squadrons against the Carthaginian centre, which retired, in order to draw the Romans away from their third and fourth lines. In this manner the two Car-

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 583.

thaginian wings fell upon the third and fourth squadrons of the Romans, which were guarding the transports near the coast. But the boarding bridges saved the Romans. As soon as the Carthaginian centre ceased to retreat, a great number of its vessels were lost, and the Romans now returned to save the two squadrons which were pressed very hard by the Carthaginian wings. One part of the Carthaginian ships was dispersed and the other thrown upon the coast: the whole Carthaginian fleet was completely defeated, and both consuls, L. Manlius and M. Atilius Regulus, sailed with their forces to Africa. The remainder of the Carthaginian fleet made for Carthage: their commanders had lost their courage and their senses to an inconceivable degree.

The Romans landed south-east of cape Hermaeum near the town of Clupea (in Greek Aspis, the Punic name is not known,) and took the place after a brave defence. The main army of the Carthaginians was still in Sicily, as they had entertained to the last the firm hope of preventing the Romans from landing in Africa, and they were consequently unprepared to meet the enemy. The Romans found the people everywhere inclined to desert their cruel masters. The Carthaginians had but few fortified places in Africa to keep their subjects in submission: just as the Lombards pulled down the walls of the fortified towns in Italy, partly because they were ignorant of, or disliked the art of besieging, and partly with a view to prevent rebellions. The African towns subject to Carthage were thus, for the most part, open places, and the real Punic colonies on the coast were the only ones which were fortified. The consequences of this system had been seen in the wars of Agathocles: the progress of an enemy in Africa could not be stopped; but the Africans were perhaps discouraged by the unfortunate issue of the war of Agathocles. It is almost inconceivable what could induce the Roman Senate at this juncture to call back L. Manlius and his army, and to think that Regulus and his army would alone be suffi-

cient to carry on the operations against the Carthaginians.

After the departure of Manlius in 497, Regulus defeated the Carthaginians near Adis<sup>2</sup>. Their army was excessively timid, and withdrew into inaccessible districts to protect itself. Unwarlike and without any zeal as their soldiers were, they were easily driven out of their fortified places, and Regulus found no difficulty in taking Tunes, in the immediate vicinity of Carthage. Africa seems to have been looked upon at that time as a fabulous land of monsters and dragons. The story about the huge serpent on the river Bagradas, whose skin is said to have measured one hundred and twenty feet, and whose defeat could only be effected by the exertions of the whole Roman army, although Livy<sup>3</sup> related it quite seriously, must be regarded as a fable. It may be, that the Romans had to sustain losses through serpents; but this particular tale is worth nothing, and was, perhaps, borrowed from Naevius, who, as a poet, might with all propriety invent such a marvellous occurrence.

The Carthaginians were reduced to the last extremity, their courage failed them, and they could not withdraw their whole army from Sicily without giving up the island altogether. An embassy was therefore sent to Regulus to sue for peace. Regulus is one of those men who have a great name in history without deserving it: in his prosperity he was without mercy, intoxicated with victory, and ungenerous. There is a story, according to which he petitioned the senate for his recall, because his farm was going to ruin during his absence<sup>4</sup>. But we know from Polybius, that he had set his heart upon concluding the war himself, in order that his successors might not reap the fruits of his labours; and Polybius shews at the same time, how unreasonably he acted in demanding, with this object in

<sup>2</sup> Vol. III. p. 587.

<sup>3</sup> Epitome XVIII.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. III. p. 586.

view, from the Carthaginians, things which were utterly impossible, and made the terms of the peace much more distressing than those which they actually obtained at the end of the war<sup>5</sup>. He demanded the recognition of the supremacy of Rome; an offensive and defensive alliance with Rome; assistance in all her undertakings; the surrender of all their ships of war except one, but if the Romans should require it, then Carthage was to build fifty ships of war to assist them. It was further demanded that they should give up Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and the Balearian islands; surrender all the Roman prisoners without ransom, but pay ransom for the Punic ones, and pay all the expenses of the war. These terms were unreasonable, and Regulus deserved the fate which awaited him. Carthage would not submit to them, and declared that it would rather fight to the last. Fresh preparations were accordingly made, all the citizens capable of bearing arms were enlisted, and mercenaries were drawn together from all parts. Among them was the celebrated Xanthippus. Diodorus<sup>6</sup> calls him a Spartan, which he certainly was not. He was a Lacedaemonian, or a Neodamodes (*νεοδαμώδης*), the descendant of a freedman, who in his education had been subjected to the rigid Spartan discipline<sup>7</sup>. The accounts which we have of the Spartan affairs at this time are obscure; but it may be regarded as a fact, that while every Spartan was obliged to obey the laws of Lycurgus, strangers, and not merely Lacedaemonians or Neodamodes, but even the children of proxeni, were allowed to adopt the same *ἐγωγή*. Xanthippus came to Carthage as the leader of a band of Peloponnesians, which he himself had probably collected at Taenarus, the chief recruiting place at that time. He declared openly, that the Carthaginians had not been defeated by the superiority of the Romans, but through the ignorance of their

<sup>5</sup> Vol. III. p. 588.

<sup>6</sup> XXIII. Eclog. 13. p. 504.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, I. 32.



own generals. It was now a fortunate circumstance that civil and military powers were kept distinct at Carthage. When Xanthippus was introduced into the senate of Carthage and requested to propose a better plan for carrying on the war, he reminded them that they had a great number of elephants<sup>8</sup>, and a better and more numerous cavalry<sup>9</sup> than the Romans; that they ought to seek the plains and compel the Romans to take refuge in the mountains; and that it was cowardice alone which could wish to transfer the war into the mountains. Xanthippus was appointed to the supreme command of the army; a great resolution on the part of Carthage! He arranged the army according to his own views; and after the soldiers were well drilled and exercised, he marched out into the open field to the great astonishment of the Romans, which was increased on the appearance of the elephants. The Romans endeavoured to protect themselves against these animals by deep lines, and by placing numerous cohorts, one behind the other in the centre, and the cavalry on the wings. In a few moments the Romans were routed and driven back to their camp: their left wing, in order to avoid the elephants, moved towards the right wing of the Carthaginians, and put them to flight, but the right wing of the Romans was crushed by the elephants. Regulus and five hundred Romans were taken prisoners, and 2000 of the left wing escaped in the confusion of the pursuit to Clupea.

Xanthippus had the wisdom, after this victory, to return

<sup>8</sup> The Carthaginians had not been long familiar with the use of elephants in war, and I believe that it was at the beginning of this war that they used them for the first time, for we do not find them mentioned either in the war against Dionysius, or in those against Agathocles. In India, elephants have been used in war from time immemorial, and it must have been there that the Macedonians became acquainted with their use.—N.

<sup>9</sup> Regulus had not more than about 20,000 men, and consequently not more than from 1500 to 1800 horsemen. The Numidian cavalry in the Carthaginian armies was always very considerable.—N.

to his country with the rich presents of the Carthaginians, and to withdraw himself from the jealousy of a foreign nation. The Romans sent out their whole fleet to rescue the garrison of Clupea; but the Carthaginians, encouraged by their victory, equipped their fleet and sailed out to meet the enemy, but they were defeated. The statement which we read in Polybius, that a hundred and fourteen Carthaginian ships were taken, is false: the word *ἐκατὸν* should be omitted in his text, and then we have the right number of ships, that is, fourteen<sup>10</sup>. The Roman consuls then sailed to Clupea, took their soldiers on board, and after having evacuated their last post in Africa, they sailed along the southern coast of Sicily towards Syracuse. It was just the season about the beginning of the dog-days, in the first days of July, when the Sirocco is sometimes accompanied by fearful storms<sup>11</sup>; and such a storm arose while the Roman fleet was on its return. When vessels, which solely depended on their oars, were overtaken by a storm of this kind, they were completely destroyed in the breakers on the harbourless coast. It was impossible for the Roman ships to escape: nearly the whole fleet was wrecked on the coast between Camarina and Pachynus. This was the first great disaster; but in this very same year it was to be followed by a second, in which a fleet and an army were destroyed.

The Carthaginians now displayed double courage: they sent considerable reinforcements to Sicily, and applied the system of tactics which Xanthippus had taught them. The Romans were somewhat intimidated, and sought war in the mountains only. The expenses of building a fleet were immense; hence the Carthaginians wished to carry on the war either by sea or by land, for to do both at once was too expensive. The Romans, after having received the news of the disaster which had befallen their fleet, had immediately turned their thoughts towards building a new

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, i. 36. Vol. III. p. 592.

<sup>11</sup> Vol. III. p. 592, foll.

one; they now made considerable conquests on the coast of Sicily, and also took possession of Panormus. Hereupon they sailed again with a large fleet towards the coast of Africa; but after they had laid waste the coast of the Lesser Syrtis, and had with great difficulty escaped destruction on the sands of the Syrtis, they returned to Panormus; and while they were boldly steering across the sea towards the mouth of the Tiber, they were surprised by a fearful storm, in which nearly the whole fleet was wrecked. It is of importance to know, that south winds are always storms in the Mediterranean—the *Noti* in Horace are heavy gales—and of the same character as our north-west winds, which are harmless in the Mediterranean, where all south winds, from south-west to south-east, are equally destructive. But in the neighbourhood of the Syrtes (from the verb *συρᾶν*) the north-west wind is equally dangerous. Vessels, which approach too near, are in such a wind driven upon the sandbanks with incredible force. The danger is increased by the circumstance, that the currents which come from the Adriatic and the Euxine meet in the Syrtes. The accounts which the ancients give of the dangers of the Syrtes are by no means exaggerated. At the present time, attention has again been directed towards those dangerous places.


The loss of the second fleet was a blow which bowed down the courage of the Romans: however they were resolved not to make peace, but to try how far they could carry on the war with more moderate exertions. In this manner the year 501 approached, four years after the defeat of Regulus. From the year 499 fortune had, on the whole, favoured the Carthaginians. But the fourth period of the war now ended with the victory gained by L. Caecilius Metellus over Hasdrubal near Panormus. The Carthaginian general had hoped to turn to his advantage the fear which the Romans had shewn, ever since the defeat of Regulus, of the Numidian horsemen and the cavalry, and to conquer Panormus. He advanced to

the distance of about two miles from the town—he may have had a secret understanding with some persons in the place. It was harvest time, and he ravaged the fields. Metellus proved himself to be a great general, and in order to draw the Carthaginians into a position where their elephants would be of no avail, he drew up his lines of light-armed troops before the trenches of the camp, which was close by the walls of Panormus. The legions acted on the wings, and the light-armed infantry was driven back by the elephants into the camp. The Carthaginians followed, and advanced nearer the camp and the town. The Romans, who were constantly supplied with fresh missiles from the town, sent showers of javelins and darts upon the Carthaginians and their elephants. During the confusion which was thus produced, and while the Carthaginians were making a valiant attack, the Roman legions sallied forth from the camp on the left flank of the enemy. The elephants were wounded, grew wild, and threw themselves upon the Carthaginian cavalry and infantry. The Carthaginians were routed, and their confusion was so great, that more than one hundred elephants fell into the hands of the Romans. It was the greatest defeat that the Carthaginians had yet suffered in the open field<sup>12</sup>. It revived the courage of the Romans and disheartened their enemies. The Carthaginians were now confined to the extreme west of the island, where they possessed only Lilybaeum, Eryx, and Drepana.

In the year after this victory the siege of Lilybaeum was commenced, and during the whole of this last period of the war we hear of nothing but sieges, which are interrupted only by blockades. The siege of Lilybaeum is one of the most obstinate efforts against one place; and from the moment it began, the war may be called the Lilybaean war, just as one part of the Peloponnesian war is called the Deceleian. All the five periods of the first Punic war might, in fact, be called by particular

<sup>12</sup> Compare Vol. III. p 597. foll.

names, which would indeed assist our memory greatly, but I will not recommend such a method, for there is much that may be said against it. The fifth and last act of this war is the noblest, and for Carthage also the most glorious: the Romans shewed only perseverance and obstinacy. Concerning the civil history of Rome during this time little can be said, for few changes were made, and the crisis was over for a time.



## LECTURE V.

EMBASSY OF REGULUS TO ROME. — LILYBAEUM. — EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON SICILY. — SIEGE OF LILYBAEUM. — DEFEAT OF THE ROMANS AT DREPANA. — WRECK OF THE ROMAN TRANSPORTS NEAR CAMARINA. — HAMILCAR BARCA.—HERCTE.—ERYX.

I DID not mention yesterday the embassy of Regulus to Rome. Every one remembers the beautiful verses of Horace, and what Cicero says, concerning Regulus; but Palmerius and Beaufort have shewn, that this tragedy is a complete fiction<sup>1</sup>, and that it was probably invented because the Romans allowed that the terms of peace proposed by Regulus were abominable, and that he had to make amends for his shameful conduct. Beaufort has drawn attention to a fragment of Diodorus<sup>2</sup>, according to which two noble Carthaginians were retained at Rome as hostages for the life of Regulus. The same fragment states, that after the death of Regulus at Carthage, one of them was killed at Rome by the relatives of Regulus, and that the other would have suffered the most cruel death, had not the Romans rescued him from his prison. It was probably this crime, committed by the family of Regulus, which caused the fabrication of the whole story about the death of Regulus. Previous to the time of Polybius it does not seem to have been known; for had he been acquainted with the tragic fate of Regulus as later writers tell it, he would not have passed it over in silence.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Vol. III. p. 598, foll. Palmerius, Exercit. in Auct. Graec. p. 151, foll.

<sup>2</sup> Fragm. lib. XXIV. p. 566, ed. Wesseling.



The common account of the death of Regulus may be effaced from the pages of history without any scruple.

Although the war had now lasted for nearly fourteen years, there had been only two battles in the open field, and the Carthaginians were, nevertheless, confined to the western corner of Sicily. The siege of Lilybaeum began in the year 502, and the Lilybaean war lasted full nine years: in the tenth, peace was concluded. The siege was undertaken by the Romans under unfavourable circumstances: the Carthaginians were masters of the sea, but they had limited their naval forces as much as possible on account of their enormous expense. The Romans encouraged by their late success, had again built a fleet, though likewise of a limited number of ships; but it was sufficient, if not to render the communication between Carthage and Lilybaeum impossible, yet to make it difficult. Lilybaeum was the only Punic town in Sicily, and had been built after the destruction of Motye by the elder Dionysius<sup>3</sup>. Its name is Punic, and shows the unpoetical character of the Carthaginians, for according to Bochart it signifies nothing but *Le Lubi*, that is, a place opposite to Libya. The colony was undoubtedly a mixed one, like Carthage in Spain, consisting of Punians and Libyans, and had now become a place of considerable importance. Panormus had originally had a Punic population; but it was now Hellenized, and was, like all the rest, completely a Greek town, for the inhabitants of Sicily were all Greeks, even those who acknowledged the sovereignty of Carthage. Lilybaeum had an excellent harbour, which was the more safe, as it was difficult to sail into it on account of the sandbanks and the lagoons. The sand, which is driven thither from the Syrtes by south winds, has in the course of time completely filled the harbour, and the present town of Marsala has no harbour, but only a miserable road<sup>4</sup>. Drepana has preserved its excellent harbour to this day, although the Emperor

<sup>3</sup> Vol. III. p. 601.

<sup>4</sup> See a different opinion in Vol. III. p. 605.

Charles V. endeavoured to destroy it from cowardice and fear of the Moors. Drepana was about fifteen miles from Lilybaeum, and not far from Drepana was mount Eryx. Such was the small district occupied by the Carthaginians, and the war, which was concentrated there for nine years, caused the misery of that part of the island, for wherever armies were encamped, everything was destroyed. The insurrection during the second Punic war completed the distress of Sicily, and at the time of the Servile war, it became a perfect wilderness. The present wretched condition of the island, after the lapse of so many centuries, and after the miseries inflicted upon it by so many destructive governments, is, with the sole exception of Syracuse, not worse than it was at that time, as far as the cultivation of the soil is concerned. The population, however, is now more brutalized than it was under the Romans, when at least arts and sciences were cultivated; for with the exception of the Portuguese, the Sicilians are in the lowest stage of European civilization.

The Romans began the siege of Lilybaeum in a bold manner<sup>5</sup>. They stationed their fleet near the place and cruised before its harbour, so that Carthage had no direct communication with Lilybaeum. They hoped to conquer it by force or by treachery; and the latter would probably have been the case, had not a faithful Achaean of the name of Alexo informed Himilco, the commander of the garrison, of the existence of a plot among the mercenaries for that object. Alexo was a man of honour, although he belonged to a contemptible class. The Romans had adopted the Greek method of besieging: in their wars against the Samnites they had only used towers, and simply blockaded the towns of their enemy, but no regular sieges are mentioned previous to the first Punic war<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 602.

<sup>6</sup> There is a fragment of Diodorus in which the Romans are made to request the Carthaginians not to force them to learn mari-

The Romans made indeed great progress, and were very successful with their fire-engines. It is a mistake of Polybius to state, that at the commencement of the siege they threw down six towers<sup>7</sup>; this circumstance belongs to a later time. Hannibal, a bold Carthaginian admiral, kept up the communication between Carthage and Lilybaeum by making his way through the Roman fleet. When Carthage heard that the besieged were reduced to extremes, and resolved to send reinforcements to Sicily, he conducted them safely into the harbour, to the great consternation of the Romans. The besieged immediately made a sally, which, however, proved unsuccessful, notwithstanding their immense exertions. But a fearful west wind soon after accomplished what men had not been able to achieve. The storm blew in the direction of the Roman camp, which was full of fire-engines and combustibles, and as the besieged threw fire into the camp, all the machines, towers, and galleries of the Romans soon became a prey to the flames. The six towers which, according to Polybius, had been thrown down at the commencement of the siege, did not fall earlier than just before the catastrophe brought about by the hurricane. The Romans now confined themselves to blockading the fortress, though they must have been convinced that they could thereby effect nothing. However they attempted, like Cardinal Richelieu, to obstruct and destroy the entrance of the harbour; but they succeeded only so far as to render the communication between the fortress and the sea less free. The Roman fleet was stationed near Lilybaeum, and that of the Carthaginians in the port of Drepana.

time warfare also, for, they said, they had always been learning new tactics, and had always soon conquered those of whom they had learnt.—N.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, 1. 42. In vol. III. p. 603, Niebuhr seems to have adopted the statement of Polybius without expressing any doubt as to its correctness.

In the year 503, the Romans sent reinforcements to their troops, as well as to their fleet, without the Carthaginians being aware of it. One of the consuls of this year was P. Claudius, the son of Appius Claudius the Blind, who had all the faults of his father without any of his great qualities. He resolved with foolhardiness to attack the Carthaginian fleet in the port of Drepana. Among the Carthaginian generals there were now some whom experience had raised far above mediocrity, whereas, among the Romans, there was not one of any great merit ; and while the Romans were superior in their soldiers, the Carthaginians excelled them in their generals.<sup>8</sup> Claudius manned his galleys in the stillness of the night, and before daybreak he sailed into the port of Drepana, expecting to find the Carthaginians unprepared. They had not indeed expected the enemy, but their general was watchful. He quickly manned his ships ; and while the Roman vessels were running into the extensive harbour at the western entrance, in a long line, he led his ships into the sea along the opposite coast. When the Romans discovered what was going on, and that it was the intention of the Carthaginians to drive them into the harbour, and there to throw them on the coast, which was occupied by Carthaginian troops, a signal was given and they hastily retreated. But while the ships which were hastening to get out pressed upon and injured those which were still running into the harbour, the Carthaginian fleet drew up in battle array, and attacked the Romans. It seems that the Romans had given up using their boarding-bridges, for had they made use of them the issue of the engagement might have been different<sup>9</sup>. The Romans were completely defeated, and lost upwards of ninety ships ; a small number only escaped to the road of Lilybaeum.

The Carthaginians had now decided advantages over

<sup>8</sup> Vol. III. p. 607.

<sup>9</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 605, foll.

the Romans. P. Claudius was called to Rome to appoint a dictator; for after the curiae had lost their privileges, the right of the consul to nominate a dictator had gradually become a right to appoint him<sup>10</sup>. He insultingly appointed M. Claudius Glycias, the son of a freedman. The Fasti mention only the name of his father, but not that of his grandfather, and he was consequently yet a *libertinus*. Claudius was tried for high treason, and according to all appearance sent into exile, where he died soon after. His sister, a vestal virgin, while riding through the crowds in the circus, loudly expressed her regret that her brother was no longer alive, since, by the defeat of another fleet, he might have sent a great many more of the rabble out of the world<sup>11</sup>. She, too, was accused and condemned to a heavy penalty as guilty of high treason against the people.

Another disaster yet awaited the Romans. They sent a convoy of eight hundred ships<sup>12</sup> with provisions to relieve the wants of the army at Lilybaeum. It was escorted by a considerable fleet, under the command of the consul C. Junius. He sailed through the straits of Messina to Syracuse, took in a cargo there, and sent a part of the convoy under escort to Lilybaeum, intending to follow himself afterwards with the remainder. This was very imprudent; for the accompanying ships of war were not sufficient against the powerful fleet of the Carthaginians, which frightened the Roman detachment so much that it took shelter on the bad roadstead of Phintias. The Carthaginian admiral Carthalo would not attack them there, but still succeeded in destroying many of the transports. Had the Romans received speedy support, the

<sup>10</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 566, foll.

<sup>11</sup> Suetonius, Tiberius, c. 2; Livy, Epitome XIX.

<sup>12</sup> This fact is worth remembering, as it refutes the false notion, that the commerce of the ancient world was of no great importance; it shews that navigation in the Mediterranean was carried on upon a very large scale.—N.

affair might yet have turned out well. But Junius delayed his departure, and when he sailed from Syracuse and heard what had taken place, and when the Carthaginians shewed themselves, he too sought shelter on bad road-steads near Camarina. A frightful south-storm now arose. Carthalo, adroit and active, doubled cape Pachynus towards the north, where he found protection against the wind. The whole of the Roman fleet, the ships of war, as well as the transports, were thrown on the rocks and the coast with such vehemence, that, as Polybius<sup>13</sup> says, not a plank was saved which could be used again. The Romans were now unable any longer to compete with the Carthaginians at sea; fortune seemed to be against them, and they renounced the sea entirely, with the exception of a few ships.

The only advantage which the Romans gained in the course of this year, was the taking of the town of Eryx. The town itself was situated on the declivity of the mountain, and the temple of Venus on the top of it formed the acropolis. The town was taken by surprise.

Carthage was now the sole mistress of the sea. It seems to have been about this time that the Carthaginians made the memorable attempt to contract a loan of more than two thousand talents with Ptolemy Philadelphus. But the king of Egypt refused to comply with their request, as he wished to remain neutral<sup>14</sup>. Carthage had to raise extraordinary contributions, and the continuation of the war drained her last resources.

It was at this time that the great Hamilcar Barca appeared on the scene of action. It is not certain whether he belonged to any of the great families at Carthage<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> I. 54.    <sup>14</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Sicul.*, vol. I. p. 92, ed. Schweigh.

<sup>15</sup> The surname Barca is of the same meaning as Barak in the Old Testament, and we may safely recognize in it the Semitic word barak, *i. e.* lightning; it may also signify blessing, but the other interpretation is more suitable. The Romans, in like manner, called the Scipios, the *fulmina belli*, and the Turks called their great Sultan, Bayazid, lightning.—N.



It might almost be said that he was a greater man than even his son Hannibal. There is no parallel case in history of a father and his son being so eminently great in their art as Hamilcar and Hannibal. To be a good general is an art; it requires genius, and the talent for it must be born with a man; the mechanical part alone can be learnt. Hamilcar began his operations with a boldness which surpasses everything of its kind. In the neighbourhood of Palermo there is a mountain, monte Pellegrino, with the convent of Santa Rosalia; in ancient times it bore the name of Hercte, (*Εἶρατῆ*), *i. e.* a prison), and near it was a small harbour just sufficient to form a landing place<sup>16</sup>. Here Hamilcar, who had just returned from an expedition against Bruttium, appeared unexpectedly with a squadron, took possession of the mountain either by surprise or by treachery, established himself, and made excursions in which he ravaged the Roman coast as far as Cumae. On this mountain, Hamilcar maintained himself, as in a fortress, for three years (504-508), during which he often suffered from extreme want of provisions, but he made excursions both by land and sea, and tried to wear out the Romans. But after the third year, he found an opportunity of making himself master of the town of Eryx. He left Hercte, and with a detachment of his troops he occupied Eryx, where he was blockaded by the Romans who were in possession of the top and the foot of the mountain. The communication with the sea was much more difficult here than on mount Hercte, and the corps which he commanded consisted of profligate mercenaries, hundreds of whom were ready to deliver him up into the hands of the enemy; but he inspired these faithless savages with such a degree of admiration, that they did not venture to make the attempt. Polybius justly remarks<sup>17</sup>, that it is impossible to relate the history of these years, on account of the apparent uniformity of the occurrences. But the engagements on this small space were, nevertheless, often

<sup>16</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 610.

<sup>17</sup> I. 56.

very bloody, and although the troops of Hamilcar were occasionally beaten, the Romans gained nothing decisive, and never made any progress beyond the momentary advantage. The newly-discovered fragments of Diodorus<sup>18</sup> contain an anecdote about Hamilcar which is beautiful, and shews his character in the clearest light. In the year preceding the close of the war, the Roman consul, C. Fundanius marched out against him; the troops of Hamilcar were defeated through the fault of the commanders of the infantry, and many were slain. Hamilcar sent to the Roman general and asked for a truce, that he might be able to bury the dead<sup>19</sup>. The consul sent him back the answer, that he ought rather to be concerned about the living, and capitulate. Hamilcar either did not receive the bodies at all, or only with this insulting reply. A short time afterwards another engagement took place, in which the Romans suffered great losses. Herald's were now sent by the Romans or their allies to effect the delivery of the dead, and Hamilcar granted their request by saying, that he would always be willing to allow them to take back the dead after a battle, for he made war against the living only. This answer was either the simple expression of his own feelings, or was intended to put the Romans to the blush. This and similar anecdotes were probably derived from Philinus, who is said to have always represented the Carthaginians in a more favourable light than the Romans.

<sup>18</sup> Lib. XXIV. 2 and 3, p. 60, ed. Dindorf.

<sup>19</sup> This *pictas* towards the dead was generally observed in the wars of the ancients, but more especially by the Greeks; the Romans were little concerned about the dead.—N.

## LECTURE VI.

THIRD ROMAN FLEET.—VICTORY OF THE ROMANS NEAR THE AEGATES.—CONCLUSION OF THE WAR AND PEACE.—SICILY THE FIRST ROMAN PROVINCE.—CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WITHIN THE LAST FIFTY YEARS.—WAR AGAINST THE FALISCANS.—INSURRECTION OF THE MERCENARIES AT CARTHAGE.—SARDINIA AND CORSICA.—ILLYRICUM.

THE peculiar nature of the war gradually convinced the Romans, that it could not possibly be brought to a close without extraordinary exertions. It was therefore decreed, for the third time, to build a fleet; but as the state was no longer able to raise the necessary sums by a property-tax, a special loan was contracted with wealthy individuals for the building and equipping a fleet of two hundred ships of war<sup>1</sup>, on condition that the money should be returned if the undertaking should turn out favourably. This condition implied, of course, that the advanced sums were not to be returned if the undertaking failed<sup>2</sup>. The taxation of property, which was generally fixed at a certain rate per thousand, would have ruined the poorer citizens, and to raise any sums in this manner would have been impossible. The loans which the Roman state contracted were usually different from those of modern times; but those which were contracted during the Hannibalian war<sup>3</sup> approached nearer to our system<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> According to Orosius, Aurelius Victor, and Eutropius, it consisted of 300 ships.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, i. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxvi. 36; xxix. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Down to the seventeenth century all loans were repaid as soon

The Roman fleet was placed under the command of the consul C. Lutatius Catulus and the praetor Q. Valerius Falto, in the year 510. The ships were no longer as awkward as before, for at Lilybaeum the Romans had taken an excellent galley, which they now used as a model for their two hundred quinqueremes<sup>5</sup>. They also provided themselves with better sailors, whom they selected from all the maritime towns of Italy; and the best soldiers of the legions were used as marines. Boarding-bridges were no longer used, for the Romans were now resolved to let the issue depend upon an open sea-fight. The Carthaginians had entirely neglected their fleet from want of money; and as their patriotism was not as strong as that of the Romans, no extraordinary exertions had been made. They manned and repaired all their old ships to convey provisions and reinforcements to Lilybaeum, Drepana, and Eryx, which felt very much the want of both. Their fleet, loaded with corn, arrived at the Aegatian islands. In order to do without a great number of transports, the provisions were conveyed in ships of war. Their marines were not of the best kind, and the whole expedition had been got up in too great a hurry. The Romans were cruizing along the coast, and the Carthaginians intended to land their provisions, in order to take on board Hamilcar and the best of his soldiers as marines, and then to venture on an open sea-fight against the Romans. The latter saw that everything would be lost if the Carthaginians were allowed to carry out their plan, and determined on attacking the Carthaginians before they had attained their object<sup>6</sup>. The Romans, well prepared, sailed out to meet

as it could be done, in order to avoid the continued payment of interest. In many cases, however, it was impossible to follow this system, and in Holland, Spain, and at Nürnberg, there still exist bonds which were signed in the fifteenth century.

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, i. 59.

<sup>6</sup> Corn is a dangerous cargo, and vessels laden with it are easily upset, if it is not laden in sacks. There are many instances of ships with corn having been upset.—N.

the enemy. Hanno, the Carthaginian admiral, endeavoured, with a favourable wind and full sails<sup>7</sup>, to cross over from the island of Hieria to Lilybaeum. He thus fell on the Romans with double force, and had decided advantages over them. The Carthaginians boldly accepted the battle; but both the cargo of the ships and the bad condition of the Carthaginian soldiers rendered it easy for the Romans to gain a complete victory. Seventy Carthaginian ships were taken, many others were sunk, and the rest dispersed<sup>8</sup>.

The Carthaginians, unable to equip a second fleet, began to negotiate for peace. According to the account of Polybius<sup>9</sup>, which seems to be probable, Hamilcar Barca was chosen to conduct the negotiations. It was soon agreed, that Sicily should be evacuated and surrendered to the Romans, that Carthage should pay a contribution of 2200 talents, and restore all Roman prisoners and deserters without ransom.<sup>10</sup> The Romans had also demanded, that Hamilcar should lay down his arms and return home as a prisoner of war; but he had rejected this humiliating condition, and declared, that he would rather die sword in hand than return home in that condition<sup>11</sup>. It was agreed, that the peace should not be valid until the Roman people had given their sanction to it; and when the terms of the peace were laid before the people at Rome, the contributions were raised by one thousand talents, and it was further demanded that the Carthaginians should give up all the smaller islands between Sicily and Italy. This circumstance alone is sufficient to shew, that the Liparian islands were then still in the possession of the Carthaginians.

<sup>7</sup> Gallies often used no sails at all or small ones, but when the wind was favourable, large sails were hoisted.—N.

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, I. 61. Compare Diodorus, *Fragm. lib. XXIV. Eclog.* 3, p. 509; Oros. IV. 10; Eutrop. II. 16.

<sup>9</sup> I. 62. Compare Valerius Max. VI. 6. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, I. 62; III. 27. Compare Appian, *De Reb. Sicul.* p. 94, ed. Schweigh.; Eutrop. II. 16. <sup>11</sup> Cornel. Nepos, *Hamile.* I

After this peace, which terminated the first Punic war, Sicily was constituted as a Roman province. This was a new system, and Sicily was the first country to which it was applied. A province, in the Roman sense of the word, was a country in which a Roman general (either during the time of his *magistratus curulis*, or, in case of his year of office having elapsed, during the time for which his *imperium* was prolonged,) exercised over his soldiers, as well as over the inhabitants of the country, the same power as in times of war, by virtue of the *lex de imperio*<sup>12</sup>. It is a wrong notion, that the inhabitants of a province were not the owners of the soil; they were unquestionably the owners of the soil, though not according to the Roman, but according to the provincial law<sup>13</sup>. Within the boundaries of a province there were also *civitates liberae* and *civitates foederatae*<sup>14</sup>. The property of those who had lost it during the war was, of course, disposed of by the Romans in what manner they pleased. But the dominions of Hiero, who retained his title of king, the Mamertines and Tauromenium, became *civitates foederatae*; whereas Segesta, Centoripa, and others, were entirely free. Henceforward, there was usually one praetor and one quaestor in Sicily.

All we know about the changes made in the Roman constitution during the last fifty years, is little more than nothing, and I think myself very fortunate in having discovered some isolated traces. One of them is, that in the year 506 a second praetor was appointed, as is evident from a passage in Lydus "*De Magistratibus*"<sup>15</sup>. Another great change which took place during the war has, from an accidental circumstance, not been fully recognised, and I almost think that I am the first that has drawn attention to it. Dionysius<sup>16</sup>, who calls the first Punic war *Φοινικὸς*

<sup>12</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 620. <sup>13</sup> Vol. III. p. 618. <sup>14</sup> Vol. III. p. 616.

<sup>15</sup> I. 38. 45. Compare vol. III. p. 619, foll.; Livy, Epit. lib. XIX.

<sup>16</sup> VII. p. 475, ed. Sylburg.



πόλεμος, says, that down to its commencement, the Roman commonwealth paid every year the sum of 500 minas to defray the expenses of the public festivals and games. This payment then ceased, but the festivals did not cease; and, from this time forward, wealthy individuals were obliged to cover the expenses of the great festivals. During and after the second Punic war, we find it expressly stated, that the expenses were defrayed by the aediles. This was an important change, for as the aedileship was an introduction to the higher offices, the change could not remain without the most serious consequences. I wonder that Polybius did not see its importance; for while he blames the Carthaginians for selling the highest state-offices, he says nothing about the Romans, who had in reality adopted the same practice; for if an aedile did not gain great popularity by the splendour of his games, he could scarcely hope to obtain any of the higher offices afterwards.

A short time before the beginning of the first Punic war another change had been made, which affected the character of the senate. Originally there had been two quaestors, but their number was doubled, and from the year 485 it was increased to eight<sup>17</sup>. He who had been quaestor had the right *sententiam dicendi in senatu*, and the censors were obliged to make him a senator as soon as a vacancy occurred. The senate had, at first, been the representative of the gentes and curiae. After the plebeians had become eligible, it was left to the discretion of the censors to choose persons to fill the vacancies which occurred in it, and the Roman senate was, perhaps, at no time more wretchedly composed than during that period. But this now ceased. If it were possible to devise any means, by which the election of really great and good men could be secured, it would undoubtedly be better than to leave the elections in the hands of the *vulgus imperitum*;

<sup>17</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 551.

but that power of the censors was a dangerous anomaly, as the example of Appius Claudius had shewn. After its abolition the senate became more important: it was henceforth an assembly elected chiefly by the people. Eight quaestors were appointed every year; after the lapse of thirty years 240 persons had been quaestors, and a great number of men were thus made senators by popular election. The censors, however, continued to have the power of expelling an unworthy individual. At a later period, when the number of quaestors was still greater, and when the tribunes of the people also became senators by virtue of their office, the senate was altogether an assembly whose members were elected by the people.

It was not without great difficulty that, after the peace with Carthage, the Romans recovered from their exhaustion; for although they had not seen the enemy in their own country, immense treasures had been lost, and not less than seven hundred ships<sup>18</sup>. Soon after the conclusion of the peace the Romans had to carry on a war against the Faliscans, which, however, was brought to a close within six days<sup>19</sup>. It is an almost unaccountable phenomenon, that during the long period of the Punic war, Italy, with the exception of one movement in Samnium, remained tranquil; and, that after the termination of it, an insignificant people like the Faliscans could venture to rise against the victorious giant. It may be, that the truce between them and the Romans had expired just at that time; and, that as the Romans may have been unwilling to renew or fulfil the conditions of the truce, those unfortunate men were induced by senseless individuals to resist the demands of the Romans by force.

Soon after the return of the Carthaginian troops from Sicily, Carthage was brought to the verge of destruction by the insurrection of her mercenaries. They broke out in open rebellion because the Carthaginians were unable

<sup>18</sup> Polybius, I. 63.

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, I. 65; Livy, *Epit. lib. XIX.*

to pay them their arrears, on account of the heavy contributions which they had to pay to the Romans. The rebels were encouraged and supported by the Italian deserters, who feared lest they should be delivered up to the Romans. One of these deserters, who had been a slave among the Romans, was Spendius, a Campanian, who now made himself very conspicuous<sup>20</sup>. Carthage was brought to the brink of destruction; and not only Libya, but Hippo and Utica also revolted. The cruel manner in which the war was carried on, shews the character of those Ligurian, Iberian, Gallic, and Libyan mercenaries: they were not real savages, but they acted like savages<sup>21</sup>. The Carthaginians had often not an inch of territory beyond their walls and fortifications. The war lasted for three years and four months<sup>22</sup>. At length, under the command of Hamilcar, and through the horrors committed by the rebellious monsters themselves, the Carthaginians succeeded in suppressing the insurrection and destroying the rebels. The Carthaginians had declared the revolted towns in Africa in a state of blockade; and here we find one of the instances in which the Romans shewed themselves just even towards their own rivals, for they recognized the right of blockade; exchanged their prisoners with the Carthaginians; forbade all commerce with the rebels; and protected the provisions which were conveyed to Carthage<sup>23</sup>. In the same spirit they refused the offer of the Uticans, who proposed to surrender their town into the hands of the Romans. These acts of justice make it the more surprising, that shortly after the Romans committed such glaring injustice towards Carthage. During this war in Africa, the mercenaries in Sardinia, the maritime towns of which were entirely Punic down to the time of Cicero<sup>24</sup>, had likewise revolted, and

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, i. 69, foll.; Diodor. *Fragm. lib. xxv. Excerpt. De Virt. et Vit.* p. 567.

<sup>21</sup> Similar instances occur in the Thirty years' war.—N.

<sup>22</sup> Polybius, i. 88. Compare Diodorus, l. c. and Livy, *xxi.* 2.

<sup>23</sup> Polybius, i. 83.

<sup>24</sup> See vol. i. p. 170.

had massacred the Carthaginian colonists in the island. Polybius<sup>25</sup> thinks that, at first, they murdered only the Carthaginian officers. The native Sards rose against the mercenaries, expelled them from the island, and refused obedience to Carthage. After the conclusion of the war against the rebels in Africa, when the Carthaginians made preparations to reconquer Sardinia, the Romans protected the Sards and took possession of the island, threatening the Carthaginians with a fresh war, if they would not give up their claims to Sardinia and Corsica. The Carthaginians, being too much exhausted to make any resistance, were obliged to yield, and to pay an additional contribution of 1200 talents. This is one of the most detestable acts of injustice in the history of Rome<sup>26</sup>.

At the time of the Peloponnesian war a number of small tribes had arisen in Illyricum, and formed themselves into independent bodies; but after the time of Philip of Macedonia a greater state had been formed, the origin of which cannot be traced with accuracy; nor is it certain whether it was founded by Bardylis, who is known to have formed a kingdom in those districts at the time of Philip<sup>27</sup>. Not even the capital of this Illyrian state can be distinctly ascertained; and all we can say, is, that it must have been situated somewhere in the neighbourhood of Ragusa. The real Illyrian pirates must have been those who inhabited the northern part of Dalmatia. The maritime power of the Rhodians was still of considerable importance; but about the year 520 the Illyrians became formidable in those seas, and ravaged the defenceless coasts in a dreadful manner; and, unfortunately for them, they also ventured to disturb the navigation of the allies of the Romans. Ambassadors were sent to demand reparation; but Teuta, the queen of the Illyrians, answered, that piracy was the

<sup>25</sup> I. 79 and 88.

<sup>26</sup> Polybius I. 88. Zonaras, VIII. 18.

<sup>27</sup> Diodorus, XVI. 4; Cicero, *De Off.* II. 11; Photius, *Biblioth.* p. 530, ed. Bekker; Libanius, *Orat.* XXVIII. p. 632.

national custom of her subjects, that she herself had not wronged the Romans, and could not forbid her subjects that which was their right and their privilege. One of the ambassadors, probably a son of the great Tiberius Coruncanius, said that it was the custom of the Romans to do away with bad customs; and Teuta, enraged at such boldness, despatched assassins who murdered the ambassadors<sup>28</sup>. Previous to this time the Romans had never entertained the thought of crossing over to the eastern coast of the Adriatic; but they now sent out an army and a fleet, which landed on the Dalmatian coast. Several tribes were subdued; and the Greek towns of Dyrrachium, Apollonia, Corcyra, and others, solicited the protection of the Romans, which was readily granted. The Romans soon concluded an honourable peace with the Illyrians, and thus became the real benefactors of the Greeks<sup>29</sup>. It is remarkable to see how much they courted the favour of the Greeks: although the latter were very weak at that time, yet the Romans sent ambassadors to them, and were delighted with the honours conferred upon them by the Greeks. The Corinthians bestowed upon them the right of taking part in the Isthmian games<sup>30</sup>, and the Athenians honoured them with the right of isopolity<sup>31</sup>. Even before this time, either immediately after or during the first Punic war, the Romans had sent an embassy to the Aetolians at a time when they were at war with the Acarnanians; but the embassy had been scorned by the Aetolians, and was not followed by any results<sup>32</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> Polybius, II. 8; Appian, *De Reb. Illyr.* 7.      <sup>29</sup> Polybius, II. 12.

<sup>30</sup> Polybius, II. 12.

<sup>31</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 9.

<sup>32</sup> Justin, XXVIII. 1 and 2.

## LECTURE VII.

HISTORY STRENGTHENS THE BELIEF IN DIVINE PROVIDENCE.—THE CISALPINE GAULS.—WAR AGAINST THEM.  
—HAMILCAR BARCA IN SPAIN.

As THE contemplation of nature shews an inherent intelligence, which may also be conceived as coherent with nature, so does history on a hundred occasions shew an intelligence distinct from nature, which conducts and determines those things which seem to us accidental; and it is not true that the study of history weakens the belief in a divine providence: history is of all other kinds of knowledge the one which most decidedly leads to that belief. Circumstances, which are called accidental, combine in such a wonderful way with others to produce certain results, that men evidently cannot do what they please. For example, the Gauls alone would have been sufficient to crush the Romans; and had they invaded Italy during the first Punic war, the Romans would have been utterly unable to make their efforts against Sicily. Again, had Alexander, the son of Pyrrhus, tried to avenge the misfortunes of his father in Italy,—had he formed connexions in Italy at the time when Regulus was defeated, the Romans would not have been able to offer any resistance. But Alexander's eyes were directed towards petty conquests; the Gauls were quiet, and the Carthaginians had no good generals, except at the close of the war: in short, it was providential that all things combined to make the



Romans victorious. They themselves seem to have been prepared for some outbreak, for ever since the time of Pyrrhus they kept a strong garrison at Tarentum to prevent any undertakings from the east.

About this time the Romans extended their relations with foreign powers far and wide. Previous to the Punic war, they had formed friendly connexions with Ptolemy Philadelphus<sup>1</sup>, and they now did the same with Seleucus Callinicus of Syria.

After the Gauls had lost the Romagna, they had fallen into a kind of torpor. During the last fifty years they had been perfectly quiet in their Cisalpine districts, either because there were no immigrations into their territory, or because they were satisfied in the belief that the Romans had forgotten them. After the extermination of the Senones, their beautiful country, Romagna and Urbino, had passed into the hands of the Romans as a wilderness<sup>2</sup>. But a great part of it was now occupied by Roman settlers according to the right of the agrarian law. After the first Punic war, about the year 522, the tribune C. Flaminius, by a decree of the people, caused this *ager Gallicus et Picenus* to be divided<sup>3</sup>. He carried this decree under the vehement opposition of the senate (for we can now no longer speak of patricians), and even of his own father<sup>4</sup>. This distribution of Gallic territory and the settlement of a great number of Romans on the frontiers, we are told, disturbed the Boians who inhabited the country about Mo-

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III. p. 548.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. III. p. 428 foll.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, Brutus, c. 14; Academ. II. 5.; Polybius, II. 21.

<sup>4</sup> (Cicero, De Inventione, II. 17.) This opposition of his own father shews the great change which had taken place. The father was like his son, a plebeian, when he opposed the measure, but this cannot surprise us, since, according to the Licinian Law, the plebeians had the *jus occupandorum agrorum*, as well as the patricians. This law of C. Flaminius is the first instance of a mere plebiscitum, without the consent of the senate, becoming binding as a *lex*, in accordance with the Hortensian law.—N. Compare vol. III. p. 418, foll.

dena, Parma, and Bologna, as far as the Romagna. Fifty years before, they had been almost extirpated, but the population was now nearly restored. Ever since their first conflict with the Romans, they had been longing for an opportunity to take vengeance upon them; and now, when the Romans settled on their frontiers, they began negotiations with the Transalpine Gauls, among whom great movements were going on at this time. Several years, however, passed away without anything further being done. The negotiations with the Transalpine Gauls caused great apprehensions among the Romans, and when at length an innumerable host of Gauls invaded Italy, the war broke out in the year 527<sup>5</sup>. The swarms which now descended into Italy from the north, were like those of the Cimbrians in after times. This war is memorable on account of the extraordinary preparations of the Romans, who made a general levy throughout Italy. The Italian allies obeyed this time also, and even more readily than ever; for they anticipated with horror an invasion like the one which had taken place about 150 years before. The Romans sent one army to Ariminum and stationed another in Etruria. The consul, C. Atilius, was still in Sardinia with his army and fleet. A corps of reserve was stationed in the neighbourhood of Rome. All the Italian allies capable of bearing arms were kept ready to march. A list of them is given by Polybius<sup>6</sup>, but it shews that he himself was not quite clear about the matter. The numbers are unfortunately not exact, and Schweighäuser's computation is quite wrong, for he speaks of the legions as if they had not been contained in the census. But this is the only instance in which I can say that Polybius used materials without being perfectly clear about them. According to him the whole of the Roman forces consisted of about 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse, numbers of which we can make no use and from which we can draw no conclusions;

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, II. 22, foll.

<sup>6</sup> II. 24.

but least of all can we, as Hume did, draw from them any inference as to the amount of the population in Italy. The list in Polybius is not complete; but I cannot think that he could have made a mistake in his calculations without being aware of it, for he is always very exact in his numbers. I have said thus much upon this point, because the census of that time is so often referred to. If we had the original lists we might see where the fault lies; but, as things are, we can say no more than that there is something wrong.

The Romans had looked forward to the breaking out of this war with far greater apprehensions than they afterwards did to that of Hannibal: such is human foresight! The Gauls, unconcerned about the consul near Ariminum, marched into Etruria, and the swarm advanced irresistibly as far as Clusium, a distance of only three days journey from Rome<sup>7</sup>. The Roman army was probably stationed in the neighbourhood of Arezzo, whither the Gauls advanced, either through the marshes near Pisa, or across the mountains in the neighbourhood of Mutilium. Here the Gauls perceived that an army, which was to protect Etruria, was closely following their traces, and they returned to meet the enemy. Polybius says that the Romans met the Gauls near Faesula. The commentators on that passage are wrong. Fiesole cannot possibly have been the place, for how could the Gauls afterwards have marched from thence along the sea coasts<sup>8</sup>? It must be a place between the sea and Chiusi, perhaps on the frontier of the Papal dominions near Aqua pendente. The Gauls had left their cavalry behind and lay in ambush at some distance. The Romans, imagining they had taken to flight, and that the cavalry was only protecting their rear, followed, and fell in with their whole army in full battle array. The Romans suffered a great defeat, whereupon the greater part of them withdrew to a hill, on which they were besieged by the

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, II. 25.

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, II. 26.

Gauls. The consul, L. Aemilius, who had been stationed near Ariminum, fortunately hastened to their assistance; but as he arrived after the defeat, he found the Roman army blockaded by the Gauls. However he delivered them from their precarious position, and the Gauls marched away along the sea coast; for as they had already collected an immense booty, and did not wish to begin a new contest with an *agmen impeditum*, they resolved first to secure their booty in a safe place, and then to return for battle<sup>9</sup>. They must have begun to march back through the territory of Siena and towards the sea coast, in the neighbourhood of Piombino, opposite the island of Elba. The consul followed them with his army, but had not the courage to attack them; and they would have returned home through the territory of Pisa without suffering any harm, had not the army of C. Atilius fortunately just returned from Sardinia and landed near Pisa. C. Atilius, who met the Gauls in the neighbourhood of Pisa, was informed that their main force was not far off, and that the Roman army was following them at no great distance. He attacked the enemy, and as the Gauls were pressed between the two Roman armies, the greater part of their forces were cut to pieces in a fearful battle<sup>10</sup>.

The Gaesatae mentioned among the Gauls were not mercenaries, as Polybius interprets their name<sup>11</sup>, but men armed with javelins. In the second year of the war the Romans crossed the Apennines, and the Boians submitted to them. During the last two years, 529 and 530, the war was carried on in the country of the Insubrians, that is, in the territory of Milan. The Insubrians, who were supported by the Transalpine Gauls, defended themselves very

<sup>9</sup> Many persons have been inclined to believe, that the ancients, whose intellectual powers were surely not inferior to ours, carried on their wars at random. Here we have an instance of such warfare, but the Gauls were barbarians, and the Romans never acted in such a way.—N.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, II. 27—31.

<sup>11</sup> II. 22.

bravely in their open country, which reflects much honour upon them. A portion of the Cisalpine Gauls, the Cenomanians, between the river Adda and the lake of Garda, and the Venetians, were allied with the Romans and remained faithful to their interest. The Venetians, who even excelled the Cenomanians in their fidelity to the Romans, were a civilized people occupying the country between the rivers Adige and Plavis, whose capital was Patavium. They were perfectly foreign to the Tuscans, and probably belonged to the Liburnian or Pelasgian race<sup>12</sup>. In the year 529 C. Flaminius gained a great victory over the Insubrians. It is unjust towards him to assert that he conducted the war north of the Po badly, and I shall say more about him hereafter, for it is the duty of an historian to rescue from the contempt of posterity those to whose names blame is attached undeservedly. The end of the war was decided in the fourth year by the great general M. Claudius Marcellus, who slew Viridomarus, the leader of the Gauls<sup>13</sup>. The victory was gained at Clastidium, in the district between Parma and Piacenza. The

<sup>12</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 166, foll.

<sup>13</sup> The triumphal Fasti state, that Marcellus triumphed, *de Galleis, Insubribus, et Germanis*. The corner of the stone which contains the syllable *ger*, was broken off at one time ; but whether, when the stone was restored, the syllable *ger* was put in at random, or whether it was so on the original stone, I can neither assert nor deny. I have often seen the stone ; but although a friend of mine wished me particularly to ascertain the truth, I was never able to convince myself whether the corner containing the syllable *ger* is part of the original stone or not. It is evident that the name cannot have been *Cenomanis*, since they were allied with the Romans. If the author of these Fasti actually wrote *Germanis*, the inscription would be the most ancient document in which the name of our nation is mentioned. The thing is not at all impossible. At the time of J. Caesar, it is true, the Germans did not live further south than the river Main or the Neckar, but in earlier times they extended much further south ; and the Germans in the Wallis, of whom Livy (xxi. 28?) speaks, were the remnants of an earlier German population which had been expelled by the Gauls.—N.

Insubrians recognised the supremacy of the Romans, who now became masters of the whole plain of Lombardy. Here they founded the two colonies of Placentia and Cremona; and I am inclined to believe that Modena, though it is not mentioned till a later period, was likewise fortified by the Romans immediately after this war, in order to secure the possession of their new acquisitions<sup>14</sup>.

While these things were taking place, events were ripening in secret, the greatness and fearfulness of which the Romans were unable to conceive. During the interval that had elapsed since the first Punic war, Hamilcar Barca had displayed those qualities which commonly distinguish a great man from a weak one. The differences of character are never seen more distinctly than in times when men are surrounded by difficulties and misfortunes. There are some who, when disappointed by the failure of an undertaking from which they expected great things, make up their minds at once to exert themselves no longer against what they call fate, as if thereby they could avenge themselves upon fate; others grow desponding and hopeless; but a third class of men will rouse themselves just at such moments, and say to themselves, "the more difficult it is to attain my ends, the more honourable it will be;" and this is a maxim which every one should impress upon himself as a law. Some of those who are guided by it prosecute their plans with obstinacy, and so perish; others, who are more practical men, if they do not succeed in one way, will try another. There are, it is true, persons who succeed in nothing, but the old proverb *audaces fortuna adjuvat*, holds good nevertheless. Of this Hamilcar is an example. Carthage had for centuries been wasting her best energies in Sicily. I believe that there were men at Carthage, such as Hanno<sup>15</sup>, who, partly from envy against Hamilcar, and partly from their own stupidity, would or

<sup>14</sup> This may be inferred from Polybius, III. 40, and Livy, XXI. 25.

<sup>15</sup> The account of the early part of the second Punic war in Livy is disfigured.—N.




could not see that, after the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, there were yet other quarters from which the republic might derive great benefits. When, after the American war, it was thought that the ignominious peace of Paris had put an end to the greatness of England, Pitt undertook with double courage the restoration of his country, and displayed his extraordinary powers. It was in the same spirit that Hamilcar acted: he turned his eyes to Spain. The only parts of Spain that Carthage had possessed hitherto were Granada and Murcia; but Hamilcar's object was to make Spain a province which should compensate for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. The latter island was then and is still very unhealthy, and its interior was almost inaccessible. Sicily had an effeminate and unwarlike population, and rich as it was, it might indeed have increased the maritime power of Carthage, but it would not have given her any additional military strength. The weakness of Carthage consisted in her having no armies, and it was a grand conception of Hamilcar's, to transform Spain into a Carthaginian country from whence national armies might be obtained. His object therefore was, on the one hand, to subdue the Spaniards, and on the other, to win their sympathy and to change them into a Punic nation under the dominion of Carthage<sup>16</sup>. The conduct of the Romans towards their subjects was haughty, and always made them feel that they were looked down upon. The highly refined Greeks, who were themselves wont to look down with contempt upon all foreigners, must have felt that haughtiness very keenly. The Spaniards and Celts were of course still less respected. Common soldiers in the Roman armies not unfrequently, especially in the times of the emperors, married native women of the countries in which they were stationed. Such marriages were regarded as concubinage, and from them there sprang a class of men who were very dangerous to the Romans. The Carthagi-

<sup>16</sup> Polybius, II. 1; Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. xxv. *Eclog.* 2, p. 510.

nians acted more wisely, by making no restrictions in regard to such marriages. Hannibal himself married a Spanish woman of Castulo<sup>17</sup>, and the practice must have been very common among the Carthaginians. This was an excellent way to gain the good feeling of the natives. The whole of the southern coast of Spain had resources of no ordinary kind: it furnished all the productions of Sicily and Sardinia, and in addition to them it had very rich silver mines, the working of which has been revived in our own days. Hamilcar was the first who introduced there a regular and systematic mode of mining. While thus the Carthaginians gained the sympathy of the nation, they acquired a population of millions which placed them beyond the necessity of hiring faithless mercenaries, as they had been obliged to do in the first Punic war: they were enabled to raise armies in Spain, just as if it had been in their own country. Hamilcar had come to Spain as soon as he had subdued the rebellious mercenaries; here he remained eight years, which time he employed with incomparable wisdom, in establishing the Carthaginian empire. When he died, he left the command to Hasdrubal, his son-in-law. Here we see a characteristic difference between the Romans and Carthaginians: the general of the latter not only holds his office for life, but he leaves it to his son-in-law, like an inheritance. This is what Livy calls *Barcina factio*.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, XXIV. 41, Compare Diodorus, Fragm. lib. XXV. Eclog. 2, p. 510 foll.



## LECTURE VIII.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR. — ITS IMPORTANCE. — THE LITERATURE UPON IT. — THE GREAT COMMANDERS: HANNIBAL, SCIPIO, Q. FABIUS MAXIMUS, AND CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS. — DIVISION OF THE WAR INTO FIVE PERIODS. — CONTEMPORARY WARS.

LIVY opens his narrative of the second Punic war with the remark, that it was the greatest and most memorable that had ever been carried on, and he could say so with justice; but after the lapse of more than 2000 years we cannot think the same, for in the wars of the French revolution far greater energies were called into action; even the seven-years war has greater changes of fortune, and as for the greatness of the generals engaged in it, it is by no means inferior to the second Punic war. But we may truly say, that in all ancient history there is no war which equals that against Hannibal in the greatness of the events. We may on the whole say, that there never was a general superior to Hannibal, and in antiquity there is not even one whom we could place by the side of him: before him all the other Carthaginian generals shrink into insignificance. Against him there stood Scipio, who, although perhaps he did not quite equal Hannibal, yet must be considered as a general of the first order: Fabius and Marcellus, who might have acquired great fame in other wars, are eclipsed by him. I do not hesitate to adopt the opinion of Hannibal himself, when he places himself above Scipio<sup>1</sup>.

According to Livy, the second Punic war was described separately by several writers. The first, but more espe-

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxx. 30.

cially the second war against Carthage, was the real subject of the annals of Fabius, who, like Cincius, prefixed to his history of it a brief sketch of the early history of Rome. I have no hesitation in saying that the account which Appian gives of this war is mainly based upon that of Fabius; Dionysius of Halicarnassus left him at the beginning of the first Punic war. I can prove satisfactorily, that the principal points in the narrative of Appian and Zonaras are derived from Fabius: Dion Cassius knew that Fabius was an eminent historian. The Hannibalian war was also described separately by two Greeks, Chaereas and Sosilus, both of whom are spoken of by Polybius with contempt<sup>2</sup>. Sosilus, if we may trust the account<sup>3</sup>, had lived in the camp of Hannibal. When Livy wrote the history of this war, he did not think of using the memoirs written by Hannibal, or the Greek letters which Scipio had addressed to the king of Macedonia. Polybius<sup>4</sup> made use of some documents of Hannibal which were kept at Rome in the temple of Juno Lacinia, and drew all his materials from authentic sources. As far as we possess his work, we cannot wish for anything further or better: his third book is a master-work, and there is nothing in it that leaves the mind of the reader unsatisfied. In the Latin language there was only one separate history of the second Punic war, by L. Caelius Antipater, who, to judge from his name, must have been a Greek, and was either a freedman or enfranchised and adopted into the gens Caelia. He wrote in the seventh century with declamatory pretensions, and many points in Livy's account are derived from him. The work of Dr. Becker of Ratzeburg<sup>5</sup> on this war is good, al-

<sup>2</sup> III. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Cornel. Nepos, Hannib. 13, where also one Silenus is mentioned, who had lived in the camp of Hannibal and written a history of the war.

<sup>4</sup> III. 34 and 56.

<sup>5</sup> The book here alluded to bears the title "*Vorarbeiten zu einer Geschichte des zweiten Punischen Krieges*," Altona, 1822. A supplementary work by the same author is entitled "*Ueber Livius xxx.*"

though it is not founded on matured studies; it contains some strange prejudices, and neglects many points which one would like to see explained. It is, however, a valuable work nevertheless, which should not be overlooked, and the name of its author will not be forgotten. In the narrative of Livy we can distinguish the different sources from which he derived his information. The account of the first period of the war, and especially the rhetorical description of the siege of Saguntum, are unquestionably derived from Caelius Antipater, and if his history of the remaining period of the war were not based on better grounds, the whole of his third decad would be worth nothing. But in some parts, in the description of the battle of Cannae, for instance, Livy follows Polybius very carefully; in other parts of this decad, as for instance at the end of a year, when he gives a brief summary of the events which occurred during the year, he followed the pontifical annals, or some annalist. He evidently wrote this decad with great pleasure, and some portions of it are among the most beautiful things that have ever been written. The points in which he is deficient are, a knowledge of facts, experience, an intimate acquaintance with the affairs of real life—he does not step out of the walls of the school—and a control over his subject. He worked with great ease, and repeated what others had said before him without toiling and moiling.

If I were to relate the history of this war according to my own inclination, the time which is set apart for these lectures would be much too short. I must therefore confine myself to brief sketches and outlines; but abridged narratives require a perfect consistency in all their parts, a thing which a person can attain only by writing them down with great care. Lord Chesterfield very appropriately said on a similar occasion, "I beg your pardon

25 und 29 : oder Entwicklung der Begebenheiten, welche zwischen Hannibals Rückkehr nach Africa und der Schlacht bei Zama liegen."

for my prolixity, but I have no time." All abridgments require time. The greater part of my labours consists in condensing that which I have written; but in these lectures I cannot give such an abridgment with the necessary consistency; and if the limits of an abridgment are overstepped here and there, in a subject which has been dear to my heart for the last forty years, I trust no one will find fault with me.

After Hasdrubal had had the administration of Spain for nearly nine years, he was assassinated. Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar Barca, was at this time living in the camp to finish his military education. Nothing in history is so well known as the vow of Hannibal, which I believe to be historical. Hannibal himself is said to have mentioned it in aftertimes<sup>6</sup>: and what reason have we for doubting it? The fact that the circumstances under which it was made are stated differently, is no ground for disbelieving it: according to some, it was the condition on which Hamilcar took his son to Spain; and according to others, it was made at the moment he took leave of his father. I also believe that when Hamilcar went to Spain in 516, or 517, Hannibal was not more than eight years old; and, consequently, born in 507 or 508, previous to the time when Hamilcar went to Sicily. He began his expedition to Italy in his twenty-seventh year. Against such an age nothing can be said: it is just the age at which a general may best display all his great qualities. Frederick the Great was not more than twenty-eight years old when he undertook the conquest of Silesia, and Napoleon was twenty-seven, or twenty-eight years old, when he made his first Italian campaign. Remarks like these may be laughed at when they are mistaken for proofs; but I know what proofs are, and what I mean to say here is simply this: that at such an age he *could* act the great part which

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, III. 11; Corn. Nepos, Hannib. 2. Compare Val. Maximus, IX. 3. Ext. 3; Appian, De Rep. Hispan. 9. p. 110.



history ascribes to him. His whole conduct bears the character of that of a young man; and at the time of his death he was not much more than fifty years old. He had two brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago. Whether Hasdrubal was older than Hannibal is unknown, but Mago was yet very young when Hannibal went to Italy. Opinions may be divided as to the personal character of Hannibal: he appears everywhere in history as some formidable being. The description of his character as a general in Livy is very beautiful; but when Livy adds that his virtues were counterbalanced by as many vices, he contradicts Polybius<sup>7</sup>, who expressly denies the charge of cruelty. Wherever any cruel or faithless action occurs, it must be attributed to Hannibal's subordinate officers in the Carthaginian army; and, it is probable, that many of the cruel acts of another Hannibal, surnamed Monomachus<sup>8</sup>, gave rise to false reports about the great Hannibal. The name Hannibal was as common at Carthage as many of our Christian names are among us. There are statements respecting his cruelty, especially in Appian, who derived them from Fabius, but Polybius knows nothing of them. I do not mean to say, that he committed no act of cruelty; but what he did was no more than what was the common practice among the Romans themselves, with whom, as with the ancients in general, the destruction of the enemy was the principal object of war. In modern times warfare has assumed a more humane character, and really destructive wars, such as we find in the history of Spain, are among the exceptions. Of Hannibal's alleged *perfidia plus quam Punica*<sup>9</sup> not a single instance is known; and we may confidently assert, that, in capitulations he always kept his engagements; for if he had not, the charge would have been brought against him, and no one would have made any capitulation with him. His whole greatness, however, was no less striking in times of peace than in war, and

<sup>7</sup> IX. 22.<sup>8</sup> Polybius, IX. 24.<sup>9</sup> Livy, XXI. 4.

in this respect the difference between him and Scipio is very remarkable. In times of peace Scipio was a useless citizen, nay, the dangerous example which he set in despising his lawful accusers<sup>10</sup> might have led the Romans to despise the laws of their country; and who knows whether his example was not actually a slow poison! I like Scipio for many reasons, but there is, on the whole, something exceedingly haughty in his character: he was conscious of his own greatness. He shewed his haughty pride from the moment he began to take part in public affairs, until he became a candidate for the consulship; afterwards he set himself altogether above the laws of his country. This feature in his character is visible throughout his life: he wanted to set himself above the laws, and submission to their sovereign power was quite foreign to him. We do not hear that he was the author of any institution or law to benefit his country, although he might have bestowed great blessings upon it by his influence; and Rome was surely in need of blessings. This neglect after the maritime war was one of the causes of the decline of the Roman constitution and morals. Hannibal, on the other hand, shewed his genius in everything; and, in times of peace, he was the benefactor and reformer of his country by wise laws and institutions. He and Scipio were both men of highly cultivated minds, and were intimately acquainted with Greek literature. Hannibal's companions were Greeks with whom he conversed in his leisure hours, and although they were not men of the first order, still the fact shews in what manner he employed his leisure time. Among many other advantages in his relations with others, he possessed irresistible personal attractions, which he seems to have inherited from his father, who subdued savages, and then managed and guided them without any difficulty. Hannibal was placed in difficult circumstances,

<sup>10</sup> Livy, XXXVIII. 55 foll.; A. Gellius, IV. 18 foll.; Val. Maximus, III. 7. 1.

but although individual Gauls and Celts, or some of the frivolous and unprincipled Numidians, were now and then faithless to him, or deserted and betrayed him, yet not one ever raised his hand against him<sup>11</sup>. He was obliged to sacrifice his soldiers to his objects; he could not spare them, and made enormous demands upon them: but not one ever attempted any thing against him. He was like a being of a higher order, that governed all and dazzled them by his lustre. A man who settled the administration of Spain, crossed the Alps, shook the power of the Romans, and reduced them to extreme weakness—such a man I call the greatest among his contemporaries; yea, I may call him the greatest of all ages. His perseverance and his faithfulness towards his country cannot be praised enough; his transactions with other states had only one object,—to serve his own country. Wherever he was, he commanded; he did not seek protection anywhere, and bowed before no one; he never violated truth, and never did any thing which was opposed to the dignity of his character, even if he lost by so doing. This man I honour, esteem, and love, almost unconditionally; although I do not wish to deny, that things are related of him which fill our eyes with tears. But when he was at Capua, and allowed Decius Magius to depart uninjured, he did not follow the dictates of policy, but those of his own generous heart. Few Romans could boast of such magnanimity, and at that time Scipio was, perhaps, the only one among them who was capable of it.

The third hero of this war is Q. Fabius Maximus, a man who has been very much overrated. Great circumspection and self-control are indeed qualities which we cannot help recognizing in him; and he was a good general, but not a better one than many others. The only important feat of his is the recovery of Tarentum; but what was that, after all? The fact of his holding out after


<sup>11</sup> Polybius, xxiv. 9.

the battle of Trasimenus is no more than what the republic had a right to expect of him. I am inclined to compare him with field-marshal Daun, and am convinced that Daun, as a general, was, at least, not inferior to him. Q. Fabius Maximus was probably the great-grandson of the great Q. Fabius, who displayed such eminent qualities during the second and third wars against the Samnites. I am very apt to transfer my affection for great ancestors to their descendants; but however much I should like to speak of Q. Fabius Maximus with affection, I cannot. His opposition to Scipio is not a rhetorical exaggeration, but an historical fact. The speeches which Livy puts into the mouth of Hanno are rhetorical flourishes, taken from Caelius Antipater, but the character of those of Fabius is historical; it is evident that he was envious, and that he could not bear the star which was rising before him. It must make a man feel wretched, if, on the threshold of old age, he looks upon the rising generation with uneasiness, and does not rather rejoice in looking upon it; and yet this is very common with old men. Fabius would rather have seen Hannibal unconquered, than see his own fame obscured by Scipio. Hence, he would not destroy Hannibal, but only weaken him.

Claudius Marcellus, an able and enterprising general, was quite the opposite of Fabius by his great boldness; he was distinguished both as a general and a brave warrior.

These are the men who acted the most prominent part in the second Punic war. The war itself must be divided, like the first, into several periods. The first comprises all that took place in Spain, including the conquest of Saguntum, &c., until the year 534, when Hannibal began his march towards the Alps. All the events of this period, however, must be regarded merely as preliminary to the war itself. The second period comprises the next three years and a part of the fourth, from 534 to 537, during which Hannibal made his irresistible progress,

crossed the Alps and overran Italy, until the taking of Capua. During the third period from this event, in 537, to 541, his star began to sink: the Romans conquered Capua, and their hopes of success received new strength, for it was now decided that Hannibal had irreparably lost the object of his war. The fourth period extends from 541 to 547, and in this time Hannibal began to set his hopes on Spain and on the reinforcements which he expected from his brother Hasdrubal. He maintained himself in a part of Apulia, Lucania, and Bruttium, and the Carthaginians raised fresh armies in Spain, until the defeat of Hasdrubal on the Metaurus. The fifth and last period, from 547 to 550, which may be called the African war, comprises the events from the time when Hannibal, at the command of the Carthaginian senate, left Italy, down to the end of the war. Several other wars run parallel to, or are interwoven with that against Hannibal; thus we have to notice, from 534 to 547, the wars of the Romans in Spain, which were carried on with various success until the taking of New Carthage; from 537 to 540 the Sicilian war and the insurrection of Sardinia, which were brought to a conclusion by the subjugation of Sardinia and the conquest of Syracuse; and lastly, from 540 to 547, the Macedonian war. Those who wish to form an accurate idea of the second Punic war must keep all these great masses separate from one another, whereby they will get rid of much that is perplexing in the detail.



## LECTURE IX.

THE CARTHAGINIAN EMPIRE IN SPAIN.—TREATY OF ROME WITH HASDRUBAL.—SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM.—EXPEDITION OF HANNIBAL TOWARDS THE ALPS. — PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROMANS ON THE APPROACH OF HANNIBAL.—HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE OVER THE ALPS.

WHILE Hamilcar was establishing a Carthaginian empire in Spain, the Romans acted the part of mere spectators. On his arrival in that country, the Carthaginians possessed only the coasts of Granada and Murcia; but under his administration, Andalusia and the greater part of Valencia, seem to have been added to their dominions. The empire of Carthage did not yet extend beyond the Sierra Morena, but connexions with the natives had already been formed, and it may have been under Hasdrubal that greater progress was made in that quarter. When we read that Hannibal was master of all Spain<sup>1</sup>, it is only a mistake of the writer, for the Carthaginians never advanced further than a little north of New Castile and Estremadura, and the northernmost point to which we can trace the conquests of Hannibal, in Polybius, is Salamanca<sup>2</sup>; and even if we consider this acquisition as a lasting one, still the Carthaginian empire did not extend over one half of the peninsula. The tribes of the interior and the Celtiberians seem not to have recognised the supremacy of Carthage, and were only her allies, retaining their own peculiar form of government, and only furnished mercenaries for the Carthaginian armies; which they did the more willingly,

<sup>1</sup> Corn. Nepos, Hannib. 3.

<sup>2</sup> See Polybius, III. 14.



as they were of a very warlike disposition. Polybius<sup>3</sup> justly remarks, that the Romans were silent at the progress which the Carthaginians made in Spain, because they dreaded to renew the war against them, while they were threatened themselves in Italy by the Gauls. Hamilcar and Hasdrubal were thus enabled to train and prepare their new nation, during the great war of the Romans with the Cisalpine Gauls. We are surprised at an account, which mentions that during this time a Carthaginian fleet appeared off the coast of Etruria<sup>4</sup>. If the account be true, it was certainly not a step taken by the government, but probably by Hasdrubal on his own responsibility. During the Cisalpine war the Romans had, strangely enough, concluded a treaty, not with the government of Carthage, but merely with Hasdrubal, the governor of Spain<sup>5</sup>. This seems to shew, that Carthage was in a state of anarchy. The treaty, however, was concluded merely with reference to Spain, where the river Iberus was fixed upon, as the boundary between the two empires. It is owing to the loss of the second decad of Livy, that we do not know at what time the Romans had gained possession of that part of Spain; for, at the beginning of the second Punic war, we find them in possession of Tarraco, and the inhabitants of the coast of Catalonia were then under their protection. Their friendship and alliance with Massilia was very old. Livy adds, that it was stipulated in the treaty that Saguntum should be free, between the dominions of the two powers; and if this had really been the case, the hostilities of the Carthaginians against that town would certainly have been a violation of the treaty. But Polybius knows nothing of such a clause; and if he, who had authentic documents before him, had found anything about it, he would assuredly have stated that Hannibal had committed a breach of the treaty.

Livy places the siege of Saguntum in the year 534,

<sup>3</sup> II. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Zonaras, viii. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxi. 2; Polybius, II. 13, 22; III. 27, 29.

although he must have seen that this is an impossibility. It must have taken place the year before, 533<sup>6</sup>. Hannibal brought on the war by his interfering in the hostilities between the Saguntines and Turdetanians, or, as I should like to read, the Edetanians, for it is hardly to be conceived how the Turdetanians, at so great a distance, could have had any complaints against the Saguntines. The Edetanians, on the other hand, were the inhabitants of Valencia, and must at that time have been under the protection of the Carthaginians<sup>7</sup>. The siege of Saguntum lasted for eight months, and has gained an imperishable celebrity in history from the heroic resistance of the Saguntines. But the description of it in Livy is a romance, undoubtedly derived from the account of Caelius Antipater. The town was, like several others in Spain, razed to the ground. The description of Polybius is much more authentic; he only knows that the town was taken, that Hannibal made extraordinary booty, and gained courage and strength for further undertakings<sup>8</sup>. Hereupon Hannibal took up his winter quarters at New Carthage, and completed the preparations for his great expedition. The Romans now sent ambassadors to him to call him to account for his conduct towards Saguntum; but he referred them to Carthage, where they were received in the senate in a manner which might have been foreseen, after so long an irritation and so ardent a desire to take vengeance for the injustice which Rome had inflicted on Carthage in regard to Sardinia. The declaration of war was received by the Carthaginians with loud acclamations.

Hannibal assembled his troops in the neighbourhood of Carthagera, and shewed great foresight in drawing Libyans to Spain and sending Spaniards to Libya, where they were to serve as garrisons; but, at the same time, he retained

<sup>6</sup> See Sigonius on Livy, XXI. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 10, calls them Tarboletans.

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, III. 17.

great numbers of Spaniards, to accompany him on his expedition. The army with which he crossed the Iberus is said to have consisted of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse<sup>9</sup>. He must have crossed the Iberus in the early part of May. P. Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius had already been consuls since the 15th of March. The tribes of Catalonia, which were under the protection of Rome, offered little or no resistance. He crossed the Pyrenees in the neighbourhood of Figuera and Rofas, in the direction of Roussillon, where the mountains slope down towards the coast of the Mediterranean and are of no considerable height. He had previously sent envoys to the Gallic tribes, to ask for a free passage through their country. These envoys now returned with presents and the assurance that Hannibal would meet with no resistance in Gaul as far as the Rhone. A part of his forces was left behind in Catalonia, and when he approached the passes of the Pyrenees a dangerous mutiny broke out among his soldiers. Three thousand Carpetanians returned home, and that others might not be encouraged to follow their example, Hannibal was wise enough to send back all those in whom he discovered any unwillingness to follow him, since he was convinced that a cheerful and small army is better than a numerous and discontented one. After having allowed his soldiers some rest in the neighbourhood of Perpignan, he continued his march with 50,000 foot and 9,000 horse.

When the Romans discovered that it was his plan to cross the Alps, they decreed to send the consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, the father of the great Scipio, with an army to Spain, and a great fleet was equipped to sail to Africa under the command of the other consul, Tiberius Sempronius. Carthage, at this time, had no fleet of any importance, which shews a great carelessness in the management of affairs on the part of the Carthaginians themselves;

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, III. 35; Livy, XXI. 13.

whereas all that Hannibal did was wise and well calculated. But in the senate of Carthage there were men of a different stamp; and it is not improbable that a property-tax was found necessary to cover the expenses of the war, and that in paying it the wealthy shewed a niggardly spirit; otherwise the mean parsimony of Carthage is quite unaccountable. The plan of the Romans was, in certain respects, not ill-calculated, but it is a proof that they underrated their enemy and his strength. Had P. Cornelius Scipio arrived with his fleet before Hannibal left Spain, Hannibal might possibly have been stopped in his progress; although I am almost convinced that Hannibal would have thrown him back upon the sea, and that he would thus have facilitated his expedition still more. But the Roman fleet did not sail, until Hannibal was master of Catalonia; and it cannot be denied that at the beginning of this great war the Romans were slow and awkward, so that Hannibal was beforehand with them in everything. It is true, they had just before made great exertions against the Cisalpine Gauls, but with the exception of this they had been engaged only in petty warfare since the conclusion of the first Punic war, and they had no standing armies. Their troops were a sort of militia without any regular training, whereas the Carthaginian army under Hannibal consisted of veterans. Moreover, the Romans did not think it necessary to place the best of their generals at the head of their armies, but made their choice with their usual views; and the consuls of this year were dull and slow like their soldiers.

Hannibal continued his march with the utmost rapidity, and, according to the calculation of Polybius<sup>10</sup>, he led his Carthaginians a distance of 9,000 stadia. This is indeed rather exaggerated, but still the distance between Carthage and the river Po is immense. When Hannibal arrived in Cisalpine Gaul, envoys of the Gauls implored his assistance against the Romans, but until then he had had

<sup>10</sup> III. 39.

to make his way through a country all peopled by independent and hostile tribes, to whom an army like his must have appeared like an inundation. Among such a host it was impossible to prevent acts of violence, especially if we consider the wants with which they had to struggle, and which impeded their progress everywhere. He passed through the magnificent country of Languedoc to Pont St. Esprit on the Rhone in order to reach the Alps. The inhabitants of Languedoc could not indeed resist the torrent that poured in upon them, and they sent their women and children into the Cevennes mountains for shelter; but the Gauls in Dauphiné and Provence had large rivers, and could defend themselves. They heard at the same time that a Roman army was already on the coast, and although the hostile feeling which existed between the Gauls and the Romans was very strong, and although the inhabitants of Languedoc had rejected with scorn the request of the Romans, still they looked upon the Romans as auxiliaries against the starved host of invaders, who in their rapid course were obliged to take all they could. Hannibal forced his passage across the Rhone by sending, during the night, a part of his army up the river where they passed over on rafts. The attention of the Gauls was thus drawn away from the main army, and this success, in a place where nature herself seemed to have drawn the boundary line, made the deepest impression upon the barbarians.

Scipio had landed in the meantime at Marseille and marched up the river, but he came too late, and Hannibal was already on the left bank when the Roman cavalry arrived. Hannibal now marched farther up the Rhone, and Scipio returned to his ships, though he might have been of real service to his country, if he had taken his road towards Briançon and Susa; for he would thus have been enabled to attack the rear of the Carthaginians, while the Gauls might have stopped the vanguard by an abattis. Concerning the particulars of the passage of the Rhone, and the subsequent events until Hannibal reached the Alps, I must refer you to Livy.



It has been one of the most disputed points of ancient history, in what part Hannibal crossed the Alps, and the ancients themselves differ widely in their accounts. Livy's description is obscure, and Polybius does not enter into any disquisition concerning the localities, because they were known in his time, and no one had any doubt about them. Livy imagines, that he passed by Briançon, through the valley of the Durance, and descended somewhere in the neighbourhood of Turin; but this is erroneous. The other ancients are divided in their opinions: some maintained that he passed over the Little, and others that he passed over the Great St. Bernard; some even thought it probable that he crossed the Simplon. Modern writers<sup>11</sup> are likewise divided; but, after the researches of General Melville, there can be no longer any doubt as to the road which Hannibal took; and if any one who has a practical mind compares with these researches the account which Polybius gives, he must see that no other road is possible. It is strange that even ingenious and learned men have, in this instance, opposed the most palpable evidence. Melville has proved, by the strongest possible evidence, that Hannibal marched across the Little St. Bernard, and that this took place about the beginning of October. The mountain cannot have been a glacier covered with eternal ice; for not far from its top a little corn was grown, and during the summer months it was a green Alp, which served as pasture. On his arrival there, Hannibal found fresh snow and a frequented road. In a district near the little St. Bernard, in the valley of Tarentaise, he had a severe contest with the Alpine tribes; and Polybius, evidently with the intention to mark Hannibal's road, says that he halted near a *white rock*.<sup>12</sup> Now, there is only one gypseous cliff in those Alps, and that is near Tarentaise, along which the an-

<sup>11</sup> A complete list of the modern works on this subject will be found in Ukert's *Geographie der Griechen und Römer*, ii. 2. p. 565, foll.

<sup>12</sup> iii. 53.



cient road ran, and which is discernible even at the present day, and known to the inhabitants of the country under the name of *la roche blanche*. This circumstance alone would suffice to remove all doubts, but this road also perfectly agrees with the number of days which Hannibal spent upon his march; and this number differs so widely from the number of days required for the road over Susa, that this place cannot here come into consideration at all. Had Scipio ventured to follow his enemy, Hannibal would certainly have defeated him, and Scipio would have been lost among those Gallic tribes, which would have risen against him. The remark of General Melville is true, that Hannibal had marched up the Rhone as far as Vienne, the ancient capital of the Allobrogiens, which is not mentioned by Livy. Here Hannibal took up the cause of a pretender; and after having established him on the throne, he received supplies for his army and continued his march. The Allobrogiens were at that time in possession of the country between the Isère and the Rhone, of a part of Dauphiné, the western districts of Savoy, and some other neighbouring territories. At Vienne, Hannibal left the Rhone. Melville saw here a Roman road leading to Yenne, which was used throughout the middle ages, and down to the beginning of the seventeenth century. From Vienne Hannibal went to Chambéry, and into the valley of Tarentaise up towards the source of the river. General Melville has shewn that the march through this narrow valley was a very troublesome one, as it was easy for the inhabitants to defend themselves in their mountains. It is a gross mistake, when some writers describe Hannibal as marching over immense fields of ice; for about Tarentaise there are luxuriant plantations of nut trees, and in the valley itself a considerable quantity of corn is grown. The arrival of Hannibal and his army was a fearful calamity for the inhabitants of this valley, for it was a host which consumed everything that these poor people pos-


sessed. The less Hannibal was able to satisfy their hunger with the supplies he carried with him, the greater was the devastation caused by his army, for in such circumstances soldiers destroy everything. However great, therefore, his exertions were in pacifying the mountaineers, yet they manifested a desperate exasperation against him, and the losses of the Carthaginians in these contests were immense. In the last days of September, Hannibal reached the Little St. Bernard. Snow began already to fall in those regions, and frosts and the other miseries of winter were now added to the sufferings with which he had been struggling hitherto. His army suffered not less from hunger than the French did on their retreat from Russia: thousands perished in a few days, but yet Hannibal was glad that he had arrived at the summit of the mountains. Those among his soldiers who were rather discontented, and had been lingering behind, now joined him again. The account of Livy, that Hannibal broke the rocks by means of vinegar, is one of those tales which we grieve to see related seriously by an intelligent man. It was undoubtedly derived from Caelius Antipater, and is nothing but a misrepresentation of an actual fact which has been explained by General Melville. The roads in the Alps run along rivers, by which they were originally formed. These rivers often pass from one mountain to another, and then roads run along above the rivers. Such a road is often buried under avalanches, or cut off by a sinking of the ground. Hannibal found such a spot on his road from the Little St. Bernard to the valley of Aosta.<sup>13</sup> He was obliged to encamp there for three days, though suffering severely from hunger, cold, and snow, and to open a new road. General Melville has admirably illustrated this part of the march from Polybius. Livy<sup>14</sup> says, that the mountain formed a precipice of one thousand feet, and that the new road was

<sup>13</sup> Polybius, III. 54. foll.

<sup>14</sup> XXI. 36. foll.

built down that precipice! This is nonsense, as every one must see. In the account of Polybius, on the other hand, there is not one feature which is not perfectly correct, and founded upon accurate observation. On his arrival in the valley of Aosta, Hannibal had lost nearly all his elephants, and his army was reduced to 20,000 foot and 6,000 horse.<sup>15</sup> It is astonishing that so large a number of horses were preserved; but it shews what hardships the southern horses are able to endure, and the great care which the Numidians must have taken of them.

<sup>15</sup> Compare Livy, *xxi.* 38, with Polybius, *iii.* 56.



## LECTURE X.

CONDUCT OF THE ROMANS ON THE APPROACH OF HANNIBAL.—FIRST ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ROMANS ON THE TICINUS.—BATTLE ON THE TREBIA.—C. FLAMINIUS.—HANNIBAL'S MARCH INTO ETRURIA.—BATTLE OF LAKE TRASIMENUS.

THE whole mode of conducting the war on the part of the Romans is a remarkable instance of the same want of design, and of the same slackness, with which war was carried on in the time of the French Revolution. Without knowing any particulars, and by mere tradition, we may form the most vivid image of the manner in which the Romans viewed their impending danger. When they heard that Hannibal had passed through the country of the Allobrogians towards the Alps, they undoubtedly thought him a fool whose army must perish by the elements. It is, indeed, only by supposing that this conviction was general among them, that we can account for their inactivity and drowsiness. The consul Scipio, who was stationed at Marseille, and had advanced into the interior as far as Avignon, ought to have been in Lombardy before Hannibal arrived there<sup>1</sup>; but he did not reach the Po until Hannibal descended from the Alps, and, to the amazement of the Romans, had defied and overcome all the immense difficulties which nature had placed in his way. We may well imagine what reports were spread about the losses sustained by the Carthaginian army, if we remember the logic of the

<sup>1</sup> The same slowness we saw in the year 1800, when the Austrians had it in their power either to prevent the passage over the Great St. Bernard or to render it fruitless.—N.

senseless among the allies in the war against the French Revolution. What the Romans believed and said to one another was something to this effect: that it was madness of Hannibal to have led his army to such a monstrous undertaking; that he and his host would be destroyed by diseases and the want of all the necessaries of life; and that not one individual would survive to return home across the Alps. It has often caused me the deepest grief to hear such reasoning, when people consoled themselves in this childish manner, and neglected the most necessary precautions. Had Hannibal been an ordinary general, he would indeed have been in a precarious position; but with an undaunted spirit he advanced with his army, which after its severe sufferings must indeed have been in a frightful condition, and may not have appeared much better than a host of gipsies. The Cisalpine Gauls were anxious to get an opportunity to rise against the Romans, but they did not venture to move until Hannibal arrived, for the Romans kept them in submission. Scipio, astonished at what he heard, crossed the river Po, and encamped on the Ticinus in the neighbourhood of Pavia. Hannibal came down the valley of Aosta: the expected insurrection of the Gauls did not yet break out. An engagement with the Roman cavalry took place, in which the Romans were beaten by the Spanish and Numidian horsemen. In this skirmish, the consul Scipio received a dangerous wound, and it was only with great difficulty that he was rescued from the tumult, according to some writers, by his own son<sup>2</sup>.

The issue of this engagement, which would have created but little sensation in other wars, convinced the Romans at once of the delusion under which they had been labouring. They now fixed their hopes on the support of Tib. Sempronius, who had been ravaging the coast of Africa, but was now called back, and sailed to Ariminum. Scipio retreated across the Po, gave up its northern bank,

<sup>2</sup> Livy, XXI. 46: Polybius, x. 3.

and pulled down the bridge of rafts which he had constructed. Hannibal had difficulties in crossing the Po, and had to collect boats from the neighbouring rivers. In the meanwhile the Insubrians declared for him.

The Romans were encamped near Placentia, and were waiting for the arrival of Sempronius and his army. I believe that there is something incorrect in our descriptions of these occurrences. General Vaudoncourt has endeavoured to clear up the matter, but his idea of the battle on the Trebia is false in the highest degree. We find Hannibal on the eastern bank of the Trebia; the Romans cross the river to offer battle, consequently Hannibal, who was on the right bank of this river, must have crossed the Po somewhat below Placentia<sup>3</sup>. In order to render a battle in which you are quite sure of victory quite decisive, you must elude the enemy: such was the constant method of Hannibal, and has at all times been the method of every courageous general who was conscious of the strength of his army as well as of his own superiority, and was confident of victory<sup>4</sup>. We must suppose that the Romans had crossed the Po in the neighbourhood of Pavia, and Hannibal, as all circumstances shew, and as I have already observed, some distance below Piacenza<sup>5</sup>. It is said, for instance, that the Romans transferred their camp from the left bank of the Trebia towards the foot of the Apennines, where they were better protected against the cavalry of the Carthaginians by several low hills rising out of the plain<sup>6</sup>. This and several other things are intelligible only if we suppose that Hannibal crossed the Po somewhere between

<sup>3</sup> See Livy, XXI. 47 foll.; Polybius, III. 58 foll.

<sup>4</sup> When in the year 1800 Napoleon crossed the Po, between Pavia and Piacenza, he defeated Melas, the old and awkward Austrian field-marshal, by the same tactics.—N.

<sup>5</sup> One of my friends, who is a highly distinguished tactician, has perfectly convinced himself and me too, that Hannibal cannot have followed the traces of the Romans.—N.

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, III. 58; Livy, XXI. 48.



Piacenza and Parma. The Romans had in the meantime been joined by the army of Tib. Sempronius. If Providence has once decided upon the destruction of an army, all the most unfortunate circumstances will conspire for that purpose. At that moment the wound of Scipio was no trifling matter, it healed very slowly, and was so severe that he could not appear at the head of his army; and who among his legates could have undertaken the command? Two months and a half had elapsed from Hannibal's passage over the little St. Bernard to his arrival on the Trebia. He had employed this time in establishing himself in the country, and in restoring his men and horses. The number of 6000 horsemen whom we mentioned above, may have included those who had been newly mounted. Hannibal pressed the Romans very much, and took their stores of provisions. The consul Sempronius, now united with Scipio, thought it a disgrace to the Roman name to remain idle, and insisted upon offering a battle; but Scipio refused to give his consent, partly on account of the state of his health, and partly because he had already had some experience of the character of his enemy. Hannibal, on the other hand, who was perfectly sure of victory, was greatly inclined to begin an engagement with the Romans, for as long as the two armies were encamped opposite one another, Hannibal could not take his winter quarters, which was an essential point, as he wanted rest for his troops, and was also anxious to get rid of the Romans in those districts, that he might be enabled to organize the Gauls. He was encamped south of Piacenza, on the right bank of the Trebia, and the Romans opposite to him on the left bank. He irritated the Romans by little skirmishes, in which he allowed them some apparent advantages over him. The Trebia has become memorable in modern history for a battle which Macdonald lost on its banks in the year 1799: it does him great honour that he effected his retreat to Genoa, where he joined the rest of the army. I never saw the river myself, but I have gathered information concerning

its localities, and it is remarkable that to this day they perfectly agree with the description given by Polybius. It is a very broad torrent which comes down the Apennines in many arms, and in such a manner that the river flows between its two banks in the form of several small streams. The ground consists of gravel and is covered with shrubs. In winter, when the snow melts on the mountains, or after a heavy rain, the river is very broad and overflows the neighbouring country; but at other times one can walk through it. Hannibal placed some detachments in ambush in the shrubs, which then, as now, covered the banks of the river. He had for some days been trying the Romans, and Sempronius began to imagine that Hannibal was timid and would not venture upon an open contest. But the simple truth was, that he would not attack the Romans on their left bank, because he would not lead his army, at a cold season, through an icy river. The Romans went into the snare. Every pedestrian traveller in Italy is accustomed to walk through the Trebia in summer, but at that time the cold was very severe. Hannibal had large fires in his camp, for brandy was then not known, except in Egypt<sup>7</sup>; and he gave his soldiers warm and plentiful food, and made them rub their bodies with oil at the fires, so that they became quite brisk and warm<sup>8</sup>. During the day there was a strong sprinkling of snow, and the cold in that part of Lombardy, especially in the neighbourhood of Verona, is in truth not less severe than an ordinary winter in Germany. Notwithstanding the snow, the Romans were imprudent enough to wade through the river, and they were almost frozen when they arrived on the right bank: in addition to this, the wind blew the snow into their faces. Hannibal now advanced to meet them, and the Romans, although in reality they were already defeated by the elements, yet fought as brave soldiers; but they were a mi-

<sup>7</sup> In the paintings of Thebes, the whole process of distilling is represented.—N.

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, III. 72; Livy, xxi. 55.

litia against an army of veterans. When all had got through the river, the Carthaginians who had been lying in ambush, rushed forth and attacked their flanks. The loss of the Romans was very great: the whole of their left wing retreated to Placentia. The weather afterwards became so fearful, that the Carthaginians did not pursue the Romans any further, although their usual maxim was to follow up a victory to the utmost. All the Romans who survived the day, threw themselves into Placentia where they had their stores, and there they remained for some time.

The consuls were at first base enough to deceive the senate at Rome, and to conceal the extent of their loss, but the truth became known but too soon. Hannibal's army spread over both banks of the Po, and he now took up his winter quarters in order to give his soldiers rest. He did not attack Placentia, because it was of no importance to him: and he always knew what was necessary. The army in Placentia thus escaped, and a portion of it marched down the Po to Cremona, from whence the whole afterwards went to Ariminum, where the consul, C. Flaminius, had arrived with his reinforcements. According to Livy<sup>9</sup>, Hannibal made an attempt to march across the Apennines into Etruria, but of this Polybius knows nothing. That time was one of those which afford abundant materials for rhetorical exaggeration. It may be however that Hannibal made some excursion to reconnoitre the country, or perhaps even some greater expedition; but the description which Livy gives of this reputed march from Modena to Lucca, of the localities and the storm, is a masterly production. I have witnessed myself a storm in those Apennines in summer, and judging from what I then saw, a storm in winter must render it utterly impossible to ascend those mountains. But to the inhabitants of the adjacent country such a storm is

<sup>9</sup> XXI. 58.

nothing uncommon: they speak of it as an ordinary occurrence. In the plain its effects are not so strongly felt, but on the mountains it is really frightful.

Caius Flaminius had now obtained the unlucky honour of the consulship. It would be unjust to judge of this man, whose name has come down to us in an unfavourable light, by his deeds. In his tribuneship he carried the assignment of the *ager Gallicus Picenus*, for which the illustrious Roman families never forgave him. He afterwards made himself still more obnoxious by supporting a tribunician law which was very offensive to the Roman nobles. This transaction is a curious example of the hypocrisy of those who always talked of the good old times, and spoke of all trade and industry with contempt; although they endeavoured to gain by the same means for themselves all the advantages they could. Such men are not capable of a generous action under any circumstances, or of sacrificing their own personal interest in any way. The tribunician law which C. Flaminius supported forbade all senators to have, either directly or indirectly, any sea ships of more than 300 amphorae, and those which they were allowed to have, were only to be used in conveying corn from their estates to Rome<sup>10</sup>. The greediness of the Roman aristocracy was extremely hurt at the blow which this law inflicted upon them; but its principle was perfectly consistent, and it was only right that the senators should not interfere with the pursuits of the knights or the wealthy merchants, who now formed the second class in Roman society, and to whom banking, commerce, and industry should have been left undisturbed. But the law, nevertheless, produced among the aristocrats such a state of excitement against C. Flaminius, that they spoke of him only as a mutineer. He may have been a sanguine and inconsiderate man, but I am convinced that he was actuated by anything but revolutionary ideas. If a man is once doomed to be decried, he is generally made to feel

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxi. 63.

his doom in all possible ways. Thus, in regard to his march to Ariminum, he was charged with rashness and with having neglected the Latin holidays—charges which are quite ludicrous. Surely Hannibal would not have waited till the holidays were over; he had, on the contrary, set out so early, that Flaminius was in reality already too late.

Hannibal had before him three roads, two leading into Tuscany and one along the Adriatic leading past Rimini, in the neighbourhood of which Flaminius was encamped, with the reinforcements which he had brought to the army of Scipio and Sempronius. It is an unaccountable fact, that the Romans do not appear to have expected the enemy in Etruria, for Hannibal penetrated into the country through the marshes without meeting with any resistance. There were two roads by which he could enter into Etruria: the one led from Bologna across the Apennines towards Florence, and the other from Modena. The former may have been impassable and overgrown, in order to prevent the inroads of the Gauls. Hannibal might have forced his way through, though perhaps with some danger; but, for his purpose, it ran too close by the Apennines, and if he had been betrayed there, Flaminius might easily have fallen upon his flanks from Rimini. Hannibal therefore took the other road. It is surprising that this opinion has ever been disputed. Strabo, who very seldom makes a mistake, had a wrong idea of the matter, and the marsh of which he speaks may be traced in the neighbourhood of Parma<sup>11</sup>. In Italy, or at least in Tuscany, no one has any doubt as to which road is to be understood. The river Arno emptied itself, at a very remote period, into a bay which has gradually been filled up. On its northern bank, not far from its mouth, there is still a number of little lakes, some of which are quite close to one another: many of them have been drained by canals.

<sup>11</sup> Strabo, V. p. 217; Compare Polybius, III. 78, and Livy, XXII. 2.



Pisa itself is situated somewhat higher, and the ground on which it stands is a continuation of the fruitful fields of Lucca. In the spring the whole district is covered with water, and forms one lake. The Romans, therefore, thought themselves quite safe in that quarter. Hannibal, however, invaded Etruria: he shewed the Romans that he could get through, although he had to struggle with unspeakable difficulties. In times of war he never asked whether what he thought necessary could be done with or without loss, and with this maxim he set out on his march towards Etruria. We may imagine that at first he went as far as Modena in order to deceive the Romans, and then proceeded to Lucca. The difficulties which he is said to have encountered may be exaggerated, but the description which we have of his march seems, on the whole, to convey a correct idea of it. He lost a great number of men, and he had only one elephant left. During his passage over the Alps he had been attacked by a disease of the eyes, and now on his passage through those marshes, he lost the use of one eye completely. After a march of three days and a half, he arrived in the neighbourhood of *Faesulae*, and then turned towards the river *Arno*, where the country is now wonderfully improved by drainage. His army had been considerably increased by the Gauls. A report of his march had reached *C. Flaminius*, who for this reason broke up his camp without delay, in order to gain possession of the road to Rome before Hannibal's arrival. The latter proceeded on the road of *Chiusi* towards Rome and ravaged the country which he traversed. Flaminius followed him with the greatest speed. One of the hypocritical charges brought against him was, that he paid so little attention to the auguries, and that he did not defer his march because the standard-bearer could not draw the standard — probably from fear — from its case<sup>12</sup>. We can scarcely form an idea of the extent of such absurdities,


<sup>12</sup> Livy, XXII. 3.



but they prove what Polybius says, that during this war the Romans were very much given to superstition.

Hannibal had advanced beyond Cortona and had the lake of Trasimenus on his right. Flaminius followed him in haste and amazement, for Hannibal had gained a few days marches upon him on his road towards Rome, and might have advanced still further: but he knew the advantages of his ground and wished to gain a decisive battle. Flaminius hastily marched along below Cortona. Hannibal had in the meantime turned around the lake, and Flaminius, in the belief that he was still continuing his road towards Rome, descended from the hills which stretch along the lake: in some places they are not more than a stone's throw distance from its borders. Hannibal ascended the hills from behind in columns, took his station upon them, and placed his light armed troops where the space between the hills and the lake was narrowest, and formed a very long defile. Here we see again the finger of Providence; for the day was foggy, and the Romans broke up very early, before sunrise, to continue their march, in very thick columns which were unable to manoeuvre. When they arrived in the narrow defile, they fell in with the light armed troops of Hannibal, and imagining that the Carthaginians were returning to meet them, they thought it necessary to hasten onward without delay. Hannibal drew his columns to the right and outflanked the Romans; and while they attempted to force their way through the light armed troops, Hannibal attacked them from behind and from the hills. Thus the Romans were driven into the lake, and not more than 6000 forced their way through the enemy. The greater part perished in the lake, and C. Flaminius was among the slain. There are two spots, Ossaia and the small stream of Sanguinetto, which are pointed out by different writers as the places where the battle was fought, and which are generally cited as instances of the manner in

which local traditions are preserved. But the Sanguinetto cannot have been the actual scene of the battle, though it may have been fought in its vicinity; and as for Ossaia, I have discovered that in the sixteenth century it was called Orsaia, and that the nobles of Perugia used to keep bears (orsi) on that spot, from which it derived the name Orsaia, which was subsequently corrupted into Ossaia.



## LECTURE XI.

EXTRAORDINARY PHENOMENA IN NATURE. — PROCEEDINGS OF HANNIBAL AFTER THE BATTLE OF TRASIMENUS. — WHY HE DID NOT MARCH AGAINST ROME? — HIS ARRIVAL IN APULIA. — L. AEMILIUS PAULLUS AND C. TERENTIUS VARRO. — BATTLE OF CANNAE.

SHAKESPEARE has connected awful phenomena of physical nature with occurrences in the moral world, as Thucydides connects the physical phenomena of the Peloponnesian war with the moral condition of the people. During the second Punic war, the earth was shaken by extraordinary convulsions and fermentations which were going on in its bowels, and Pliny<sup>1</sup> says, that in one year fifty-seven earthquakes were reported at Rome, a greater number than had ever been observed before within so short a period. Whether the earth shook in fifty-seven different places, or at different times of the year, cannot be decided, on account of the vague manner in which Pliny speaks of the fact. We may, however, believe that the earth shook under the feet of the combatants, near lake Trasimenus, without their being aware of it<sup>2</sup>. It may be that the thick fogs, which covered the scene on the morning of the battle, had some connexion with these internal convulsions of the earth, although in spring such fogs are not unfrequent in those districts. I myself saw one, in the month of June, in the valley of the Tiber, not far from lake Trasimenus, which reminded me very forcibly of the morning of that memorable battle.

<sup>1</sup> Hist. Nat. II. 86.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, l. c ; Livy, XXII. 5 ; Zonaras, VIII. 25.

After the battle of Trasimenus, Hannibal exchanged the Libyan armour of his soldiers for that of the Romans<sup>3</sup>, which shews how well he knew how to train his army. In order to use the Roman armour with success, it was indispensable to adopt their whole method of training and exercising the troops, and this could not be learned as quickly as the manoeuvres of the phalanx. The introduction of the pilum alone shews how, in the midst of war, he kept his troops ready for any improvement. Ever since the battle on the Trebia he had treated the Italians with kindness; he took care of the wounded, and restored the prisoners to freedom, probably on condition that they should never again take up arms against him. He now adopted the same line of conduct towards the far greater number of prisoners who were taken in the battle of Trasimenus. When he crossed the Alps, it was not his intention to fall upon Rome like a torrent, and to scale its walls; he was not capable of such a false calculation; he must, like Pyrrhus, have entertained the idea of forming a close alliance with the Italians, and of thus crumbling Rome to dust by a series of wars. He was obliged to create for himself a power in Italy, before he could hope successfully to combat and crush Rome.

When he broke up from lake Trasimenus, which must have been immediately after the battle, he fell in with a detachment of four thousand Romans, who had been sent from Rimini to reinforce the army of C. Flaminius, and were now cut to pieces. He did not march towards Rome, but to Spoleto, the third line of Roman colonies, in the hope of making an impression upon the town, the conquest of which would necessarily afford him great advantages. But the town held out, and remained faithful to the Romans<sup>4</sup>. It is a peculiar feature which Hannibal had, in common with many great generals of modern times, that he had an aversion to sieges. He him-

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, III. 87; Livy, XXII. 46.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, XXII. 9.

self never besieged a place, and long sieges were always conducted by his generals. When, therefore, he found that his attempt upon Spoleto did not succeed, he broke up, and continued his march into Picenum. Now, every one will ask, Why did he not march directly towards Rome? Why did he not avail himself of the general consternation which prevailed there?—for the Romans were alarmed in the highest degree, and the city and its immediate vicinity were no longer their recruiting places; their forces could only be strengthened by drawing reinforcements from distant parts of Italy;—or why did not Hannibal attempt to blockade Rome, if he despaired of taking it by assault? To these questions we may give the following answer: in those times Rome was an extremely strong fortress, protected by steep rocks, walls, banks, and moats. The Capitoline rock was hewn quite steep; one side of the Quirinal, as far as the porta Collina, was a rugged rock, and protected by a strong wall; further on was the wall of Servius Tullius, an Italian mile in length. Where the city was not protected by anything but a wall, as between the Aventine and Caelius, there it was backed, at least partly, by marshes; in short, a great army would have been required to undertake the blockade. Hannibal might have burnt down the suburbs, and thus have produced great terror and alarm; but that was not what he wished, and he had, besides, several reasons for not undertaking anything of the sort. His army was suffering from diseases, principally of a cutaneous nature, and required rest for their recovery<sup>5</sup>. The connexions which he hoped to form with the Italians by his generous conduct towards them, had not yet been effected<sup>6</sup>. Another reason must assuredly have been, the unhealthy state of the atmosphere in the neighbourhood of Rome, during the summer months. The battle of Trasimenus must have taken place about the end of May, or

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, III. 87.

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, III. 90.

the beginning of June: there is a passage from which its exact date can be inferred, but I do not recollect it at present<sup>7</sup>. His army, therefore, would have been consumed by diseases, even if the health of the soldiers had not already been impaired. He took up his summer-quarters—for they are as necessary in Italy as winter-quarters are in other countries,—in Picenum and the Marca Ancona, a fruitful and healthy country, with a moderate temperature. Providence here again evidently interfered on his behalf; the earthquakes, which announced awful events to the world, had paved his way, and been his battering-rams, for the walls of several fortified towns were thrown down, and he was enabled to gain his entrance in many places without resistance<sup>8</sup>. While thus his soldiers recovered from their sufferings, the Romans exerted all their powers. Q. Fabius Maximus was made dictator, and received the command of the army which he formed by collecting those who had survived the day of Trasimenus, and by fresh levies<sup>9</sup>. The Romans began even to enlist prisoners as soldiers, when they were willing to serve.

In the meantime Hannibal left his quarters, for at the beginning of autumn the season became more favourable. He marched through Abruzzo, the country of the Pelignians and Marrucinians, along the coast of the Adriatic, wishing to reach Casinum and the Via Latina, and by confining the communication between Rome and Campania to the Via Appia, he wished to see whether such a position would encourage the Italians to venture upon something decisive. He soon found himself involved in difficulties on account of his having no maps, though it is wonderful how well, in general, the ancients attained their objects without them. He knew that Casinum lay

<sup>7</sup> The atmosphere in and about Rome is pestiferous even before the end of June, and in ancient times it was no less so than at present.—N.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxii. 18, who gives one instance of it.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxii. 11; Polybius, iii. 88.



on the road, and he commanded one of his generals to lead his troops thither. Now whether it was that he made a mistake in speaking, or that his general misunderstood him, we know not, but the general led his troops through Samnium and upper Campania, to Casilinum<sup>10</sup>. Hannibal did not discover the mistake till it was too late, for Fabius was before hand, and had turned from the Via Latina into Samnium, and fortified himself there. When, therefore, Hannibal saw that his plan was thwarted by this unlucky accident, he ravaged the beautiful country of Campania, where many of the Roman nobles had their estates, and he wished to return through Samnium, into Apulia, in order to take up his winter-quarters in those mild districts, and at the same time to have, by his presence, the Italians more under his direct influence. He had by this time already conceived the idea of forming an alliance with the king of Macedonia. But Fabius cut off his retreat near mount Callicula; Hannibal, however, did not lose his presence of mind, and availing himself of the superstition of the Romans, used the well known stratagem of fastening bundles of brushwood to the horns of a great number of oxen, and kindling the wood in the darkness of night, &c. The Romans were so alarmed at this strange phenomenon that they took to flight<sup>11</sup>. Hannibal now quickly took the position which had been occupied by the Romans, and continued his march through Samnium, until he reached the frontiers between Apulia and the Frentanians, where he pitched his camp. Here Fabius again met his enemy, but without suffering any defeat; in petty skirmishes the Romans even gained some advantages. But these little victories led the Romans to forget their real position, and to believe that their former defeats were to be attributed merely to chance, and that Fabius, with more courage, might wipe off the disgrace from the

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxii. 13.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxii. 16; Polybius, iii. 93; Zonaras, viii. 26.

Roman name. Fabius was obliged to return to Rome, and left the whole command of the army to his legate, M. Minucius Rufus. It is well known that the senate gave to Minucius the power of *prodictator*, so that both had equal powers<sup>12</sup>; and when Fabius returned, the troops were divided between him and Minucius. When Hannibal was informed of this measure he provoked Minucius, lay in ambush, and gained such a victory over him, that he would have been completely lost, had not Fabius and a corps of Samnites come to his assistance. Minucius now resigned his power, and Fabius terminated the campaign in as favourable a manner as the circumstances would allow of.

During the ensuing winter, Hannibal was, properly speaking, in distressed circumstances: the harvest appears to have been safely carried into fortified towns before his arrival, for provisions were scarce, and he had great difficulty in supporting his army; but what rendered his situation more precarious than anything, was the fact that not one of the Italian nations had yet joined him against the Romans.

The consuls of the year 537 were L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro. It seems a well-established fact that the father of the latter was a butcher, a circumstance which, in former times, would have rendered it impossible for him to obtain the consulship. Whether a man possessed a hide of land, of two or of four jugers, nay, whether they were his own property, or whether he merely tilled them as a labourer, was a matter of indifference to the Romans, but it was husbandry, which in their opinion made a man honourable. Varro is said to have risen by demagogic artifices<sup>13</sup>; but whether the account of Livy is correct or exaggerated, or whether it is a mere tale,

<sup>12</sup> Livy, XXII. 26; Polybius, III. 103; Dion Cassius, *Fragm.* 48; Plutarch, Fabius, c. 7; Zonaras, VIII. 26.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, XXII. 25, foll. Polybius knows nothing of it.

cannot be ascertained. We may, at any rate, ask, how did it happen that, after the battle of Cannae, the senate went out to meet him, and offer thanks to him for not having despaired<sup>14</sup>; and that from that moment, down to the end of the second Punic war, he alone had an army with extraordinary powers? If he had actually, as Livy says, been a contemptible man, such distinctions would be incomprehensible. My belief is, that he was one of those unfortunate persons who are doomed in history to do penance for their misfortunes. In their political opinions the two consuls were diametrically opposed to each other. Aemilius Paullus was not merely a patrician, which would have made little difference, but he was literally a *μισόδημος*, on account of a charge which had been brought against him before the beginning of the Punic war.

The Roman armies were encamped in Apulia, not far from Cannae. The Romans had exerted themselves to their utmost to raise their troops to an equal number with those of the Carthaginians. Their forces consisted of no less than eight legions, all more than complete, each consisting of 5000 men. There were consequently 40,000 Romans, independent of their allies, who served as infantry<sup>15</sup>, 2400 Roman horsemen, and 6000 of their allies. Hannibal had no more elephants, but he had a considerable number of Gallic horsemen; the Spanish cavalry, however, was the best. The Numidians, like the Cossacks, were not made for a shock, but were most excellent for reconnoitering, foraging, and harassing the enemy; against the infantry or heavy cavalry they were useless. It is a mere chance that we know the date of the battle of Cannae, and we are astonished to find that it was at so late a season of the year: Gellius<sup>16</sup> says that it took place on the second of August. But how was it that so long a time was allowed to pass away in inactivity? Both

<sup>14</sup> Livy, xxii. 61; Plutarch, Fabius, 18.

<sup>15</sup> Polybius, iii. 107; Livy, xxii. 36.

<sup>16</sup> Noct. Att. v. 17.

armies were encamped for a considerable time opposite each other on the banks of the Aufidus, a river which flows from the mountains of Samnium, and empties itself into the Adriatic. The Roman forces were divided into two camps, each occupying one bank of the river; their head quarters were at Canusium, and their stores at Cannae. The latter place, which was only a few miles distant from the Roman camp, was taken by Hannibal<sup>17</sup>; but the Romans seem nevertheless to have been too timid to engage in a decisive battle. It may be, however, that all their troops had not yet arrived, and that for this reason Aemilius Paullus would not yet venture anything. But what ought to have been done? The wisest plan, I believe, would have been to refuse a battle as long as Hannibal did not compel him to it; for the longer the hopes which Hannibal entertained in regard to the Italians continued to be disappointed, the better it was for the Romans. But it might, on the other hand, be said also, that a longer delay might have encouraged the allies of the Romans to do what they wished, but did not yet venture to do. Everything depended upon one decisive moment; and if Lucania and Apulia had deserted the Romans, their situation would have been fearful. Aemilius Paullus knew that if he conquered in the battle, the advantages would be immense; but he also knew that if he lost the battle, all would be lost. One camp of the Romans crossed the river Aufidus, which in that part forms two great reaches, and joined the other. Hannibal likewise crossed the river, and drew up his army in battle array in the face of the enemy, between the two reaches, and in such a manner that his two flanks were leaning against the reaches. His position was such, that the Romans could derive no advantage from their superiority in numbers. They had placed their cavalry on the two wings: Hannibal did the same, but in such a way, that one wing

<sup>17</sup> Polybius, III. 107.

was occupied by his light, and the other by his heavy cavalry. He ordered a part of his infantry, chiefly Gauls, to advance against the Romans, and to open the contest; but they were easily overwhelmed by the Romans, and on their retreat they were received by both the Carthaginian wings, on the right and on the left. The Romans followed them in columns, and now attacked the Carthaginians, Numidians, and Spaniards, who had the river in their rear. The two Carthaginian wings fell upon the advancing Romans, and the whole Carthaginian cavalry rushed forth against one wing of the Roman cavalry, and a fierce contest began, in which the Romans were unable to maintain their ground, and were, in a short time, completely routed. It is not improbable that many of the Italian allies of the Romans, especially those who deserted their cause soon after, did not do their duty during the engagement. The Carthaginian cavalry now threw themselves upon the Roman infantry, and routed them also most completely. The victory was decided, although the contest was still maintained for a long time, until at nightfall the defeat of the Romans was complete. I must notice here a curious circumstance, which is mentioned by Appian and Zonaras<sup>18</sup>, and was probably derived from Fabius; namely, that in that part of Apulia a sea-breeze rises every day at noon-time. This is probable enough. The whole district is of a calcareous nature, and in summer the whole of Apulia is covered with clouds of dust. But in this case it is added that, on the day before the battle, Hannibal had ordered the fields to be ploughed, and that he took such a position that the wind, blowing towards the Romans, carried the clouds of dust into their faces, so that they were unable to fight. I readily believe that Hannibal may have availed himself of the wind; but the rest sounds rather marvellous, and is perhaps nothing more than one of those fictions by which a conquered

<sup>18</sup> Appian, *De Bello Annibal.* 20. foll.; Zonaras, ix. 1 foll. Comp. Livy, xxii. 46.



party endeavours to cover its own disgrace. Aemilius Paullus was among the slain, and the number of the dead, according to the lowest estimation, amounted to 40,000 foot and 2,700 horse<sup>19</sup>.

After the battle, the surviving Romans of both camps capitulated, with the exception of a small detachment, which threw itself into Canusium, and afterwards escaped into the mountains. They surrendered, on condition that Hannibal should enter into negotiations with Rome concerning the ransom of the prisoners, as had been done in the first Punic war, when the captives were always exchanged, and the party which had the greater number received a sum of money as a compensation. Hannibal, who, as I have already remarked, had an aversion to sieges, was unconcerned about the Romans at Canusium, and marched towards Capua. This must have been sooner after the battle than Livy represents it: Hannibal cannot have deferred it, for there is yet an immense number of events, all of which belong to this same year. It is a very well known story related by Cato<sup>20</sup>, that Maharbal<sup>21</sup>, the commander of the Carthaginian horse, immediately after the battle, requested Hannibal to send him to Rome, where, in five days, he promised to celebrate his victory by a banquet on the Capitol. Hannibal answered with a smile, that it was a fine idea, but impracticable; whereupon Maharbal replied, "Thou knowest, indeed, how to gain a victory, but not how to make use of it." We cannot say how great the consternation and paralysis would have been at Rome, if the Carthaginian cavalry had made its appearance on the Via Latina, before the mournful tidings of the destruction of the Roman army had reached the capital; but no part of the army could have reached


<sup>19</sup> Livy, xxii. 49. Compare Polybius, III. 117; Appian, *De Bello Annibal*, 25; Plutarch, *Fabius*, 16.

<sup>20</sup> Gellius, *Noct. Att.* x. 24; compare Livy, xxii. 51; Plutarch, *Fab.* 17.

<sup>21</sup> I believe we must pronounce Maharbál, and not Mahárbal.—N.



Rome in so short a time, except the cavalry, and even this not without the greatest difficulty, and without changing the horses on its road; for the distance between the field of battle and the city of Rome was at least two hundred miles, even if we suppose the road to have formed a straight line. The only thing, however, which the Romans would have had to do against cavalry, in order to be safe, would have been simply to shut their gates. It is not impossible that Maharbal may have fancied Rome to be in a state of consternation, similar to that after the battle on the Allia; but, although there were in the city only recruits and soldiers destined for the navy, yet I can never believe that the Romans would have been so desponding as not to defend their walls; and although their defence would perhaps have been of no avail, it might at least have compelled Hannibal to lay encamped before Rome in the middle of August, which is the most unfavourable season.



## LECTURE XII.

HANNIBAL IN CAMPANIA.—CAPUA.—THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR, FROM 537 TO 541.—EXERTIONS OF THE ROMANS.—THEY GAIN ADVANTAGES IN CAMPANIA.—BESIEGE CAPUA.—HANNIBAL AT THE GATES OF ROME.—HIERONYMUS OF SYRACUSE.—HIS SUCCESSORS, HIPPOCRATES AND EPICYDES.—SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF SYRACUSE BY THE ROMANS.

LIVY<sup>1</sup> gives a list of the Italian nations which deserted Rome after the battle of Cannae, and the fact is represented as if it had happened immediately after the battle. But this cannot have been the case: several of them continued to be faithful to Rome for a considerable time afterwards, and we see that the belief in the unshaken omnipotence of Rome was still very strong among them; but it was especially the fortresses of Beneventum, Luceria, Venusia, Brundisium, Paestum, and Aesernia, that exerted their influence upon the people far around them, so as to paralyze them, and prevent their joining the Carthaginians. Even before the battle of Cannae, Hannibal had entered into negotiations with Capua,—next to Rome the most flourishing city of Italy, but, in regard to moral power and political importance, quite the reverse of Rome. Campania was proverbial for its wealth, but its inhabitants were luxurious and effeminate in the highest degree: they stood to Rome in the very favourable relation of isopolity; and the great families of Campania thought themselves quite equal to those of Rome, and were connected with them by

<sup>1</sup> XXII. 61, with the note of Glareanus.

intermarriages<sup>2</sup>. They entertained the hope, which was fostered by Hannibal, that the fall of Rome would transfer the supreme power to Capua. When, therefore, Hannibal appeared in Campania, every thing was prepared. The Romans had small garrisons in all places, but at Capua there was none, and the only thing which made the inhabitants of Capua hesitate was the circumstance, that 300 of the noblest Campanians, who formed the cavalry belonging to the Campanian legion, were still engaged in the service of Rome, and had been sent to Sicily, where they were kept, so to speak, as hostages to insure the loyalty of Capua. The Romans were unable to do anything except by persuasion. One voice only rose at Capua to recommend the people to remain faithful to Rome<sup>3</sup>. The apostacy of Capua was the most glaring ingratitude, and it is only natural that the Romans could not forgive it; for no kind of ingratitude is so mortifying as the assumptions of unworthy men, when they become refractory, and wish to occupy places which are filled by others worthier than themselves. But Capua was not merely ungrateful, but it displayed a useless barbarity by putting the Romans to death in hot bath rooms. Capua now concluded a very favourable treaty with Hannibal, in which no mention is made of any kind of Carthaginian supremacy; but Hannibal recognized their independence, did not claim the right of levying contributions among them, or of making them serve in his armies, and allowed them to select 300 from among the noblest of his Roman captives, as a compensation for the 300 Campanian horsemen in Sicily<sup>4</sup>. He also promised them, in the name of Carthage, that they should not be forgotten in any future peace. It is not known what became of those 300 noble Romans, whether the Campanians put them to death, or exchanged them for their own nobles; but I believe that they were exchanged,

<sup>2</sup> Compare vol. 111. p. 109, foll. and p. 291.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxiii. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxiii. 7.

for at that time Rome was not as haughty as she had used to be.

The acquisition of Capua was a great gain to Hannibal. It may be taken for granted, that on his march into Campania the Hirpinians had declared for him. Acerrae, which also enjoyed the right of isopolity with Rome, was taken after a long siege; but the attempts against Cumae, Naples, and Nola, were unsuccessful, and, near the last of these places, the Carthaginians were repulsed with some loss. Livy<sup>5</sup> does not seem to think that this loss was very considerable, and it may certainly have been somewhat exaggerated by other writers, as it was the first advantage which the Romans gained after many defeats. It was however, at any rate, of great importance to them, that Hannibal did not succeed in his attempts to obtain possession of Cumae and Naples; for if he had succeeded, he would have had a place of arms and of communication with Carthage, from which he might have derived incalculable advantages. But he was now in the strangest position: he had, in reality, not a single sea-port town; and although he was the general of a maritime state, yet he was in the midst of a foreign country, and shut out from the sea.

The taking of Capua forms the conclusion of the second period of the second Punic war: Hannibal had now reached the highest point of his glory. Whether it be true, that his winter quarters in the luxurious city of Capua destroyed the character and discipline of his army, or whether this statement be a mere rhetorical declamation, is a point, concerning which I think it preferable to be silent. Thus much however is certain, that when, after extraordinary exertions, men betake themselves to rest, they lose their disposition for great and energetic activity, and sometimes never acquire it again. This is a dangerous cliff in the lives of many, and it may have been so to Hannibal and his army. But there is another

circumstance which is usually overlooked, namely, that he could not recruit his army either from Africa, or from Spain or Gaul. Every battle cost him a number of men; his being in the heart of a foreign country rendered a series of little skirmishes unavoidable; and the greatest loss is always that which we sustain in a foreign land. When Hannibal descended from the Alps, he had only 20,000 foot and 6000 horse; since then he had fought three great battles, and not received a single man to reinforce his army. He had no choice but to complete his forces by Italians. We know that he drew soldiers from Bruttium, and we may suppose, that he strengthened himself in other parts also. The year after the battle of Cannae, he received reinforcements and elephants; the exact numbers are not mentioned, but they must have been considerable<sup>6</sup>. At the end of the war, only a few of the veterans were surviving who had crossed the Alps. All this must account for the fact, that the character of his soldiers was afterwards no longer equal to that of the army with which he had begun the war<sup>7</sup>. Whatever injurious influence, therefore, the stay at Capua may have had on the army of Hannibal, the above-mentioned circumstances alone are sufficient to account for its state of dissolution.

I shall relate very briefly the history of the period from the taking of Capua in 537, down to the year 541. The Romans now made the most incredible exertions.

<sup>6</sup> Livy xxiii. 13, relates, that the senate of Carthage decreed in the very year of the battle of Cannae, to send reinforcements to Hannibal; and he adds, that the decree was carried into effect with that slowness which is common in prosperous circumstances. This might, indeed, have delayed the arrival of the reinforcements till the year after; but elephants are mentioned in the camp of Hannibal even before he took up his winter-quarters.—Livy, xxiii. 18.

<sup>7</sup> The Prussian army of 1762 was infinitely inferior to that of 1757; and those who have seen the French armies must own, that the one of 1807 was incomparably better than that of 1812, during the campaign to Russia.—N.

Their legions were henceforth constantly increased. Allies are no longer mentioned; and it is highly probable that, in this year, they were incorporated with the legions for the whole duration of the war, in order not to let them stand isolated. This is, however, a mere conjecture of mine, which I do not mean to give as an historical fact; it may be nothing but a false appearance, but as long as I have no evidence to the contrary, I take it to be correct. Instead of confining themselves, after such losses, to operations on a smaller scale, the Romans conceived the great idea of multiplying everything. They were obliged to create a new army, and with it to meet the Carthaginians, who were accustomed to victory. They refused to ransom those who had been taken prisoners at Cannae<sup>8</sup>; but, whether this measure was wise and just, and whether the prisoners were worth being ransomed, is a point about which a great many things might be said. The awful consequence, however, was, that Hannibal sold them all as slaves. The actions of those who belong to a great body of men, must not be judged with the same severity as those of single and independent persons, for the former are obliged to give up their own individuality. I have known persons who acted in a similar manner, although they were perfectly incapable of doing the same thing either before or after such an occasion. We have, moreover, to consider, whether Hannibal did not, perhaps, demand ready money, which the Romans were not in a condition to pay. But even those who survived the day of Cannae, without having been taken prisoners, were treated as cowards, with bitterness and contempt<sup>9</sup>; just as the unfortunate admiral Byng was shot, in order to establish a maxim. As a sufficient number of freemen could not be found, 8000 slaves were bought on credit of their masters, and formed into two regiments<sup>10</sup>; nay,

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxii. 59, foll.; Polybius, vi. 58.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxiii. 31; xxv. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxiv. 11.



even gladiators were enlisted with their arms. We can hardly form an idea of the distressed state of Rome: the price of corn had risen to ten times the ordinary price, and Rome was in a complete state of famine<sup>11</sup>. Lucania (with the exception of Petelia), Bruttium, the greater part of Samnium, and almost all the Greek towns of Italy, threw themselves into the arms of Hannibal<sup>12</sup>; and it is surprising that, under these circumstances, he not only gained no lasting advantages, but that, from this time forward, the Romans continually acquired new strength.

In the year after the battle of Cannae, Hannibal made two unsuccessful attempts upon the fortified camp of M. Claudius Marcellus at Nola<sup>13</sup>, and sustained a considerable loss. Q. Fabius Maximus and Marcellus were his antagonists; and he is reported to have said at the time, that he respected Fabius as his tutor, but Marcellus as his rival; that Fabius prevented his committing any mistake, and that Marcellus gave him exercise for the development of his own powers<sup>14</sup>. This is not a mere rhetorical phrase. The Romans established themselves in Campania with a decided superiority, as early as the year 539. The Campanians were cowards; they took the field only in the neighbourhood of Cumae, but were defeated, and allowed themselves to be shut up like sheep in a fold. Hannibal made several attempts to relieve them; one Carthaginian army, under the command of Hanno, advanced as far as Beneventum, but was beaten there by Tib. Sempronius Gracchus and his slaves, whose bravery was afterwards rewarded with their freedom<sup>15</sup>. After being thus thwarted, Hannibal made only feeble attempts. I do not understand why Hannibal, who had in the meanwhile received reinforcements from Carthage, did not exert

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, ix. 44.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxiii. 30; Polybius, vii. 1.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, xxiii. 46; compare xxiv. 13.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch, Marcellus, c. 9.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, xxiv. 14 foll.

all his powers to relieve Capua, which was blockaded by the Romans with double entrenchments. It is true the communication with the city was extremely difficult, but Hannibal ought to have stormed the entrenchments; this neglect is unaccountable to me. He lingered in Apulia and Lucania, made some petty conquests, and abandoned Capua to its hopeless fate. At last, however, he made an attempt, the real object or meaning of which history is at a loss how to explain. He appeared before Capua<sup>16</sup>; and, when he found that he could not induce the Romans to engage in an open contest, he marched along the Via Latina towards Rome, and crossed the river Liris in the neighbourhood of Fregellae<sup>17</sup>. He found no favourable reception anywhere, and marched towards Rome, which was thrown into a state of the greatest alarm. Q. Fulvius was hastily called away from Capua, for the protection of the capital. This was just what Hannibal wished. He had probably calculated that both armies would be called back, which would have enabled him to relieve Capua, and to introduce provisions, or to lead away its population. But it seems that the general, to whom he had left the command to effect this, was not fit for the task. Hannibal was encamped near the porta Collina, on a projection of Monte Pincio, opposite the low grounds of the garden of Sallust, and he challenged the Romans to fight. Q. Fulvius hastened along the Via Appia towards Rome, and offered battle. But to fight a battle in that position could surely not be the real object of Hannibal, and he confined himself to ravaging the country, and then returned to Campania and Rhegium<sup>18</sup>. If his Italian allies, the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians, had, in the meanwhile, compelled the other consul to raise the siege of Capua, Hannibal would have gained his end; but he was always obliged to do everything himself.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, XXVI. 5 foll; Polybius, IX. 3 foll.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, XXVI. 9.

<sup>18</sup> Polybius, IX. 6.

Hiero died at the age of ninety, either in the year of the battle of Cannae, or the year after, and was succeeded by his grandson Hieronymus. We find almost invariably in Greek dynasties, that the successors of great men do not seem to know what use to make of the power bequeathed to them, except so far as their own enjoyment is concerned. Hieronymus was the son of Gelo, the son of Hiero; had Gelo been alive, he would have followed quite a different line of policy<sup>19</sup>; but Hieronymus, in the belief that, after the battle of Cannae, Rome would not raise her head again, thought that he might treat the Romans with contempt, although he had no wish to throw himself into the arms of the Carthaginians. He was a contemptible young man, without ability or experience, and fancied that, in the confusion of the war, he might make himself sole master of Sicily<sup>20</sup>. He intended to give up the alliance with Rome, and to negotiate with the Carthaginians. Hannibal, who kept his own objects in view in such cases, made all possible concessions without any scruple, on condition that Hieronymus should renounce his alliance with Rome. This Hieronymus did; but he took no further steps. The Romans established themselves in Sicily, notwithstanding their immense difficulties, and Hieronymus, who had exasperated his subjects by his tyrannical despotism, was murdered<sup>21</sup>. After him two Carthaginians of Syracusan origin, Hippocrates and Epicydes, usurped the government. The Romans endeavoured, in their negotiations with them, to be as gentle as they could, and to gain them over to their cause by persuasion; and as Hannibal did not, in the meantime, derive from his alliance with Syracuse the advantages which he had expected, the negotiations of the Romans began to gain ground. But the two usurpers had declared themselves in the most decided way against the Romans. M.

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, vii. 8.

<sup>20</sup> Livy, xxiv. 6; Polybius, vii. 4.

<sup>21</sup> Livy, xxiv. 7; Polybius, vii. 6.

Marcellus was now sent to Sicily. The events which now followed may be related briefly. The siege of Syracuse occupied a great part of the year. Marcellus, by careful operations, took possession of two parts of the town, Neapolis and Tyche; but Acradina, the principal part of the city, was taken by treachery<sup>22</sup>. This siege is remarkable on account of the engines which Archimedes is said to have used. We have different accounts about this subject; but that which is well established, may be reduced to the fact, that Archimedes constantly thwarted the attempts of the battering-rams, and destroyed the great engines of the Roman ships by his superior skill in mechanics, but not by fire and the like<sup>23</sup>. The account of the burning-glasses must be rejected. It is not improbable, that when afterwards such glasses were invented, and persons thought that they might be used in sieges, or for the destruction of ships, this possibility was transformed into an historical fact, and forged into the siege of Syracuse. That these glasses were not mentioned by Polybius may be inferred, from the silence of Livy about them. The humanity and gentleness of Marcellus after the taking of Syracuse are generally spoken of as something quite extraordinary<sup>24</sup>, and I agree in declaring it an act of humanity, that he did not order the town to be plundered or destroyed; but from the *Excerpta Περὶ Γνωμῶν*, published by A. Mai<sup>25</sup>, we see this humanity in a different light: those of its inhabitants who were not sold as slaves were driven out of the town into the open fields, where they died of starvation, so that the free Syracusans had to envy the lot of slaves, and that many of them pretended to be slaves, merely to obtain the means of satisfying their hunger. Such were the manners of the times!

<sup>22</sup> Livy, xxv. 25 foll.; Polybius, viii. 5—10 and 37.

<sup>23</sup> Polybius, i. c; Livy, xxiv. 34 foll.; Plutarch, Marcellus, c. 14 foll.; Zonaras, ix. 4.

<sup>24</sup> Livy, xxv. 40.

<sup>25</sup> Diodorus, *Excerpta Vaticana*, p. 68 ed. L. Dindorf; compare *Excerpt. Vales.* p. 569

## LECTURE XIII.

SURRENDER OF CAPUA.—THE YEARS FROM 541 TO 545.

—THE WAR IN SPAIN.—P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO.—HADRUBAL.—BATTLE ON THE METAURUS.

THE taking of Syracuse and the treatment which its inhabitants experienced, shew how little the wars of the ancients can be compared with those of modern times, and how grateful we may be that the principles of war are so much altered for the better. Another example of the same cruelty was exhibited at the taking of Capua. Cicero<sup>1</sup> seems to think it a wise clemency that the Romans did not destroy the town, but they raged against its inhabitants with all the fury that one can imagine. The citizens were obliged to throw their gates open to the Romans, but were at the same time so fully convinced of the fate which awaited them, that a number of senators mutually opened one another's veins, and thus put an end to their lives<sup>2</sup>. One noble Capuan killed his wife and two children, before the town was surrendered. When the gates were opened, the inhabitants suffered everything that can be inflicted by an army of enraged soldiers, who were, in truth, no better than demons. All Campanian citizens were compelled to quit the town; the noblest persons were thrown into chains; and Fulvius Flaccus ordered all the senators to be put to death. Only freedmen and slaves were allowed to remain and inhabit the place<sup>3</sup>. The town thus received quite a different population, and its whole territory was confiscated by the Romans<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> De leg. Agr. l. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, xxvi. 14, says that they poisoned themselves.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxvi. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxviii. 46.



During the period from 541 to 545, no great events or battles took place. Hannibal defeated the proconsul Cn. Fulvius<sup>5</sup>, and from an ambuscade he fell upon the consuls M. Marcellus and T. Quinctius Crispinus. Marcellus was slain, and Crispinus died afterwards in consequence of his wounds<sup>6</sup>. Hannibal gained possession of the towns of Arpi and Salapia, but both were re-conquered by the Romans: he had taken Tarentum after a long siege, the issue of which was, for a time, very doubtful; but, soon after, the town was surrendered to the Romans, by the treacherous governors whom he had entrusted with the command of the garrison. All the Greek towns thus abandoned the cause of Hannibal.

Let us now turn our attention to Spain. At the beginning of the war the Romans thought that the Carthaginians, after such brilliant successes in Spain, would send army upon army to reinforce Hannibal; and although the Romans themselves were in the most difficult circumstances, they sent out an army under the brothers Publius and Cneius Scipio<sup>7</sup>. They arrived in Spain in the year 535, the second of the war, established themselves in the neighbourhood of Taragona and harassed the Carthaginians. After the battle of Cannae the Carthaginians wished Hasdrubal to march into Italy, but he was prevented by the Scipios. The Spaniards were a strange people: they always hated their rulers, whether they were Carthaginians or Romans. The district in which the war was carried on cannot be distinctly seen in the narrative of Livy. It seems surprising, but cannot be doubted, that the Romans advanced into Andalusia as far as Cordova, for how they could venture to penetrate so far, is quite unaccountable. The war in Spain deserves the less to be minutely de-

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxvii. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, xxvii. 27; Polybius x. 32.

<sup>7</sup> The name of the *duo fulmina belli* seems to have been transferred from Hamilcar Barca to the Scipios.—N.



scribed, as all accounts of it differ, according to Livy, most widely from one another, and are very far from being trustworthy<sup>8</sup>. In one year—it is uncertain which—the Scipios made several successful campaigns. In the eighth year after their arrival in Spain, according to Livy<sup>9</sup> about 540, the Romans sustained great losses, and within thirty days both the Scipios were slain. Publius fell first by the faithlessness of the Celtiberians who served in the Roman army, and allowed themselves to be bribed by the Carthaginians<sup>10</sup>. The Romans lost by this defeat all their possessions west of the Iberus, but the progress of the enemy was checked by L. Marcius. The advantage, however, which Hasdrubal derived from his victory, was that it afforded him the means for his expedition into Italy. Whether Spain in his absence remained faithful to the Carthaginians or not, was to him a matter of indifference, for he thought that it would be easy to reconquer it after having gained possession of Italy. The Romans, on the other hand, were determined not to give up Spain; and as they knew of the preparations which Hasdrubal was making, they resolved to send a pro-consul to Spain. But when no one was prepared to undertake the command, Publius Scipio, the son of Publius Scipio who had fallen in Spain, came forward and offered to go. He is said to have warded off a fatal stroke aimed

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxv. 39; xxvi. 49; compare xxvii. 7. (Even the death of Marcellus is related in three different ways.—N.)—See Livy, xxvii. 27.

<sup>9</sup> xxv. 36.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, x. 6; Livy, xxv. 35; Appian *Hispan.* 14–16. (These Celtiberians had many of the peculiarities which distinguish the barbarous nations of the early times: the same features are found among the Vandals and the Goths, who were anything but faithful. Faithfulness is not a characteristic of barbarians, and the more civilized men are, the more faithful do they become. The ancient Germans were as faithless as the modern Albanese, who will do anything for money. Such also was the character of the Celtiberians, notwithstanding their great heroism in other respects.—N.)

at his father in the battle on the Ticinus; but if we consider that he was not more than twenty-four years old when he went to Spain<sup>11</sup>, it seems impossible that he should have done what is ascribed to him, as early as the battle on the Ticinus. As there was no other choice, he obtained the votes of the people, although many objected because he was too young, and, in their superstition, considered it an evil omen that he was yet in mourning for his father. There is one point in his character which has led many to the belief that he was an impostor: he was accustomed to go early in the morning into the sanctuary of Jupiter on the Capitol, and to remain there alone for some time, pretending that he had interviews with the gods. His pretension to prophetic powers, which, in some instances, seemed to be justified by what actually took place, gained him the confidence of all. Similar things are related of Mohammed and Cromwell; and some persons believe that these men were under the influence of a supernatural inspiration, while others regard them as mere hypocrites; but I think, that we are justified in supposing that there was a mixture of both: the truth is known to God alone. Scipio was very popular, and was supplied with all that was necessary for his great undertaking.

The year in which New Carthage was taken is uncertain, as Livy<sup>12</sup> himself confesses, but I believe that it was the year 546. It is hardly conceivable how it was possible for the Romans to take the town, when we consider that their possessions were confined to the small coast of Valencia, and that there were three Carthaginian armies in Spain. The event, however, shews that it *was* possible. But we must say, that the Carthaginians took no pains to relieve the town, although it had become, within a short period, a place of great importance, and had a numerous

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxvi. 18; Appian, De Reb. Hisp. 18. But Polybius, x. 6, says: Ἔτος ἑβδομον ἔχων πρὸς τοῖς ἑικοσι.

<sup>12</sup> xxvii. 7.

population<sup>13</sup>. It was situated on a peninsula, and Scipio first made a powerful attack upon its walls from the land side, but he was repelled with great loss. On the northern side of the peninsula there was a marshy district, which, when the tide came in, was always under water<sup>14</sup>. The existence of that district was not unknown to Scipio, and after having sent some men to reconnoitre, and having heard that it was possible to ford the district, he renewed his attack from the land side; and while the inhabitants were defending themselves here, a detachment of the Romans entered the town from the marsh, not far from the main wall, and took possession of one of the gates. The taking of New Carthage was an irreparable loss to the Carthaginians. It seems that Hasdrubal must have been in the neighbourhood, but his whole care and attention were directed to his Italian expedition. The number of his forces is not known, for Polybius does not mention it, but a large army had been assembled with an adroitness equal to that of his father and his brother, and he also formed connexions of friendship with the Gauls. Livy says that, since the passage of Hannibal across the Alps, many Carthaginians had followed the same road, and that in this manner they had become better acquainted with the Gallic tribes<sup>15</sup>. From his account we also see that, at this time, the Arvernians had the supremacy in Gaul, and that, owing to their intercession, Hasdrubal met with no resistance on his progress. Hence it is said, that he marched in two months the same distance as that on which his brother had spent five<sup>16</sup>. This, however, must be understood of the distance between the Pyrenees—for here he had been in winter quarters—and the Italian foot of the Alps. Hannibal had not expected his brother so

<sup>13</sup> Livy, xxvi. 42 foll. ; Polybius, x. 11 foll.


<sup>14</sup> The tide is not as striking here as in the ocean, but it is nevertheless of considerable importance.—N.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, xxvii. 39.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, De Bell. Annib. 52.

early, since Hasdrubal had set out on his march very much sooner than had been anticipated. Hannibal, in the meantime, drew the Romans from one point to another, as if he had been playing at chess with them. Hasdrubal was met by M. Livius Salinator, but he hoped to be able to put himself in possession of Placentia, which would serve him as a safe place of arms. It is almost inconceivable how this town, surrounded as it was by Gallic tribes, could maintain itself. By his unsuccessful siege of it Hasdrubal lost a great deal of time, and it was particularly unfortunate, that the letters he sent to his brother fell into the hands of the Romans, who were thus made acquainted with his whole plan. Livius Salinator encamped; and C. Claudius Nero, his colleague, who was then operating against Hannibal, tried to deceive him, and hastened to his colleague whom he met near Sena. During the night, Hasdrubal's attention was excited by hearing the military music play twice, and he concluded from this circumstance that there must be two consuls. He therefore wished to retreat, and to occupy a defensive position behind the river Metaurus; but the guides whom he had with him ran away, and he was unable to find the fords by which he had crossed the river. It is probable that there had been heavy rains, since otherwise the Metaurus might have been forded in any place without difficulty; for, in ordinary circumstances, the water at most reaches up to a man's breast. While he was thus marching along the banks, he was attacked by the Romans. Hasdrubal fell, and his whole army was routed and cut to pieces. Those who escaped alive owed their delivery only to the circumstance, that the Romans were tired of slaughtering. A Roman threw the head of Hasdrubal into the camp of Hannibal. Thus ended the third period of the war<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, xxvii. 46. foll.; Polybius, xi. 1. foll.; Appian, *De Bell. Annib* 52.



## LECTURE XIV.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IN SPAIN.—INSURRECTION OF THE ITALIAN ALLIES IN THE ARMY OF SCIPIO. — SYPHAX. — P. CORN. SCIPIO, CONSUL, CROSSES OVER TO AFRICA.—MASINISSA.—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.

AFTER Hasdrubal had led his forces into Italy, the Carthaginians had still two armies in Spain, one under the command of Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, and the other under the command of Mago. Scipio continued the war against these two, and it soon became evident that Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, had been the soul of all the undertakings of the Carthaginians; for, after a succession of battles, Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, left Spain and went to Africa, and Mago also embarked, and led the remainder of his forces to the Balearian islands, which seem to have refused obedience. Mago soon afterwards went to Liguria, endeavouring to establish a power there, with which he might attack the Romans in Etruria; for this country, which had been faithful to Rome until then, began to shew somewhat of a refractory spirit, which alarmed the Romans with fear of a rebellion. When the nations of Spain perceived that they were given up by the Carthaginians, and that they were making their last efforts only to extort from them the means for carrying on the war in other quarters, they refused obedience, and endeavoured to expel the Carthaginians. Even the town of Gades, which was older than Carthage itself, shut its gates against Mago; but its magistrates, who were tempted to come out into the camp of Mago, were put to death<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 37.

This injustice on the part of Mago was the signal for Gades to abandon the cause of Carthage for ever. A treaty was concluded with the Romans, which, in some accounts, is ascribed to an earlier date than the narrative of Livy allows us to suppose. But it is not improbable, that the tradition of an earlier treaty with the Romans may be a politic forgery of the Gaditans themselves, by which they ascribed to themselves the merit of having shewn a friendly disposition towards the Romans, even immediately after the fall of the Scipios.

Scipio remained in Spain during the years 545 and 546, and punished the towns which had violated their alliance with the Romans, or had treated them cruelly. The most remarkable event of this time is an insurrection in the Roman army<sup>2</sup>. The accounts of it in our historians are not complete, and evidently do not hit the main point. The rebellion did not take its rise among the Roman soldiers, but among the Italian allies. They chose an Umbrian and a Latin of Cales for their leaders, and gave them the title and the ensigns of Roman consuls. Here we see the first symptoms of the tendency of the Italian allies to place themselves on an equality with the Romans, for they began to feel their own importance, and saw that, although they were not inferior to the Romans in war, they were disregarded by them on all occasions. Another cause of their discontent may have been the circumstance, that they received their pay more irregularly than the Roman soldiers. But, in short, the affair was of a very serious nature. The deep cunning of Scipio, however, deceived them: he persuaded them that, in reality, justice was on their side, that he would give them their pay either as a body, or to every one separately at Carthagena; and, in order to inspire them with full confidence, he sent the trusty garrison of Romans out of the town. The rebels, there-

<sup>2</sup> Livy, xxviii. 24. foll. ; Polybius, xi. 25. foll. ; Appian, *De Reb. Hispan.* 35. foll.



fore, believed that they would find Scipio alone in it: but the columns which were marching out received orders to halt at the gates. The leaders of the insurgents were invited to the houses of several distinguished Roman officers, and were detained there: the others, in the meantime, assembled in the market-place without their arms. The Roman garrison then returned in arms, and compelled the rebels to submit to the will of Scipio. He could not expect any advantage from excessive severity, and therefore contented himself with putting to death thirty-five of the most guilty. He also punished some Spanish princes, who, although they had supported him before, had now become tired of the Romans. These were his last actions in Spain; but, before he returned to Rome, he had ventured upon the romantic enterprise of paying a visit to Syphax, king of the Massylians, or Masasylians, whose capital was Cirta<sup>3</sup>. Syphax was not tributary to Carthage, but in that state of dependence in which we always find the princes of a barbarous nation in their relation to a very wealthy, civilized, and powerful neighbouring state. He served them for money, and acknowledged their supremacy without resistance; and, as it has always been with the barbarians in those countries, he was sometimes quite the subject of Carthage, while at another time he revolted from her, and soon after again became reconciled with her. When Hasdrubal was in Spain, Syphax was at war with Carthage, made overtures to the Romans in Spain, and requested the Scipios to send over some Roman officers, that he might learn from them the art of conducting war in the manner of the Romans. But peace was concluded with Carthage, and these transactions were not followed by any results<sup>4</sup>. Syphax was now neutral; and Scipio was induced, by his invitation, to cross over to Africa, and to enter into an alliance with him. Scipio had, from the first, enter-

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxviii. 17. foll.; Polybius, vii. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxiv. 48.

tained the very just opinion, that the Carthaginians ought to be conquered in Africa. At the court of Syphax, Scipio met Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, who arrived there as ambassador from Carthage. The conduct of Syphax towards the Romans had, undoubtedly, no other object than to prevent the Carthaginians becoming too powerful, and to obtain as much money as possible: surely, we have every reason to wonder, that Scipio was not sold to the Carthaginians for some enormous sum.

Scipio was still pro-consul; he had been curule aedile<sup>5</sup>, but not praetor, and he now offered himself as a candidate for the consulship. The *lex annalis* was already in force, and he had not yet attained the age prescribed by the law. But all restrictions of this kind were wisely set aside for the time that the war lasted, and Scipio was made consul by the unanimous votes of all the centuries<sup>6</sup>, for no one enjoyed such a degree of popularity. The nation longed to see the end of the war. It is, according to all appearance, nothing but one of those foolish opinions, by which the majority of people are so easily misled, when we hear it said that the Roman aristocrats did not want to put an end to the war, in order to be able to multiply the number of their consuls. I have myself heard persons express similar opinions. When Louis XVI. was executed, I heard very intelligent men say, that it was the emigrants who had prevailed upon the Convention to pronounce the sentence, in order to call forth the general indignation of Europe against the republic. Absurd as this opinion was, we cannot wonder that a similar one became current among the Romans. The charge fell upon the nobles of both orders; and it was the ruling party, whose rallying point was old Fabius<sup>7</sup>, which gave rise to this opinion by their jealous attempts against Scipio, whom they tried to keep down as much as possible. It was this same party which, after Scipio was made consul, refused him the means

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxv. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, xxviii. 38.

<sup>7</sup> Livy, xxviii. 40. foll.

of transferring the war to Africa; but, the more this party lowered itself, the more vehemently did public opinion, not only in the senate but in all Italy, express itself in favour of Scipio. But yet the senate expressly refused sending an army to Africa. Sicily was given to Scipio as his province, with the remark that, with the means he thus obtained, he might go over to Africa, if he thought it useful to the republic<sup>8</sup>. But nothing at all could be done on such a condition; and he demanded the permission to increase his forces at least by enlisting volunteers, who would be no burden to the senate. When persons praise the perseverance of the Roman senate during this war, this conduct towards Scipio, which nobody can think very praiseworthy, ought not to be kept out of sight. The senate in this instance behaved in the same manner towards Scipio, in which the senate of Carthage acted towards Hannibal. We can well understand, that the irritation produced by the nobles must have been the more provoking, in proportion to the enthusiasm which the other party shewed for Scipio. It may be, that the ruling party imagined that Scipio intended to usurp the supreme power in the republic; but he never thought of such a thing. These disputes brought Rome nearly to the point of giving up all the advantages which it had gained. Italy was visited by famine and epidemic diseases; and Rome herself was so much worn out, that the voluntary exertions which were made on her behalf must excite our admiration. The towns of Etruria made extraordinary efforts; although, in point of duty, they were bound to little or nothing at all. This shews that hitherto they had suffered less than others, and that the Romans had strictly kept to the letter of their treaties with Etruria. A part of the Umbrians built a fleet: great numbers of men, who had already served their time, as well as of young men, came from the Sabines, Marsians, and Picentians, and

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxviii. 45.

offered to serve as volunteers in the army of Scipio. Thus a great army and a fleet were soon ready to follow him to Sicily, contrary to the expectations and wishes of the senate. The year, however, passed away without any important event, either because the Roman general forgot his duties under the beautiful Grecian sky of Sicily, and in his intercourse with the enlightened Greeks, or because he was occupied with preparations. Hannibal was confined to Bruttium, and was hardly able to step over into Lucania; but in this confinement he resembled a lion surrounded by hounds, and whoever attacked him, paid dearly for it.

In the year following, when Scipio had assembled a considerable fleet, he sailed to Africa with 16,000 foot and several thousand horse. The timid party at Rome trembled, as they imagined that the last resources were now going to be lost. Scipio landed in the neighbourhood of Utica, at a place which may be recognised to this day, and which bore the name of *Castra Cornelianæ*<sup>9</sup>, as long as the Roman empire existed. It was a barren head-land, near which there was a convenient harbour. Here he encamped and fortified himself<sup>10</sup>. Syphax had, in the meanwhile, been entirely gained over by the Carthaginians, and Hasdrubal, either of his own accord or at the command of the Carthaginian senate, had given him his daughter Sophonisbe in marriage. After Scipio had landed, he was met by three armies, one Carthaginian under Hasdrubal, and two Numidian armies, under the command of Syphax and Masinissa. Masinissa, although a barbarian, has a great fame in history. Among the Romans he was very favourably known, as connected with Scipio by ties of hospitality, as we see from Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*, where he appears as a venerable old man. He had received at Carthage an education superior to that of other barbarians<sup>11</sup>,

<sup>9</sup> Caesar, *De Bell. Civil.* II. 24 ; Orosius, IV. 22.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, XXIX. 28.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Pun.* 10.

and in his later years, he must evidently have been conversant with the Greek or Latin language. His life was subject to great changes of fortune<sup>12</sup>. According to the accounts of the Romans he was faithlessly treated by the Carthaginians; but however this may be, thus much is certain, that while he served under the Carthaginians in Spain, he had always kept up secret negotiations with the Romans. The romance that he was in love with Sophonisbe, and that she was nevertheless given in marriage to Syphax, was probably invented to excuse his faithlessness to Carthage. It seems that, at the time when he was in Spain, he received money from the Romans, for he returned to Africa and revolted from Carthage. At the time of Scipio's arrival in Africa, we find him again as the ally of the Carthaginians, and operating, together with Hasdrubal, against the Romans. Scipio, however, renewed his former connexions with him, and Masinissa promised him to desert the Carthaginians, but that, before taking that step openly, he would procure the Romans some material advantages. This fraudulent conduct shews that, in a moral point of view, Masinissa was no better than a common barbarian: he was a base traitor, who deserves the hatred of every honest man. His whole life was an uninterrupted series of treacheries against Carthage. It was he who now led out the Carthaginians to an expedition which he had planned with Scipio<sup>13</sup>. Scipio lay in ambush, fell upon the Carthaginians, and Masinissa went over to the Romans<sup>14</sup>. A great number of Carthaginian citizens were slain. After this, Scipio blockaded Utica, but could do nothing. Syphax and Hasdrubal took the field against him: it is unknown whether their camps were open or fortified; but they consisted of straw-huts and tents built of branches, which, in the climate of Africa, must have become as dry as touchwood<sup>15</sup>. The Romans set fire to

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxix. 29 foll.

<sup>13</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Pun.* 13 and 14.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, xxix. 34.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, xxx. 3; Polybius, xiv. 4.

them, and the conflagration produced such a confusion, that the fugitives allowed themselves to be slaughtered like sheep. Syphax now abandoned the Carthaginians and withdrew to his own dominions: such is the general custom in the east, where all desert him who is deserted by fortune. Masinissa now came forth with claims to the throne of Syphax, and many Africans declared themselves in favour of him. Masinissa even made a campaign against him, and Laelius completed the undertaking: Syphax was defeated and taken prisoner. Masinissa followed up his victory and took possession of the town of Cirta. Every one knows the tragic fate of Sophonisbe<sup>16</sup>: Masinissa married her, but she was afterwards poisoned, because Scipio did not trust her. A part of the dominions of Syphax was given to his son<sup>17</sup>; he himself afterwards adorned the triumph of Scipio, and spent the last years of his life as a prisoner at Alba<sup>18</sup>.

Carthage was in the greatest difficulties, and Hannibal received orders to quit Italy. At the same time negotiations for peace were commenced with the Romans. Here we see what injury the annual change of the magistrates might have done to the Roman republic. Scipio may have thought, and with justice, that, if he should be obliged to resign his command, his successors would reap the fruits of his labours,—that this did not actually happen, is surprising enough—and he therefore endeavoured to accelerate the end of the war. The conditions which he proposed to the Carthaginians, were hard indeed, but yet tolerable in comparison with what happened afterwards. He demanded that the Carthaginians should confine themselves within

<sup>16</sup> Livy, xxx. 12 and 15; Appian, *De Reb. Pun.* 27 foll.; Diodor. *Fragm. lib. xxvii.*

<sup>17</sup> Appian., l. c. 33; Livy, xxx. 44.

<sup>18</sup> Livy, xxx. 45; Polybius xvi. 23. (There are several pedestals on which we read the name and history of Syphax: a proof that there must have been several statues of him, for the pedestals are unquestionably genuine.—N.)




the Punic canal<sup>19</sup>, surrender all their ships with the exception of thirty triremes, give up Spain, as they had before given up Sicily and Sardinia, and deliver up all Roman prisoners and deserters. Respecting the sums of money which were demanded of the Carthaginians to defray the expenses of the war, the accounts differed, as Livy says,<sup>20</sup> greatly: the fact, that Greek authors give us exact numbers, proves nothing. A truce was now concluded, during which the Carthaginians sent ambassadors with full powers to Rome, to obtain the sanction of the senate and people to the peace. There the peace was accepted on condition that Hannibal should quit Italy. When the ambassadors returned, and the Carthaginians at the same time heard that Hannibal was returning with forces sufficient again to take the field against Scipio, those people who had done least before were now vexed that steps had been taken to conclude a peace. Such people generally appear in history in a false light: in this instance they were contemptible if compared with the noble spirit of Hannibal. He recommended the peace, but the riotous and turbulent popular party at Carthage raved and stormed against it, trusting that the gods would come to their assistance. These were the sentiments of the majority. The peace had been agreed to on both sides, but it had not yet been confirmed by oath. In the meanwhile there arrived a large convoy with provisions for Scipio, and the restless party at Carthage insisted on taking possession of it by force. When Scipio sent ambassadors to remonstrate against such proceedings, they were insulted, and the Carthaginian magistrates had great difficulty in getting them on board their ships in safety. But even here they were pursued and attacked, and some of them lost their lives. This was the same violation of the law of nations as the murder of the ambassadors at Rastadt in 1799, when many persons believed that the French government

<sup>19</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Pun.* 32. (This canal is unfortunately unknown.—N.)

<sup>20</sup> xxx. 16.

had given secret orders to murder them. But this was a mere conjecture and can never be proved. Hannibal had in the meantime landed at Adrumetum, and had brought with him from Bruttium all who could be induced to follow him: he left the country almost uninhabited. All the Italian and Roman deserters who were willing to serve under him were enlisted as soldiers—and they were men whom he could trust, for a peace with the Romans would have been death to them,—and it is not improbable that they had some influence in the breaking off of the negotiations with the Romans. Scipio was really inclined to make peace, but the Carthaginians were resolved once more to try their fortune.



## LECTURE XV.

THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE BROKEN OFF.—BATTLE OF ZAMA. — PEACE CONCLUDED. — CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR. — WAR WITH MACEDONIA. —CONDITION OF MACEDONIA.—PHILIP III.—GENERAL VIEW OF THE STATE OF THE EAST.—PEACE WITH MACEDONIA.

THE war was brought to a close in Africa, according to Cato, in the year 550, and according to Varro, 553. When Hannibal saw the true state of affairs, he endeavoured to continue the negotiations for peace; for he foresaw the impossibility of carrying on the war successfully, and he was convinced that, if the last battle should be lost, the Carthaginians would be obliged to accept a peace which would render it impossible for them ever to recover again. Peace, therefore, appeared desirable to him as well as to Scipio, who had every reason for fearing lest his adversaries at Rome should take the command from him, and appoint a successor. But the negotiations were broken off through the folly of the people of Carthage; for as their invincible general was within their walls, they believed, what he himself neither could nor did believe, that everything was gained; and they would hear no more of peace, although Scipio demanded nothing more than the conditions agreed to before, and a trifling indemnification for the injury they had done to the convoy.

In the decisive battle of Zama the Carthaginians were completely defeated: the greater part of their army was cut to pieces, and the remainder dispersed. Hannibal escaped with a small band to Adrumetum. This was the

only battle in which he made use of the elephants, but they had ceased to be formidable to the Romans. Scipio, instead of forming his cohorts into maniples, arranged them in *échelons* or columns, the one by the side of the other<sup>1</sup>; but, between these columns, he left large spaces which were afterwards filled up by the cavalry. These spaces were left open, that the elephants, when frightened by the light troops of the Romans, might escape through them: and the event proved how well the plan was calculated.

After this battle was lost, the only thought which occupied the minds of the Carthaginians was to make peace. It was a piece of great good luck for them, that Scipio himself, for reasons which I have already mentioned, was desirous to bring the war to a close. The terms, however, which he now made, were much harder than those which he had proposed before. While the first treaty allowed them to have thirty triremes, their number was now reduced to ten; they were to keep no elephants for purposes of war, and those which they had were to be surrendered; 10,000 Euboean talents were to be paid by instalments in the course of fifty years, that is 200 every year; 150 hostages were to be given, and all prisoners and deserters to be delivered up to the Romans. Among the deserters were the unhappy Italians, especially Bruttians, who had fought in the army of Hannibal. Whether all were put to death, or sold as slaves, is unknown, for Livy passes over this part of the treaty, which is mentioned by Appian<sup>2</sup>, and must consequently have been spoken of by Polybius. The Carthaginians were further obliged to recognise Masinissa as king of Numidia, and to conclude a passive offensive and defensive alliance with the Romans, who thus shook off all obligations on their own part. The Carthaginians

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxx. 33; Polybius, xv. 9.

<sup>2</sup> De Rebus Pun. 54. Compare Livy, xxx. 37; Polybius, xv. 18.

pledged themselves to undertake no war without the sanction of the Romans, and to provide the Roman army in Africa with all that was necessary for the space of five months. Some of the nobles spoke against these terms, and it was on this occasion that Hannibal seized one Gisco, and dragged him down from the elevated place where he stood, amidst the cries of the multitude that their rights as citizens were violated. Hannibal saved himself only by declaring that, having left Carthage at the age of nine years, he was not acquainted with its manners and customs<sup>3</sup>. He then urged the absolute necessity of concluding peace, of which, in fact, every sensible man must have been convinced. The Carthaginians ought to have staked their whole existence in supporting him; but some of them entertained the foolish hope of still obtaining advantageous and easy terms.

After the peace was concluded and sanctioned at Rome, the Roman army returned to Italy. It was undoubtedly the first object of attention to the Romans to heal the wounds which had been inflicted upon the Italians. Many of the inhabitants of southern Italy were punished, and their lands confiscated, and no small number of colonies were founded in those districts, perhaps rather with the intention to provide for impoverished Romans, than to secure the possession of the country. The veterans who had served in the army of Scipio, received settlements in Apulia and Lucania<sup>4</sup>: the first instance of provisions being made for veterans, which, however, became gradually established as a regular custom.

Much might be said respecting the consequences of this war, although little is mentioned in our historians.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxx. 37; Polybius, xv. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxxi. 4, whose words, however, are:—*Decreverunt Patres, ut M. Junius, praetor urbis, si ei videretur, decemviros agro Samniti Appuloque, quod eius publicum populi Romani esset, metiendo dividendo crearet.*

The prices of everything had risen to an unnatural height, and the middle classes must have been exhausted by the constant and heavy contributions which they had been obliged to pay. And the result of this must have been, that the separation between the rich and the poor became more marked than it had ever been before, and it is, indeed, not long afterwards that there appears a state of things, which is completely contrary to the spirit of the earlier Romans. It must have been soon after the war, that the people of Rome proposed to make Scipio censor and consul for life, but he declined the honour<sup>5</sup>. The fact itself is well established. He was the first Roman who received the honourable title of the Great, as Sigonius has shewn<sup>6</sup>: in the *Fasti* this is overlooked, but Polybius<sup>7</sup> expressly calls him *ὁ μέγας*. It is an interesting fact, that towards the end of the war the Romans made a public loan which was to be paid back by three instalments<sup>8</sup>; but the difficulties during the Macedonian war were so great, that the last payment could not be made in any other way than in lands. Livy has very much neglected the internal condition of Rome, but we cannot enter upon it here. Concerning the state of intellect and literature I shall speak hereafter, when I have reached the end of the war with Antiochus.

Immediately after the battle of Cannae Philip III. of Macedonia had sent ambassadors to Hannibal, and had concluded a treaty with him, the document containing which fell, by chance, into the hands of the Romans<sup>9</sup>; there was, indeed, no reason for keeping it secret. This treaty, as we read it in Polybius, is certainly genuine; for it is written in quite a peculiar form, which is not Greek, and

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 5, and Valerius Maximus, iv. 1. 6, speak of a consulship and dictatorship for life, but do not mention the censorship.

<sup>6</sup> *Animadv. histor.* c. 1.

<sup>7</sup> xviii. 18; xxxii. 12. foll.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxix. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxiii. 33 foll.; Polybius, vii. 9.



which is undoubtedly an example of the style in which the Carthaginians drew up such documents. Neither of the contracting parties had undertaken any important obligations towards the other. As regards the advantages granted to Philip, Hannibal had assured him that he would compel the Romans to give up their possessions east of the Adriatic: that is, Coreyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, the island of Pharos, the Atintanians, a people of Epirus, the Parthinians, an Illyrian tribe, and the Illyrian town of Dimalle; all these places were to be given to Philip. But when the treaty fell into the hands of the Romans, they displayed all the heroism and perseverance which distinguish them during this whole period, and sent out a fleet under the command of M. Valerius Laevinus, to protect those possessions<sup>10</sup>. The war began in the year 537 or 538,—as Laevinus was not consul, but only praetor, the exact year cannot be ascertained,—and ended in 558. On the part of the Romans it was badly conducted, but no less so on that of Philip, although he had to make but small exertions against a few places to expel the Romans, and he might easily have made himself master of those places; in short, he conducted the war in a manner which might make us inclined to form quite a different idea of his power from that which it afterwards actually proved to be.

At the time when the war broke out, Philip was perhaps not more than twenty years old. When his father Demetrius II. died, he was left a child under the guardianship of an uncle, or rather an elder cousin, Antigonus, with the nickname of Doson. This man shewed a conscientiousness which, considering the character of those times, excites our astonishment,—for he was *faithful*. As Philip at first appears not only as a young man of an amiable disposition, but of great accomplishments, we must infer that his guardian bestowed equal care upon the

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxiv. 40; Justin, xxix. 4.

formation of his character, as upon the development of his mind. But there was something vicious in the nature of Philip, which led him soon to rid himself of the watchful eye of Antigonus. Yet he possessed great abilities; he had decided talents as a military commander, great courage, and the power of using and increasing the resources of his kingdom, which became more particularly manifest after his peace with the Romans. He gave to his kingdom a power which it did not possess at the time when he succeeded to the throne, for the Macedonian empire had fallen into decay under Antigonus Gonatas. The Aetolians had risen, and the Achaeans had emancipated themselves; under his successor, Demetrius II., the empire had been still more reduced, and from this state it did not recover till the last year of the guardianship of Antigonus Doson. Old Aratus had sacrificed the freedom of his country by an act of high treason, and had given up Corinth rather than establish the freedom of Greece by a union among the Peloponnesians, which would have secured to Cleomenes the influence and power he deserved. In the beginning of his reign, Philip, in conjunction with the Achaeans, carried on a war against the Aetolians, in which the latter lost a considerable part of their importance: some of their fortified places fell into the hands of the enemy, and the respect, which they had until then enjoyed in Greece, was lost. At the time when Philip entered into the alliance with Hannibal, Greece was in the enjoyment of peace. The Aetolians had concluded a disadvantageous peace, though they were otherwise free. The part of Thessaly which had been taken from them, Phocis, Locris, Euboea, together with Chalcis, Corinth, Therea, and some other places, now belonged to Macedonia. The Achaeans, nominally free and united, were in reality in a state of dependence. The same was the case with the Boeotians. The Aetolians, on the other hand, were free, and had still a large territory, which comprised, besides Aetolia proper, the coun-

try of the Ozolian Locrians, of the Dolopes, and the greater part of Phthiotis. Acarnania was under the protection of the Macedonians. Philip was allied with the Eleans, Messenians, and Lacedaemonians, who were at that time ruled by a mere nominal king; Rhodes, with its great maritime power, was connected with Macedonia by treaties and ties of friendship. The kings of Syria at this time governed over western Asia, but Caria, Samos, and the maritime towns on the Hellespont and Bosphorus, belonged to Egypt; Chios, Lesbos, and Rhodes formed a free confederacy. A war had been carried on between the states of Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt, which was terminated by a peace, in which Egypt lost its possessions in Syria. Now, while all the countries east of the Adriatic were thus restored to peace, the attention of the Greeks was directed towards the Romans. Athens, in its state of impotence, was connected with them by friendship, and kept aloof from all political associations.

It might have been thought that Philip, at the head of such an extensive empire, and with such warlike nations at his command, would have been able to gain important advantages over the Romans; but in the beginning of the war there were only little skirmishes, and Philip conquered Atintania and the Ardyaeans, who occupied the northern part of Illyricum. About the fourth year of the war the Romans concluded an alliance with the Aetolians<sup>11</sup>, and unfortunately for unhappy Greece, they now became more enterprising. They sent, it is true, only one legion, consisting of the epibatae of their ships, but they had a fleet in the Grecian seas of considerable importance. Through the Aetolians, they became acquainted and enticed into friendly relations with Attalus I. of Pergamus, who was engaged in the conquest of Lydia, and ruled over a rather extensive and rich principality. The Roman fleet, under Laevinus and his successor P.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxvi. 24; compare 26, and Polybius, xi. 6; xxiii. 8

Sulpicius Galba, was a curse to Greece. In the treaty with the Aetolians, it was stipulated that all places (Livy says only those between Aetolia and Coreyra,) which should be conquered by their united forces, should be treated in such a manner, that the towns and the soil should belong to the Ætolians, but the inhabitants and all their moveable property to the Romans, who might sell them or carry them away, just as they pleased. In discussing the question whether Polybius, in his judgment of the Aetolians<sup>12</sup>, be just or not, we ought to remember this ignominious clause, for it shews incontrovertibly what they were. After the Lamian war, it is true, they deserved praise, but afterwards they proved that they were barbarians in their manners, as well as in their ways of thinking, although they may have spoken the Greek language. The deplorable consequence of their treaty with the Romans was, that when Dyme, Oreum, and Aegina were taken, the Romans sold the inhabitants as slaves. The Aetolians, however, were unable to maintain their possession of Dyme and Oreum, and it was only in Aegina that they held out<sup>13</sup>; but they sold this important island to Attalus for thirty talents<sup>14</sup>. This shameful conduct roused the indignation of the Greeks against the Aetolians and Romans, and increased the popularity of Philip. As the Romans left the Aetolians without support, Philip and the Greeks penetrated into the heart of their country, and took vengeance for the ravages they had made on the sea coast. Thus the Aetolians, abandoned by the Romans, concluded a disadvantageous peace, the terms of which are not known<sup>15</sup>.

Two or three years afterwards,—the chronology in Livy is very uncertain,—perhaps in the year 548, the

<sup>12</sup> In such passages as, II. 3 foll. 45 foll. 49; IV. 3, 67; IX. 38, and many others.


<sup>13</sup> Polybius, XI. 6; XXIII. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, XXVII. 29 foll.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, XXIX. 12; Appian, De Reb. Maced. 2.

Romans concluded a peace with Philip, the terms of which were calculated to conceal great disadvantages<sup>16</sup>. The fact was, that the Romans, in order to obtain peace, gave up Atintania, which belonged to them, and allowed Philip to establish himself in Epirus. The Ardyaeans were likewise left to Philip; but the Romans concluded this peace in the hope that, before long, an opportunity would offer for recovering what was now lost.

<sup>16</sup> Livy and Appian, ll. cc; Justin, xxix. 4.



## LECTURE XVI.

AFFAIRS IN THE EAST.—INTERNAL CONDITION OF ROME.—  
SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR.—CONDITION OF GREECE.—T.  
QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS.—BATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALAE.  
—PEACE WITH PHILIP.—FREEDOM OF GREECE.

AFTER having concluded peace with Rome, Philip entered into an alliance with Antiochus the Great of Syria, for the purpose of taking from Ptolemy Epiphanes,—who had succeeded his father (the contemptible Ptolemy Philopator); being a child of five years,—his possessions in Caria, and on the coasts of Asia and Thrace. This led to a war with the Rhodians and Attalus, whose interest it was that Egypt should continue in the possession of those districts. But Philip and Antiochus gained their end; the whole coast of Thrace, Perinthus, and Lycia, were conquered, and the Egyptians lost all their possessions in those parts. The distress inflicted upon Athens afforded the Romans a welcome pretext for renewing the war with Philip. Athens was at that time utterly decayed, desolate, and impoverished, but it had, nevertheless, hitherto enjoyed a kind of independence: it had been for upwards of twenty-five years in friendly relations with Rome. The murder committed on two young Acarnanians, who had entered the temple of Demeter at Eleusis during the celebration of the mysteries, induced the Acarnanians to call Philip to their assistance, in taking revenge on the Athenians. Philip, who had long been wanting to get possession of Athens, was delighted with the opportunity, and ravaged Attica in a most cruel manner. The complaints of the Athenians were carried to Rome, where long discussions took place



as to what should be done<sup>1</sup>. The senate and the ruling party, whose desires already knew no bounds, would not hesitate for a moment to declare war against Philip, to indemnify themselves for what had been sacrificed in the late peace with him. But the people, who were exhausted in the highest degree, wished for rest, and when the proposal was first brought before them, it was rejected. It is one of the greatest errors to believe that a constitution remains the same so long as its forms remain unaltered. When changes have taken place in the distribution of property, in the social condition, in the sentiments and the mode of life of a nation, the nature of its constitution may become quite the reverse of what it was before, even though not an iota may have been altered in its form; it may at one time be democratical, and at another it may, with the same forms, be aristocratical. We moderns pay too little attention to such internal changes, although they are among those points which we must endeavour to ascertain, and without which history cannot be understood. The constitution of the Roman republic was at that time quite different from what it had been before, although no change had been made in the letter of it. An oligarchy and the influence of wealth already existed, and the people, who had very little influence, decreed what in reality they did not wish. This state of the constitution is manifest during the seventh century on a hundred occasions; and in these transactions about the war with Philip, we see one of the earliest and most remarkable symptoms of it. It was a great misfortune that, after the second Punic war, there was not some great man of sufficient influence to examine the constitution, and to regulate its spirit<sup>1</sup> in accordance with the actual state of things; for if the issue of a long disease is left to chance, without remedies being applied, a state must necessarily come to ruin.

The second war against Philip was decreed in 552.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxxi. 51. foll.

The proconsul, P. Sulpicius Galba, who had carried on the war in those parts before, and had been the scourge of Aegina, Oreum, and Dyme, was entrusted with the command. Philip remained on the defensive, especially at first. The war must have been declared at a very late season of the year, for it commenced after the end of the consulship of Sulpicius. Livy<sup>2</sup> erroneously places the beginning of it in the year of the consulship of Sulpicius Galba, according to which date, the consulship of P. Villius Tappulus would have no place left for it. During the first campaign, in the year 553, the Romans gained little or nothing: the undertaking failed altogether, for they had, as it were, taken the bull by the horns. Illyricum, as far as Scutari, is a land similar to Franconia: it has many hills of a moderate height, and many parts are almost perfect plains. On the eastern frontier, however, lofty mountains, which branch out from Scardus and Scomius, rise up and occupy the western part of Macedonia, and range southwards as far as Pindus and Parnassus. These mountains are high, rough, and cold, and even the valleys between them are almost uninhabitable<sup>3</sup>. Sulpicius attacked the Macedonians in these mountains; and, however much the historians may have disguised the fact, or have been ignorant of it, he was completely thwarted in his undertaking. T. Quinctius Flaminius, who undertook the command as consul in 554, was wiser, and altered the mode of action. The Macedonians had fortified the passes in the mountains on their frontier; their main camp was near Argyrocastro, where the river Aous flows through a narrow defile between two mountains, one of which stretches towards Pindus and the other towards Acroceraunus<sup>4</sup>: both

<sup>2</sup> XXXI. 33. foll.      <sup>3</sup> Those mountains were the original seats of the true Macedonians.—N.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, XXXII. 5. Compare Polybius, II. 5; Plutarch, Flamin. 3. (This is still, and ever will be, the true road of communication between Illyricum and Greece, the ancient *fauces Antigoneae*.—N.)

were wild and impassable. Here the king of Macedonia was encamped. The Aetolians, with whom the Romans had renewed their alliance, in the meanwhile made an attack upon the frontiers of Thessaly<sup>5</sup>. It was of great importance to the Macedonian to prevent their uniting their forces with the Romans; and he succeeded in effecting this by the energy with which he maintained his ground in Epirus. Villius had already pitched his camp there, but Flamininus was convinced of the uselessness of an attack upon the front of the Macedonians. Faithlessness was in those times the prevailing characteristic of the Greeks: an Epirot chief of the name of Charopus now got Flamininus out of his difficulty; he sent to the consul a man by whose guidance he might evade the mountain pass<sup>6</sup>. A detachment of 4000 Romans was accordingly sent to follow the guide along the discovered path, and having made a long circuit, they reached, on the third day, the heights in the rear of the Macedonians. When the preconcerted signal was given, the consul attacked the front lines of the enemy, but was beginning to sustain great loss, when on a sudden the Macedonians discovered that they were surrounded by the Romans, and that in a few minutes their retreat might be cut off. The Macedonians, therefore, quitted their position after a contest in which they did not lose many lives, and retreated across mount Pindus into Thessaly. Flamininus penetrated further into Epirus, and all the towns threw their gates open to him. This expedition, however, was not followed by any great results. The consul now took up his winter quarters in Phocis, after having made himself master of Elatea.

King Attalus, the Rhodians, and the Roman fleet were

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxxii. 13.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, xxxii. 11; Appian, *De Reb. Maced.* 4. (Most passes can be evaded, and on this account they have lost their importance in civilised countries. If the pass of Antrodoco, near Naples, could not be evaded, it would be impossible to attack Naples.—N.)

in the Aegean. The Achaeans were at this time the most powerful confederacy in Greece: they possessed more than half the Peloponnesus, viz.: Elis, Messenia, Achaia, Argolis, Corinth, and Arcadia; Corinth, however, was given up to the Macedonians. Philip had unceremoniously retained Orchomenos, although it should have been restored to the Achaeans; but at the commencement of the second war with Rome he gave it back to them. Sparta was governed by the furious tyrant Nabis. Had Philip at this juncture given up Corinth to the Achaeans, they would probably never have been induced to abandon his cause; for they entertained an implacable hatred of the Aetolians, and it was only this hatred that led them to the otherwise disgraceful amity with Macedonia. They were indignant at the Romans also, on account of the ravages they had made in Greece during the first Macedonian war. Philip was unable to defend himself, and the country as far as Thermopylae was in the hands of the Romans. A party among the Achaeans now urged the necessity of entering into an alliance with the Romans, and Aristaeus, their strategus, at the congress of Sicyon, which was attended by the ambassadors of the Greek states, carried a decree to that effect, though not without great opposition. The Achaeans were never a warlike people, even at the time when Philopoemen did his utmost to inspire them with a warlike spirit: war was troublesome to them. The general, Philocles, to whom Philip had given the command of Corinth, made himself master even of Argos, the greatest among the Achaean cities. The Boeotians were taken by surprise and compelled to join the Romans, for in the year 555 the proconsul Flaminius appeared before the gates of Thebes, and demanded to be admitted, in order to negotiate with them within the walls of the city. He was accompanied by his troops, and as he was entering with them, the Boeotians decreed the alliance with Rome, which under these circumstances was

a mere farce<sup>7</sup>. One hundred and twenty five years had passed since the death of Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian party in Boeotia was very weak: all things had assumed a different aspect: the Greeks no longer considered themselves as a nation destined to govern, but saw in the Macedonians their natural protectors against the Gauls, Scordiscans, Thracians, and Dardanians, to resist whom they felt that their own strength was insufficient. They had become accustomed to looking up to the court of Macedonia, and had derived no small benefit from the gold which flowed from that quarter: in short, it had become a natural feeling with the Greeks to resign the supremacy to the Macedonians, who were no longer looked upon as barbarians: the well educated classes in Macedonia spoke Greek as their mother tongue, and at Pella Greek was unquestionably spoken just as much as the Macedonian idiom, so that, in reality, the difference between Macedonians and Greeks had become effaced.

Thessaly was now the natural scene of the war. Philip had exerted all his strength, and if it be true that he made a general levy, the small number of troops that was brought together proves that Macedonia must have been in a fearful state of desolation, in consequence of the ravages made there by the Gauls, and of the wars under Antigonus Gonatas; for, even with a moderate population, it would have been easy to raise an army of 100,000 men. Flamininus seems to have had few other allies besides the Aetolians, who, if our accounts be correct, amounted to no more than a few thousand foot and 500 horse<sup>8</sup>. The campaign was opened at an early season of the year: and, as the harvest in Thessaly takes place in the early part of June, the battle of Cynoscephalae was fought in the course of the same month. The

<sup>7</sup> Livy, XXXIII. 1 and 2.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, XXXIII. 3; Polybius, XVIII. 4; Plutarch, Flamin. 7.



corn was ripe, but not yet cut<sup>9</sup>, so that, on their foraging excursions, the soldiers had only to reap it. The Romans and Macedonians approached each other at a spot where a line of small hills (Cynoscephalae) separated the two armies. Here the vanguards of both met unexpectedly; but three days passed away before the battle began, and both armies made side marches for the purpose of foraging, and without being aware how near each other they were, behind that line of hills. On the third day, heavy showers and a thick fog kept the Romans within their camp. Neither Flamininus nor Philip had any wish to begin the contest; the former also intended to take another position, because the district was too open for him, notwithstanding the hills. Under such circumstances, things usually happen which are not wished for. A trifling skirmish took place, in which the Macedonians were repulsed, and retreated to the highest of the neighbouring hills. Reinforcements came up on both sides, without there being any intention on the part of the commanders to give battle, and the struggle became more serious. The Romans were now repulsed; and this success had such an effect upon the Macedonians, that the king was obliged to give battle, for fear of discouraging his soldiers. The description of the battle in Polybius is masterly<sup>10</sup>. The right wing of the Romans gained a decided victory; but on their left, which faced the dense masses of the Macedonian phalanx, the victory was undecided. At first, they could not resist those masses of sixteen men in depth, where the hindmost lines were protected, and held forth their Macedonian lances (σάγισσαι). The Romans owed their victory unquestionably to their cavalry, especially to that of the Aetolians. According to Polybius and Livy, 8000 Macedonians were slain, and 5000 taken prisoners<sup>11</sup>. Philip fled to Larissa, and from thence to Tempe, and

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, XVIII. 3; Livy, XXXIII. 6.

<sup>10</sup> XVIII. 5. foll.

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, XVIII. 10; Livy, XXXIII. 10; Plutarch, Flamin., 8.



immediately began to negotiate with the Romans. A truce was concluded; during which he was to send ambassadors to Rome, to provide for the Roman army, and to pay down a contribution towards defraying the expenses of the war. The Romans were the more inclined to make peace, as they were no longer on a good understanding with the Aetolians, which state of feeling may, perhaps, have existed even before this campaign; but, immediately after the battle of Cynoscephalae, the Aetolians gave vent to most vehement ill-temper, in consequence of which Flaminius was placed in a desperate position. The Aetolians, in their conceit, placed themselves on a footing of equality with the Romans, and felt hurt when the latter claimed a higher authority for themselves than they thought fit to concede to them. The Aetolians behaved with such a deplorably mean spirit towards Rome, that nothing short of the foolish character of a southern nation can account for it. Wherever such a state of feeling exists, the fruits of it are the greatest ingratitude and hostile malice towards allies<sup>12</sup>. The Aetolians wanted to turn the happy issue of the war to their own advantage and aggrandizement, but of this the Romans would not hear; for their policy was, to restore the Greeks in such a manner, that the separate nations might balance one another, without any one of them being predominant, nor was it their wish to destroy Macedonia. The Aetolians, on the other hand, insisted upon the Macedonian dynasty being expelled, in order that they themselves might be able to take the government into their hands. It was, without doubt, immediately after these events, that Alcaeus, the Messenian, wrote his beautiful epigram on the victory of Cynoscephalae, in which he speaks with contempt of thirty thousand Macedonians, who were slain by the *Aetolians and*

<sup>12</sup> The Spaniards, down to this day, have no feeling of gratitude towards the English, who were their deliverers; and they boast of the battle of Salamanca, although it was the English who gained it for them.—N.

*Latins*<sup>13</sup>. This was an insolence for which Greece had to pay dearly. Any other general, who had not borne in his heart that love of the Greeks which Flaminius cherished, would have taken such conduct very differently. But peace was concluded with Macedonia in the year 556, on conditions which were very humiliating to Philip; for he was obliged to give up all his possessions out of Macedonia,—that is, Thessaly, all the towns in Greece, and the coasts of Thrace and Asia Minor; to surrender all his ships of war, with the exception of five; to keep no more than five hundred soldiers; to pay 1000 talents, by instalments, in ten years; and to give his son Demetrius as a hostage to the Romans<sup>14</sup>.


After various expectations, hopes, and resolutions, the Romans made a noble use of this peace. Whatever their policy may have been, Quinctius Flaminius, at least, seems to have acted from very pure motives: they restored freedom to all the Greek states, they gave back Corinth to the Achaeans, and pledged themselves to evacuate the invincible Acrocorinthus, Chalcis, and Demetrias, as soon as the affairs with Antiochus should be settled. Flaminius had, unfortunately, concluded an alliance with Nabis, that monstrous tyrant, who had induced Philip to sell Argos to him: and here an evil policy was certainly at work. The Romans constituted Thessaly as an independent state; and the Orestians, who formed a part of Macedonia proper, but had revolted, received a republican constitution, though it seems to have been connected with Thessaly, as I conclude from a list of Thessalian generals. Euboea formed one republic; Phocis, Ambracia, Phthiotis, and Athens were proclaimed free; three states of Peloponnesus—Elis, Messenia, and Laconia—became independent. But, although the Romans

<sup>13</sup> It is preserved in Plutarch, Flamin. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Polybius, XVIII. 27; Livy, XXXIII. 30; Appian, De Reb. Maced. 2.

thus proclaimed themselves the deliverers of Greece, yet they gave the towns of Oreum and Eretria to Eumenes, the son of Attalus—he seems to have sold Eretria afterwards,—and left him in possession of Aegina<sup>15</sup>. The Athenians received the islands of Paros, Scyros, Delos, and Imbros. Down to the time of Sulla, the Romans always shewed a particular favour and respect for the Athenians, and never have the Muses been more kindly towards any nation than towards the Athenians.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, XXXIII. 30 and 34.



## LECTURE XVII.

WAR AGAINST THE BOIANS AND INSUBRIANS. — ANTIOCHUS AND HIS EMPIRE. — HANNIBAL AT THE COURT OF ANTIOCHUS. — WAR AGAINST NABIS. — FEELINGS OF THE GREEKS.—BATTLE OF THERMOPYLAE. — WAR AGAINST THE AETOLIANS.

IF, in relating the history of Rome, we were to follow the standard of the ancients, we could have little hope of attaining our end within the time allowed for these lectures; for all that I have hitherto related is contained in about thirty-three books of Livy, which constitute only a small part of his whole work. But the constitution of Rome, which is to us the most important part of her history, has been growing, and fully developing itself before our eyes; and the wars, which have any moral or artistic interest, are over. Henceforth, we have only masses to consider. I shall relate at full length the history of the destruction of Carthage, and of the Cimbrian war; but why should I enter into the detail, for instance, of the battle of Magnesia, in which rude and undisciplined masses of barbarians fought against the Romans? Livy's history, from the time we have now reached, down to where it broke off, formed more than three fourths of the whole work, though it comprised a period of no more than about 215 years. We may follow just the opposite course, and condense our narrative as we proceed further.

The Boians, Insubrians, and other Gallic tribes, at first supported a Carthaginian general, of the name of Hamilcar, in order to inflict some severe wound upon the

Romans, and then they commenced war against them. As they were barbarians, they had taken no part in the second Punic war, nor did the Romans provoke them in any way; they enjoyed perfect peace until Hamilcar arrived among them, and made their forces rally round him. The Insubrians submitted after a few campaigns; but the Boians held out for more than nine years, in the course of which Placentia and Cremona were entirely destroyed, for the Boians knew that it was the intention of the Romans to annihilate them; and we see from Pliny, that they had vanished from the face of the earth at the time when Cato wrote<sup>1</sup>. The fate of this people is very remarkable: the towns which they once inhabited in Gaul proper were scarcely known in after times. One branch of them had marched into Italy, and another to the countries on the Danube. In the Cimbrian war, this latter branch was extirpated, whence the name of the country *Deserta Boiorum*<sup>2</sup> (Bohemia), which was subsequently occupied by the Marcomannians. According to Cato, the Boians had consisted of 120 tribes (tribus), which, in his days, had ceased to exist. It is not more than seventeen or eighteen years ago, that persons wondered why the Boians were not oftener mentioned in history; but they forgot that the Gauls, south of the Po, were completely extirpated by the Romans in the war which followed after the second Punic war. The Romans then established colonies in those districts, with very extensive territories, such as Bologna, Modena, Parma, and Lucca. Even in the time of Polybius, those districts had scarcely any population; but afterwards they were rapidly peopled, and the Julian law united the country with Italy. The Celts on the northern banks of the Po had no connexion with the Romans<sup>3</sup>.

At the close of the war against Philip, the Aetolians shewed themselves not only ungrateful towards the Ro-

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. III. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. III. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Respecting the war against the Boians, Insubrians, &c., see Livy, XXXII. 30. foll.; XXXIII. 36. foll.; XL. 38.; XLII. 7. foll.

mans, but were most vehemently exasperated<sup>4</sup> at their not having received the rewards they expected for their services, and this feeling did not by any means subside afterwards. They were right in some respects, but wrong in others: they made too great pretensions, while the Romans did not act fairly with regard to the towns of Phthiotis, which they did not surrender to the Aetolians. But I am convinced that, even if there had been no real ground for complaint, the Aetolians would have moved heaven and earth, in order to drive the Romans out of Greece. They now turned their eyes towards Antiochus, who bears the surname of the Great quite undeservedly. The dynasty of the Seleucidae is poorer in great men than any other of those which became established in the various kingdoms of the empire of Alexander. Seleucus the first was the most distinguished among them, though even he can scarcely be called a great man; but the majority of his successors are unworthy and degenerate orientals, like some of the first Ptolemies. Antiochus is surnamed the Great, merely because his reign was a happy one. His empire extended from the Hellespont to the frontiers of India, and comprised Phrygia, Cilicia, Syria, Coele-Syria, Babylonia, Media, Persia, and all the country as far as Cabul: he concluded treaties with Indian chiefs, and had immense treasures; but, with all this, his power was not greater than that of the former kings of Persia. The descendants of the Macedonians and Greeks, in their numerous colonies in Asia, had become just as unwarlike as, at a much later period, the descendants of the Crusaders, who were held in the greatest contempt by the natives, and had adopted all the vices of eastern nations without any of their virtues. Antiochus was a haughty and presumptuous man. I have already mentioned that he entered into an alliance with Philip, against the young king of Egypt. He was now in Asia Minor, and fancied that he might easily extend his dominion over

<sup>4</sup> Polybius, XVIII. 28.



a part of Europe. The countries which Philip had taken from Egypt, and which, in his peace with Rome, he had been obliged to give up, were in a defenceless state, and overwhelmed by Thracians; just as the Britons were by the Picts and Scots, and they therefore called Antiochus to their assistance. This invitation was flattering to his vanity; but the Romans declared, that they would not suffer him to overstep the natural boundaries of his empire, and demanded of him to restore the Greek towns in Asia to freedom, that they might enjoy the same benefit which had been granted to the European Greeks. This was the arrogant demand of a people anxious for war. Hannibal was at that time with Antiochus; for he had been obliged to leave Carthage, because he had attempted to do away with abuses of every description, and to reform the constitution of his country. When we read in Livy<sup>5</sup> that Hannibal reformed the *ordo judicum*, we must not conceive these judges to be the same as the judges among the Jews: they were, undoubtedly, no others than those whom Aristotle calls the One Hundred, or the One Hundred and Four, and whom he compares to the ephors of Sparta. They seem to have had a great resemblance to the state-inquisition of Venice, which, although quite distinct from the organism of the state, yet had the right to interfere in state affairs. Hannibal's reforms in the financial department were extraordinary; for, in order to prevent the ruling men from enriching themselves at the cost of the nation, he introduced a system of economy, and revealed the abuses which had been carried on. The party, whose interests he thus opposed, set all their engines to work against him, until he found himself compelled to quit his country. At last, they had endeavoured to excite the Romans against him; and the latter began to silence their own sense of justice, by arguing that they had made peace with the Carthaginians, but not with Hannibal: they sent ambassadors to demand that he should

<sup>5</sup> XXXIII. 46.

be arrested as a conspirator. This step, if we may believe Livy, met with much opposition on the part of the great Scipio. Hannibal, on being informed of the fate which awaited him, fled to Antiochus. When, on his arrival in Asia, he heard of the king's plans, he saw at once that he would ruin himself, and advised him not to enter upon a war with the Romans without the alliance of Philip of Macedonia and Egypt. Antiochus was at first greatly astonished at finding that Hannibal thought so little of the monarch of so great an empire, as to consider it necessary to form alliances for the purpose of undertaking a war against Rome. It was very easy to form an alliance with the Aetolians, (the Achaeans were firmly attached to the Romans;) but matters could not be so easily arranged with the king of Macedonia, for, on the one hand, Philip could not forgive Antiochus for not having supported him in his last campaign, and Antiochus, on the other hand, wished, in the case of his being successful, to make himself master of Greece and Thrace. But, if we leave these difficulties out of the question, an alliance between the two kings would certainly have succeeded in weakening the Romans considerably. Hannibal's opinion, however, was approved of only by a few who were not blinded by pride and vanity, as Antiochus himself was, and the negotiations were not followed by any results. Had Antiochus been a wise man, he would have had nothing to do with the Aetolians, or he ought at least to have convinced himself of the real extent of their power. The small number of their troops seems to us almost incomprehensible.

Before the war broke out, Flaminius and the Achaeans carried on a war against Nabis. The description of this war in Livy<sup>6</sup> is taken from Polybius, whose original account is lost. I shall only mention its issue very briefly. The Roman army engaged in this war was extremely small. The result of the war was, that the district of the

<sup>6</sup> XXXIV. 22, foll.

Eleuthero-Lacones, which is now called Maina, was detached from Lacedaemon, and constituted as an independent state, that Nabis, for a period of eight years, had to pay a tribute of fifty talents annually, and had to give his son Armenes as a hostage to the Romans. Argos with its whole territory was given back to the Achaeans<sup>7</sup>. But they mistrusted the Romans, since the Roman garrisons had not yet been withdrawn from Chalcis, Acrocorinthus, and Demetrias, as had been promised. Roman cohorts were thus still in the heart of Greece; but although they had wrong opinions of the great powers of Antiochus, they were wise enough now to withdraw their garrisons<sup>8</sup>. Boeotia also was exasperated against the Romans: in short, all the Greeks were divided into two parties, the one for, and the other against the Romans. Quinctius Flaminius has stained the history of his life, by allowing the faction devoted to him to murder the head of the Macedonian party, and by protecting the murderers against the justice of the law<sup>9</sup>. The friendship of the Achaeans towards the Romans was only of a negative nature, and all the Greeks bore, in truth, ill will towards them, and would have openly declared against them, had it not been repugnant to their feelings to make common cause with the Aetolians.

After many and fruitless discussions, Antiochus resolved to follow the pressing invitations of the Aetolians, but he took with him only 10,000 men and landed at Demetrias in Thessaly<sup>10</sup>, which, after the departure of the Roman garrison, had fallen into the hands of the Aetolians. He made himself master of Phthiotis, went to Euboea, and took the fortified town of Chalcis: it would seem as if fate had wished to justify the unwillingness with which the Romans had entrusted these places to the Greeks. In Boeotia his arrival was hailed with joy<sup>11</sup>; but the eyes of the Boeotians

<sup>7</sup> Livy, xxxiv. 35.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxxiv. 51.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxxiii. 27, foll.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxxv. 43.

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, xx. 4.

as well as of the Aetolians, were soon opened to the delusion by which they had been led on, for they had expected the king to come over with an army of at least 50,000 men. Antiochus was likewise surprised and perplexed when he discovered, that the Aetolians had only 4000 men infantry and some hundred horse. In these difficulties Hannibal was looked to for help. It is one of the most distressing things that can happen to a great man, to be asked for his advice in dangerous moments which he has foreseen and foretold, and which would have been averted, had he been listened to. But as there was no other way left, Hannibal's advice, to enter into an alliance with Macedonia, was now followed with the most ardent zeal<sup>12</sup>, but quite in vain; for Philip concluded an alliance with the Romans, in the hope of obtaining possession of Thessaly, and it is indeed not improbable, that in some secret article of his treaty with Rome, Demetrias and Lamia were assigned to him. This was an immense advantage to him, though he valued the acquisition more, inasmuch as it afforded him the means of ruining the Aetolians with the help of the Romans. The consul, M.'Acilius Glabrio, united his forces with those of Philip at Larissa, and marched southward. Antiochus and the Aetolians retreated towards Thermopylae: which was now to be defended by Macedonian Asiatics. That the memorable pass could be evaded was generally known. The Romans made a gallant attack. Some Aetolians had occupied the heights. M. Porcius Cato and L. Valerius Flaccus went up the mountain path; and no sooner had they chased the Aetolians from the mountains, than the whole army of Antiochus took to flight, and made for Chalcis, where the king had passed the preceding winter in the enjoyment of Asiatic luxuries. But he soon quitted this place also, and leaving only a small garrison behind, he returned to Asia Minor, as if the war had been at an end. Here the great Antiochus abandoned himself to

<sup>12</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm. lib. xxix. Exc. de Virt. et Vitiis*, p. 574.

sensual pleasures, and ordered an army to be raised from all Asia, which was to be so numerous as to render all resistance of the Romans hopeless.

The Aetolians were left entirely to themselves. Heraclea and Lamia, two towns belonging to them, were besieged, the former by the Romans, and the latter by Philip, according to the secret article in his treaty with Rome, above alluded to. The siege of Heraclea was carried on systematically and with great energy, and the town was taken by assault; the garrison and the citadel surrendered at discretion<sup>13</sup>. All the fair prospects of the Aetolians had now vanished, for it was more than probable that Antiochus would never return to Greece. But what saved them was the wish of the Roman generals to cross over to the rich countries of Asia, and the policy of the Romans to prevent Philip attaining his purposes of aggrandizement. When, therefore, Lamia was on the point of surrendering, the Roman consul sent Philip a message, ordering him to raise the siege. Henceforth Philip took no active part in the war, and confined himself to extending his dominions to the west of his kingdom, by conquering Athamania and the Dolopians. The Aetolians would have been extirpated, had not the Romans had reasons for preserving them. The Romans now appeared before Naupactus, and laid siege to it. The town would have been taken had the Romans acted with the same energy as at Heraclea; but they carried on the siege with the wish to spare the enemy, and the Aetolians having in the meantime gathered all their scattered forces, the Romans withdrew from the place<sup>14</sup>. The war came to its close with the siege of Ambracia<sup>15</sup>, which belonged to the Aetolian state. The peace was concluded by the consul M. Fulvius, and the Aetolians obtained tolerable terms, for they had only to


<sup>13</sup> Livy, XXXVI. 24. foll.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, XXXVI. 35; Plutarch, Flamin. 15.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, XXXVIII. 5.

pay a contribution of a few hundred talents<sup>16</sup>. Ambracia was saved, and passed peaceably into the hands of the Romans. The siege of this town is one of the most ingenious in ancient history, and its defence does honour to the Aetolians, whose wars are, on the whole, not glorious. I have here somewhat anticipated the time, for the siege of Ambracia took place in the year 564. Cephallenia, which had also belonged to the Aetolians, fell entirely into the hands of the Romans, as had been the case before with the Atintanians. Rome had thus secured to herself all the landing places along this coast, and had opened to herself all the roads into Greece.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 11 ; Polybius, xxi. 13.





## LECTURE XVIII.

WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS IN ASIA.—BATTLE OF MAGNESIA.—  
PEACE WITH ANTIOCHUS, AND THE SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS IN ASIA.—DEATH OF P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO.  
— BEGINNING OF DEMORALIZATION AMONG THE ROMANS.—M. PORCIUS CATO.

AFTER Antiochus had left Europe, he confined himself to defending his fleet against the Rhodians, Attalus, and Eumenes. With regard to the Romans, he was as much at ease as if he had been secured from them by an impassable gulf;<sup>1</sup> and it was Hannibal alone who induced him to keep possession of the Hellespont. This he did, but no more; for he thought it sufficient to prevent the Romans from attacking him in his own dominions. But M. Æmilius Regillus, a Roman admiral, was already approaching with a Roman fleet. How little the sea was the element of the Romans may be seen from the fact, that immediately after the Punic war they had given up their fleet. Hence we find them at Myonnesus with no more than from eighty to ninety ships, half of which, at the least, belonged to the Rhodians, who were by far the best sailors of those times. A Phœnician<sup>2</sup> fleet, which approached under the command of Hannibal, was not able to join that of Antiochus. The Romans gained a victory, and the fleet of Antiochus was almost entirely destroyed.

L. Cornelius Scipio and his friend C. Laelius, were con-

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxxvi. 41.

<sup>2</sup> The Phœnician towns, so powerful in the time of Alexander the Great, appear wholly to have lost their importance.—N.

suls in the year 562, and it was at this time that they fell out with each other. Laelius aspired to the command of the army; but the great Scipio, who had been the best friend of Laelius in private life, now exerted himself in favour of his own brother; and by his influence, which was still unbounded in the republic, he succeeded in getting the command conferred upon his brother. P. Cornelius Scipio, who had in the meantime been censor, accompanied his brother to Asia as his legate. The Roman army in Asia consisted of only about 20,000 men, partly Romans and partly Italians, independent of some thousands of Achæan and Pergamenian soldiers. When the Romans drew nearer, Antiochus was seized with such an inconceivable panic, that he immediately quitted Lysimachia, Abydos, and the whole coast of the Hellespont. The Romans thus crossed over, like Alexander the Great, without meeting with any resistance. It is a fact not generally known, that Philip had already commenced the war, and led his troops into Asia before the arrival of the Romans.<sup>3</sup> As soon as the Scipios reached the coast of Asia, there came an ambassador from Antiochus, expressing the wish of his king to restore peace. Scipio proposed moderate terms, which however appeared intolerable to the pride of the Syrian king. A son of the great Scipio, we know not how, had fallen into the hands of the Syrians, and was treated by them with great distinction. The ambassador offered to restore him to freedom; but Antiochus, who thereby hoped to attain his end the more surely, sent him back to his father at once, and without ransom.<sup>4</sup> This, however, did not produce the desired effect; and as it was impossible to come to any terms, the decision was left to a battle, which was fought near Magnesia, at the foot of Mount Sipylus. The Roman army, including the allies,

<sup>3</sup> Livy, XXXVII. 7; Appian, *De Reb. Maced.* 7; *De Reb. Syr.* 28; Polybius, xx. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, XXXVII. 34 foll.; Diodorus, *Fragm. lib. xxix.* Excerpt. *de Legat.* vi. p. 620.

did not amount to 30,000 soldiers; the Syrian army, which is said to have consisted of 100,000 men, was a motley host of Asiatics. The event of the battle was decided very soon, and it was of no avail that Antiochus gained some advantages on his right wing: the elephants made no impression upon the Romans, who had learnt to despise them, and they themselves had African elephants, which however, like the African lions, are much weaker and more timid than the Indian ones. Even the Macedonian phalanx, which at Cynoscephalæ had given the Romans so much trouble, was soon overwhelmed. The loss of the Romans is said to have been very small;<sup>5</sup> and this is indeed probable enough, for the soldiers against whom they fought were like those whom Alexander defeated at Arbela. Antiochus sued for peace, and was willing to accept any terms that might be offered. A preliminary treaty was granted to him, on condition that he should pay down immediately 500 talents for the truce, during which all the other articles should be made out at Rome, 2500 talents after the treaty should have received the sanction of the senate and people at Rome,<sup>6</sup> and 12,000 additional talents by instalments of 1000 a year. Antiochus was further to give hostages, to give up to the Romans all the countries west of Mount Taurus,—that is, the whole of Asia Minor, with the exception of Cilicia,—to pledge himself not to interfere in the affairs of the Roman allies in Europe without the consent of the Romans, give up all ships of war, and even his triremes, keep no elephants, and raise no mercenaries in countries allied with Rome. This treaty was signed in the year 562. The peace was not definitively concluded till some time after.<sup>7</sup>

In the spring of the year after this, Cn. Manlius Vulso,

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxxvii. 44.

<sup>6</sup> It is only accidental that this point is not mentioned afterwards.—N. (See Livy, xxxviii. 38.)

<sup>7</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 38; Polybius, xxi. 14, xxii. 26; Diodorus, *Fragm. lib. xxi. Exc. de Legat. ix. p. 621; Appian, Syriac. 39.*

the successor of L. Cornelius Scipio, anxious for an opportunity to undertake something from which he might derive fame and wealth—a desire which is henceforward the prevailing character of the Roman generals—made a campaign against the Galatians in Phrygia.<sup>8</sup> These barbarians had wandered through Macedonia and Greece; and after having ranged for a long time over Asia Minor,—which though it seems to have been destined by Providence to be one of the most flourishing and happiest countries in the world, is now, under the despotism of barbarians, like an accursed desert,—they had settled in Phrygia, in the district about Ancyra. They had accumulated immense riches in the course of a few years. They consisted of three tribes, bearing the strange names of Trocmi, Tectosagae, and Tolistoboi, which became gradually hellenized. The campaign of Manlius Vulso against them was most unfortunate for the inhabitants of Asia Minor: on the part of the Romans, it was very unjust that Manlius Vulso should undertake this war, contrary to the express wish of the *decem legati* who had come to Asia. The Galatians were not extirpated, but suffered so severe a defeat, that from this time forward they continued to live in quiet obedience to the Romans. Eumenes, who was quite an insignificant prince, was now made a great king by the Romans, and received an independent kingdom, comprising Mysia, Lydia, Phrygia, and Ionia, with the exception of a few of the Greek maritime towns, which were constituted as republics,<sup>9</sup> a kingdom for which he might be envied by many a European king. The Rhodians also were not forgotten, for they received Lycia and Caria, with the exception of Telmessus, which was given to Eumenes. The Rhodians deserved indeed to possess such rich countries, for they were a thoroughly respectable people, respecting whom the Romans them-

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 12. foll.; Polybius, xxii. 16 foll.

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, xxii. 26 foll.; Livy, xxxviii. 39; Diodorus, *Fragm. lib. xxix. Exc. de Legat. x. p. 621*; Appian, *Syriac*, 44.

selves owned that they had not the *levitas Graecorum* but a *severitas disciplinae* equal to their own.

Before I proceed to give you an outline of the state of morality and literature among the Romans, I have to mention the death of P. Cornelius Scipio, which is obscured by various contradictions. It is a remarkable instance of the manner in which false and impossible tales have crept into the annals of those times, so as to make it hopeless for us to attempt to arrive at a positive conviction as to what is historically true and what is mere fiction. Contradictory occurrences, and such as took place at different times, are here put together. What Livy<sup>10</sup> mentions from the speech of Tiberius Gracchus, may be looked upon as something more than the narrative of an annalist. There is however no doubt that, at one time, Scipio was called upon before the senate to answer to the charge of having embezzled sums of money which he had received from Antiochus, and of not having given to the republic an account of money which he had gained in the course of the war<sup>11</sup>. This was a peculiar point with the Romans; their generals had full right to dispose of the spoils and the money exacted from a conquered enemy in what manner they pleased; they might distribute them among their soldiers, or make them over to the treasury of the republic; but they were obliged to be prepared to give an account of the manner in which they had acted; and to demand such an account was considered by the people as their constitutional and inalienable right. L. Scipio had given no account; and when called upon to defend himself against certain suspicions, he sent for his account-books, and caused them to be read before the senate; but his brother snatched them from his hands and tore them to pieces, declaring it to be inconsistent that, as he and his brother had so much enriched the state, he should be taken to account for the trifling sum of about

<sup>10</sup> XXXVIII. 56.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, XXXVIII. 54 foll.

36,000*l*.<sup>12</sup> The fact that Scipio could speak of such a sum as a trifle, shews how high the standard of property must have been even as early as that time. But this act of P. Scipio did not remain without consequences. A charge was also brought against him of having been bribed by Antiochus; and when he was summoned to appear before the tribunes, he said that the day was ill suited for litigation, since it was the very same day on which he had conquered Hannibal, and went to the capitol, whither he was accompanied by the whole people<sup>13</sup>. This charge may have been the one to which allusion was made in the speech of Gracchus, where it was stated that Gracchus had intended to arrest L. Scipio, and that P. Scipio on hearing of it returned from Etruria, and rescued his brother from the hands of the constable. But however this may be, he was accused, because *animos plus quam civiles gerebat*. He had not expected such a charge, and it may be that he withdrew or went into voluntary exile to Liternum, a Roman colony; thus much at least is certain, that he passed the last years of his life away from his country. It is during the time of his living abroad that he is said to have betrothed his daughter Cornelia to Tib. Gracchus; but if we consider the age of her sons, it seems more probable that the engagement did not take place till after Scipio's death<sup>14</sup>.

The history of Scipio is very instructive, for it shews how the state was hastening towards its dissolution. No one thought of the republic being in danger, and the danger was indeed as yet far distant; but the seeds of dissolution were nevertheless sown, and its symptoms were already beginning to become visible. We hear it generally said that, with the victories of the Romans in Asia, luxury and all the vices which accompany avarice and rapacity,

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 55; Gellius, N. A. iv. 18; vii. 19; Diodorus, Exc. Vatican. p. 78 foll. ed. Dindorf.

<sup>13</sup> Gellius, N. A. iv. 18.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 57.



began to break in upon them. This is indeed true enough, but it was only the symptom of corruption, and not its cause: the latter lay much deeper. After so many years of destructive and cruel wars, during which the Romans had been almost uninterruptedly in arms, the whole nation was in a frightful condition: the poor were utterly impoverished, the middle class had sunk deeper and deeper, and the wealthy had amassed immense riches. The same men who had marched into rich foreign countries as hungry soldiers, now returned with exorbitant riches—the treasures extorted from conquered nations. The officers and nobles had now opportunities to satisfy their desires with splendid buildings and luxuries of every kind, and to fill their houses with costly furniture, carpets, plate, &c. The Romans had grown rich, but the immediate consequence was a brutal use of their riches. Agriculturists are excellent men, so long as they live in favourable circumstances, but when they acquire wealth on a sudden, they exhibit a striking proof of how difficult it is to make a rational use of it. A similar instance occurs in the history of Ditmarsch, where corruption became general at a time when after some years of scarcity, the people acquired wealth by extraordinary sales of corn. Thus, the Romans who had accumulated immense wealth, and did not know how to use it, began to abandon themselves to gluttony. Hence it came to pass, as Livy says<sup>15</sup>, that cooks who had before been the most despised class of slaves, now became the most expensive. The Roman pontiffs, as we see from their bills of fare, might in their eating and drinking have rivalled the canons of modern times<sup>16</sup>. Before this time the Romans had lived like simple peasants, but now exorbitant sums were spent upon Greek cooks: gluttony and the most disgusting vulgarity took the place of former fruga-

<sup>15</sup> XXXIX. 6.

<sup>16</sup> Horat. Carm. II. 14. 26 foll. with the notes of the commentators.

lity. The Athenians lived frugally at all times, and the Greeks are on the whole a frugal nation; the Italians, on the other hand, can be frugal; but at times, when they are let loose, they indulge in brutal intemperance.

Although the form and appearance of the Roman constitution continued to be democratical, yet the nobles could do anything with impunity. I need only remind you of L. Quinctius Flaminius who slaughtered a man of Gallic origin, who implored his assistance either against an unjust verdict, or because he, being an hostage, had been insulted, merely to afford his favourite the pleasure of seeing a man struggling in the agonies of death<sup>17</sup>—a crime more horrible than that of the sultan who called in a man and ordered him to be beheaded, in order that his painter might have something frightful to paint. Cato ejected him from the senate. Although the Romans were, in general, much more conscientious than the Greeks, and although Polybius, fifty years after this time, places them very far above the Greeks, still embezzlement of the public money, extortions from the allies, and acts of violence and wantonness of every description, are henceforth of quite common occurrence. This is the state of things which we see in the fragment of Cato's oration *De Sumtu Suo*<sup>18</sup>, the gem among the fragments in Fronto, who made the extracts for the emperor Antoninus Pius. Cato was at this time the most remarkable man, the man of the good old times, in the true sense of the word. His name of Priscus is expressive of his Latin origin from Tusculum. Rome perhaps never produced such another singular genius. The Romans at that time acquired all scientific refinement through the medium of Greek literature, but Cato formed an exception, for although, at a late period of his life, he acquired the lan-

<sup>17</sup> Livy, xxxix. 42.


<sup>18</sup> Fronto, p. 149, ed. A. Mai, Rome, 1823. Comp. Meyer, *Fragmenta oratorum Romanorum*, p. 30, foll. 2nd edit.

guage and made himself acquainted with the literature of the Greeks; yet in reality he despised the Greeks, and his peculiar mode of thinking, his style and language, are pure old Roman: a circumstance which shews that it was not absolutely necessary for a Roman to be imbued with the spirit of the Greeks in order to be a great man. He displayed his immense powers in the most various ways<sup>19</sup>: he was a great general, a great statesman and orator, an excellent agriculturist: in short, an active man in all the affairs of human life, and indefatigable in his exertions for the good of his country. There was no polish in anything he did, nothing that was merely put on: all was with him the gift of nature, and nothing was the result of artificial training. Livy, without wishing to attach any blame to him,—for he loved him,—uses of him the expression *allatrare solitus est*<sup>20</sup>. He could not live at peace with the noble and the wealthy, for they and their acquired manners were disgusting to him in the highest degree, and to combat what was repugnant to him was the natural turn of his mind. With regard to the conduct which he required of every one to shew towards the state, we cannot charge him with affectation: it arose from his purest convictions. L. Valerius Flaccus was a man who agreed with him in sentiment. Cato had the nature of a lion, and was active with unremitting zeal. At the age of eighty-six he carried on a great law-suit, and at the age of ninety he accused Servius Galba. He was a Roman in the fullest sense of the word, and was bent upon seeing the sovereignty and grandeur of his nation firmly established. He was a great patron of industry; he defended the Rhodians, protected the Lusitanians, and all those who were helpless or friendless. He is one of the greatest and most honourable characters in Roman history: he resembles the great men of the sixteenth century in

<sup>19</sup> Livy, XXXIX. 40.

<sup>20</sup> XXXVIII. 54.

whom that which we call rudeness was nothing but the peculiar manners of the time. Respecting the other Romans of that time, who are usually called great men, I have nothing to say: there is none among them who deserves the name of a great man.



## LECTURE XIX.

EARLY ACQUAINTANCE OF THE ITALIANS WITH GREEK LITERATURE. — ROMAN LITERATURE. — ATELLANAE AND PRAETEXTATAE. — LIVIUS ANDRONICUS. — NAEVIUS. — PLAUTUS. — ENNIUS. — PACUVIUS. — ROMANS WHO WROTE GREEK. — DEATH OF SCIPIO AND HANNIBAL. — THE IMPORTANCE OF CAPITAL AT ROME.

THE current ideas respecting Roman literature are no less one-sided than those respecting the early intellectual condition of the Romans. We must not imagine that, previous to their conquests in Greece, they were as ignorant of Greek literature as, for instance, our ancestors were, previous to the revival of letters, or that they had no literature of their own. It is certain, however, that the Romans did not possess any such distinct class of literary men as there existed in Greece. With regard to their knowledge of Greek literature and poetry, we have the strongest possible evidence that the Romans, and the Italian nations in general, were intimately acquainted with them at a very early period. In the ancient works of art of the Etruscans and Oscans, we find representations of subjects from the ancient Greek fables, and of Greek persons, although the names of these persons, by passing through the mouth of the people, had sometimes undergone peculiar changes. Instead of Odysseus, for example, we find Ulixes, which seems to have been a Sicilian form; instead of Ganymedes we find Catamitus. These and similar instances prove that Greek myths were generally known in Italy<sup>1</sup>. But to understand them must

<sup>1</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 310 foll.

have been difficult for the Romans, especially for the Sabines and the original inhabitants of Italy, whose religion was not a mythology, but a real theology with mythical legends. Their divinities were *numena*, and consequently without those elements which gave life to the poetry of the Greeks. Among the Pelasgians and Latins, on the other hand, there was a greater resemblance to the elements of Grecian mythology and poetry, which struck root also among the Romans through the medium of the Sibylline books, so that Greek poetry soon became intelligible to them. The theatre of Tusculum, which, if we may judge from the foundations, cannot have been erected later than the second Punic war, but in all probability was built much earlier, presupposes the performance of dramas, whether of Greek or of native growth. After the first Punic war, Greek poetry took root at Rome, and was cultivated and imitated in the Latin language.

The *atellanae*, which we meet with at the close of the fourth century, are an evident proof of a fresh vein of national poetry. I believe they were extempore productions, like the poetry of the improvisatori of modern Italy, and they were certainly not confined to the Romans. As the *atellanae* present to us a kind of national comedy, so the *praetextatae* were very old national tragedies<sup>2</sup>. I believe we are not mistaken in thinking that there was some connexion between these *praetextatae* and the solemn funeral processions, in which the masks of the dead, who had *curules imagines*, were carried about. There is no mention of any earlier *praetextatae* than those of Attius. The fact of his having composed them according to certain rules of art and in a poetical style is a proof of their existence previous to his time.

The translation of Greek poetry into the Latin language was a great and important step. Livius Andronicus is called a Tarentine, probably for no other reason but because he was confounded with Livius Macatus, who

<sup>2</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 520, note 1150.



maintained himself at Tarentum<sup>3</sup>. The interval between his alleged departure from Tarentum and the time when he appeared before the public with his dramas seems to be too long, unless we suppose him to have spent only his early childhood at Tarentum. In early times, the personal character and circumstances of bards were generally neglected, and the Romans in particular paid little attention to the history of the lives of their early poets. At a later period, they began to compile historical information concerning them; but the most incredible things were put together, as we see in the biographies of Naevius and Terence. Livius Andronicus translated the *Odyssey*, which, from its relation to Latium, had greater attractions for the Romans than the *Iliad*<sup>4</sup>: he did not however translate the whole of the *Odyssey*, but made an abridgment of it in the national Italian rhythm and not in a Greek metre. The great poem of Naevius was likewise in the Saturnian rhythm. All that Livius wrote besides his *Odyssey* are tragedies, which, like the *atellanae*, were not performed in standing theatres, but on a kind of scaffolding in the *Circus*.

Besides the historical poem of Naevius, in which he combined national subjects with Greek mythology, he wrote both tragedies and comedies. That he was a great poet we may believe on the assertion of Cicero,<sup>5</sup> who had in reality no taste for the old national poetry of his countrymen. In the latter period of his life Naevius was persecuted, for considering that he had not the full franchise, he had been too bold, and had insulted the *Metelli*, who availed themselves of the circumstance of his being a *Campanian*, and threw him into prison.

When Naevius was an old man, Plautus, one of the greatest poetical geniuses of antiquity, was just entering on his best period. He shews his great talent in his bold and free though somewhat singular manner of dealing with his characters. He takes Greek pieces with Greek

<sup>3</sup> See Livy, XXVII. 34, and XXIV. 20.

<sup>4</sup> It is a very ancient idea that *Circe* had some connexion with *Circeii*.—N.

<sup>5</sup> Brutus, c. 19.

dramatis personae, and treats them with a perfect irony: the Greeks in his plays speak, act, and are witty, as Romans would be, and there occurs in them nothing that could have been foreign to the Romans. All his personages display those peculiarities of character which distinguished the *aerarii*, who formed a lower order in the population of Rome, and consisted chiefly of freedmen and strangers who had become naturalized, but could not rise to the rank of free Roman warriors. The scenes are laid at Athens, Epidamnus, or Ephesus, and the names of the persons are Greek, but we are reminded every moment that we are in the very heart of Rome. The parasite is, I believe, not a Roman character. What makes Plautus such a wonderful poet is that on this slippery ground which he had chosen he always shews the most extraordinary skill in hitting the right point. His language is no less admirable than his poetical skill: if we compare his language with that of his predecessors we find it greatly altered, enriched, and refined, which is a proof that the language was much cultivated at that time, for, had this not been the case, it would certainly be very different from what it is in the comedies of Plautus. We have fortunately the opportunity of comparing his language with that of a *senatus-consultum* of the fifth century, and that of the tomb-stone of Scipio Barbatus.

Livius Andronicus was the client of one Livius; Naeivius was a Roman citizen, a *municeps Campanus*, and lived at Rome, though only with the rights of an *aerarius*; but as regards Plautus, it is not known whether he was a Roman citizen—he had perhaps not given up the franchise of his native place. I do not believe the story, that he gained his living by working at a hand-mill.

Ennius, who was somewhat younger than Plautus, was a gentleman, a Roman citizen, and belonged unquestionably to one of the tribes. He lived on terms of great intimacy with Scipio, Fulvius Nobilior, Laelius, and the principal men of the republic, and was not only much esteemed

personally, but he was the first who made the Romans esteem and honour men of literary occupation. Among his fragments there are some very excellent specimens of his poetry. He seems to have despised comedy—a rare saint! Some of his poems were written in the national Italian rhythm, for instance, his *Sabine women*. But, on the whole, he followed his own method, and, although he used some Greek metres, still we cannot say, that he borrowed them; for it is true that the Greeks have their pure iambic and trochaic metres, but the same metres, with some modifications, were national also among the Romans; and I believe that the senarius is as little peculiar to the Latin language as it is to our own, and Naevius merely adopted it as Ennius adopted the hexameter. The introduction of this latter verse produced at Rome the same sort of poetry which it produced in Germany; and the hexameters of Ennius are nearly as awkward and as imperfect as the earliest German hexameters. Those of Ennius have sometimes no caesura at all, and sometimes wrong ones in the fourth foot, which render them altogether unsatisfactory. I must confess that, much as I like the *numeri and sales* of Plautus, I cannot be pleased with the hexameters of Ennius. They have a great many peculiarities, such as the entire suppression of short syllables: *ego*, for instance, is used like the Italian *io*, as one syllable. Ennius wished to try all the Greek metres, with the exception of the really lyric ones, and constructed them with more accuracy than the earlier dramatists; for through Plautus the senarius, for instance, became a rhythmical verse. If we compare the metrical forms of the poetry of Klopstock with those of count Platen Hallermünde, we find the same contrast as between the verses of Ennius and those of Virgil. Ennius is less original than either Naevius or Plautus. He was a native of Campania, he belonged to a hellenized people, he had received a Greek education, and the Greek language was his second mother tongue: no wonder, therefore, that he wished to introduce Greek forms into Roman

poetry. The literature of the Romans was at this time very brilliant in comparison with that of the Greeks; for the best Alexandrian period was over, and, when Livius Andronicus began his career, Callimachus was either already dead or near his end: Eratosthenes was more of a versifier than a poet: Antagoras and Aratus were dead: in short, Greek literature was fast dying away, whereas at Rome it was thriving with extraordinary vigour; and would have done so still more, if Ennius had not had such great influence: for some time, however, the Romans held out against it.

Pacuvius was younger than Ennius, and a son of the sister of Ennius. He well deserves the name of the deep-thinker. Horace depreciates him very unjustly. Pacuvius followed Aeschylus and Sophocles as his models, and despised Euripides, which is a very characteristic feature, and one by which he placed himself in opposition to the taste of his whole age.

How familiar the Romans were with Greek literature may also be seen from the works which were written immediately after the second Punic war. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius wrote the history of their country in the Greek language. Fabius is often mentioned, but no one, not even Dionysius, has ever objected to him that his language was barbarous or unreadable; nay, the very fact that Dionysius carried his history down to the commencement of the first Punic war must shew that, in his judgment, Fabius was from that time forward all that could be desired: at the same time, however, he saw that for the early times of Roman history, Fabius was not satisfactory. Subsequently we still find many other Romans who wrote historical works in Greek; the great Scipio wrote his own history in the form of a letter to Philip of Macedonia<sup>6</sup>; P. Scipio Nasica wrote the history of the war

<sup>6</sup> I have not been able to find any authority for this statement. Cicero (*De Officiis*, III. 1,) says distinctly: *nulla eius (Africani,) ingenii monumenta mandata literis, nullum opus otii, nullum solitudinis*

against Perseus<sup>7</sup>; and Aemilius Paullus engaged Greek dramatists, rhetoricians, painters, and drawing-masters, to instruct his sons.

The Great Scipio died in the year 569, and in the same year Hannibal put an end to his life by poison, because the Romans very dishonourably demanded of Prusias of Bithynia to deliver him up to them. Bithynia was a very small country on the coast of the Euxine, extending from Byzantium to Heraclea; but after the fall of the Persian empire it had been extended; and some districts in its vicinity, which were not occupied by other states, were added to it, so that it comprised the whole country, from the frontiers of Paphlagonia, to those of Mysia; it was a rich but not a powerful state. At the time we are here speaking of, it was governed by Prusias. The other states of Asia Minor were Pergamus, Paphlagonia west of the river Halys, Cappadocia, which was divided into Upper Cappadocia and the rich country of Pontus, and Pamphylia,—Cilicia belonged to Syria. Prusias had hitherto been independent. It is almost inconceivable how Hannibal, while staying at his court, could have been overlooked by the Romans, but when they were informed of his presence there, they sent an embassy to Prusias. It is an unpardonable act of T. Quinctius Flaminius that he allowed himself to be made use of for such an object<sup>8</sup>. But virtue and the sense of honour were vanishing more and more from the Roman republic, and its condition was already most deplorable.

In the earlier times the strength of Rome consisted in her free peasantry, but this class of her population was gradually losing its importance and influence. One of

*munus extat*. In another place (Brutus, 20,) Cicero speaks of an *historia quaedam Graeca, scripta dulcissime*, as the work of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus minor, the son of the great Scipio; but it is scarcely possible to suppose that Niebuhr made a mistake here, especially as he mentions the letter of Scipio also in another passage above, p. 156.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, xxix. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxxix. 51 foll.; Appian, Syriaca, 11.



those levies which the late wars had required must have ruined numbers of whole families. Another change which had lately taken place, and which could not remain without political consequences, was the importance which capital had acquired. Ever since the end of the first Punic war, when the Romans had gained possession of Sicily, we find capitalists engaged in enterprises and speculations to increase their moveable property, and this spirit was encouraged by the facility and impunity with which they could pursue their objects in the provinces. Usury was indeed forbidden by the Roman law, as it was in later times forbidden by the canon law; but such a law is unnatural, and of no avail, for, in defiance of the canon law, a variety of ways were devised, which enabled capitalists to take interest with impunity; and similar methods were resorted to at Rome, where capitalists did business with foreigners, or substituted other names for their own. The canon law imposed no restrictions on the Jews, and the Roman law did not extend its protection to the Italian allies, or to freedmen; so that a thousand ways were left open to evade the law. In the provinces the spirit of usury found no obstacles. The *Publicum Romanum* had been immensely extended: the tunny-fisheries, the tithes of Illyricum and other countries, put large sums of money into circulation, and the profits made by these things were as great as those made in modern times by speculators in paper securities. Whenever, for instance, a contribution was to be raised, the publicani were immediately ready to offer the money at an interest of at least 12, but sometimes 24, or even 36 per cent, and the governors of the provinces took good care that the debts were paid. This is the manner in which the class of publicani was gradually formed. Distinct traces of them are found in Livy<sup>9</sup> as early as the second Punic war, although it was not until the century following that they acquired their notorious importance. They form a parallel to the money-dealers whom the eighteenth century produced.

<sup>9</sup> XXIII. 48 and 49; xxv. 3 and 4.



## LECTURE XX.

THE LIGURIAN WAR.—WAR IN SPAIN.—CATO AND TI. SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS.—THE LAST YEARS OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP OF MACEDONIA.—CONDUCT OF THE ROMANS.—DEMETRIUS.—PERSEUS.—DEATH OF PHILIP.—THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF PERSEUS.—WAR WITH THE ROMANS.—FEELINGS OF THE GREEKS AT THAT TIME.

THE Ligurian war<sup>1</sup> is not only insignificant, but extremely obscure, on account of our want of accurate geographical knowledge. It has some resemblance to the present undertakings of the Caucasian tribes. The Apennines are not, indeed, as high as the Caucasus, but they offer the same advantages for armies to defend themselves. The Ligurians were defeated in the end, which is always the unavoidable fate of such nations. The war did not extend beyond the river Varus, or the frontiers of the Provence. The Ligurian tribes defended themselves and their poverty with such a resolute determination, that the Romans, who could not expect any rich spoils, aimed at nothing short of extirpating them, or expelling them from their mountains. The consuls, P. Cornelius Cethegus and M. Baebius Tamphilus, were sent against them with an army of 50,000 men. The Ligurians capitulated and were transplanted into Samnium, where they afterwards dwelt under the name of the Cornelian and Baebian Ligurians<sup>2</sup>.

Ever since the successful campaign of Scipio in Spain, the Romans had sent thither one, and sometimes two

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxxv. 3 foll.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, xl. 37 foll.

praetors, and kept regular troops there. From the second Punic war, or perhaps even from the time of Pyrrhus, one legion seems to have been stationary at Tarentum, and another in Sicily; and now we find two legions stationary in Spain. This system of keeping stationary troops altered the character of the Roman armies, and had a decided influence upon all their civil relations. In former times the legions had always been disbanded at the end of every campaign, and new ones were formed. This method had the advantage, that every Roman passed through his time of military service and then returned home, so that the soldiers were never separated or distinct from the citizens. Now things became different. The legions stationed in Spain, for instance, remained there for a number of years, married Spanish women, and became estranged to Italy. When therefore such legions were disbanded, many soldiers would remain in Spain, unwilling to return to a country to which they had become strangers. The Roman dominion in Spain extended over Catalonia, Valencia, and Andalusia; but at the end of the second Punic war their authority seems to have become unsettled, until it was re-established by Cato, who won the hearts of the Spaniards by his justice. It is indeed surprising to see that a Roman general with humane feelings was able to win the affections and confidence of those tribes, and to establish the authority of Rome for a length of time, until fresh acts of injustice provoked their resentment. But Cato succeeded, and that not merely by his justice and bravery, but also by his cunning, which was a prominent feature in the Roman character from the earliest times. The Spanish towns were strongly fortified, for the Spaniards were a civilized nation, and to conquer them was a matter of great difficulty. These fortifications became the occasion of a general war. It is said that Cato sent circulars to the magistrates of seventy or eighty towns, with the command not to open them before a certain day fixed by him. These letters contained, for each town, the

command to raze its walls to the ground on that day, and the threat that, in case of disobedience, the town would be besieged and its inhabitants reduced to slavery. Each town obeyed, imagining that it alone had received such a command; and before the stratagem was discovered, the towns had already made considerable progress in the destruction of their fortifications<sup>3</sup>.

In the year 574 the consul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the son of that Gracchus who had distinguished himself in the war against Hannibal, and the father of the two unfortunate brothers, was in Spain. The hostile feeling towards the Romans had spread even among the Celtiberians, who occupied the countries from the sources of the river Ebro, including La Mancha, Andalusia, Old and New Castile, and the western part of Valencia and Arragon. They had in reality never been subject to the Carthaginians, and their mercenaries had served in the armies of both belligerent parties. They were now involved in a war with the Romans, who wished to reduce them to submission. The more difficult this undertaking — the Celtiberians were the bravest among the Spaniards—the more was it incumbent on the Romans to subdue those countries. But Tib. Sempronius Gracchus concluded a peace with them, which was so fair and reasonable, that those nations, who had in reality no wish at all to carry on the war, looked upon it as the greatest favour that they could have implored from heaven.<sup>4</sup> The whole family of the Gracchi is distinguished for their extraordinary gentleness and kindness, qualities which were, on the whole, foreign to the Romans. This peace was the means by which Gracchus gained a hold on the affections of the natives of Spain.

Philip of Macedonia did not live to a great age; at his death he may have been about sixty years old. His expectations respecting the war against Antiochus had not been realized, though his circumstances had been improved,

<sup>3</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 41. Compare Livy, xxxiv. 17.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xl. 47 foll.; xli. 3 foll.; Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 43.

by the acquisition of Demetrias and Magnesia, by means of which he encompassed Thessaly. The Dolopians had continued to be subject to him, and he was also in possession of Athamania and the Greek towns on the coast of Thrace, which he had first taken from the Egyptians, then given up, and at last re-occupied during the war against Antiochus. The Romans for some time allowed this state of things to continue, but then they began insidiously to undermine his empire. They supported Amynander, who expelled the Macedonian garrisons from Athamania,<sup>5</sup> and they readily listened to the ambassadors from the Thracian towns and the Thessalians, who complained of Philip.<sup>6</sup> The Romans sent commissioners to Macedonia, whom Philip received with feelings of great exasperation; but he yielded in what he could not help, merely with a view to gain time. Misfortune had taught him wisdom. He had conducted the war from which he might have derived advantages with laxity, and as a matter of secondary importance. But ever since the year 555, during the last eighteen years of his life, he had been making constant and serious preparations, and he, as well as the Romans, acted with mutual faithlessness towards each other. When the Roman army returned from Asia, he instigated the Thracians to fall upon them and take possession of their baggage, while he endeavoured to secure himself as much as possible against any attack that might be made on him. Not being allowed to keep ships of war, he formed the plan of entirely abandoning the maritime towns which had no considerable fortifications, and of drawing the population into the interior of Macedonia, and he established Thracian settlements in the desolate towns of his kingdom.<sup>7</sup> The working of the Macedonian mines was carried on with double zeal, and the arsenals were filled with arms. At the same time Philip kept up negoti-

<sup>5</sup> Livy, XXXVIII. 1—3.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, XXXIX. 24 foll., 33 foll.; Polybius, XXIII. 4—6, 11—16; Appian, *De Rebus Maced.* 4. p. 516. foll. ed. Schweigh.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, XXIV. 8; Livy, XL. 3.

ations with foreign powers, and turned his eyes not so much to the impotent kings of the east—Eumenes was dependent on the Romans, and Prusias was an insignificant prince, who could effect nothing with his troops; the utmost he could have done would have been to assist with money—but he formed friendly connexions with the Thracians, especially the Getae and Bastarnae, who were inclined to abandon their abodes, because the Sarmatians were at that time constantly advancing in the countries on the Dniepr. Philip endeavoured to persuade those tribes to seek new homes in Italy.<sup>8</sup> Such an undertaking on the part of the Thracians would have been the only means of giving the Roman power a shock; and had those nations actually invaded Italy, Philip would have been sure to gain considerable advantages, for the Romans were generally hated, and deserved to be hated. Of virtue and honesty towards foreign nations not a trace was left among them; and of justice, which had formerly been the very foundation of their religion, they had no longer any idea. Among the many things for which they drew well-deserved hatred upon themselves, we must mention here the intrigues by which, both in free states and within the families of princes, they contrived to gain over to their interest the most contemptible persons, who, encouraged by and relying on the protection of the Romans, ventured to do anything. By such means they created within the royal family of Macedonia an enmity between the heirs of the throne, Demetrius and Perseus:<sup>9</sup> the former was the younger son of Philip by his legitimate wife, and the latter the son of a concubine. Demetrius had spent some time among the Romans as a hostage, and they had gained possession of his mind by holding out to him the hope of succeeding to the throne of his father, and by the promise that they would recognise him and not Perseus.<sup>10</sup> How far Demetrius may have

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxxix. 35.

<sup>9</sup> Justin, xxxii. 2; Polybius, xxiv. 7.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxxix. 53.

gone to favour the scheme of the Romans, or whether he actually did make himself guilty of anything more than a mere transitory unjust thought, cannot be ascertained; but it is quite certain that the charges against him, of which we read in Livy<sup>11</sup>, are very much exaggerated, and that the account of the manner in which Perseus calumniated him and seduced his father to murder him, are rather romance than history, however beautiful they are to read.

Philip died soon after, in the year 573. It is perhaps one of those suspicions which hang over so many things, when Livy<sup>12</sup> calls the death of Philip *peropportuna Perseo*, insinuating thereby that his death was brought about by Perseus. Why should not Philip at his age have died a natural death? How could he have conceived the idea of excluding his son, who was certainly not an idiot, from the succession, and of fixing upon Antigonus, his cousin, as his successor? All this is highly improbable. When Philip died, he left his kingdom, stronger and more powerful than any one could have expected, to his son Perseus.

Perseus<sup>13</sup> is one of those characters of which it is difficult to give a definite idea; one of his prominent features, however, was avarice. This vice was his ruin; he could not separate himself from the treasures with which he might have raised a formidable power against the Romans;

<sup>11</sup> Livy, XL. 23.

<sup>12</sup> XL. 57.

<sup>13</sup> The name Perseus has been the subject of much discussion. Schneider (*Ausführliche Grammat. der Lateinischen Sprache*, vol. I. part 2, p. 71 foll.) has some pages about the declension of the names terminating in *eus*, but has not found the simple solution of the question. All Greek names terminating in *εὐς* had in old Latin the termination *es*, and were declined after the second declension, forming their genitive case in *i*; for example, *Piræes*, gen. *Piræi*, not *Piræei*, as we sometimes find it written in a barbarous way. In later times, however, Perseus falls under the third declension, but the genitive is *Persi*, as if the nominative were *Persus*. The accusative is *Persen*. I have never met with the form *Persum*, although of *Piræeus*, the accusative *Piræum* sometimes occurs.—N.



and when he promised subsidies, his avarice did not allow him to abide by his word<sup>14</sup>. In his wars he was undecided and wavering, which arose, it is true, partly from the nature of the circumstances, but partly also from his own peculiar character. He was not a general, for he had no calmness or composure in moments of pressing danger. But we must nevertheless say of him thus much, that so long as circumstances were not harassing or perplexing, and so long as he could act according to his own plans, he was always skilful in choosing the right way of proceeding. In the first year of his reign he endeavoured to gain popularity among the Greeks, among the Rhodians, Boeotians, Acarnanians, and Thessalians, as well as among the Achaeans, and he was most successful in his endeavours<sup>15</sup>. During this period he concealed his avarice; he was even generous, dispensed with tributes, and pardoned those against whom justice had pronounced her severe judgment. In short, his popularity rose to such a height, that the Greeks looked upon him as the prince in whose power it was to restore the Macedonian empire, and to drive the Romans away from the eastern shores of the Adriatic. The Rhodians were not bound to the Romans by any treaty, and therefore could, without violating any obligation, enter into friendly relations with Perseus. He married a Syrian princess, the daughter of Antiochus Epiphanes<sup>16</sup>, who is accurately described in the Bible<sup>17</sup> as a savage tyrant and a frantic man, who however displayed considerable energy. Perseus hoped to find a useful ally in him. A sister of Perseus was married to Prusias<sup>18</sup>. These connexions raised the suspicion of king Eumenes, and his fear lest he should fall a prey to Prusias and Antiochus. The natural consequence was, that he

<sup>14</sup> Livy, XLIV. 26. Compare Polybius, XXVIII. 8.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, XLI. 23 foll. XLII. 5. Comp. Polybius, XXVI. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, XLII. 12.

<sup>17</sup> Maccab. I. 6. 1; II. 1. 14 foll. 9. 3 foll.

<sup>18</sup> Livy, XLIII. 12.

brought complaints against Perseus before the Romans, who not only listened to his suggestions, but took up the complaints against the Macedonian king, as well as those against the Rhodians. The small tribes of Thrace, which were oppressed by Perseus, justly or unjustly, likewise brought complaints against him. The Carians and Lycians complained of the Rhodians.<sup>19</sup> In order to weaken the Rhodians, the Romans, whose policy was completely Machiavellian, gave to the Carian and Lycian towns the most favourable and decided answers, and thus rendered the Rhodians more and more disaffected. But enough of this. One party among the Rhodians was attached to the Romans, and had yet power enough to prevent an open declaration of hostilities. The Rhodians were thus kept quiet at the beginning of the war with Perseus.

Perseus had reason to hope that, unless he himself broke the peace, the Romans would leave him alone. But in the meanwhile, an attempt was made at Delphi to assassinate Eumenes<sup>20</sup>. The devising such a plan for getting rid of an enemy is just what might have been expected of Perseus, although he afterwards positively denied having had any share in the attempt. It may be that the whole affair was merely a wretched farce of Eumenes, but it is almost too bad to suspect such a thing without evidence. The Romans demanded of Perseus to deliver up some persons who enjoyed his especial favour, and who were suspected of being the instigators of the attempt. The refusal of Perseus caused the final outbreak of the war, which did not last quite four years, from 581 to 585. The turn it took was quite different from what the Romans had anticipated, for they imagined that it might be brought to a close by a single campaign. The war itself, however, came very opportunely for them, for their wish was to overthrow the kingdom of Macedonia; and not merely this,

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, XXVI. 7; Livy, XLI. 6. Compare XLIV. 15.

<sup>20</sup> Livy, XLII. 15 foll.; Appian, *De Rebus Maced.* 2. p. 521, ed. Schweigh.

but to place all the relations of those eastern countries upon a different basis, to remove the treaties by which they were restrained, and to introduce altogether a new order of things.

As the last books of Livy are mutilated, we cannot form an accurate notion of one part of the time, and we are left in ignorance of the exact connexion of the operations. The Roman general P. Licinius Crassus appeared in Thessaly, where Perseus came to meet him,<sup>21</sup> having conceived the mad hope that, by resolute conduct, he would obtain more favourable terms. His calculation was wrong, for the Romans were faithful to their maxim, not to lay down their arms until Perseus was subdued. Negotiations were entered into, but the Romans demanded entire submission. A battle was then fought in Thessaly near Sycurium, in which many Romans were slain, and still more were taken prisoners. The Roman fleet was a curse to many of the Greek sea-towns. With the exception of a few, such as Charops in Epirus, Lyciscus in Aetolia, and Callicrates in Achaia, all the Greeks had joined Perseus against the Romans. The rational men among the Greeks indeed wished that the issue of the war might be such as to enable Perseus to maintain himself, but very few had confidence enough to act in reliance upon such an issue. The great mass of the people, however, fancied that it was impossible for Perseus not to conquer the Romans, and after the successful battle in Thessaly all their heads were completely turned, so that the Greeks indulged in every kind of insolence towards the Romans<sup>22</sup>. We have seen a similar state of feeling in Germany, where a general exasperation against the dominion of the French was manifested just at the time when their power had reached its height; and whenever the French sustained a trifling loss, some people were foolish enough to imagine that their power was on the decline, and to indulge in the

<sup>21</sup> Livy, XLII. 55 foll.

<sup>22</sup> Livy, XLII. 63

most insulting language against them. Such was the feeling of Polybius, who, as long as he was in Greece, hated the Romans as bitterly as his father Lycortas, or Philopomen, although he cannot surely have been deceived as to the personal character of Perseus<sup>23</sup>. Afterwards when he lived among the Romans, he resigned himself to his fate, and became reconciled to them. It was this feeling which led the Greeks to their own ruin. On every occasion they gave vent to it, and such occasions occurred frequently. The Romans, on the other hand, acted with the greatest cruelty, treating all the Greeks as their enemies. A number of maritime towns were taken, and destroyed or burned to ashes, and the inhabitants were carried away as slaves. The consul A. Hostilius Mancinus, and in particular the praetor C. Lucretius, were distinguished for their cruelty. Perseus tried on every occasion to negotiate; in the third year of the war he was particularly fortunate, and had even time enough to undertake an expedition against the neighbouring Dardanians<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> Polybius, xxviii. 10.

<sup>24</sup> Livy, xliii. 5.



## LECTURE XXI.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR AGAINST PERSEUS. — L. AEMI-  
LIUS PAULLUS. — BATTLE OF PYDNA. — CONDUCT OF  
THE ROMANS AFTER THEIR VICTORY. — ARRANGEMENTS  
IN MACEDONIA AND GREECE. — THE PERIOD BETWEEN  
THE CONQUEST OF MACEDONIA AND THE THIRD PUNIC  
WAR.

IN the third year of the war, Perseus evacuated Thes-  
saly and withdrew to Pieria, a tract of coast extending from  
mount Olympus to the gulf of Thermae, where his army  
took up its winter-quarters. Tempe alone was occupied  
by one of his generals. The Roman consul, Q. Marcius  
Philippus, made a bold attempt, for, being stationed at  
the entrance of Tempe, at the foot of mount Olympus,  
and not being able to force the entrance, he endeavoured  
to evade it, and marched with his whole army across  
Olympus<sup>1</sup>. The Macedonians who did not expect such  
boldness, thought themselves quite safe. It was, however,  
not without incredible difficulties that the Romans arrived  
at the northern foot of Olympus, and here they found  
themselves in a position where they might have been cut  
to pieces. The whole undertaking deserves censure, for  
if Perseus had had his wits about him the Roman army  
might have been completely destroyed. But he left Dium,  
after having set fire to a portion of it, and retreated to  
Pydna. The Roman general, after having advanced as  
far as the river Ascordus, finding his situation perilous,  
returned to Dium and thence to Phila. The Macedoni-  
ans, emboldened by this apparent flight, advanced again.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, XLIV. 6 foll.

The whole advantage which the Romans derived from this undertaking was, that Tempe was evacuated by the Macedonians. Some decisive step, however, had now become necessary. The Romans made slow progress, like the progress of a besieging army; but the Greeks were undecided in the highest degree, the one relying upon the other, and hoping that a coalition would be formed against the Romans, and so forth. The Rhodians thought that the time had now come for shewing that they were independent: they were highly exasperated against the Romans, and hoped to see them defeated, in order to be able to maintain their own authority in Lycia and Caria. The relation subsisting between Prusias and Antiochus had lately gained more strength, and Antiochus had not directed his arms against Europe, but against Egypt. Eumenes began to feel more secure: he altered his whole policy, and thought it more advisable to support the interests of Perseus than those of the Romans. Secret negotiations were commenced, which however could not remain concealed long in such a demoralized age. The Romans never forgave Eumenes this apostacy. The Bastarnæ, with whom Perseus had long been carrying on negotiations, were now in movement<sup>2</sup>, and Genthius, king of the northern part of Illyricum, with the capital of Scutari (Scorda), was allied with Perseus. On this occasion, the Macedonian king shewed his contemptible character, for, after having promised Genthius 300 talents, he sent him only ten, and kept back the rest, declaring that he would send them soon after; but the fact was, he wished to deceive Genthius, for he could not prevail upon himself to part with his money. Genthius, not suspecting Perseus to be capable of such meanness, threw the Roman ambassadors into prison, so that now he had no longer any choice between Rome and Macedonia<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> It is quite unpardonable that Perseus did not send the Bastarnæ into Italy, according to the grand scheme of his father.—N.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, xxix. 2; Livy, xliv. 27.



In the year 584, L. Aemilius Paullus was made consul for the second time. He was convinced of the necessity of bringing the Macedonian war to a close, and was provided with the means of attaining his object. The Rhodians had unfortunately attempted to mediate between the Romans and Macedonians, but in a manner which had offended the former. The Rhodians felt that at home they were powerful and respected by their neighbours, so that whenever opinions were divided on any subject, it was in their power to give the casting vote, as had been the case in the war against Antiochus. Such circumstances are always very deceptive, and in this instance they made the Rhodians forget the enormous disproportion between their own power and that of the Romans<sup>4</sup>. The language which they used towards the Romans was not what it should have been: their wish was to save Macedonia from destruction.

Perseus opened the last campaign without any additional forces, except those of Genthius, who continued his hostilities against the Romans. The king had pitched his camp in the neighbourhood of Pydna, and his lines extended from mount Olympus, which is here 6000 feet high, to the sea. Aemilius Paullus marched into Pieria, and made an attack upon the Macedonian lines, but with little success. He too succeeded in marching across the mountain; and although the Macedonians were not taken by surprise, yet their advanced corps was defeated by a Roman army under the command of young Scipio Nasica<sup>5</sup>. The Romans advanced in such a manner that the king was obliged to retreat. But soon the decisive battle commenced, in which the Macedonian kingdom found its inglorious end. In the space of a single hour, the whole army was defeated: the infantry was cut to pieces, and the cavalry escaped in a disgraceful manner, without any considerable loss. The king had now no confidence in any one, or any thing. He could not make up his mind to hold out against a siege either at Pella or at Amphi-

<sup>4</sup> Polybius, XXIX. 4; Livy, XLIV. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, XLIV. 36.

polis: his avarice went so far that, even now, he thought of nothing but of saving his treasures, as if it had been possible to find any place where they could be safe. All the towns opened their gates, and Perseus fled. If he had wished to save his life as a free man, he might have gone to his allies in Thrace, and from thence to some of the Greek towns on the coast of the Euxine, which could have no motive for delivering him up to the Romans. But he acted like a blind man, and went to Samothrace, to seek an asylum in its inviolable sanctuary<sup>6</sup>. This was foolish, but his chief motive was to save the beloved money, which he had taken with him. He was surrounded by traitors, and after he had put to death one of them, the others deserted<sup>7</sup>. His eyes were now opened, and seeing that his fate might be like that of Pausanias, he surrendered into the hands of the Romans. Genthius saw his kingdom destroyed in a very short time, and he himself was taken prisoner.

L. Aemilius Paullus made a cruel use of his victory, if we may judge from our own feelings of humanity: one hundred and ten years after the war with Pyrrhus the Romans took vengeance on Epirus. Its inhabitants were divided, and some had declared in favour of Macedonia: there was no national feeling among them. The Romans took up their quarters among the Molossians, and here scenes took place like those in Scotland in the massacre of Glencoe, though not with so much cunning: but in both cases a massacre took place in the midst of a population which believed itself to be in perfect safety<sup>8</sup>. The inhabitants were first commanded, under penalty of death, to deliver up all their gold and silver, and immediately after, the soldiers fell upon the devoted people.

<sup>6</sup> There is no doubt, that the worship of Samothrace and that of Lanuvium were of the same kind.—N.

<sup>7</sup> Livy, XLV. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, XLV. 34; Plutarch, Aemil. Paul. 29; Appian, De Rebus Illyr. 9; Polybius ap. Strabon. VII. p. 322.

150,000 men are said to have been sold as slaves, or put to death. After such a cruelty, which was perpetrated at the command of L. Aemilius Paullus, he cannot possibly be reckoned among the number of great and virtuous Romans. This mode of acting would have been cruel enough even in the course of a war; and I cannot see the reason why many persons call Aemilius Paullus a mild and humane man. It was in a similar manner that he acted in Boeotia, and throughout Greece those places in which a party favoured the cause of the Romans received Roman soldiers to crush their opponents. In Aetolia they broke into the senate-house, and the senators were put to death instantaneously, at the request of the leading men of the Roman party<sup>9</sup>. It was by the same kind of policy that ten commissioners were sent to settle the affairs of Macedonia, and others to Achaia, who compelled the Achaeans to pass a decree, that all those who had been supporters of Perseus should be put to death. The Achaeans gave a very appropriate answer, requesting the Romans to name the offenders, that they might be tried. But the Roman commissioners refused to condescend to this, and insisted upon a decree being passed pronouncing death on the Macedonian party in general, before they would bring forward a list of them. When the Romans were pressed further, they declared all those who had been strategi to be guilty. One man, Xenon, who had been strategus himself, now rose, and declared that he was so convinced of his own innocence, that he would willingly submit his case not only to a court of his own countrymen, but to the Romans themselves. This offer came opportunely for the Romans, and they immediately made out a list of no less than one thousand persons, who were to quit their country and go to Italy. On their arrival at Rome, however, they were not placed before a court of justice, but were distributed as hostages in the towns of

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, xxx. 14; Livy, xlv. 28 and 31.

Etruria. Seventeen years after this event, not more than 300 of them were surviving: some of them, who had attempted to escape, had been convicted and put to death<sup>10</sup>. One among these Achaean hostages was Polybius, the historian: his condition, however, was soon improved, as he became acquainted with the great Roman families, and Aemilius Paullus selected him to give his sons a Greek education. From this time forward it is difficult to say what belongs to Roman and what to universal history.

Macedonia was declared free, no Roman proconsul was sent out to undertake its administration, and the tribute was reduced to half the amount which had been paid to the kings<sup>11</sup>; but the country was cunningly divided into four republics, and in such a way that tribes naturally connected together were severed from one another, and were annexed to a different republic with which they had no natural connexion. The object of this measure was to destroy all national feeling in each of the four states<sup>12</sup>.

From this time we must date the great wealth of the Romans, but the condition of the people grew worse and worse: the cancer of poverty spread further every year, while one class of the population accumulated enormous riches. The moral corruption was general at Rome, and, even before the war against Perseus, Roman history has recorded some monstrous crimes. At the beginning of the seventh century, two of the most distinguished Roman ladies, the wives of consuls, were accused of having poisoned their husbands, and were put to death by the decree of their own cousins<sup>13</sup>. The republic grew richer in the same proportion as the inner or moral condition of the people became worse. During the war against Perseus, contributions had still been raised; but this afterwards ceased, though I have no doubt that contributions were

<sup>10</sup> Pausanias, vii. 10. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Plutarch, Aemil. 28.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xlv. 29 foll. 32.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, Epitome 48.

again resorted to during the Social war, a circumstance which has hitherto been overlooked. Plutarch<sup>14</sup> and most modern writers speak as if the spoils of Macedonia had been so ample, as to render contributions for war unnecessary. But those spoils were deposited in the public treasury, and it was the continual revenues derived from Macedonia and Illyricum which rendered contributions superfluous.

After the destruction of the kingdom of Macedonia, the Romans, who wished to overthrow the power of the Rhodians also, were on the point of declaring war against them. When the Rhodians saw that there was no possibility of escaping, they descended to the lowest humiliation. Some of those who had rendered themselves guilty by keeping up a correspondence with Perseus put an end to their own lives, so that only corpses were delivered up to the Romans; others fled from their homes, but finding no asylum anywhere, they likewise found themselves, in the end, compelled to bring their wretched existence to an end. At length, however, the Rhodians were pardoned, but had to submit to the hardest conditions: they lost Caria and Lycia, with the exception of Peraea, Caunus, and Stratonicea, so that they did not even retain their most ancient possessions on the opposite coasts. They acknowledged the supremacy of Rome<sup>15</sup>.

The war against Perseus was followed by a period so barren of important events that Polybius, when he made a second edition of his history, after the destruction of Corinth<sup>16</sup>, wrote the intermediate period, from the Macedonian war to the taking of Corinth, merely as an introductory sketch to the subsequent history, which formed a

<sup>14</sup> Aemil. Paul. 38. Compare Cicero, *De Off.* II. 22; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* XXIII. 17.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, XLV. 10 and 25.

<sup>16</sup> The first edition of his history ended with the destruction of the kingdom of Macedonia and its immediate consequences, the reconciliation of the Rhodians with Rome, and the carrying away of the Achaean hostages.—N.




work quite distinct from his earlier history, and was connected with it only by the slight sketch of that intermediate period. I shall follow his example, and relate only that which is most necessary to fill up the gap. One of the points which must not be overlooked is that at the close of the sixth century the Romans began to attack the Gauls in the Alps<sup>17</sup>. Soon after the war against Perseus they protected the Massilian colony of Antipolis near Nicaea, and other towns, against the Ligurians<sup>18</sup>. The whole country round Genoa was already subdued by the Romans, whose object was gradually and as occasion offered to make themselves masters of the whole coast as far as Spain. In the east they subdued the Dalmatians, and gained possession of the country extending from Zara to Ragusa. They also endeavoured to subdue Corsica completely. In Spain the war still continued and was conducted with the greatest energy against the Celtiberians. If the other Spanish nations had co-operated with the Celtiberians, they might have been able to repel the Romans and confine them to the coast, as they could not have sent very numerous armies to Spain; but this was not done, for the Spaniards did not feel the necessity of a national union, and the Lusitanians were quite satisfied, provided they themselves were left in peace. The Celtiberians were likewise desirous of peace, and the Romans succeeded in gradually gaining tracts of country from them, especially the district of Cuenca in the south, and parts of Lusitania and Estremadura. In the west they advanced towards the Vaccaeans and Salamanca. The Lusitanians were an ingenious and able people, but they had not yet got a general such as shortly afterwards arose among them. All these tribes, as well as the Celtiberians, would willingly have recognised the supremacy of Rome, and have strengthened her military power, had the Romans only been inclined to make peace on tolerable conditions:

<sup>17</sup> Livy, *Epitom.* 46 and 47.

<sup>18</sup> Polybius, xxxiii. 4.



but this was not their object; they wanted to reduce Spain to perfect submission and rule over it. What they promised they did not perform, and hostilities always began afresh on the arrival of a new general, so that no one could place any further confidence in the Romans. In this manner the time was approaching, when a new and grand historical drama was to commence.



## LECTURE XXII.

CARTHAGE DURING THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THIRD WAR WITH ROME. — MASINISSA BECOMES THE OCCASION OF THE THIRD PUNIC WAR. — CONDUCT OF THE ROMANS. — BEGINNING OF THE WAR. — P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO.

THE outbreak of the third Punic war had long been prepared by the relations existing between Carthage and Masinissa. The peace with Rome lasted for fifty years, during which the Carthaginians did not give the Romans a single reason for complaint. We must suppose that this interval was a time of prosperity for Carthage, for after it we find the town very rich and populous; and it is not difficult to conceive that the obstacles which prevented the maritime nations of the east from entering upon great commercial enterprises, were of great advantage to the Carthaginians. During the wars between Egypt and Syria, for instance, the Carthaginians, who were neutral, were allowed to sail and trade where they pleased. But still, so long as that state of things lasted, in which they were kept in a sort of minority, their national character and their constitution seem to have fallen into decay. The government was weak, and the democratical element gained the ascendancy—I believe that Carthage became a wild democracy, and was in a state of total dissolution. What we positively know is but little, and we can only here and there catch a glimpse of the real state of things among the Carthaginians. The great object of their complaints was ever and anon Masinissa. It is not improbable that he may have received secret instructions from the Romans, for he seems to have been convinced that, how-

ever glaring his acts of injustice might be, the Romans would not declare against him. The Carthaginians endured everything with extraordinary forbearance, in order not to give Rome any occasion for making war upon them, for they clearly saw that their bright and happy days were gone, and they resigned themselves to their melancholy fate. And this is the only reasonable course that can be adopted under such circumstances; though a nation must not cease to be aware of the heavy sacrifice it is making, or forget the fact that it is unhappy, for as soon as this feeling is gone, demoralisation, baseness, and cowardice, step into its place; and I am rather inclined to believe that, at least to a certain extent, this was the case with the Carthaginians.

Very soon after the death of Philip of Macedonia, the Carthaginians complained bitterly of Masinissa, who had snatched from them one district after another. The Romans, for appearance sake, sent over some persons to act as mediators between Carthage and Masinissa. But these commissioners did not bring anything to a decision: they allowed things to go on as they might, without pronouncing a sentence either one way or the other<sup>1</sup>. At last, a war broke out between the Carthaginians and Masinissa. The exact time at which this took place is one of those points which cannot be accurately determined; but I am not inclined to place the event as near the outbreak of the third Punic war as is commonly done. The territory of Carthage embraced the modern Tunis and the western part of Tripoly, the interior of which had been in the possession of Masinissa even before this time. He was now very powerful, and much stronger than Carthage. Had the Carthaginians taken up arms at a proper time, they would perhaps have been able to keep him at a distance: but this was neglected. Their armies still consisted of mercenaries; and they had the misfortune

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Pun.* 68; Livy, XLII. 23. foll.; compare Zonaras, IX. 15.

of having an unskilful general, who lost the decisive battle against Masinissa, and, after being surrounded by the enemy, concluded a most disgraceful peace. The Carthaginian army surrendered their arms, a part of their territory was given up, and Carthage had to pay 5000 talents by instalments of one hundred every year. Carthage was so wealthy that this was not a very exorbitant demand upon her, but the best part of her territory was lost. The Romans had, as usual, sent commissioners, who, with a truly diabolic spirit, deferred giving any decision, but instigated Masinissa. They sent their reports to Rome, informing the senate of the great resources which Carthage still possessed; for the Carthaginians seem to have made great preparations for several years before the war with Masinissa broke out. They had, it is true, no ships of war, but they were abundantly supplied with materials for building a fleet; their arsenals were filled with arms: they were, in fact, fully prepared, and that with the greatest justice, since they were under no restrictions in this respect by their treaty with Rome. It was at this time that old Cato perpetually repeated his advice to destroy Carthage—a blindness hardly conceivable in so wise a man. Scipio Nasica was much wiser, who declared that the existence of such a rival state was the only means of saving Rome.

After this victory of Masinissa, things came to a crisis. The Romans, imagining that it was an easy affair, determined upon the destruction of Carthage. The Carthaginians were taken to account for their conduct towards the Numidian king; desponding and broken-hearted, they sent ambassadors to Rome. The answer which was there given them was obscure: they were requested to make reparation to Rome, but, at the same time, they were assured that nothing should be undertaken against Carthage<sup>2</sup>. But, in 603, the consuls M'. Manilius and L. Marcius Censorinus led an army consisting, it is said,

<sup>2</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Pun.* 74. foll.; comp. Polybius, xxxvi. 1. foll.

of 80,000 foot and 4000 horse, among whom there were perhaps many other troops besides those of the Italian allies, to Sicily, where the troops were organized, and other Carthaginian ambassadors were waited for. Utica, without having any grounds for complaining, but despairing of the fate of Carthage, had thrown itself into the arms of the Romans, and had been received by them, contrary to the treaty with Carthage. When the Carthaginian ambassadors appeared, the consuls declared that the senate did not wish to encroach upon the freedom of the Carthaginian people; but, as they were divided into so many parties, they desired to have some security; and for this purpose they demanded that, within thirty days, 300 children of the noblest Carthaginian families should be delivered up into their hands as hostages. These children were sent over to Sicily by their parents, in heart-rending despair<sup>3</sup>. After the Romans had, in this manner, secured the submission of Carthage, their army crossed over to Africa, and landed, partly at Utica, and partly at the place where Scipio had been encamped. The Roman consuls now informed the Carthaginians, that they were ready to treat with them on anything that had not been settled previously. When the Carthaginian ambassadors appeared before the consuls, they were told that the Romans had information about all their proceedings, and knew their plans: that the Carthaginians must deliver up all their arms and artillery; for, they said, as Rome was able to protect them, there was no reason for Carthage to possess arms, and all the preparations that had been made could have no other object than to make war against Rome. Hard as this command was, still it was obeyed, and the Carthaginians now believed that they had satisfied the Romans in every respect. But when they had their last audience, they were led through the lines of the Roman army, and were told that the government of Carthage had indeed shewn its good-will, but that it had no con-

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, xxxvi. 2.; Appian, l. c. 76.

trol over the city so long as it was fortified; the preservation of peace, therefore, required that the people should quit the city, give up their navy, and build a new town, without walls, at a distance of ten miles from the sea-coast. This announcement produced the highest degree of despair among the ambassadors: they foresaw that, on their return to Carthage, they would be exposed to the fury of an enraged people; and some of them, who had not the courage to return, remained with the Romans. The indignation and fury which this news excited in the city of Carthage was so great that all the gates were instantly shut, and all the Romans and Italians, who happened to be there, were seized and tortured to death<sup>4</sup>. This the consuls had not expected. They were, according to the Roman standard, men of learning and good education; but, distinguished as Manilius was as a jurist, he was incapable of commanding an army:—this whole transaction with Carthage was a cursed and diabolical undertaking.

The consuls imagined that Carthage might be taken by storm in an instant. The city, situated on a peninsula, was protected on one side by a treble wall: but, on the side towards the bay of Tunis, it had only one low wall. The Romans, who expected to find a defenceless population, attempted to storm both walls. But despair had suggested to the Carthaginians means of defence on both sides, and they repelled the assault. Everybody was engaged, day and night, in the manufacture of arms, with enormous and unexampled exertions. Hasdrubal, who lived in exile on account of his conduct, continued the war against Masinissa, independent of Carthage, with an army of 20,000 exiles, and ravaged the open country. The sentence of his banishment was now repealed, and he was made general of the Carthaginian forces out of the city.

The end of this war was not decided until the fourth year after its commencement. The history of it is so

<sup>4</sup> Polybius, xxxvi. 5. ; Appian, l. c. 92.



distressing, that it is painful to me to think of, and much more to relate. There can be nothing more heart-rending than this last struggle of despair, which was necessary, and yet could not end otherwise than in the destruction of Carthage. I will not, therefore, enter into the detail. At first, the Carthaginians rejoiced to see the Romans, with their great forces, fail in their attempts. We do not know who had the command in the city: outside of it there were two generals, Hasdrubal and Himilco Phamaeas. The manner in which the latter carried on the war, and relieved his native city by various diversions, bears great resemblance to that of Francesco Ferrucci, against the emperor Charles V., who accomplished a thousand brilliant feats, until he fell into the hands of the enemy, and was murdered. But Himilco Phamaeas, who at first displayed great military talents, shewed in the end how great the moral corruption of his country was, and that he lived in an age in which all sense of honour had become extinct. For, after having accomplished things which were really brilliant, he entered at last into negotiations with Scipio: declaring that the fate of Carthage was decided; that everyone's duty was to take care of himself; that, for this reason, he would conclude a treaty for himself; and that he would assist anyone who would not identify his own fate with that of Carthage<sup>5</sup>. Some thousands, with their officers, followed his example, and went over to the Romans. This was a great misfortune for Carthage. The Roman senate did not blush to honour this traitor with magnificent robes, extensive estates, money, and other things. Hasdrubal twice defeated the Romans, who had raised the siege and retreated into the country. An attempt of their's on Hippo likewise failed. It now appeared as if a great diversion was going to take place.

Masinissa does not deserve the praise of the Romans, who call him *socius fidelissimus*: he was in reality a pro-

<sup>5</sup> Appian, l. c. 108.

fligate and unprincipled oriental sultan. He began to think that it would be better for him if Carthage were saved than if it were destroyed, for he was very cunning, and foresaw that, if Carthage existed no more, he could extort nothing from the Roman province. This, however, was not all: he also knew that the Romans, according to their maxim, *bella ex bellis serere*, would one day attack his kingdom also; and he was conscious that his friendship towards the Romans was not so enthusiastic as to give him a claim on the permanence of their favour and indulgence. He therefore began to negotiate<sup>6</sup>. Those who are acquainted with the history of the East, will remember many parallels to this conduct<sup>7</sup>. The Romans consequently found that he was anything but inclined to support their undertaking<sup>8</sup>. Had the Carthaginians submitted to Masinissa, he would unquestionably have come forward as their protector; and it is not impossible that the Roman dominion in Africa would then have been broken. It was folly in the Carthaginians not to do so; but the state of the open country may have prevented them. Just at this time a rebellion had broken out in Macedonia under a Pseudo-Philip, and shortly after Achaia also rose against the Romans. This state of general discontent must have suggested to the Carthaginians the hope that Nemesis would intervene, and make Rome herself the victim of her ambition.

Thus the time passed away, until in 605, P. Cornelius Scipio was made consul. Public opinion distinguished him above all his contemporaries. We generally call him Aemilianus, a name which he assuredly never bore in his

<sup>6</sup> Appian, l. c. 94.

<sup>7</sup> The pasha, who had at first instigated the sultan against Ali Pasha of Janina, afterwards found that it was more to his own interest that Ali should not be overthrown, but merely weakened.—N.

<sup>8</sup> The Introduction to the *Somnium Scipionis* cannot be looked upon as historical; Cicero is also greatly mistaken in supposing that Scipio had not gone to Africa as tribune until then.—N.

lifetime. Analogy and the *usus loquendi* frequently differ very widely, and such is the case here, for according to analogy he ought to have been called Aemilianus. Cicero always calls him *hic Paulli filius*, and the name Aemilianus is an invention of later times: I am so strongly convinced of this, that I would unhesitatingly declare any passage to be spurious if the name occurred in it. Scipio is one of those characters who have a great reputation in history, which however, in my opinion, is not altogether well deserved. He was, it is true, a very eminent general and a great man, he did many a just and praiseworthy thing; but he made a show of his great qualities, and Polybius, his friend and instructor in military affairs, who in other respects loves him very much, shews in his narrative quite clearly, that the virtues of Scipio were ostentatious<sup>9</sup>. Things which every other good and honest man does quietly, Scipio boasts of, because they are not common among his own countrymen. What distinguishes him is an unflinching political character: he belonged to those who wished, by all means, to maintain the state of things such as it actually was. Everything which existed had in his eyes an indisputable right to exist, and he never asked whether it was right or wrong in its origin, or how detrimental its injustice was to the republic itself. Even where he saw the deplorable condition of the state, and knew the evil consequences that would result from it, he nevertheless persisted in upholding the actual state of things. I know many good men of a similar disposition, who oppose reforms where they ought to be made. The elder, or great Scipio, was free and great in all his movements, but the younger did not possess those qualities: in many things he was cunning and obstinate, but we must at the same time acknowledge, that he was a very distinguished general at a time when Rome was not rich in military geniuses.

<sup>9</sup> See Fragment. Peiresc. 89.

## LECTURE XXIII.

TOPOGRAPHY OR CARTHAGE. — ITS SIEGE AND DESTRUCTION. — PSEUDO-PHILIP OF MACEDONIA, HIS WAR WITH ROME AND HIS DEFEAT. — ACHAIA, ITS CONSTITUTION AND THE EVILS RESULTING FROM IT. — UNREASONABLE DEMAND OF THE ROMANS. — INSULTS OFFERED TO THE ROMAN AMBASSADORS.

CICERO has bestowed his special favour on this second Scipio. We sometimes feel a particular interest in a person if, in placing ourselves in his circumstances, we discover that we are one with him: and the position of Scipio is indeed somewhat similar to that of Cicero. Although the *leges annales*<sup>1</sup> were otherwise strictly observed, and although Scipio had not yet attained the age required for the consulship, still he was made consul by the unanimous desire of the people, and without him the war would have been protracted a long time.

Carthage, as I have already remarked, was situated on a peninsula, but did not occupy the whole of it, as has been erroneously inferred from the statement<sup>2</sup> that it was 23,000 paces in circumference<sup>3</sup>. The town was completely

<sup>1</sup> Those which existed in the time of Cicero had been framed by Sulla; but whether those of the time of Scipio were the same I cannot say; but the *lex Villia* (Livy, XL. 44) was unquestionably in force.—N.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. 51. Compare Strabo, XVII. p. 832.

<sup>3</sup> This opinion has been refuted by the researches made on the spot by Colonel Hömberg (I cannot answer for the correctness of the name, it being written differently in the different MSS. and nothing ever having been published upon the matter, as far as I am aware.—ED.), a sincere, open, single-minded, and straightforward

destroyed by the Romans: buildings are not found at present, but foundations of buildings are still visible. The ancient city of Carthage lay between the treble wall running across the isthmus, and a line dividing the peninsula into a western and an eastern part. Bozra, the citadel, was somewhere about the centre of the place occupied by the city. Whether a portion of the space assigned to the city was distinct from the rest and bore a distinct name is not known, but seems to me probable enough. The north-eastern part of the peninsula was called by the name of Megara, and in this district it was difficult for ships to land. The whole peninsula seems to have been surrounded by a breast-work. The harbour of Cothon was in the south-west<sup>4</sup>. When C. Gracchus, and after him Julius Caesar, endeavoured to restore the city, they heeded the curse that lay on the ancient site, and built the Roman Carthage by the side of the ancient city<sup>5</sup>. In Megara Punic tombs have been discovered, which cannot, of course, surprise us, for it was outside the city. Roman antiquities have likewise been found there.

About the time when Scipio was made consul, L. Mancinus discovered a spot on the northern side of Megara,

ward soldier. But his drawings fell into the hands of a real adventurer, Camillo Borgia, a nephew of Cardinal Borgia, who had great talent for drawing. He abused the confidence which Colonel Hömberg had placed in him, by copying his drawings and giving them out as his own. What I here say is known to many, but in Germany no one is aware of it.—N.—The work of Camillo Borgia, as far as I know, has never been published; but the learned Dane, Estrup, saw the MS. at Naples after the death of C. Borgia, and made some use of it for his work "*Lineae Topographicae Carthaginis Tyriae*," Hafniae, 1821.

<sup>4</sup> See Livy and Strabo, ll. cc.; Appian, *De Rebus Pun.* 95 foll.; Polybius, i. 29; Orosius, iv. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, l. c. 136; Plutarch, C. Gracchus, 11; Jul. Caesar, 57; Livy, *Epitome lib.* 60; Dion Cassius, *XLIII.* 50, *LII.* 43; Pausanias, *ii.* 1. 2.

where an army might land and establish itself<sup>6</sup>. Megara must have been a kind of suburb full of gardens, and of great importance to Carthage. After this was taken, Scipio began to besiege the city itself with all his energy : it was useless to attack Carthage on the land side where it was protected by the treble wall, and he therefore directed his attacks against the southern side. The entrance of the harbour Cothon was a very narrow passage, and within the harbour there were several smaller basins which, though built for different purposes, may be compared to the docks of London. One of them was destined for the reception of merchant-vessels, and another for ships of war. The Carthaginians soon began to suffer from scarcity of provisions, and a famine would unquestionably have compelled them to submit ; but Bithyas, with the greatest resolution and indefatigable exertions, succeeded in carrying into the city a convoy of provisions, through the midst of the awkward ships of the Romans<sup>7</sup>. In order to prevent the repetition of such boldness, Scipio had recourse to stopping up the mouth of the harbour, in which he succeeded so completely that the whole bay is now a swamp, though this is partly the result of the mud and sand which are driven thither by the current from the Syrtes. Its extent can now be recognised only from the nature of the ground, as in Italy the port of Trajan is recognised in the place called Porto<sup>8</sup>. When the Carthaginians perceived that they would soon be shut up, they immediately set about digging a new passage out of the harbour, through the narrow neck of land by which the harbour was separated from the sea. They also secretly built a fleet of 50 triremes, and when all was ready the new passage was opened on a sudden, and the Carthaginian fleet sailed out into the sea. The Romans were so perplexed and confused at this sight,

<sup>6</sup> (Appian, l. c. 113.) The most satisfactory account of this war is to be found in Appian, who had here nothing to do but to abridge the narrative of Polybius.—N.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, l. c. 120.

<sup>8</sup> Pliny, *Epistol.* vi. 31 ; Rutilius, 237, &c.



that if the Carthaginians had attacked them at this moment, they might have destroyed the Roman fleet entirely. But here we see the same thing that we so often meet with in the history of man—their resolution failed; and while the Romans were preparing themselves to meet a serious attack, the Carthaginians lost their opportunity irreparably. The Romans, who had renounced the sea, had only Greek vessels, and when on the third day after the Carthaginians again sailed out, the Roman fleet turned round and a battle ensued, which lasted till towards the evening. The Carthaginians then ceased and withdrew towards the harbour, with the intention of renewing the contest the next morning. But, on their return, a great confusion arose within the narrow channel, as the ships were hurrying into the port, and many of their vessels were thrown by the Romans against the quay, and the fruit of their enormous exertions was destroyed. It is sad to see how every thing was lost through the unhappy chance of a single moment. Scipio now took possession of that part of the harbour which was destined for merchant-ships, whereupon the Carthaginians set fire to their arsenal.

At length the Romans were within the walls of the city, and Bozra, the citadel, which was not protected by walls, now became the object of the contest. The treble wall on the isthmus, however, was not yet in the hands of the Romans. The struggle which now commenced is similar to that of Saragossa in Spain in 1808. The three main streets, leading from the market place to the centre of the citadel, were lined with rows of houses, of from six to eight stories in height, all of which, as we may imagine, were of solid structure<sup>9</sup>. The houses were conquered one by one, by breaking through the walls from room to room

<sup>9</sup> As regards architectural beauty, we must consider Carthage as a town like those of Greece or like Rome; but Carthage was built on a more grand and magnificent scale, in confirmation of which we need only remember that the streets were constructed according to

and from house to house, for the means of blowing up the houses, which were used at Saragossa, were then unknown. The struggle was at the same time carried on upon the flat roofs of the houses. A complete famine raged in the city, and the living fed upon the bodies of the slain. During this unspeakable misery the Romans gradually advanced up to the highest point, which is called by our historians the temple of Aesculapius<sup>10</sup>. Only those who begged the favour as suppliants were allowed to surrender as slaves, and in this manner 50,000 were sent away into slavery. Hasdrubal, who had before mutilated the Roman prisoners in the most cruel manner, retreated into the temple of Aesculapius, where he was joined by some Roman deserters who set fire to the building. But his courage failed him, and he begged of Scipio to save his life, which was readily granted, that he might adorn the triumph of the Roman general. But his wife, standing on the pinnacles of the temple, gave vent to her indignation at this cowardly act of her husband, and threw herself with her children into the flames. Thus perished Carthage, after it had existed for nearly seven hundred years. The life of the unworthy Hasdrubal was spared by those Romans whose ancestors had put to death the great C. Pontius. The destruction of Carthage was complete; a part of its territory was given to the king of Numidia—Masinissa was dead,—and the rest was constituted as a Roman province, governed by a proconsul or praetor.

At this time a war, which had in the meanwhile broken out in Macedonia, was already brought to its close, and Achaia was near its end. As regards the Macedonian war, it is almost impossible to conceive how the nation could allow itself to be imposed upon in the manner we are told of.

artistic rules, which were unknown to the Greeks. The first construction of regular streets is ascribed to the Carthaginians, and, I believe, with justice.—N.—See Isidorus, xv. 16. § 6.

<sup>10</sup> Appian, l. c. 130; Strabo, xvii. p. 832.

The Pseudo-Demetrius in Russia was, according to some historians, not an impostor by any means; and the reason why he was not recognised was only the fact that he had become a Roman Catholic while in Poland. Sebastian of Portugal, although there is not that amount of evidence in his favour which there is for Demetrius, was probably an unfortunate prince. But the Pseudo-Philip of Macedonia was a real impostor, probably a Thracian gladiator, whose name was Andriscus, and to whom it occurred, no one knows how, to give himself out as the son of Perseus. Such impositions are not uncommon in Asia, but during the middle ages some instances occur in Europe also. The Pseudo-Philip first appeared at the court of the king of Syria, but was delivered up to the Romans.<sup>11</sup> At Rome he was so much despised, and so carelessly watched, that he found an opportunity to escape. It was well known that Philip, the son of Perseus, whose name Andriscus assumed at first, had died in captivity at Alba, in the country of the Marsians,<sup>12</sup> or rather had been killed by having been perpetually disturbed in his sleep;<sup>13</sup> and yet when Andriscus appeared in Thrace, whither he had fled from Rome, numbers of people gathered round him, by whose assistance he was enabled to enter Macedonia, where he immediately issued a proclamation declaring himself the son of Perseus. The Romans had no army in those parts, so that the impostor had only to conquer the Macedonians, whom he defeated on the eastern bank of the Strymon. To the great amazement of all, he crossed this river, and gained a second victory over the Macedonians, after which they all submitted to him. The noblest Macedonians had been transplanted to Italy by the Romans; and as the rest of the population were very credulous, Andriscus made the

<sup>11</sup> Livy, *Epitome*, lib. 49.

<sup>12</sup> Polybius, *Excerpt.* Vat. lib. xxxiv.—xxxvii. p. 79, ed. Lucht.

<sup>13</sup> All the children of Perseus died in misery, and had hardly their daily bread. His last son earned his living by being employed as a scribe.—N. (Plutarch, *Aemil. Paullus*, 33, 37.)

most astonishing progress. He invaded Thessaly, which would have been inevitably lost, had not the Achaean troops come to its assistance. His government was entirely tyrannical.<sup>14</sup> Polybius in one of his fragments calls him ἀνὴρ στυγνός.<sup>15</sup> But he nevertheless knew how to make people respect him. The Roman praetor P. Juventius was defeated, and Andriscus again entered Thessaly. The affair had now assumed a serious aspect, but Q. Caecilius Metellus, who was now sent as praetor against him, increased his forces with auxiliaries. The position of the usurper was particularly difficult, from the circumstance of Macedonia being in some parts accessible by sea. After several engagements, it was in the neighbourhood of Pydna, where Perseus had been defeated, that a decisive battle was fought. The usurper lost it, and was delivered up to the Romans by the Thracians, to whom he fled after the battle. It must have been on this occasion that Pella was destroyed; Dion Chrysostom<sup>16</sup> speaks of it as having been completely razed to the ground. At present it lies buried under mounds of earth, and the most interesting remains of ancient art might be discovered there, but the hope of seeing them brought to light has vanished.

Had the Achaeans clearly known what they wanted, they would have exerted themselves at the time when Andriscus rose against the Romans; but imprudence led them into follies which could not have any beneficial consequences. The history, or rather the explanation of the decline and fall of Achaia, is foreign to my plan; but I may make a few observations, to give you some notion of the state of things there. Achaia then comprised the whole of Peloponnesus, and formed a confederation of states, which was as irrational as the old German confederacy, in which the pettiest prince had, in reality, as important a vote as a great state. It resembled the American confederacy pre-

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. XXXII. p. 590.

<sup>15</sup> *Excerpt. Vat.* p. 85, ed. Lucht.

<sup>16</sup> *Orat.* XXXIII. p. 12. foll. ed. Reiske.

vious to the constitution of Washington, when Delaware, for instance, with its 70,000 inhabitants, was on an equality with Virginia, which had a population of one million and a half<sup>17</sup>. It was this irrational constitution which ruined the Achæan league. Elis was a great country, and Laconia, even without its maritime towns, was larger than Achaia proper. The latter had only twelve towns, some of which were surely not more important than Sinzig on the Rhine, and each of these towns had the same vote as Sparta.<sup>18</sup> Some modifications, it is true, were made to render this state of things bearable. Other parts of Greece out of Peloponnesus had likewise adopted the constitution of the Achæans, and had joined them. The laws of this constitution interfered with everything: the education of children, as well as the mode of living of the people. The Lacedæmonians, who had abolished the laws of Lycurgus and adopted those of the Achæans, were now desirous of getting rid of them. The Romans insidiously encouraged them, and approved of their proceedings; they expressed their sorrow, but left the people to their internal disputes. The consequence was that Lacedæmon declared itself independent of the confederacy; and when it was attacked by the Achæans, it appealed to the Romans to decide the question. The Romans had not yet made up their minds as to what course to pursue, for they were at the time engaged in the last Punic war; but when in the year 605 they clearly saw that Carthage would fall, they spoke in a different tone to the Achæans, and they now took a step for which they had undoubtedly made up their minds long before; they demanded, on the ground of the disorders arising from the combination of so many heterogeneous elements, that those places, which had not been united with


<sup>17</sup> A similar state of things is found in the history of Holland, where the Dutch, who formed more than one half of the population, and paid 58 per cent. of the taxes, had the same number of votes as Zealand, which paid only 3 per cent.—N.

<sup>18</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 29 foll.

Achaia at the time when (after the war with Philip) the treaty with Rome was concluded, should be separated from the confederacy. These places were Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Heraclea, at the foot of Mount Oeta, and Orchomenos, in Arcadia.<sup>19</sup> This command of the Romans called forth such a degree of exasperation, that the Roman ambassadors at Corinth were attacked in the theatre, insulted, and driven out of the town.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Livy, Epit. lib. 51; Pausanias, VII. 14; Dion Cassius, Fragn. Ursin. 165; Justin, XXXIV. 1; Polybius, XXXVIII. 1 foll.

<sup>20</sup> We often find in Roman authors the expression that Corinth was destroyed *ob pulsatos legatos*. The verb *pulsare* is not correctly explained in our dictionaries, for it does not imply that the ambassadors were actually beaten: *pulsare* means in general to *insult* an ambassador, and to treat him in a manner contrary to the laws of nations.—N.





## LECTURE XXIV.

CONDITION OF THE ACHAEANS. — THEY DECLARE WAR AGAINST ROME.—CRITOLAUS DEFEATED IN LOCRI.—METELLUS. — DIAEUS. — MUMMIUS. — DESTRUCTION OF CORINTH.—WARS IN SPAIN, AGAINST THE CELTIBERIANS.—M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS CONCLUDES PEACE WITH THEM. —WARS AGAINST THE LUSITANIANS, VIRIATHUS, AND NUMANTIA.

THIS demand of the Romans was a glaring injustice. But Roman history during this period is full of atrocities and arbitrary proceedings against foreign nations; there is nothing pleasing in it, and we can only seek for instruction. Just at the time when it loses its moral interest, the whole history of antiquity is swallowed up in it. The Achaeans ought to have submitted to necessity, and it was madness on their part to set themselves against it. Those persons who use the boasting language of patriotism in such circumstances mislead their nation, and are themselves the most outrageous tyrants, but those who preach submission are looked upon with contempt. Such was the case among the Achaeans. I refer you, by way of illustration, to the prophet Jeremiah: it was the false prophets that brought about the destruction of Jerusalem.

The insult which had been offered to the Roman ambassadors did not call forth immediate revenge, but it was kept in reserve, and embassies went to and fro between Rome and Achaia. Callicrates, the traitor, who had been at the head of the Roman party, had completely sold himself to the Romans. After his death the Achaeans were

under the influence of Critolaus and Diaeus, who were literally madmen; if they had given the matter but one thought, they would necessarily have seen that it was impossible to stand against the Romans, even if the Homeric gods themselves could have come to their assistance. The Achaeans had for the last fifty years been under the protection of the Romans, and during that period they had only occasionally carried on petty warfare; but during the greater part of that time they had been inactive: they had no standing army, but only a militia. They had spent their time very ill in indulging in sensual pleasures, and had neglected to prepare themselves for the evil day that was coming. From the new fragments of Polybius we see that a moral depravity, which it is highly distressing to contemplate, had spread very widely among the Achaeans. After several discussions for and against, they had the wantonness to declare war against the Romans. The Boeotians and Chalcidians, who were as thoughtless as the Achaeans, joined them.<sup>1</sup> Critolaus led a small army towards Thessaly, for he probably hoped to find the Pseudo-Philip still able to hold out against the Romans, who would thus have been shut up between two hostile armies; he had imagined that Thessaly and Macedonia would join him immediately on his arrival, but before he reached Thermopylae the fate of Macedonia was decided. In Heraclea, at the foot of Mount Oeta, which in compliance with the command of the Romans had renounced the Achaean confederacy, there was still an Achaean party, which now quitted the town to join the army of Critolaus. As soon as Metellus heard of the invasion of Thessaly, he hastened from Macedonia to meet the Achaeans. Critolaus no sooner heard of his approach, than he abandoned his position, and withdrew into Locris. Here the Achaeans

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, vii. 14; Livy, Epit. lib. 52; Polybius, xl. 1 foll. (Whether the Chalcidians were influenced by their love of freedom, or by the fear of being given over to Macedonia, is uncertain.—N.)

were overtaken by Metellus and dispersed like chaff.<sup>2</sup> Critolaus himself vanished from the field of battle, and it is not improbable that he may have sunk with his horse in the marshes on the sea coast.<sup>3</sup> After the Achaeans were thus completely routed, a detachment of 1000 Arcadians, who had not advanced further than Elatea in Phocis, fell into the hands of the Romans on their retreat, in the neighbourhood of Chaeronea, and were all cut to pieces. The distressing state of Greece at this time is well described in the fragments of Polybius, which also shew how greatly he has been wronged by the reproach of a want of feeling for the woes inflicted on his country, for all he says is the expression of the most unspeakable grief.

The Roman fleet sailed round Peloponnesus, landed near Patrae in Achaia, and ravaged the country in the most barbarous manner, for it was impossible for the Achaeans to defend the coast. The inhabitants of Thebes quitted their city and sought refuge on the heights of Cithaeron and Helicon. Metellus after his victory shewed a humane disposition and a wish to spare the Greeks, for he pitied them; but it was of no avail: he could not act as he wished, partly on account of the conduct of the Greeks themselves, and partly because Providence had decreed their destruction. When he had advanced as far as Megara, Mummius hastened to take the command against the Achaeans. He was not of as gentle a disposition as Metellus, for all that he sought was, laurels for himself, and treasures for Rome. Diaeus, who was now strategus of the Achaeans, had enlisted in his army all the slaves capable of bearing arms, the small number of whom shews the high degree of both the moral and political misery of Greece, a country in which every thing is so easily restored, and in which wealth and abundance flow from ever inexhaustible sources. Diaeus, a man perfectly mad and without conscience, who ought to

<sup>2</sup> Pausanias, VII. 15; Vell. Pat. I. 11; Livy, Epit. lib. 52; Polybius, XL. 3 foll.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias, VII. 15. 3. Compare Livy, Epit. lib. 52.

have put an end to his life now, instead of afterwards,—for, in that case, it would have been easy for the Achaeans to obtain a favourable peace—fancied that he was able to defend the Isthmus: he rejected all proposals of peace, and his faction predominated. The Achaeans were successful in one engagement, but in a second they were so completely defeated, that there was no possibility of facing the enemy again. The whole army in its flight passed by Corinth, and sought shelter in the mountains, and the Corinthians, who saw their own defenceless condition, likewise took to flight. Thus the Romans, on the third day after the battle, took possession of Corinth and began to plunder it<sup>4</sup>. Corinth possessed the most splendid works of art, which were either carried away or destroyed, and the town itself was reduced to a heap of ashes: the honesty of Mummius was that of a barbarian. The Corinthians were sold as slaves, and the other Greeks who had taken no part in this war were nominally restored to freedom; but all national relations were destroyed, so that the *concilia*, and probably the *commercium* and *connubium* between the several places also, were abolished. Thebes was destroyed, and in the time of Pausanias<sup>5</sup> there existed only a village within the walls of the Cadmea. The territory of Corinth was made *ager publicus Romanus*. During this distress of Greece, Polybius fulfilled the bitterest of duties: he went to his country to obtain, by his mediation, tolerable terms for those who survived the fall of their country, and to save many a relic dear to his feelings. He thus obtained the restoration of the honours paid to Philopoemen, whose name the Romans hated<sup>6</sup>. The lot of Polybius was that of a physician who has to make a desperate cure on his own children.

The wars which had been carried on in Spain for many years may be divided into great periods: the first comes

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias, vii. 16.

<sup>5</sup> ix. 7. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, xl. 8 foll.; Excerpt. Vat. p. 89, ed Lucht.

down to the end of the second Punic war; the second extends from that time to the peace of Sempronius Gracchus, the result of which was, that the Romans became masters of Catalonia, Valencia, and Andalusia, and acquired a kind of supremacy over the Celtiberians and some other tribes. In one of the articles of this peace, the Spaniards had pledged themselves not to build any more towns. But, at the close of the sixth century, when the Celtiberians extended the circumference of their town of Segeda, the Romans, referring to that article of the treaty, interfered, and a fresh war broke out, which lasted for nearly four years<sup>7</sup>, and may be called the first Celtiberian war, as it was in reality confined to the Celtiberians, who consisted of four tribes. The Romans, with their much superior forces, made progress, but, on many occasions, they were fairly beaten. The consul M. Claudius Marcellus, the grandson of the Marcellus who had been five times consul during the period of the second Punic war, was a man of ancient Roman virtue and of great humanity, who honoured and respected those people who were struggling for nothing but their freedom. He therefore endeavoured to intercede for them, and procure them a peace on equitable terms. But the Roman senate maintained that it was incompatible with the dignity of the republic to conclude a peace with a nation inferior to the Romans, and that the Celtiberians must submit to their discretion before any thing could be said about peace. Marcellus, therefore, seeing no other way of putting an end to the war, and abhorring the miseries which might be inflicted on the Celtiberians by a cruel successor, managed to gain their confidence. It is remarkable to see the extraordinary power which personal qualities had over the minds of the Spaniards, and how they gave their full confidence to one general, while there were others whom they would not trust on any condition. They followed the advice of Marcellus, who concluded a very reasonable peace

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 44.

and received hostages. The hostages, however, were sent back, and he merely obliged them to provide a number of horsemen to serve in the Roman army. For the present the war was thus concluded.

But, even before this time, another war had been going on in the south of Lusitania<sup>8</sup>. The Lusitanians were a nation of robbers and very different from the Celtiberians, who were a serious, conscientious and just people; and the Lusitanians were therefore just as troublesome to the ancient Spaniards as the Romans. On one occasion when they had insulted the Romans, a war was commenced against them, which the Romans carried on in a very profligate manner, as was their custom during that time. But they were victorious, and the Lusitanians who sought for mercy gave hostages, surrendered their horses, and were willing to submit to any terms that might be dictated. The Romans promised to transplant them and give them settlements in a fertile country. The treaty was concluded by the consul Ser. Sulpicius Galba, the mortal enemy of old Cato, who was the pillar and the light of the aristocracy. He then ordered the Lusitanians to encamp in three divisions at some distance from one another, and after having treacherously induced them to surrender their arms, he ordered all of them to be massacred<sup>9</sup>. It may be that this cruelty did not arise from Galba's savage nature alone, but in part also from the fact that he could not trust the sincerity of the Lusitanians. But however this may have been, honest old Cato brought a capital charge against him for this crime; and Sulpicius Galba would have been condemned to death, had he not implored the mercy of the people by producing his own young children and those of his cousin<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 56 foll.

<sup>9</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Hispan.* 59, 60.

<sup>10</sup> Suetonius, *Galba*, 3; *Valer. Maxim.* ix. 62.; *Cicero, De Orat.* i. 53; *Brutus*, 20; *pro Murena*, 28; *Pseudo-Ascon. in Divinat.* p. 124; *Livy, Epit. lib.* 49



Out of this war arose that against Viriathus. If, as we read in an epitome of Livy<sup>11</sup>, he carried on the war against the Romans for fourteen years, we must suppose that he had acted a prominent part in the Lusitanian war. In the earlier part of his life he had been a robber, and was one of those Lusitanians who had escaped from the massacre of Ser. Sulpicius Galba. He now roused his countrymen to revenge, assembled around himself all his former comrades who were still alive, and began the war against the Romans in the year 605, which he himself conducted for a period of eight years. If I were to relate to you how he wore out the Roman armies, how he was present every where with his light cavalry, dispersed the Romans, and then conquered them one by one, and how many Roman generals he defeated—more than one of them lost his life,—it would be attractive and interesting indeed, but my time does not permit me to do so. Suffice it to say that towards the end of the war in 612, the Romans, desirous to put an end to it, concluded a peace with Viriathus, in which they recognised him as *socius* and *amicus*, as if he had been a king *aequo jure* with themselves. It was contrary to Roman principles to conclude such a peace; but it was not kept, and it was violated the very year after by Q. Servilius Caepio<sup>12</sup>, who got rid of Viriathus by treacherously engaging some Lusitanians to murder their own leader. They went into his tent, and finding him asleep they cut his throat, and returned to the Romans to receive their blood-money<sup>13</sup>. Among the Lusitanians we frequently meet with instances of the most malicious treachery, and we shall form a tolerably correct notion of them, if we compare them with the modern Spaniards, who still shew the same character in many things. But although the modern, as well as the ancient Spaniards—the Celtiberians must always be excepted—are distinguish-

<sup>11</sup> Lib. 54 in fine.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, l. c. 69 and 70.

<sup>13</sup> Appian, l. c. 74.

ed for their love of money, still their treachery is oftener to be ascribed to their fearful party-spirit than to their avarice. The Spaniards seem to act on the principle, that friendship is mortal, and hatred immortal. They never become reconciled to those with whom they have once fallen out; and this feature appears both in ancient and in modern times. Their mode of warfare is likewise the same as it was of old, for they have never fought a battle in the open field, except under the command of an Hamilcar and a Hannibal; and in modern times under a Gonsalvo, a Corduba, or an Alba; but they are excellent in petty warfare, and in the defence of fortified places; in the lines they are good for nothing. There are many other features besides which the modern Spaniards have in common with their ancient forefathers. Perperna could not maintain himself in Spain against Pompey, nor could the successors of Viriathus against Caepio. Unless a general inspire the Spaniards with confidence in his own personal qualities, they have no confidence in themselves. D. Junius Brutus Galliaicus concluded a peace with them, and assigned them a district in Valencia, in the mildest climate, where they completely lost their warlike spirit. Brutus was the first Roman who advanced as far as the frontiers of Galicia, across the river Minho<sup>14</sup>. This expedition was, it is true, merely transitory, but it left a deep impression; the permanent subjugation of those countries did not take place till a later period.

Out of the war against Viriathus arose that against Numantia. This town was the capital of the Arevaci. We are not able to give a satisfactory account of the constitutions and of the condition of the people of Spain; but it is evident that the Celtiberians must have had a republican constitution, and were not governed by kings like the nations in southern Spain. But although the Celtiberians as a nation had a national constitution, still their important cities seem, like the towns of Greece, to have

<sup>14</sup> Florus, II. 17; Livy, Epit. lib. 55.

had an independent political existence of themselves. The Arevaci had two great towns, Termantia or Terrestia, and Numantia. The latter was the stronger of the two, although the number of its soldiers did not amount to more than 8000<sup>15</sup>. It was situated in a very rough district, amidst rocks and mountain torrents, in the neighbourhood of the modern Soria. Whether it was protected by walls, or whether the statement that it was strong enough without them, be a mere rhetorical figure to express its resemblance to Sparta, I cannot decide<sup>16</sup>. The longer this war lasted, the more formidable was it to the Romans. They twice concluded a peace, but broke through it each time, till at length Scipio Africanus was appointed to torture to death the brave people of Numantia.

<sup>15</sup> Appian, l. c. 76.

<sup>16</sup> See Florus, II. 18 ; Strabo, III. p. 162 ; Appian, l. c. 90.

## LECTURE XXV.

WAR AGAINST NUMANTIA, CONTINUED.—ITS DESTRUCTION BY SCIPIO.—SERVILE WAR IN SICILY.—ATTALUS OF PERGAMUS.—ARISTONICUS.—CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AT ROME.

WE are generally inclined to believe that the ancient Spaniards were barbarians, but if by this name we understand savages, they were certainly not barbarians. The Turdetani were civilized at a very early period<sup>1</sup>; they had an alphabet similar to that of the Libyans, and their coins are infinitely better than those of any European nation during the middle ages. We have also ancient inscriptions, of which however no rational interpretation has yet been given, and which can be explained only through the medium of the Biscay language. With the exception of Baron Wilhelm Von Humboldt, there is no one in our days who could throw any light upon the subject. Some persons pretend to find in the alphabet of the Turdetani a jargon of Greek, but this is an absurdity.

During its first years the war against Numantia was carried on by the Romans without any success. In the year 613 the consul Q. Pompeius, the son of Aulus, obtained the command in Spain<sup>2</sup>. He was unfortunate in

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, III. p. 139.

<sup>2</sup> This man was one of the ancestors of Pompey the Great, and was at the head of the aristocracy of his time, although he was the son of a musician. This fact itself is very characteristic. He was a man of talent, and acquired his wealth not in a very honourable manner; but after having once obtained great celebrity and

his undertakings, and the Numantines even conquered his camp. His position was so desperate, that he thought it advisable to offer peace. The Numantines who wished for nothing else, accepted the offer; and in order that the peace might obtain the sanction of the Roman senate, they were obliged nominally to submit to Rome, to pay a certain sum of money, to promise to serve in the Roman armies as auxiliaries, and to give hostages, who however were to be sent back afterwards<sup>3</sup>. But this reasonable peace did not satisfy the Romans, as Pompeius had foreseen; it was annulled by the senate, or at least not observed by the successor of Pompeius, M. Popillius Laenas. The Numantines then sent ambassadors to Rome, appealing to the treaty of Pompeius. The officers of his army bore witness to the treaty, but Pompeius applied every means to induce the senate to annul the treaty without making him answerable for it, and the war was renewed. The command was afterwards given to the consul, C. Hostilius Mancinus, who soon saw himself surrounded by the enemy, and had no other way of escape left except in the mercy of the conquerors. But the Numantines had lost their confidence, and he was obliged to confirm his promise by a solemn oath. At that time Tib. Sempronius Gracchus was in the Roman camp as quaestor, and as he was the only one in whom the Numantines could place any confidence, he was obliged to pledge his own honour before they could be persuaded to trust Mancinus<sup>4</sup>. When the Roman camp was taken, they shewed a noble confidence and benevolence towards Gracchus; for having lost his account-books in the camp he went to Numantia, and the

having become rich, he was welcome to the faction of the aristocrats; whereas T. Sempronius Gracchus, of a plebeian but truly ancient and noble family, was at the head of the people.—N.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, l. c. 79.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, l. c. 80.; Comp. Plutarch, Tib. Gracchus, 5 foll.; Aurel. Victor, De Vir. illustr. 64.

inhabitants, his former enemies, gladly returned to him his papers, though they might easily have retained him as a hostage. When afterwards the peace concluded with the Numantines excited the displeasure of the senate, Mancinus had to act the same part which Sp. Postumius had acted after the defeat of Caudium<sup>5</sup>. It was decreed that he should be delivered up to the enemy, in order that the treaty might thus be annulled. But the Numantines refused to accept him, and sent him back, that the curse of the perjury might fall upon the Romans<sup>6</sup>. After this again a few years passed without any progress being made by the Romans, and it was obvious that there was no hope of bringing the war to a close, unless Scipio Africanus was made consul<sup>7</sup>. It seems probable that by this time he had attained the age prescribed for the consulship by the *lex annalis*, and there must be some misunderstanding in the ancient writers, for they found difficulties here which we cannot see<sup>8</sup>. He began his operations by introducing a better discipline among his troops, whose number amounted to 60,000; and after having driven the Numantines back into their town, he surrounded it with several lines of fortifications, as the Spartans had done at Plataeae, and took all possible precautions to prevent provisions being introduced into the town. The Numantines might have received sacks of flour by the river Durius; but in order to render this impossible, he threw into the river long beams, which were armed with swords and darts, and fastened to the banks, to float both above and below the town. How long this blockade lasted we cannot say. All attempts of the Numantines to break through the Roman fortifications failed. On one occasion, however, some men succeeded in their bold undertaking, and forced their way to the town of Lutia, where they met with such admiration of their courage that several hundred young

<sup>5</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 220, foll.

<sup>6</sup> Velleius Paterc. II. 1

<sup>7</sup> Appian, l. c. 84.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, Epit. lib. 56; Appian, l. c.



men offered their assistance, and a general insurrection seemed on the point of breaking out. On this occasion Scipio acted in a manner of which we cannot think without a shudder. To follow the Numantines to Lutia was his duty, but he committed the atrocity of cutting off the hands of about four hundred young men, who were brought before him as friends to the cause of the Numantines. After the Numantines had consumed all their provisions, after they had for some time been living upon the corpses of their enemies and their own friends, and had experienced all the horrors and miseries which we have seen inflicted upon Missolonghi, they at length wished to surrender. Scipio demanded that they should lay down their arms and surrender at discretion. The Numantines then begged for a truce of three days to consider the proposal. This time they employed, especially the persons of the higher classes, in destroying their wives and children, that they might not fall into the hands of the Romans; and the slaughter which they made among themselves was so great, that on the third day only a small number came forth from the town, in such a condition that their features scarcely shewed any traces of human beings. Scipio selected fifty for his triumph, and the rest were sold as slaves<sup>9</sup>. According to some authors all the Numantines had put an end to their lives, but this statement is unhistorical<sup>10</sup>. Numantia vanished from the face of the earth, and was never rebuilt by the Romans. The day of punishment for the awful deed was not far distant.

Even before the fall of Numantia, a Servile war had broken out in Sicily, the particulars of which belong, properly speaking, to the history of Sicily. This insurrection had its origin in the decrease of the population of the island, where famine and plagues had raged in the same degree as in Germany during the 'Thirty-years' war.

<sup>9</sup> Appian. l. c. 97 foll.

<sup>10</sup> Florus, II. 18 ; Vegetius, III. 10.

Hardly twenty-four years had passed after the conclusion of the first Punic war, when the second broke out, and completed the devastation of Sicily. Many of the conquered places had been razed to the ground, and whole districts had become *ager publicus*, which were occupied by speculators, and formed into extensive estates. They were chiefly used as pasture-land, just as in the time of Arcadius and Honorius, when, as we see from the Theodosian Code, Calabria and Bruttium were changed into vast pasture lands, and the herdsmen formed gangs of robbers<sup>11</sup>. Immense numbers of slaves were kept on these estates<sup>12</sup>. Formerly slaves had, comparatively speaking, been rare; but, after the destruction of so many towns, we hear of immense numbers of them, and they were sold in the markets for a mere trifle. Imagine the three Punic wars, the war in Syria about the inheritance of Antiochus Epiphanes, the numerous pirates along the whole coast of Cilicia, the ravages in Achaia, Macedonia, Africa, and Spain; and remember that, in poor countries, men were always carried away, and sold as slaves—and you will be able to form a tolerably correct estimate of the number of slaves<sup>13</sup>. The slaves in Sicily were treated very cruelly; their masters were partly Romans and partly Sicilians. This rebellion of the slaves in Sicily exhibited the same features as that of the negroes in St. Domingo, in 1791. Their leader was a Syrian, of

<sup>11</sup> The herdsmen, in all parts of Italy, are still a degenerate race of men. I have frequently spoken with great respect of the Italians as husbandmen, but I repeat that the herdsmen are degenerate. In Tuscany, there are but few; but, in the papal state, they are numerous, and when they are not robbers themselves, they are the comrades and spies of robbers.—N.

<sup>12</sup> Diodorus, xxxiv. Eclog. 2. p. 525. foll.

<sup>13</sup> It has been said that, in the slave-market of the island of Delos, 10,000 slaves were sold every day: but nothing can be more absurd than this; and, from the account given by Strabo (xiv. p. 668), it is clear that he only meant to say, that there were in one day 10,000 slaves.—N.

the name of Eunus, who even assumed the diadem. The insurrection spread over the greater part of the island: Enna and Tauromenium fell into the hands of the slaves, and the free men who could not escape were all murdered. Four Roman praetorian armies were defeated, until the consul P. Rupilius at length conquered them, and took their fortified places.

During this time, Attalus Philometor, of Pergamus, had died, and with him the dynasty of the princes of Pergamus had become extinct. The first princes of that family were clever men, and of a mild disposition, although much may be said against their policy, if we take humanity as our standard. But the last Attalus was a man of different character: his reign was tyrannical, and he himself was one of those contemptible miscreants whom we meet with occasionally in the history of the East, where a little natural perversity is easily carried to the highest pitch, as in the case of the gluttony of Sultan Ibrahim. In the East, men sometimes take a delight in what is most unnatural and disgusting, and thus become true incarnations of a base and satanic nature. Such a man was Attalus. The only art he occupied himself with, was that of preparing poisons; and what amused him most was, to get rid of those who were his nearest in kindred<sup>14</sup>. He died without issue, and left his whole kingdom to the Romans, who certainly would not easily have recognised any one else as his successor; for they looked upon his kingdom as their own property, which they had a right to claim, just as a master had the right of succession to the estate of his slave or his freedman, who died without having made a will. The remarks of Florus<sup>15</sup>, therefore, on this affair are foolish. But there was a natural son of Eumenes, the predecessor of Attalus, called Aristonicus, who claimed the kingdom of Attalus as his lawful inheritance; as, however, there was no one in the world who

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus, XXXIV. Exc. de Virt. et Vit. p. 601; Justin, XXXVI. 4.

<sup>15</sup> II. 20.

could give him assistance, it is inconceivable how he could have the madness to believe that he would be able to hold out against the Romans, and how it was possible for him to find any support among the people of Pergamus. And yet the war lasted much longer than had been anticipated. The effeminate inhabitants of the magnificent country of Lydia and Ionia carried on the war with great resolution; and, besides them, Aristonicus had many Thracian mercenaries in his army. On the part of the Romans, the war was badly conducted, as their generals thought of nothing else but enriching themselves, and turning everything into money, instead of making the proper use of their victories: they were, in fact, glad when a powerful and wealthy town revolted, because it afforded them an opportunity for plunder. The war was at length brought to an end by M. Perperna and M. Aquillius. Aristonicus was taken prisoner at Stratonicea, and adorned the triumph at Rome<sup>16</sup>. The Romans thus acquired an extremely rich province. The end of this, as well as of the Servile war, belongs to a later date than the year 619, which is the year of the tribuneship of Tib. Sempronius Gracchus. The reduction of Sicily falls in the year 620, and the defeat of Aristonicus in 622<sup>17</sup>.

The time at which we have now arrived is marked by a change in the constitution; for, in the year 622, we find for the first time two plebeian censors<sup>18</sup>. The first time that both the consuls were plebeians, had been in the year 580, a fact recorded in the *Fasti*, where we read

<sup>16</sup> Sallust, *Fragm. Hist. lib. iv* ; Vell. Paterc. *II. 4*.

<sup>17</sup> The *Annales* of Zumpt deserve to be recommended, and, with the exception of a few inaccuracies, they are satisfactory. For the early periods of Greek history, however, the work is not always founded on careful investigation.—N. A new and improved edition was published at Berlin in 1838, under the title "*Annales veterum regnorum et populorum, imprimis Romanorum, confecti a C. T. Zumptio.*"

<sup>18</sup> Livy, *Epit. lib. 59*.

*ambo primum de plebe*<sup>19</sup>; it is strange that Livy does not mention it. But circumstances had now so long been ripening, that no one thought of opposing the election of two plebeian censors. Dionysius says<sup>20</sup> that, in his time, there were no more than fifty patrician families left, which is not to be understood of gentes, but of families in the proper sense of the word; so that, for example, the Scipios, Cethegi, and Lentuli were considered as three families. My belief is that, at the time when the consulship was in the hands of two plebeians, the number of patrician gentes, whose members were invested with public honours, did not amount to more than fifteen. But these gentes were not taken into account, since the curiae, in which alone their influence could be exerted, had lost their political importance long before, and their influence was only that of separate families. Thus, in the Aemilia gens, we have only the Lepidi, Paulli, and Scauri; in the Cornelia gens, the families of the Scipios, Sullae, Lentuli, and Cethegi, &c. The Claudia gens consisted of a single family, and of the Valeria gens, the only family remaining was that of the Messalae: in short, the patricians formed a very trifling number. The noble plebeian families, on the other hand, were very numerous, and constantly increasing. A very great majority of the senators were plebeians; and, ever since the end of the Hannibalian war, most of the praetors had been plebeians: at one time, among six praetors there was only one patrician. This, however, must not be understood as if there had been any feud between the two orders, for the contest had passed from the plebeians to the *novi homines*. It is only the unlearned, though often ingenious historians of the eighteenth century, and especially those of foreign countries, that were mistaken on this point. At Rome, nobody thought any longer of a distinction between patricians and plebeians. This may account for

<sup>19</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 70.

<sup>20</sup> Dionysius, I. 85. Comp. vol. I. p. 329.



Livy not mentioning the change, since, in reality, the distinction had ceased altogether. But the number of patricians was then still sufficient for the censorship, and hence forty years more passed, before both censors were plebeians.

About this time, a change must also have taken place in the aedileship, which had been divided for a long period in such a manner, that it was held alternately, one year by patricians and the other by plebeians, for the patricians had been less jealous about this office on account of its costliness. Various other changes besides must have occurred during this period; they were not, indeed, of a legislative nature, but they were manifested in the whole *habitus* of the Romans. Among these, I reckon the entire change in the character of the tribuneship. A tribune was at this time like a despot, to whom absolute power was given. An instance of this occurred on one occasion, when the tribunes threw the two consuls into prison, because, at a levy of troops, they refused to comply with the wishes of the tribunes<sup>21</sup>. Such occurrences were intimately connected with the changes which had taken place in the condition of the people. In former times, every citizen capable of bearing arms was made a soldier in case of need; but it had gradually become customary to select men from the masses, which, though it seems to us an arbitrary mode of proceeding, yet had the advantage that the strongest and best known persons were taken. As the legions had now generally to remain a long time in the provinces, military service had become hard and oppressive, and many tried to escape by the interference of their friends and patrons. In such cases, the tribunes frequently acted from personal motives; while, formerly, they had acted upon higher principles. And if it so happened that the consuls selected a friend of the tribunes to serve in the legions, the tribunes would interpose their veto, and thus protect him. As the levy of new legions had become a matter of great

<sup>21</sup> Livy, Epit. lib. 48; comp. 55.



difficulty, by the wide extension of the Roman franchise, inasmuch as, instead of the men appearing in person, and submitting to an examination, as had been the case before, the custom of making levies by lot was introduced in 601<sup>22</sup>. The tribunes therefore now demanded, that each of them should have the privilege of exempting from military service ten of the men selected by the consuls for the legions; and, when the consuls would not consent to this, the tribunes ordered them to be imprisoned<sup>23</sup>. This is a remarkable fact, which shews how much the character of the tribuneship had become altered and degenerated<sup>24</sup>. A few years later, the tribune C. Atinius Labeo ordered the censor Q. Metellus to be thrown down the Tarpeian rock, and it was only with difficulty that he was saved from the hands of this tyrant by the other tribunes, on whom his relations called for protection<sup>25</sup>. Such wild acts of tribunes, which are not unfrequent during this period, prove that the tribunes themselves no longer knew what they really were. The same Atinius, whom I mentioned before, carried a law of great importance, that the tribunes of the people should be senators by virtue of their office, and that they should not be excluded from the senate on any other grounds than those on which other senators were excluded<sup>26</sup>. By this law, the senate would have become an entirely democratic and elective assembly; but, although Gellius supposes that this law remained in force, yet it cannot have been of long duration. I believe that the *leges Aelia* and *Fuvia*, which are only mentioned by Cicero<sup>27</sup>, belong to the end of the sixth century. They ordained that the concilia convoked by the tribunes should, like the comitia of the

<sup>22</sup> Appian, De Reb. Hispan. 49.

<sup>23</sup> Livy, Epit. lib. 55.


<sup>24</sup> Compare vol. I. p. 625. foll.

<sup>25</sup> Livy, Epit. lib. 59; Cicero, pro Domo, 47.

<sup>26</sup> Gellius, XIV. 8; Zonaras, VII. 15.

<sup>27</sup> See the passages in Orelli's Onomasticon Tullianum, pars III. p. 126 foll.

centuries, be liable to be dissolved by signs in the heavens. This measure had been resorted to in order to effect something which was necessary, for the higher classes required protection against the violence of the tribunes, which threatened to break up the constitution; and the augurs now had a veto against the tribunes, as the tribunes had against the government. The importance of these laws is evident from the manner in which Cicero speaks of them. Yet it was unworthy on the part of the Romans that, in order to attain their object, they had recourse to a lie, with the full consciousness that it was one. The form of the *leges Aelia et Fuvia* is strange and offensive, but the meaning was to create a sort of counter-tribuneship.



## LECTURE XXVI.

AGER PUBLICUS AND ITS OCCUPATION.—CONDITION OF  
THE ROMAN PEOPLE AT THE TIME OF THE GRACCHI.  
—AGRARIAN LAW OF TI. SEMPR. GRACCHUS.—CHARAC-  
TER OF THE OPPOSITION.

THERE was a time when the name of the Gracchi was branded with infamy, and when they were looked upon as notorious only for their arbitrary proceedings, and as the ringleaders of a tyrannical faction; but such opinions, as well as the old view of the agrarian laws, are now undermined; and, although the intricate nature of the *ager publicus* may not be universally understood, yet, in Germany<sup>1</sup>, the correctness of the results of our historical investigations is generally recognised<sup>2</sup>.

*Ager publicus* was land conquered in war, and belonging to the republic. The use of it was given either to Romans, or to natives, or to others, on certain conditions. The Licinian law had ordained that no one should possess more than five hundred jugers of it<sup>3</sup>. The occupation of such public land could indeed be transmitted from father to son as an inheritance, and it could be sold or disposed of in other ways; but the occupant always remained a precarious tenant, whom the owner, that is

<sup>1</sup> With the exception, perhaps, of some obscure and isolated corner of Austria.—N.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. II. p. 130 foll. (In an American work on my History of Rome, the author, a remarkable man, states that there was not a person in the world to whom the notion that the Gracchi did not attack private property was not perfectly new when it was first promulgated.—N.)

<sup>3</sup> Compare vol. III p. 13.

the republic, had the right to turn out, whenever it was thought necessary to apply such land to other purposes. The manner in which the Licinian law was observed, was such as might have been expected. L. Postumius employed a whole legion in the cultivation of an extensive tract of domain land<sup>4</sup>; and it is a well-known fact, that Licinius Stolo himself emancipated his son, that he might be able, in his name, to occupy a greater portion of public land than his own law permitted<sup>5</sup>. Down to the war with Pyrrhus, immense tracts of land had been acquired; and, during the time of the Punic wars, the public domain was increased to an enormous extent. A great part of it was used for the foundation of colonies, or was assigned to the Roman allies; but, in this case also, in such a manner that the republic retained the ownership for itself. After the Hannibalian war, a number of colonies were founded, and extraordinary assignments had only been made to the veterans of Scipio in Apulia, Samnium, and Lucania; and, ever since the time of C. Flaminius, nothing had been assigned *viritim* to all the plebeians. A man who himself farms a piece of land which requires no capital can, of course, pay a much higher rent than a man who cannot farm it himself; for the latter requires labourers, whereas the former not only reaps the whole produce of the soil, but has not to pay any wages. I have a very accurate knowledge of the present system of agriculture in Italy, and I am acquainted with large farmers, who have vast possessions, which they manage on speculation, and who are an abominable class of men, and must lead to the ruin of their country; although, in some respects, they have a title to praise, which is not sufficiently acknowledged. But I also know small independent peasants, the most respectable class of men in Italy<sup>6</sup>, and I re-

<sup>4</sup> See vol. III. p. 413.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. III. p. 52.

<sup>6</sup> With these sentiments, and those which follow, compare a letter of Niebuhr, in *Lebensnachrichten über B. G. Niebuhr*, vol. II. p. 398

member very well one poor peasant of Tivoli, who was obliged to recover his small estate from the hands of a usurer, and exerted all his powers to satisfy his noble pride of being an independent proprietor. On that occasion, I saw very clearly the influence of wages, and how important it is for a family to have a piece of land which they can cultivate themselves without the employment of labourers. In Italy, the money is in the hands of the few, the nobles; and, in unproductive seasons, the peasant is obliged to sell or pledge his piece of land. During the middle ages, the number of these small proprietors was very great, but at present it is greatly reduced. In my inquiries at Tivoli, I learned that formerly almost every citizen had his hide of land; but that, in times of war, many had been obliged to sell their property; so that, fifty years ago, the number of small landed proprietors was five times, and 400 years ago, fifty times greater than at present. I can assert this the more confidently, as I have my information from the old statistical documents of Tivoli itself<sup>7</sup>. It was exactly such a state of things as this which presented itself to Tib. Sempronius Gracchus. While the number of Roman citizens was increasing every year by Italian allies, who obtained the Roman franchise, and more especially by freedmen, the number of landed proprietors decreased.

The numerous small estates of former times were no more. During the Hannibalian war everything had become altered; for where, for example, a poor peasant was the neighbour of a rich one, the former had been compelled, during those times of distress and epidemic disorders among the cattle, to borrow money from his neighbour, and not being able to give security, he had undoubtedly to pay a high per centage as interest. Now the son of such a peasant was, perhaps, serving in the legions, and if the father happened to be attacked by

foll., where a more detailed description of the state of the Italian peasantry is given.

<sup>7</sup> Compare *Lebensnachrichten über B. G. Niebuhr*, vol. II. p. 404.

illness, he was obliged to engage labourers. In this manner he was reduced more and more, and if in the end he was not able to pay the interest, he was compelled to give up his land to his neighbour. In this and various other ways many a small estate had passed into the hands of the rich<sup>8</sup>. Such a change of property increases in its progress like an avalanche. The Licinian law had enacted that, on a piece of one hundred jugers of the domain land, a certain number of citizens should be employed as labourers, in order that it might be cultivated by freemen and not by slaves<sup>9</sup>. But this enactment had not been observed, and thousands of slaves were employed on account of their cheapness. It is not improbable that the first idea of reform occurred to Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, when on his march to Spain he passed through Etruria, on whose extensive estates he saw far and wide no free labourers, but numbers of slaves in chains<sup>10</sup>.

The population of Rome had more and more become a true populace, while in the country the number of the poor was increasing to an awful extent. It was a state of things like that towards which, unfortunately all Europe is, at present, hastening; but the difference is, that the Romans had it in their power to remove the evil. Few Romans reflected upon the causes out of which it had grown; but many must have known that the misery would never have reached that height, if the Licinian law had been observed, if men had been appointed to watch over its proper execution, and if the newly acquired lands had from time to time been distributed or their occupation been rightly conducted. Every one, like the king in Goethe's poem, wished for a different state of things, but no one had the courage or will to undertake the reform. After the second Punic war it would not have been difficult to accomplish the object. In the

<sup>8</sup> Cato ap. Plin. Hist. Nat. xviii. 6 and 7; Sallust, Jugurth. 41.

<sup>9</sup> See vol. III. p. 16.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch, Tib. Gracch. 8.



midst of great shocks and sufferings of a state there occur moments which must be seized, and in which the disease can be overcome ; but that moment had been neglected at Rome, and was now irreparably lost. Seventy years had now elapsed from the time of the Hannibalian war, and every one who contemplated the condition of the republic must have felt like a person who is suddenly placed before a bottomless abyss. C. Laelius is said to have had the intention to interfere and to help, but afterwards to have given up the idea as impracticable. Hence he is said to have received the surname Sapiens, either in mockery or to indicate his real wisdom.<sup>11</sup>

All the great Roman families were concerned in these things, for there were surely few of the illustrious families which were not in the possession of public domain exceeding by far the lawful extent of 500 jugers, or which did not keep upon it more than the legal number of a hundred large and five hundred small cattle. To offend these families was unavoidable. But the law was perfectly clear, and might have been enforced with the utmost strictness ; and if this had been done according to the letter no one could have raised any objection, any more than a farmer of domains can object to the government, when he is told that he must leave his farm, that his holding the land alone is considered detrimental to the state, and that it must be parcelled out and distributed among other tenants. But there was, on the other hand, a kind of equity to be observed. Even C. Flaminius had not applied his law to domain land already occupied, but only to newly-conquered land, and he had thus tacitly acknowledged the right of possession. Since that time a hundred years had elapsed, and those lands had consequently been in the possession of a family for the period of a hundred, and other lands even for a period of 150 or 200 years ; and where they had not continued in the same family, they had been bought

<sup>11</sup> Plutarch, Tib. Gracch. 8.

of them by others who never thought that these lands would be taken from them. Many might have said that they had acquired them *bona fide*; many also had received them in a desolate condition after having been ravaged and laid waste in war, and had, at great cost, cultivated and changed them into fertile fields or olive plantations, which require a long time before they bear fruit; others had spent large sums in erecting extensive buildings on those lands. The question therefore naturally arose, whether all these things should be sacrificed by the occupants. If Gracchus had demanded this, he would have acted with perfect justice, and in accordance with the letter of the Licinian law; but it would, nevertheless, have been in the highest degree unfair. He therefore formed a different plan. The bill he brought forward enacted that no one should occupy more than 500 jugers of the domain land, and 250 jugers for each of his sons, which however must have been limited to *two* sons, as I conclude from the expression *nequis plus MILLE agri jugera haberet*<sup>12</sup>. He further wished to enact that the lands thus recovered by the state should not be allowed to be sold, in order to prevent the wealthy Romans from sooner or later acquiring them again. Buildings erected on land which according to this law was to be taken from the possessors, were to be valued, and the price to be given in money to the owner of the buildings. The only difficulty now remaining was this. Those who had purchased such lands and paid for them their actual value, lost their money; and a man, for instance, who possessed 400 jugers and bought 400 in addition with ready money, lost the value of 300 jugers. What should have been done in such a case? The state ought undoubtedly to have paid a moderate price for such lands, and then no one could have objected. And, indeed, this plan would not have involved any difficulties, for the number of those who possessed more than 1000 jugers cannot, after

<sup>12</sup> Aurel Victor, De Vir. illustr. 64; Livy, Epit. lib. 58; Appian, De Bell. Civil. 1. 9.

all, have been so very great, and certainly the public treasures could not have been applied in a better way. The *sentina rei publicae*, or the poor—who were a burden to the state and a disgrace to the Roman people, they sold their votes, for they could not be excluded from the comitia—might thus have been made honest citizens, and in this manner the object of Gracchus would have been fully and completely attained. It is ever to be lamented that Gracchus did not adopt this course, which was absolutely necessary, whatever it might have cost the republic. Even this plan would undoubtedly have called forth a vehement opposition on the part of the wealthy aristocrats, but certainly not that bitter exasperation which Gracchus had to encounter. There were many who felt how dangerous the disease was under which Rome was labouring; but most of them considered its condition perfectly hopeless, and thought that it was impossible to interfere without calling forth a host of other evils.

Tib. Gracchus did not stop short here: he is further said to have contemplated to extend the Roman franchise<sup>13</sup>; but the account we have does not allow us to take this for certain. From the actions of his brother we clearly see that he was aware of the fact, that the middle class of citizens had vanished almost entirely, and that in order to restore that class, it was thought necessary to grant to the Italian allies the full rights of citizenship. A wise plan! The party of Gracchus contained many distinguished men, who were certainly as great losers by his law as its opponents, but they were nevertheless ready to support the noble cause. Even Appius Claudius, his father-in-law, who in other respects shared the pride of his family and P. Mucius Scaevola<sup>14</sup>, the great jurist, who was consul that year<sup>15</sup>, saw the

<sup>13</sup> Vellej. Paterc. II. 2.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch, Tib. Gracch. 8 and 9; Cicero, Academ. I. 5.


<sup>15</sup> Both the consuls of that year were plebeians, which shews the absurdity of French and Italian historians who speak of a struggle between patricians and plebeians.—N.

necessity, and encouraged Tib. Gracchus, although they unquestionably occupied as much of the public domain as the Scipios. It is difficult to describe the exasperation of the opposition party<sup>16</sup>, who violated even the laws of public decency; for men of distinction and champions of the oligarchs no sooner perceived that their interests were attacked, than they displayed all the greediness and avarice which we usually see only in persons without any education: they had recourse to excesses such as are generally committed only by the lowest of the rabble. It is one of the most revolting sights, when such men assume a conduct by which they place themselves entirely on a level with the populace—and such was the conduct of those oligarchs. Tib. Gracchus was the noblest among the young men of his time, and enjoyed among his countrymen the same degree of respect as among the barbarians. Every one acknowledged his virtues, and even those who had none themselves could not deny that he possessed virtues, or as they may have called them—follies. But all this was forgotten by his antagonists: they spoke of him as a rioter and a mutineer, and a coalition was formed against him. P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica,—the grandson of him whom the Roman senate had called the best of the Romans, in the time of the Hannibalian war, and the son of him who had zealously exerted himself to preserve the manners of the olden times,—now conspired with the infamous Q. Pompeius. But still we cannot conclude from this fact that he was a thorough miscreant: he was only a man who had become hardened and intractable in his oligarchical pretensions, who saw his enemy in the light in which his interest placed him, and hated him, and wished to hate him with justice. According to the Publilian law, the law of Gracchus did not require the sanction of the senate, and as soon as

<sup>16</sup> The whole opposition was confined to the senate, for the tribunes, with the exception of M. Octavius, and the assembly of the people, supported him.—N.

the tribes had passed it, its execution could follow immediately. A triumvirate was to be appointed as a perpetual magistracy, to watch that the law was fairly carried into effect. All that the opponents of Gracchus could do was to incite his colleague, M. Octavius, against him.

In certain Roman families we find certain sentiments and opinions hereditary. Such is the case in all free countries, and it is one of the talismans by which their constitution is preserved. So it is in England, and so it is with our views about the Church in which we are born. There are also certain family characters, and all the Gracchi are distinguished for their mildness, their unaffected and sincere love of the oppressed, a feature which we can trace through three generations: we first find it in the Gracchus who occurs in the second Punic war, then in Gracchus, the censor, who married the daughter of the great Scipio, and lastly in his two sons. To dwell on such characters as these is the more delightful, as they are seldom met with in history: in our own days they seem to be quite extinct.



## LECTURE XXVII.

MACHINATIONS OF THE OPPOSITION.—M. OCTAVIUS IS DEPRIVED OF HIS OFFICE, AND THE LAW OF TIB. GRACCHUS CARRIED.—HE TRIES TO OBTAIN THE TRIBUNESHIP FOR THE NEXT YEAR.—IS MURDERED.—PERSECUTIONS OF HIS FRIENDS.—EVENTS OF THE PERIOD FROM THE DEATH OF TIB. GRACCHUS TO THE TRIBUNESHIP OF C. SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS.

As there was no other way of preventing the agrarian bill of Tib. Gracchus being carried, than by inducing one of the college of tribunes to interpose his veto, the antagonists of Gracchus contrived to gain M. Octavius for that purpose. If the notion that the tribunes originally belonged to a class of Romans inferior to the ruling party is utterly groundless, it is still more so in regard to the times of which we are now speaking; nay, we may say, without any hesitation, that at this time the tribuneship was held almost exclusively by such men as belonged to consular families, and that a plebeian very seldom obtained the consulship without having previously been a tribune. Thus the tribunes were just as much persons of distinction, as those who were invested with the highest magistracies, and it was by no means an extraordinary case that a man like Gracchus was among the tribunes. All *novi homines* passed through the tribuneship, and any plebeian, who had the opportunity of being raised to this office, was assuredly very glad to obtain it. M. Octavius belonged to a very distinguished family, and would himself have been a great loser by the law of his colleague. But Gracchus offered to make good this loss out of his own



property. Octavius could not accept this offer without lowering himself. Gracchus then entreated and besought him to give up his opposition, and intimated to him, that unless he did so he himself would be obliged to proceed to extremes, and to propose to the people to deprive him of his office. This was indeed the greatest irregularity, but Gracchus might have said in his own defence, that a tribune who was independent of the people was an abuse, and a still greater irregularity. The people had surely the right to take away a commission from a man to whom they had given it; and it is an absurdity, if, in a republic, this right is not maintained. Gracchus was therefore in reality right, but as far as the forms were concerned, he upset the laws of the constitution. Yet it was a case, as he might have said, in which necessity broke through all laws; and in order to act with perfect justice, he offered himself to be put to the vote first. When Octavius persisted in his refusal, Gracchus, who saw that his object could not be attained in any other way, proceeded to carry his threat into effect. When seventeen tribes had already accepted the proposal, Gracchus again entreated Octavius, either to desist from his opposition, or to give up his office; and when Octavius still persevered, the eighteenth tribe voted, and his tribuneship was gone. Gracchus had thus been driven by his opponents to an act of formal injustice, and those who had no feeling of right and wrong triumphed over him, as if he had really violated the laws of the constitution.

The agrarian law was now carried without opposition, and a permanent triumvirate was appointed, consisting of Tib. Gracchus, his brother Caius, and Appius Claudius. He also carried a law, that the treasures which king Atalus had bequeathed to the Roman people, should be divided among those to whom lands should be assigned, in order to afford them the means of purchasing the necessary implements.

The time was now approaching when the tribunes for

the next year were to be elected. The tribunes entered upon their office on the ninth of December, but for a long time past—we do not know when this custom began,—the elections had taken place very early in the year, at the commencement of June, the harvest time in Italy. The tribunes at that time always appeared in the senate, and took part in the discussions; and here Tib. Gracchus was treated with the most vulgar and unbridled fury. It must have been evident to him, that if he should one day be without his sacred magistracy, he would be the victim of his opponents; he would, after the expiration of his tribuneship, still have been *triumvir agrorum dividendorum*, but he would not have been inviolable. He therefore offered himself as a candidate for the tribuneship for the year following. This was the more agreeable to his enemies, as it was contrary to the existing law or custom. This custom may have arisen out of the mere circumstance that, for a long period, no tribune had held his office for two successive years; but in later times the re-election of the same man is by no means uncommon. When the tribe which had the *praerogativa* had elected him and the second had given its vote the same way, the opposition party declared the votes to be illegal, and demanded of the tribunes to stop the election. Q. Rubrius, the colleague of Gracchus, who presided at the election, hesitated, not knowing what to do; and Mummius, the successor of Octavius, offered to take the place of the president; the other tribunes demanded that the presidency should be decided by lot. These disputes occupied the whole day, which passed away without anything being decided<sup>1</sup>.

The events which occurred on that day convinced Tib. Gracchus that his life was in danger, and he went about among the people like an accused criminal with his only little son, begging them to protect his and his child's life. It was his misfortune that the election took place at this season of the year, for the country people, who, at any

<sup>1</sup> Appian, De Bell. Civil. i. 14.

other time would have flocked to Rome by thousands to protect him, were now detained by their labours in the fields. The population of the city was indifferent towards Gracchus, and could, in fact, not be otherwise, for a great number of them had no interest whatever in the affair. In this instance too we see how the nature of the constitution had become different from what it had been in former times, though not a single iota of the laws had been altered. In former times, when the territory of Rome did not extend further than about fifty or sixty miles from the city, every one could come to Rome on extraordinary occasions, and the rustic tribes could be really represented by the *Romani rustici*; but after the assignments made by C. Flaminius some country-people lived at a great distance, as far as the Romagna, and it was impossible for them to come to the city to attend the assemblies.

The election was to be continued the next day, and the people assembled with a presentiment that blood would be shed. Tib. Gracchus himself was scarcely armed. In the earliest times of the republic, at least as far as the first decad of Livy goes, we see that the place where the tribunes addressed the plebs was the rostra in the forum, and it was in the forum that the plebs gave their votes. In later times, and even as early as the Hannibalian war, the plebs never voted in the forum but on the area in front of the capitol<sup>2</sup>. Here a scaffolding

<sup>2</sup> The time at which this change took place is not known, but it is possible that some one may discover it. What is said about it in the common works on Roman Antiquities is wrong. The votes were at this time probably given *viva voce*. In the comitia of the centuries the votes were given, according to the lex Cassia, by means of little tablets. (Orelli, Onomast. Tullian, III. p. 278, foll.) This lex tabellaria still requires to be more fully explained than has yet been done. In works on Roman Antiquities it is erroneously stated that the votes in the assemblies of the tribes were always given *viva voce*; and it is the great Cicero, for whom I nevertheless entertain the highest esteem, who has occasioned this and other errors respecting the constitution.—N.

was erected on such occasions, and benches were placed around it, as is still the custom in Italy. When the people were assembled a tumult broke out, and the uproar became so violent, that several benches were broken. The senate had purposely assembled in the neighbourhood.

The tumult was declared seditious, and the senators, P. Scipio Nasica at their head, entered the assembly. A lie had been spread abroad, that Tib. Gracchus had appeared with the diadem; no one surely believed in this impudent calumny, except those whose interest it was to assert it<sup>3</sup>. The people, who had no clear notion of what they wanted, deserted Gracchus. A common man, or one of the colleagues of Gracchus—for many claimed the honour—was the first who struck him on his head with a piece of wood, and he was killed. A number of his followers were instantly taken prisoners as his accomplices. His friend P. Mucius Scaevola had opposed the persecution, but in vain. The real persecutions, however, were carried on in the year following, by P. Popillius Laenas in a manner worthy of the Inquisition, or of an Alba. Thousands were consigned to prison with or without a judicial verdict, and this Popillius was descended from a man who, about 240 years before, had been one of the greatest champions of liberty<sup>4</sup>. The cruelties of this monster may be read in Plutarch's lives of the Gracchi. There is however one anecdote which I cannot leave unnoticed, and which refers to an event that must have taken place the year before the consulship of Popillius Laenas. The most intimate friends of Tib. Gracchus were not warriors or statesmen, but Greeks of cultivated minds, such as Diophanes of Mitylene and Blossius of Cuma. The latter was a Greek philosopher, for although the inhabitants of Cuma spoke the Oscan language, yet they were in reality Greeks. When he was summoned by the lictors to appear before the tribunal of the consuls, and was questioned about the relation between him and Gracchus, he openly avowed that

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Tib. Gracch. 19.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. III. p. 46 foll.

he had been his intimate friend, and on being asked whether he had always obeyed his commands, Blossius answered in the affirmative, adding that Gracchus had never desired anything that was bad. At length he was asked, what he would have done if Gracchus had ordered him to set fire to the capitol. Blossius replied: Gracchus would never have given such a command, but if he had I should have obeyed it, for I am convinced that it would have been for the good of the people<sup>5</sup>. This answer of Blossius has been censured, but it was the fault of those who put such a captious question to him. He saw in Gracchus his own exalted self, and the word he spoke, does not disgrace him, but those who wrenched it from him. The persecutions of Popillius Laenas cannot be characterized in any other way than by saying, that they were the most horrible murders: all whom he put to death were pure and innocent victims.

Notwithstanding their victory, the ruling party could not abolish the triumvirate. The place of Tib. Gracchus was occupied by M. Fulvius Flaccus, and when Appius Claudius died, C. Papirius Carbo, a disciple of Gracchus, but, as usually happens in such circumstances, an unworthy one, was appointed in his stead. Carbo followed the foot-steps of Gracchus, but with evil intentions. A man of great distinction who had passed a life full of awful changes of fortune once said to me: "You do not know what a recollection it is to have lived during a revolution: one begins the attack with the best, and in the end one finds oneself among knaves." Such times as the French revolution to which my friend alluded are no longer to be feared, and centuries may pass before a revolution breaks out in Europe<sup>6</sup>. But in such times it cannot be said impres-

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, Tib. Gracch. c. 20.

<sup>6</sup> This feeling of security and the firm conviction of Niebuhr, that no state of Europe had to fear a revolution are expressed in several of his letters published in the *Lebensnachrichten*. Hence his extraordinary surprise at the outbreak of the French revolution of



sively enough, that circumstances are often such as to draw the most innocent persons into the current, without their being aware of there being anything dangerous in it. Circumstances are often so fearfully complicated, that only those who possess an iron determination are able to stand and see their way. In this manner honest men may continue to be the supporters of a government, which, without their knowing it, has already passed into the hands of knaves. We have now come to that period of Roman history, when the explanation of the mere forms of the constitution is no longer sufficient, and when the men themselves must be considered each by himself, and when each is a separate psychological problem. The spectacle which is presented to our eyes is that of men engaged in combat with one another for the spoils of the dead body of the state. Papirius Carbo was a man of great talent, a circumstance which often deceives us; but we must remember that a man may even be benevolent and affectionate, and may yet be in the power of the evil spirit. I have known persons who were all that is amiable and good, in times of peace, but who, under the influence of the demon of war, committed acts of which everybody would have thought them incapable. Carbo was a man of that character, so that the report of his having murdered Scipio is not at all incredible, although it may be false. Scipio may have died a natural death, for it is not unfrequent in southern countries that persons are said to have been poisoned, who are in reality carried off quite naturally by a sudden death, in an attack of putrid fever. But Scipio may yet have been murdered, for he had exasperated the people in the highest degree by a conduct which no one can approve of. The opponents of the Sempronian law

July 1830. The writer of these lines very well recollects the day when the news of it reached Bonn. Niebuhr, who had read them just before entering the lecture room, spoke during the whole hour about nothing else but the circumstances which had caused the outbreak of that revolution.



were not the Roman nobles alone, but among them were also many Italian allies; for when, for instance in Samnium, a district was taken by the sword, it belonged to the Roman domain and might be given to Roman citizens, or, as was done in many cases, to allies of the Romans, who were allowed to cultivate the land on condition of their paying a certain tribute. The Romans, moreover, sometimes assigned conquered lands to their allies, on condition that they should perform certain services. Now all those allies who were in the possession of public land—although the Sempronian law affected only Roman citizens—combined with the wealthy Romans; and Scipio, after his return from Numantia, was their leader. In this unhappy conflict, in consequence of which the right of citizenship was withheld too long from the allies, the exasperation on both sides rose to the highest pitch. Scipio intended to address the people, and was preparing his speech in the evening, but in the morning he was found dead in his bed. He was the brother-in-law of the Gracchi, for Sempronia, their sister, was his wife: and yet he had declared before the people, that he approved of the murder of Tib. Gracchus.

The period from the death of Tib. Gracchus, to the tribuneship of C. Sempronius Gracchus, is marked by several attempts of both parties, but the particulars are not recorded. We know, for instance, that even a tribune, M. Junius Pennus, quite in the spirit of the oligarchy, declared that he would not consent to the civic franchise being given to the Italian allies<sup>7</sup>. But as a wish for it had once arisen among them, it could no longer be refused. Among the Marsians and other nations of Italy, there were large, wealthy, and very illustrious families, whose morals were uncorrupted, and at all events superior to those of the Romans. And yet they were excluded from the franchise, and not even tolerated in the city. A

<sup>7</sup> Cicero, *De Officiis*, III. 11; compare Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* I. 21.

discontent spread among the allies, like that which we have seen produced in Ireland on the Catholic emancipation question. Even in the tribuneship of Tib. Gracchus the subject had been discussed, whether the franchise should not be given to the Latins, that is, to those Latin colonies which had not received it in 417,<sup>8</sup> especially Tibur and Praeneste. These colonies consisted of Roman citizens and Italians of every description, who lived according to the Latin law, and had the first claims to the Roman franchise. Tib. Gracchus is said to have thought of proposing a law to satisfy their wish, but he probably never carried out this intention. They then supported the senate against him, and afterwards demanded the rights of Roman citizens. We have unfortunately merely a few traces of the particular circumstances of that time, and we can hardly conceive how Fregellae could be so mad as to think of compelling the Romans by force to grant its request. We find Fregellae in arms, but the other towns took no part in the struggle. The Italian allies also kept aloof, and may have been malicious enough to rejoice at the inconsiderate conduct of Fregellae, for the nature of their demands was quite different. Fregellae, which thus stood alone, was destroyed by the praetor L. Opimius, and heavy vengeance was taken on its inhabitants<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> See vol. III. p. 140 foll.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, *Epit. lib.* 60 ; Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 3 ; Vell. *Paterc.* II. 6 ; Aurel. Vict. *De Vir. illustr.* 64 ; Asconius ad *Pison.* p. 17, ed. Orelli.

## LECTURE XXVIII.

C. SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS.—HIS TRIBUNESHIP AND LEGISLATION.—INTRIGUES OF THE SENATE TO DEPRIVE HIM OF THE FAVOUR OF THE PEOPLE.

It is a well attested fact that in point of talent Tiberius Gracchus was excelled by his brother Caius. We have, properly speaking, no specimen of the oratory of Tiberius; but of the speeches of Caius there are extant several fragments, which perfectly justify the praise bestowed on them by Cicero<sup>1</sup>, who could not be mistaken on this point. It is further highly probable that Caius was more of a statesman than his brother; he displayed, at any rate, more of his talents, the cause of which may have been the circumstance that the time of his public activity lasted longer; for while the career of Tiberius did not extend beyond a period of seven months, Caius took an active part in public affairs for two years previous to his tribuneship, during the two years of his tribuneship, and also for some time after it. The statement that Caius owed his education chiefly to his excellent mother deserves full credit<sup>2</sup>. In the filial relation of the Gracchi to their mother, we see another trace of the humanity of their family: and this filial attachment is a trait quite foreign to the Romans of this, as well as of the subsequent periods of their history. Amiable domestic relations are extremely rare among the Romans, though we have a few instances of them in the case of Horace and his father, and in that of Tacitus and Agricola, although Tacitus was unhappy in his own family.

Caius was driven by a sort of fatality into a path where

<sup>1</sup> Brutus, 32.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, Brutus, 27.

certain destruction awaited him. Broken-hearted and deprived of all hope by the death of his brother, he was anxious to keep aloof from the high offices of state; he was, it is true, triumvir, but this could not be avoided, and he wished to act merely where he could do so without shaking or upsetting the actual state of things, some inner voice dissuading him from pursuing any other course. But the eyes of his own countrymen, as well as those of foreigners, were fixed upon him. His unassuming behaviour when he was quaestor, and various actions which were anything but calculated to produce this effect, attracted the attention of the people towards him. The senate endeavoured to detain him, and to put off his election to the tribuneship, just as Charles I. refused to convoke parliament. But in these and similar cases, those who are in the possession of power only render things worse by their attempts to check the course of events. The senate unjustly wanted to keep C. Gracchus engaged in Sardinia, but he returned to Rome without asking for leave of absence. When he was taken to account for this step, he was acquitted, as it was too manifest that it was only by intrigues that he had been kept at a distance. After his election to the tribuneship, which he entered upon under the greatest expectations of the people, his first step naturally was to avenge the death of his brother and his friends. Nasica had gone to Asia, from whence he had never returned; but many others of his party were yet at Rome, and against these Caius directed his operations. He brought forward two bills: the one enacting that those who had been deprived of one office by the people, should not be allowed to be candidates for any other: the second, that any magistrate should be liable to a capital charge, who had put to death a citizen without a formal sentence having been passed upon him<sup>3</sup>. The first of these bills was aimed at Octavius, but C. Gracchus withdrew it at the request of his mother.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, C. Gracchus, 4; Cicero, pro Rabirio, 4.

The second, which was mainly directed against Popillius Laenas, was carried. But Laenas quitted Italy<sup>4</sup>. These two laws were the *inferiae* on the tomb of his brother; but he did not stop short here. The execution of the agrarian law had been decreed, and although things went on slowly, yet some progress was made, and Caius remained triumvir.

His subsequent legislation embraced every branch of the administration, and is of the most varied nature<sup>5</sup>. Those who infer from his legislation that he was a demagogue, are greatly mistaken, the laws themselves contradict such a view. The measure against which most has been said is that which ordered, that corn should be sold at a low price to the inhabitants of the city<sup>6</sup>. In order to understand this law, we must remember that Rome was a republic with immense revenues, a great part of which belonged to the sovereign, that is, to the people, and that a vast number of them were as poor as the poor in our own days. What should such a population of free men do? Were they to beg? or should the state support them? The idea of the dignity of a free state lies at the bottom of many things, and this is to a certain degree the case with the poor's rates in England. With a barbarous people this idea has no meaning; but with a free and proud nation it is a duty to provide for those members of the community who are unable to provide for themselves. The number of real paupers at Rome must have been immense; many of them were not included in any tribe, and others belonged to the *tribus urbanae*, but all were descended of free parents;—and were these people to be allowed to starve? Both the Gracchi

<sup>4</sup> We possess a beautiful fragment of the speech in which he brought forward this bill against Laenas; it is the beginning of the speech, and is censured by Gellius (xi. 13,) in a pedantic manner.—N.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, l. c. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, Epit. lib. 60; Appian, De Bell. Civil. i. 21; Cicero, pro Sextio, 25.

entertained the idea of turning as many of them as possible into industrious husbandmen; but this was not practicable in every instance, for many had no claims to portions of the public land. If, in our days, a part of the revenue of a capital town were set apart to pamper the poor, it would indeed be culpable, although capitals are in most cases more favoured in this respect than other towns. But C. Gracchus had no intention of giving away the corn for nothing; he only gave it at so low a price that, with some labour, the poor might be enabled to support themselves and their children. As he was in general a zealous, active, and creative man, he built large corn-magazines, the ruins of which were seen at Rome down to the sixteenth century, between the Quai, the Aventine, and the Monte Testaceo; but no trace is now to be seen of those *horrea populi Romani*. I believe that it is from this time that we have to date the distinction between the *plebs urbana* and the thirty-five tribes.

Another law of C. Gracchus was proposed with the intention to make the service in the armies easier<sup>7</sup>. The soldiers had formerly been obliged to provide themselves with the necessary weapons, that is to say, their value had been deducted from their pay. The republic was now so rich, and the treasury so well filled, that it was by no means a great sacrifice to provide the soldiers with clothes and arms from the public treasury. He also made new roads through Italy, improved those which existed already, and brought their construction to a degree of perfection which it had never before attained<sup>8</sup>.

After this he proceeded to measures relative to the constitution. A case of *delictum manifestum* required no trial among the Romans, and it was only necessary to establish the identity of the person. If the case was not manifest, the praetor appointed a judge who proceeded ac-

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, l. c. 5.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch, l. c. 7; Appian, De Bell. Civil. 1. 23.



cording to certain forms. This was the case both in civil and criminal affairs. It had been customary from early times to appoint senators as judges. Ever since the beginning of the seventh century a number of law-suits, for which formerly special quaestors had been appointed to bring the cases before the popular courts, had been referred to ordinary court-days. As the complaints of Roman subjects against their Roman governors became more frequent, a *quaestio repetundarum* was introduced; the quaestor, however, did not bring such cases before the popular courts, but before one consisting of senators appointed to the office of judges by lot. But these judges were in the same predicament as those on whom they had to pass sentence: and this was the source of corruption, and the most scandalous verdicts had been pronounced, the judges having, in fact, made their office a very lucrative traffic. The power of bringing a charge against a governor was much more detrimental to the provincials than if it had not existed at all, for the governors now not only endeavoured to enrich themselves, but had to spend large sums to bribe the judges, who again had no other objects in view except to enrich themselves. All feelings of honour had vanished<sup>9</sup>. It was evident that under such circumstances the state was hastening towards its downfall. C. Gracchus, therefore, who knew very well that it must indeed be a hard winter before one wolf will seize upon another, turned his attention to the equites, — the order which now constituted, in some measure, a middle class between the senators and the lower people, although they possessed immense riches. Things had reached that

<sup>9</sup> A striking analogy to this state of things is exhibited at Naples. A Neapolitan minister, a very eccentric but talented man, once said to me, that at Naples a man might have as many false witnesses as he could wish, at the rate of a carolina (about sixpence) a-piece. When afterwards I asked a distinguished Neapolitan, whether this assertion was not unjust, he said that if a man would carry on this traffic on a large scale, he might obtain any number of false witnesses at a still lower price.—N.

point which we now see in France, where no other standard of distinction exists except that of wealth. C. Gracchus saw in the equites a desirable equipoise to the senators. From the people he expected nothing at all, for he well knew that the popular courts were no longer worth anything, and that to some extent they consisted of a populace just as corrupt as the Neapolitan *lazaroni*. C. Gracchus therefore sought a remedy in that portion of the population which consisted of the rich and wealthy: and he could, in fact, do nothing else. By the *lex Sempronia judiciaria* he composed the *judicia* of 300 equites, who were now the only judges. There are, it is true, three different opinions on this point, but after the investigations of Manutius it can no longer be a matter of doubt<sup>10</sup>. After an independent body of judges had thus been formed, he substituted a committee of them in the place of the popular courts, which from henceforward were called together only on rare occasions by way of exception, and extraordinary inquisitions ceased altogether. This law was in reality an encroachment upon the democracy, and in truth a very necessary one, for C. Gracchus knew the people, and saw what a wretched class of men they were.

In order to introduce some better blood into the thirty-five tribes, he proposed to bestow the Roman franchise upon the Latins, who consisted of the original Latin towns and a number of colonies. The other Italian allies, from the Marca Ancona down to Lucania in the south, were to step into the relation in which the Latins had been hitherto<sup>11</sup>. It may be that something was actually carried into effect, but we do not know what. The plan itself was so wise and useful that all intelligent Romans, who did not wish to see either the aristocrats or the democrats

<sup>10</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 22; Vell. Paterc. ii. 6; Tacitus, *Annales*, xii. 60. Compare Livy, *Epitome lib.* 60; Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 5.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, l. c. 23; compare Vell. Paterc. ii. 6; Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 5.

gaining the upper hand, must have been rejoiced at it. In many Italian towns there were families of distinction, which would have settled at Rome, as in the time of Augustus the Asinii, Munatii, and others did. Cicero expressly states<sup>12</sup> that, previous to the Social war, Greek science and literature were more cultivated among the Latins than among the Romans. Therefore, instead of increasing the Roman people by freed-men and a low populace, C. Gracchus intended to add numbers of good and well-educated Latins. I do not know of any wiser or more praiseworthy plan than this.

Many of his laws concerning the administration are either not known at all or known merely from slight allusions, but all those of which we have any knowledge are excellent. Ten years had passed away since Attalus had bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people, and seven since Aristonicus had been conquered; but the affairs of Asia had not yet been settled, and the governors availed themselves of this neglect for the purpose of satisfying their avarice by plunder. C. Gracchus at length carried a law by which the province of Asia was regulated: this law is admitted, even by Cicero, to have been a model of wisdom<sup>13</sup>. Especial care was taken to arrange the farming of the public revenue, in such a manner that the interest of the state was perfectly secured. While he assigned lands to the people, and endeavoured to turn as many of them as possible into honest peasants, he did not by any means sacrifice the interests of the republic; for the tithes which the state had hitherto received from those lands were not abolished, in order that the republic might lose nothing. It was evident to him that Rome could only be saved by returning to her own principles, and he therefore imitated the ancient Romans who had renovated and, as it were,

<sup>12</sup> Pro Archia poeta, 3.

<sup>13</sup> In Verrem, III. 6. This is, as far as I know, the only passage in which Cicero speaks of this law, but he there says nothing in praise of it.

refreshed the people, by extending the franchise. He opened good prospects for the Italians who were to succeed to the privileges of the Latins, for he undoubtedly hoped that a peaceful development of the principle would lead to further and still more beneficial reforms.

The senate had hitherto distributed the provinces at discretion, which had given rise to the most detestable system of bribery. The elections of magistrates had for a considerable time past taken place long before the close of the year, and the actual consuls, after the election of their successors, referred to the senate *de provinciis*, and the senate then decided what commissions were to be given to the consuls or praetors. Every one of course endeavoured to obtain that from which he hoped to derive the greatest profits or honour. C. Gracchus now made the wise law, enacting that before the elections took place the senate should decide which provinces were to be given to the consuls or praetors,<sup>14</sup> so that the persons to whom they were to be given were as yet unknown; the division of the provinces was then made by lot, and only in a few instances by the senate. This law did away at once with some of the most glaring abuses in the administration.

While C. Gracchus was thus quietly proceeding as a legislator, while he was engaged in distributing the public land, and founding several colonies,<sup>15</sup> in which the Latins and Italians were allowed to take part, the jealousy and exasperation of the aristocrats rose to the highest pitch, and the senate now had recourse to a peculiar kind of stratagem. M. Livius Drusus, one of the colleagues of C. Gracchus, was prevailed upon to try to undermine his popularity. Here we have an instance in which it is clearly seen that the constitution of Rome was suited more for a city than for a whole nation. Livius endeavoured to outbid C. Gracchus in conferring benefits upon the people; he acted in the name of the senate and succeeded, for the masses

<sup>14</sup> Cicero, *pro domo*, 9; Sallust, *Jugurth.* 27.

<sup>15</sup> Vell. Patere. i. 15; Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 8; Appian, *l. c.* 24.


never take the trouble to consider who the man is that offers them advantages ; and in this instance, they were unable to recognize in the actions of C. Gracchus the purity and sincerity of his intentions. The majority of the inhabitants of Rome, whom I call Romans only with great reluctance, consisted of freedmen, and their children or grand-children, and they perhaps thought that Gracchus intended to deceive them. As Livius held out to them the same advantages as Gracchus, or even greater ones, the multitude followed him, although they must have seen through his scheme. Such is the character of the Romans to this day ; for if a man ventures to give them his advice on any matter, out of true sympathy and with the greatest possible disinterestedness, they will always indulge in the suspicion that he has some impure motive for doing so, or that he is a knave. This trait is common to all classes in modern Rome. Livius abolished the tithes of the lands distributed, and proposed to found twelve colonies, each of which was to consist of 3000 citizens<sup>16</sup>. Whether these colonies were actually established may be questioned, but as those of C. Gracchus were established, I do not see why those twelve should not have been founded. I conceive them to be the XII. *coloniae* of which Cicero speaks in his oration for Caecina<sup>17</sup>. During the Hannibalian war, these twelve Latin colonies had deserted Rome, whereas the remaining eighteen had remained faithful<sup>18</sup>. If therefore, as I think, these twelve colonies were not quite new ones, but twelve Latin towns which still had a large and undivided territory, so that a great additional number of citizens could find room in them, it is clear that these colonies obtained greater privileges than those which did not receive any increase by the Livian law. C.

<sup>16</sup> Plutarch, C. Gracch. 9.

<sup>17</sup> c. 35.

<sup>18</sup> (Livy, XXVII. 9 and 10.) It has been proposed to read in the passage of Cicero XIII. *coloniæ*, instead of XII. *coloniæ* ; but this conjecture cannot be admitted. N.—See Savigny, *Zeitschrift für gesch. Rechtswissensch.* v. 2. p. 237.

Gracchus saw that the thoughtless multitude followed the senate, whose sole object was to deceive them. There are two classes of men, the one consisting of those who are sincere and open, and seek and love the beautiful and sublime, who delight in eminent men, and see in them the glory of their age and nation; the other comprising those who think only of themselves, are envious, jealous, and sometimes very unhappy creatures, without having a distinct will of their own: they cannot bear to see great men in the enjoyment of the general esteem. It was these latter, a set of men more fatal to mankind than original sin, that rose against C. Gracchus. He was too spotless, too pure, and too glorious not to be an offence to many; for every one was reminded by his example of what he ought to be: it was the greatness of Gracchus which determined them to bring him down. It is not surprising to find that this disposition existed among his colleagues, but thousands of others wanted to make him feel that they had no gratitude for him. When the tribunes for the year following were elected, he was taken no notice of, but he still remained triumvir.





## LECTURE XXIX.

CONSULSHIP OF L. OPIMIUS AND DEATH OF C. GRACCHUS.

— C. PAPIRIUS CARBO. — L. CRASSUS. — FOREIGN WARS DURING THIS PERIOD. — THE JUGURTHINE WAR, AND SALLUST'S DESCRIPTION OF IT.—M. AEMILIUS SCAURUS.

L. OPIMIUS, a powerful supporter of the senate, was now raised to the consulship, which he had sought in vain the year before, for C. Gracchus, who then possessed the highest degree of popularity, and was convinced that the people would do anything to please him, once requested them to promise him something, and when the promise was made, he asked them to elect C. Fannius consul—none of whose ancestors had yet held this dignity—instead of Opimius<sup>1</sup>, just as in the ancient romance the ladies ask favours of king Arthur. Gracchus had thus incurred the implacable enmity of Opimius, and Fannius faithlessly deserted him, and made common cause with his adversaries. Gracchus was now divested of the *sacro-sancta potestas* of a tribune; the measures of the senate displayed more and more their hostile spirit, and the foundation of the colonies, which had been sanctioned by the senate itself, was suspended. On one occasion, when the people were assembled in front of the capitol, and while Opimius was offering up a sacrifice, Gracchus and his friends were insulted by one of the lictors of the consul, who called out “Make way, you bad citizens, for the good ones.” A tumult arose, and the man was killed<sup>2</sup>. At the instigation of Opimius and the oligarchs

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, C. Gracch. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, C. Gracch. 13. Compare Appian, l. c. i. 25.

the body was carried to the forum, in order to produce some great and tragic scene there. The senate made a decree that the consuls should take care that the republic might not suffer any injury — a decree which invested them with dictatorial power, because it was no longer customary to appoint a dictator. C. Gracchus took leave of his wife, and went with M. Fulvius to the Aventine, which had at all times been a place of refuge for the oppressed. But everything was in a state of utter dissolution, and he had no power to oppose the senate; he never thought of going to extremes, and he could not make up his mind to shed one drop of blood. His friend Fulvius, a man of a bolder and more determined character, armed as many of the populace and as many slaves as he could, to defend himself. Their conduct was like that of Brutus and Cassius. The elements of the old plebeian movements existed no more, and the populace of the city was in such a degraded condition that they had no sympathy for Gracchus, nor could he feel any for them. The consuls therefore had no difficulty, and the only thing they had to do, was to attack the Aventine with a small force. The fact that the equites, who owed their existence as a distinct class to Gracchus, and who from this time forward are mentioned along with the people, as *equites et populus*, acted the part of mere lookers-on, is at first sight rather surprising, but is easily accounted for by the fear which is so peculiar to wealthy persons whose property does not consist of land but of capital. There is, on the whole, no class of men more cowardly than that of mere capitalists, as we see in the history of Florence and of all other republics.

The Aventine was feebly defended, and the clivus publicus was taken by storm. Fulvius Flaccus sent his son, a youth of eighteen years, to the senate to sue for a truce, but the youth was thrown into prison and afterwards put to death. Flaccus himself was overtaken in some house

and slain. Gracchus leaped down from the steep wall of the temple of Luna on the Aventine, at present the church of St. Alessio, in order to reach the Sublician bridge; but he strained his foot, and as no horse was to be had, it was only with great difficulty that he arrived at the bridge. His friends Pomponius and Laetorius, two equites of great fortunes, defended him against the pursuing enemy at the bridge, until they were cut to pieces<sup>3</sup>. Gracchus in the mean time fled across the Tiber into a sacred grove, which however afforded him no protection, for Opimius had promised to give the weight of his head in gold to any one who should bring it to him. Gracchus was soon overtaken, but it is probable that some faithful slave, or client, put an end to his life. Every one knows the horrible barbarity of Septimuleius of Anagnia, who, himself a stranger to all these disputes, filled the head of Gracchus with lead to increase its weight. Opimius put to death, during his consulship, more than 3000 persons, all of whom may be said to have been murdered<sup>4</sup>. Some may have escaped. The scene was, on the whole, like that at Naples in 1799, and all those who fell as victims were men of distinction. Some of those who had belonged to the party of Gracchus became apostates, and among them we find C. Papirius Carbo, who, after being raised to the consulship, defended Opimius against the tribune, Q. Decius, who accused him of having put to death Roman citizens without a trial<sup>5</sup>. Carbo thus became the favourite of the

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, C. Gracch. 16 and 17; Appian, l. c. i. 26; Aurel. Victor, De Vir. Illustr. 65.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, l. c.; Orosius, v. 12.

<sup>5</sup> (Cicero, De Oratore, II. 25, comp. 39; Livy, Epitom. lib. 61.) It is curious to see how great the power and influence of tradition is in some of the tribunician families, and how the same characteristics appear through several generations, or recur after the lapse of a long intermediate period. An analogy to this is seen in England, in the family of the Russells. As instances of it in Roman history I may mention the Maelii, Publilii, Licinii, and Decii. A Decius is mentioned among the first tribunes, and it was a Decius who now had

oligarchs. But he soon found himself attacked by L. Crassus, the brother-in-law of C. Gracchus, and the same of whom Cicero speaks so often in his "Brutus," and in the masterly dialogue "De Oratore." He was a man of very great talent and genius, but it was not cultivated in him as it had been in C. Gracchus. Crassus began his career with the popular party, but he afterwards deserted it: he went over to the senate, and became the detained champion of the oligarchy. His apostacy, however, has nothing in it that is odious, and no blame can be attached to him for it. His coming forth against Carbo was the first blow which the victorious party received; his attacks were so severe, that Carbo put an end to his own life by taking a solution of vitriol (*atramentum sutorium*)<sup>6</sup>. All this was satisfactory to the feelings of those who still cherished the hope that a better time would come. But things remained as they were. The equites were very much intimidated, and the consequences of the independence of the judges had not yet become visible. But matters were brought to a crisis by the war against Jugurtha.

I have not spoken of the foreign wars of the Romans during this period; and, as our time is very limited, I can now only just direct your attention to them. From

the courage to accuse Opimius. In the political condition of our country we can scarcely form a correct notion of such a principle; but in antiquity and in all free countries it preserves the identity of sentiment from generation to generation, and is the security for the identity of the political state of a nation. Where this principle does not exist, we may declare without hesitation that the line which runs through the nation is made of sand, and may break off any where and at any time; so that such a nation is a mere assemblage of individuals, but not a state with an hereditary constitution. I have mentioned this because it is a thing so completely foreign to us, and because some of us might be inclined to look upon it as an enslaving principle.—N.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero, Ad Famil. ix. 21 says *cantharidas sumpsisse dicitur*. Niebuhr here confounds C. Carbo with another person of the same family, who when accused by M. Antonius, *sutorio atramento absolutus putatur*. Cicero, Ad Fam. ix. 21.

the time of Tiberius Gracchus, to that when the Jugurthine war broke out, the Spaniards had shewn but little hostility towards the Romans. The Balearian islands were taken by Q. Metellus, one of the four sons of Metellus Macedonicus. The Metelli now formed the greatest among the illustrious plebeian families, and represented the pride of the oligarchy. They had great characters among them; and all that can be censured, for instance, in Metellus Numidicus, leaves his personal character untouched. The Balearian islands were conquered by one of his brothers, and another subdued the Dalmatians, who appear from henceforward as subject to Rome<sup>7</sup>. The Roman dominion in Gaul was likewise extended. The first who were conquered there were the Salluvians, in Provence, where Aquae Sextiae (Aix en Provence) became the first Roman colony beyond the Alps. During the Hannibalian war, the Arverni had the patronage, or, as it is called in the history of Greece, the supremacy over the greater part of southern Gaul; they were governed by kings, and were in the possession of a splendid empire. In the time of the Gracchi the Romans were engaged in a war against their king, Bituitus, and the Allobrogi, and gained signal victories under Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus. Bituitus was treacherously taken prisoner, and spent the remainder of his days in Italy<sup>8</sup>. Soon after these victories, we must conceive the Roman empire to have extended over Dauphiné, the inhabitants of which (the Allobrogi) however, although they recognised the supremacy of Rome, did not belong to the Roman province. But Provence and lower Languedoc formed a real Roman province; and, although there was not always a praetor or a proconsul residing there, yet the whole administration was that of a province. The exact time when that

<sup>7</sup> Livy, *Epit. lib.* 60 and 62; Florus, *III.* 8.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, *Epit. lib.* 61; Florus, *III.* 2; Vell. *Patercul.* *II.* 10; Appian, *De Reb. Gall.* 12; Eutropius, *IV.* 22.

country was constituted as a Roman province can only be guessed, as we do not possess the books of Livy in which he must have mentioned it.

But by far the most important war of this period is that against Jugurtha. The description which Sallust has given of it is one of the best specimens of ancient literature, and I am almost inclined to prefer it to his *Catiline*. But both works are peculiar phenomena in Roman literature: they are what we call monographies, which are otherwise unknown among the Romans; for the memoirs of Fannius were of quite a different nature. The books of Sallust are not written in the form of annals, the character of which he evidently tries to avoid: his intention was to write history in a compact and plastic manner. The works of Sallust are of such a kind, that the more we read them the more do we find to admire in them: they are true models of excellent historical composition. As regards the Jugurthine war, I can do no better than refer you to Sallust's description of it.

When Masinissa died, he entrusted Scipio with the execution of his will, and left his kingdom to his three sons, Gulussa, Micipsa, and Mastanabal, the last of whom is expressly said to have been well acquainted with Greek literature<sup>9</sup>, so that he was not a barbarian. We must also remember that, at the taking of Carthage, its libraries were given to these Numidian princes. The present shahs in those countries are in an infinitely lower state of civilisation than the ancient kings of Numidia. Gulussa and Mastanabal died; the latter left no legitimate children, but only Jugurtha, a son by a concubine; and thus the vast Numidian empire, extending from the frontiers of Morocco to the Syrtes, fell into the hands of Micipsa<sup>10</sup>. He had two sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal. Jugurtha, who from his childhood had always gained the affections of all who came in contact with him, attracted the attention of king Micipsa. But, when the latter discovered that the talents

<sup>9</sup> Livy, *Epit. lib.* 50.

<sup>10</sup> Sallust, *Jugurth.* 5.



of his young nephew were far superior to those of his own sons, he was led by jealousy to send him to Spain, hoping that he would there terminate his career in the war against Numantia. But Jugurtha was spared by fortune; he distinguished himself, and became the intimate friend of Scipio<sup>11</sup>. Some noble Romans tried to persuade him to cause a revolution, and place himself on the throne of Numidia. When Jugurtha left Spain, he received from Scipio a letter of recommendation to Micipsa, who thus became reconciled to him; and in his will he even placed him on a footing of equality with his own sons—probably in compliance with the wish of the Romans—and the three princes were to govern their empire in common. Hiempsal was proud and ferocious, and insulted Jugurtha, though he was unable to cope with him in any way. As these princes could not live at peace with one another, they resolved to divide the kingdom; but Jugurtha, not satisfied with this, murdered Hiempsal. Jugurtha's character was like that of an Albanese, bold, audacious, cunning, and adroit; he had no notion of the sanctity of an oath, no honesty, and no humanity: he was, in short, of a satanic nature. He also made an attempt on the life of Adherbal, who, however, fled to the Romans. They were, at first, willing to investigate the matter; but Jugurtha bribed the commissioners, among whom Opimius, the murderer of C. Gracchus, was the most conspicuous. They were so overwhelmed with gold by the Numidian usurper, that they decided everything according to his wishes, and divided the kingdom in such a manner that he obtained the most warlike and most productive portion of it<sup>12</sup>. But, immediately after the division, new quarrels arose between him and Adherbal, who was besieged in Cirta. The Italians, who were with Adherbal, advised him to surrender, and tried to stipulate that his life should not be endangered; but Jugurtha cared little about this, and even gave vent to his rage against the Italians. During

<sup>11</sup> Sallust, Jugurth. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Sallust, Jugurth. 16.

the siege of Cirta, a Roman embassy arrived, and called Jugurtha to account for his conduct; but he evaded their summons in the most audacious manner: he deceived them, and gained his object. One of these ambassadors was M. Aemilius Scaurus, a great man in Roman history: but we are, nevertheless, in the greatest difficulty as to what to think about him. When in earlier years I read in Horace<sup>13</sup>,

Regulum et Scauros, animaeque magnae  
Prodigum Paullum, &c.,

I imagined that there must be in his history many things which I did not know, for I was not acquainted with anything to justify such praise. It is at all events a great mistake of Horace to use the plural *Scauros*, for the son of our M. Aemilius Scaurus, whom Cicero defended merely to confer a favour on his family, was a monster, and only another Verres. What seems to speak in favour of our Scaurus, is the great veneration which Cicero entertained for him. To Cicero it was one of the most pleasing recollections of his youth when he thought of the time when, at the age of sixteen, he was introduced by his father into the house of M. Aemilius Scaurus, and formed the acquaintance of Mucius Scaevola, and all the great men of that age. But if we look upon Scaurus as a man, without any such bias in his favour, we can say nothing without falling into the greatest contradictions, for at different times he is quite a different man. There are persons who at one time display a very honourable character, though at an earlier period of their lives they may have acted as very bad citizens, and as if they had no principles whatever. Such a man was, in the history of England, old Shaftesbury, and the patriots under Charles II., who at one time kept up a secret correspondence with Louis XIV., while at other times they were real patriots<sup>14</sup>. The fundamental features in the


<sup>13</sup> Carm. i. 12, 37.

<sup>14</sup> I know a man who has a great name in history, and who at one

character of Scaurus were very great pride, decided talents, and inflexibility. He was a great statesman, and during the last twenty years of his life he seems to have conducted himself, if not in a virtuous manner, yet with great consistency, so that, at least as far as appearance goes, he deserves the reputation which he has in history. His conduct, at the time when he was one of the commissioners to Numidia, was blameless, for he was particularly hostile towards Jugurtha. But after the death of Adherbal, things became too bad: the consul L. Carpurnius Piso Bestia, received orders to lead an army into Africa against Jugurtha, and Scaurus accompanied him as his legate. The war was at first conducted in an honest way, but Jugurtha contrived to persuade Bestia and Scaurus that peace was far more advantageous to them than war. He nominally submitted to the Romans; thirty elephants, money, cattle, and deserters were surrendered to them; but the whole transaction was a shameful masquerade, for the deserters were allowed to escape, and the elephants were given back for money<sup>15</sup>. These things excited the greatest indignation at Rome, and C. Memmius, a bold tribune, came forward to expose the whole of the revolting system.

time did not scruple to appropriate advantages to himself with the utmost indelicacy, but who, at other times, has acted like a true political hero. Man is a changeable being.—N.

<sup>15</sup> Sallust, Jugurth. 29.



## LECTURE XXX.

THE WAR AGAINST JUGURTHA CONTINUED.—Q. CAECILIUS METELLUS.—C. MARIUS BRINGS THE WAR TO A CLOSE.—THE CIMBRI AND TEUTONES.—DEFEATS OF THE ROMANS BY THE CIMBRI.—C. MARIUS FOUR TIMES CONSUL; BEGINS HIS CAMPAIGN IN HIS FOURTH CONSULSHIP.

BESTIA's treaty with Jugurtha was so scandalous, that C. Memmius carried a decree that an inquiry should be made into those transactions; and L. Cassius, who was looked upon as a man of the greatest integrity, was appointed for the purpose. His word was of such weight that Jugurtha, in reliance upon it, ventured to come to Rome to be tried. In Jugurtha's whole conduct we see an evil tendency, combined with a feeling of weakness, in his relation to Rome. He was on the point of betraying his accomplices, to avoid which there was no other means than that of abusing the tribunician power: so C. Baebius, one of the tribunes, was bought over to forbid Jugurtha to speak. The tribunician power had at that time become strong for evil, but feeble for good. Jugurtha, encouraged by such proceedings, murdered Massiva, a young Numidian, and a descendant of Masinissa, who was then staying at Rome, and Jugurtha escaped to Africa in safety, leaving his sureties behind him. The senate, however, now annulled the transactions with Jugurtha, and sent Sp. Postumius Albinus with an army to Africa. He conducted the war in a slow and careless manner, and then resigned the command to his brother Aulus, who

allowed himself to be imposed upon to such an extent that he was surrounded by the Numidians; he lost his camp, and concluded a disgraceful treaty with Jugurtha.

Q. Caecilius Metellus now obtained the command, and was provided with great military forces. Three quaestors were appointed to inquire into the transactions with Jugurtha; they were equites, and did not form a popular court,—one of whom was M. Scaurus, according to the statement of Sallust<sup>1</sup>. Scaurus had contrived to get this office in order to conceal the part he had taken in former crimes; for many of his accomplices, and among them Opimius, had been condemned, and the whole party had completely lost the favour of public opinion. From this moment the division began, which afterwards led to the civil war between the parties of Marius and Sulla. The equites formed the opposition. Respecting the internal history of Rome during this time little is known, and not even the names of those who were put to death by the sentence of the quaestors. That Opimius and Bestia fell is certain, but it is a *per multos vagata quaestio*. Metellus conducted the war for two years in a manner which deserves our greatest respect, although he made some mistakes. For the details I refer you to Sallust. Jugurtha engaged in an open battle only once, and lost it.

The war had been protracted, and no one knew how long it would yet last, when the opinion became prevalent at Rome that it was the fault of Metellus that it had not yet been brought to a close, although no one had reason to doubt his virtue. He was incorruptible, disinterested, just, a great statesman and general, and his personal character was quite blameless, but his pride and his pretensions were unbearable; and it cannot be denied that this trait in his character brought great sufferings upon his country, and that the immense irritation of Marius would never have been roused had not the whole party of the optimates set their engines to work to keep him down.

<sup>1</sup> Jugurth. 40.

C. Marius was his legate. The accounts of the ancients respecting his descent are doubtful: some represent him as a man of very low birth, others raise him somewhat higher<sup>2</sup>; but it is quite certain that his ancestors were clients of a municipal family of Arpinum, which does not however imply that they were not free men. His name is Campanian, and consequently Oscan. He was poor, but this did not do him any harm; and I also believe it to be true, that he served at first as a common soldier, and that at a still earlier period he worked as a field labourer<sup>3</sup>. But his extraordinary genius must soon have become manifest, otherwise he would never have been able to rise so high; for it was a rare occurrence among the Romans, especially in later times, for a common soldier to rise above the rank of a military tribune, unless indeed he had the very best connexions. But Marius rose without them. At the time when he came forward as a candidate for the aedileship, he must have acquired considerable property, but he was unsuccessful. Soon after, however, he obtained the praetorship; but even at that time the oligarchs acted badly towards him<sup>4</sup>. He, however, maintained his ground against their charge of *ambitus*, which was at that time an every-day occurrence; for every one was accustomed to spend his money when he offered himself as a candidate for some office, and then to make the crime, of which he himself was guilty, a charge against his competitors. When Metellus went to Numidia, he made Marius one of his legates. It was at that time not very uncommon for a *homo novus* to rise to the office of praetor; and when Sallust<sup>5</sup> says that a *homo novus* had never before obtained the consulship, he is very much mistaken; for out of the six praetors, four usually rose to the consulship; and it was in this way that Fannius had been made consul.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Mar. 3; Vell. Patercul. II. 11; Sallust, Jugurth. 63.

<sup>3</sup> See the passage of Juvenal, quoted in vol. III. p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Mar. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Jugurth. 63.



Marius, who at the time of the Jugurthine war must have been a man of about fifty years of age, signalised himself very much in the Roman army. He was very superstitious, and was always accompanied by a Syrian, probably a Jewish, prophetess, of the name of Martha, in whose counsels he had implicit faith<sup>6</sup>. Once, while he was offering a sacrifice, something had happened which, as he believed, promised him the highest honours of the republic<sup>7</sup>. Stimulated by such circumstances, he resolved to seek the consulship. This presumption was more than Metellus could brook, and he therefore tried to dissuade him from it, and to detain him in the camp, by throwing ridicule on his ambitious scheme. But, when Marius resolutely applied to Metellus for leave to go to Rome, the latter forgot himself so far as to say that he need not be in a hurry to obtain a refusal, and that he had better wait until his (Metellus') son could be elected as his colleague. The son of Metellus was a young man of about twenty, and had consequently to wait twenty years longer before he was allowed to sue for the consulship. Marius never forgot this mockery: he quitted Africa without leave of absence, and, on his arrival at Rome, he was received by the people with extraordinary favour. It is unjust to call the Gracchi demagogues, but Marius deserves that name in the fullest sense. He flattered the populace, and delighted in appearing among them as one of their equals. He was not fit for the time in which he lived; for he had a peculiar kind of pride, which many circumstances tended to wound; and this perpetual irritation exasperated him. Greek education and Greek literature were then as prevalent, and thought to be as necessary, as an intimate acquaintance with French literature was in my youth; and, if we recall to our minds that period of our own history, we may understand how great the demand for Greek literature must have been at that time. Marius, though he was undoubtedly acquainted

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, Mar. 17.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, Mar. 8; Sallust, l. c.

with the literature of his own country, despised that of the Greeks, as well as that which was then the fashionable literature of the day among the Romans. He possessed great wealth, which can have been acquired only in war; and it is a remarkable characteristic of the times, that he was nevertheless considered as a man of incorruptible manners, as a *vir sanctus*; whereas, about 180 years before, Fabricius was thought a *vir sanctus*, because he possessed nothing that belonged to the luxuries of life. We must, however, acknowledge that C. Marius had not robbed the republic. His talents as a general were immense, and it was the consciousness of his superiority in this respect that bore him aloft. The opinion of the nation was not divided on this point. He was as great on the day of battle, as in the disposition of his troops and in the art of fortifying his camp; and in the management of a campaign he was unrivalled. He had few friends, for the prominent features of his character were bitterness, hatefulness, and cruelty; but he was, at the same time, the man whom Providence had sent to save Rome, the degradation of which had been brought about by those who opposed him. Metellus, when compared with Marius, was no more than an ordinary general; for Marius was an extraordinary man, of great foresight, and free from all rashness: at times when it was necessary to act, his energy knew no bounds, and he had at once the clearest possible insight into all the circumstances and relations of the case. His hatred of the optimates led him to bring many a charge against them, which, although unjust, appeared to him perfectly just. After being raised to the consulship, he received the command to bring the war against Jugurtha to a close. On this occasion, Metellus shewed a mean spirit; and, not being able to bear the sight of Marius, he departed to Rome in secret<sup>8</sup>. Marius could not terminate the war till his second campaign, when he entered

<sup>8</sup> Sallust, Jugurth. 86.

into negotiations with Bocchus, king of Mauretania, who delivered up Jugurtha into the hands of the Romans. The conduct of Jugurtha had been alternately pusillanimous and audacious, and he was unable to accommodate himself to circumstances. He had delivered up to Metellus 200,000 pounds of silver, all his elephants, and a part of his horses and arms; but, when he himself was ordered to surrender, he escaped into the desert. He had thus himself destroyed all his resources<sup>9</sup>.

The war against Jugurtha was thus concluded; and it was high time indeed, for the republic required the talents of Marius in a war, compared with which that against the Numidian king was little and insignificant. The Cimbri and Teutones were expected on the frontiers of Italy, after they had cut to pieces the armies of Q. Servilius Caepio and Cn. Manlius. The Cimbri were not real Gauls, but Cymri, of the same stock to which belonged the Welsh, the Basbretons, the early inhabitants of Cumberland, and the whole western coast of England. Their language was still spoken by some persons in Cumberland as late as 150 years ago.

The Picts of Scotland were likewise Cynri, and the Belgae also belonged to the same race. The Gauls who had conquered Rome included a great number of Gael, and the Cymri must have been predominant. They extended eastward as far as the river Dniepr, where they were called Galatians.<sup>10</sup> But the whole question about these nations is one which we cannot settle with proper accuracy. These tribes had been driven from their seats by the progress of the Sarmatians. In the year 639 they appeared in Noricum, on the frontier of Italy, which extended in reality as far as the bay of Triest, a district which was already inhabited by Gauls who lived under the protection of the Romans. The Cimbri, who re-

<sup>9</sup> Sallust, l. c. 62.

<sup>10</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 522 foll.; Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, I. p. 519 foll.

mained behind, appear on the middle Danube and in Hungary, attacking the Boians, a kindred tribe, as well as foreigners, in order to acquire a territory to live in. The Teutones had already left the southern part of Bohemia. That they were Germans is as certain as that the Cimbri were Cymri, or, more generally speaking, Gael. Many Gaelic words have a general affinity to the Cymrian, and yet the languages differ so much from each other, that the Cymri and Gael do not understand each other, though both are comprised under the generic name of the Gaelic nation. Whether the Cimbri and Teutones had already united their forces in Noricum, or whether they were yet separated there, is unknown. The Romans sent out an army to protect the Carnians under Cn. Papirius Carbo<sup>11</sup>, the son of the Carbo who had put an end to his life when accused by L. Licinius Crassus; but he was defeated in 639, in the neighbourhood of Norcia, by the Cimbri, who seem to have fought alone there. The Cimbri, who were satisfied with this victory, did not descend into Italy, either because they were overawed by the name of the Romans, or from other reasons unknown to us. They afterwards appear in Helvetia, where they were joined by the Tigurini. What country the Ambrones came from is totally unknown; one might almost suspect that they were Ligurians from the Alpine mountains, but the question is an inextricable problem. The Cimbri now threw themselves into Gaul, like a horde of nomades, with an immense number of waggons loaded with women and children. It is difficult to say where they defeated M. Junius Silanus and M. Aurelius Scaurus<sup>12</sup>, for our accounts are incredibly scanty. According to one statement it might almost seem that in one of these battles the Romans had advanced as far as La Rochelle, between Poitou and the Garonne<sup>13</sup>. Another de-

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Gall.* 15; Livy, *Epit. lib.* 63.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 65 and 67; Florus, *III.* 3; Asconius Pedian. in Corn.

<sup>13</sup> Orosius, *v.* 15.

feat was sustained near the lake of Geneva by the consul L. Cassius Longinus<sup>14</sup>. Thus defeat followed after defeat. The Romans wished to protect the Gauls, but all attempts failed. These ravages of the Cimbri brought, for the moment, infinite misery upon the Gauls, but they prepared at the same time the way for the victories of Caesar; for with the exception of the Belgae, who made a successful stand against the Cimbri, nearly all the other towns of Gaul were taken and laid waste.


The greatest defeat which the Romans suffered in this war, was on the river Rhone, the year after the first consulship of Marius. The proconsul Q. Servilius Caepio and the consul Cn. Manlius undertook the war in that year with two consular armies. Their number, which is stated to have been 80,000,<sup>15</sup> makes us suppose that a great number of Gallic auxiliaries served in the Roman armies. The two consular armies were totally annihilated<sup>16</sup>. The consequence was, that Marius, now again the only man on whom the nation fixed their hopes, was made consul for the second time; and even his political adversaries, who saw the very existence of the republic endangered, now supported his elevation. It was fortunate for the Romans that the Cimbri, after this great victory, turned to Spain, either because they dreaded the passage over the Alps, or because they shrunk from attacking the Romans in their own country. They now for a few years ranged over Spain, and the ravages which they made there were perhaps as great as those inflicted on the same country by the Suevi and Vandals, in the fifth century of our aera. The Celtiberians shewed their usual bravery, and maintained themselves in their towns, while other places were

<sup>14</sup> Livy, *Epit. lib. 65*; Orosius, *v. 15*; compare Caesar, *De Bello Gall. i. 12*.

<sup>15</sup> According to Orosius (*v. 16*) Valerius Antias was the only authority for this number.—N. Compare Livy, *Epit. lib. 67*.

<sup>16</sup> Dion. Cass. *Excerpt. Vales. p. 631*; Florus, *III. 3*; Eutrop. *v. 1*; Vell. Paternul. *II. 12*.

taken and destroyed. Marius devoted the time of his second and third consulships to the forming and training of a new army. The elements of which the Roman armies had formerly consisted had degenerated with the social and political condition of the people: the Roman population no longer consisted of a free peasantry, and armies could be raised only from a mass, which deserved no other name than that of a populace. The task of Marius, to make well disciplined soldiers out of such materials, was a very difficult one indeed. The remnants of former armies were, for the most part, utterly demoralized, and the army which he formed, consisted of foul-hearted recruits of the very worst description, and of veterans whom he had brought over from Africa. At length, in his fourth consulship, he marched out against the enemy; but even before this he had chosen the banks of the Rhone, on the frontiers of Provence and Dauphiné, as the field for exercising his troops, and he had accustomed them to the greatest possible exertions. Many had perished under the hardships they had to endure, but those who survived had become hardened and stedfast soldiers.





## LECTURE XXXI.

C. MARIUS DEFEATS THE TEUTONES, AND, IN CONJUNCTION WITH C. LUTATIUS CATULUS, THE CIMBRI ALSO.—THE CONSULSHIPS OF MARIUS.—L. APPULEIUS SATURNINUS AND HIS AGRARIAN LAWS.—HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES ARE PUT TO DEATH.—THE EQUITES AS JUDICES AND FARMERS OF THE REVENUE.

WHEN the Cimbri were returning from Spain, and when it was generally believed that they would take the same road across the Alps which Hannibal had chosen, the Gauls forgot their hostile feelings towards the Romans, and began to look upon them as their protectors. The barbarians, for reasons which we do not know, shewed no inclination to attack Marius. The Cimbri separated their troops from those of the Teutones, and the former marched round the northern foot of the Alps towards Noricum, in order to invade Italy from that quarter, while the latter remained in Gaul. The reason why Marius now retreated is unknown, like many other things connected with this war. The Cimbri passed by the Roman camp, jeering and mocking their enemies, and marched around Switzerland, and between the Pennine Alps and those of Trent, where at that period there was no practicable road for such hosts with their waggons. The Romans sent an army under the proconsul, C. Lutatius Catulus, to meet them in the neighbourhood of Trent; but in point of discipline his army was quite the reverse of that of Marius; just as Catulus himself was the very opposite to Marius in acquirements and accomplishments, for according to Cicero<sup>1</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> Brutus, 35.

he was well acquainted with Greek literature. When Marius retreated from the Isere, the Teutones followed him with increased confidence in their own strength, as is generally the case when an enemy seems to take to flight. Marius pitched his camp, either intentionally or by chance, in such a position that the soldiers could not venture to go out to provide themselves with water without their arms. The skirmishes which thus took place led to the decisive engagement, which lasted for two days. Marius sent his legate, M. Claudius Marcellus, with one legion to attack the enemy's rear ; and this plan was successful, as it frustrated the attacks of the barbarians upon the Roman camp. Southern nations have much stronger muscles, and can endure much more than we can, and it is an erroneous opinion that they can bear less cold than we ; for in Napoleon's campaign in Russia the Italians held out much longer than the other soldiers. The battle against the Teutones, which took place in summer, also furnishes a proof of their superiority in this respect ; for the northern barbarians, unable to bear the heat of the sun, were defeated on the second day. They retreated to their waggons, but could not maintain their ground, and the whole nation was literally annihilated, for those who survived put an end to their own lives<sup>2</sup>.

When half of the danger had thus been removed, the Cimbri descended from the Alps of Trent. Orosius<sup>3</sup> is the only ancient writer on these events, in whom we rejoice to find a pure source of information ; in other narratives, especially that of Florus, it would seem as if the Cimbri had been the most senseless of barbarians. Had Florus not been the *homo umbraticus* he really was, he would have known that when an army has to march through a river, the cavalry ride through it in thick columns at a higher place, which most assuredly does check the current of the river, and greatly

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Marius, 19 foll. ; Livy, Epit. lib. 69 ; Vell. Patercul.  
11. 12.

<sup>3</sup> v. 16.

facilitates the passage for the infantry below; and in many parts of the river Adige this method is particularly successful. Florus further says that they threw trees into the river, intending thereby to stop its course; but I cannot believe that they were so foolish as to imagine anything of the sort. If they threw trees into the river, it was certainly with a view to break down the bridge of the Romans, and this plan could not but succeed. Lutatius Catulus, being unable to hold out against the rapid progress of the Cimbri, retreated even beyond the river Po. The towns of Verona, Mantua, and others were left to the protection of their own walls. We are completely in the dark as to what took place further; we do not even know the exact position of the *Campi Raudii*, on which the great battle was fought. Some place it near *Vercellae*<sup>4</sup>, and as it does not appear who could have invented such a statement, there seems to be no reason why we should reject it. It is, however, certain that the Cimbri for some time ranged over Lombardy north of the Po, and that they made dreadful ravages. But Marius, now consul for the fifth time, came to the assistance of Catulus, and after the two armies were united they won the decisive battle, concerning the detail of which scarcely anything is known. Thus much only is certain, that the Cimbri formed a great mass, and it may be that their front lines were bound together with chains, in order to form, as it were, an impregnable wall<sup>5</sup>. Diseases had already begun to rage among the barbarians, for Lombardy is, in general, a very unhealthy country, on account of the bad water. Marius is said to have placed his lines in such a position, that the sun and the wind were against his enemy<sup>6</sup>, but we cannot decide whether this is true or not. But the fate of the Cimbri was the same as that of the Teutones, and those who escaped could do nothing but take refuge among the small tribe of the *Aduatici*, with whom they had formed an

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Mar. 25.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, l. c. 27.

<sup>6</sup> Florus, III. 3.

alliance. Here they must have taken up their abode for a time<sup>7</sup>.

It is a controverted point whether the merit of this victory belongs to Marius or Catulus, but I believe that there is no ground for looking upon the matter as doubtful, for it cannot be denied that Catulus was jealous and envious of the vulgar upstart. Marius celebrated his victory by the most brilliant triumph; but how giddy he had become by his lofty position was seen most strikingly when he entered the senate in his triumphal robes. He was rewarded for his services by being made consul for the sixth time, perhaps the first instance of a man being invested six times with this honour; for it cannot be said with certainty, whether Valerius Corvus had been consul six times<sup>8</sup>, though I am almost convinced of it. The general opinion at Rome was, that some one before C. Marius *had* been invested with the consulship six times, and the Romans evinced no surprise, until he obtained the same dignity for the seventh time.

The period which now follows is so full of horrors, that it would have been better for Marius if he had died on the day of his triumph, for then the world would have seen him only in his glory, and—have been deceived. He had formed connexions with a knave, L. Appuleius Saturninus, a man who is frequently coupled with the Gracchi, although there can hardly be any difference so great as that between Saturninus and the Gracchi. This Saturninus is a strange phaenomenon. I can hardly believe that there were real foundations for all the charges brought against Catiline, for in regard to some of them it is impossible to discover what could have been his object; but such is not the case with Saturninus: it is really difficult to account for his conduct. He was by no means of vulgar origin: he belonged to a noble plebeian family. I do not recollect at this moment whether it is of him or of his companion, C. Servilius Glaucia, that Cicero says that

<sup>7</sup> Caesar, De Bello Gall. II. 29.

<sup>8</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 124.

he had never known a man of a more malign wit<sup>9</sup>. In his career to the higher offices of the republic he had been offended. Italy was divided into eight quaesturae, which were distributed by lot, and one of them was the quaestura Ostiensis, with which the duty of providing for the granaries at Rome was connected. Saturninus had held the office of quaestor Ostiensis, but owing to some acts of injustice, he was deprived of it. Just as this punishment was, it gave him a severe blow<sup>10</sup>. He then became tribune, and in this capacity he shewed the most scandalous conduct towards the censors. When he offered himself for the tribuneship a second time, and a certain Nonius was put forward as his competitor, Saturninus incited the people so much against him, that the unfortunate man was murdered in the market place. Saturninus thus obtained the tribuneship by force. One of his comrades was the praetor C. Servilius Glaucia, a man of very noble birth. It is difficult to say what these two in reality wanted, but we must believe that, however wild their scheme may appear, one of them intended in his frantic folly to establish himself as tyrant. In order to comprehend the characters of this period of Roman history, we must look upon them as complete madmen. Robespierre was a man of a similar stamp, for no one can say what his real object was. Men of that description merely wish to rule at random, without having themselves any distinct notion of what they want. The second tribuneship of Saturninus was at the time of the sixth consulship of C. Marius. He began a complete course of legislation, commencing with agrarian laws<sup>11</sup>. It would seem as if the lands, which were to be distributed according to his agrarian law, were in Gaul, and that it

<sup>9</sup> Something to this effect is said by Cicero (*Brutus*, 62) of Glaucia.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero, *Pro Sext.* 17; *De Harusp. Respons.* 20; Diodorus *Fragm. lib. xxvi. Eclog. 2*, p. 527.

<sup>11</sup> Plutarch, *Marius*. 29.

was his intention to establish colonies there<sup>12</sup>. Marius, whom he flattered immoderately, was to have the honour of bestowing on three individuals in each of these colonies the rights and privileges of Roman citizens. If in former times a general had had such presumption, it would have called forth a rebellion. The agrarian laws, when passed by the people, no further required any sanction, and as the senate did not prevent their passing, Saturninus demanded that all the senators should expressly swear to them beforehand<sup>13</sup>. Marius refused taking the oath, perhaps because he had acquired some insight into the contemptible character of Saturninus, or, what is more probable, from a want of fixed principles, which he shewed on many occasions; for soon afterwards he changed his mind, and advised the senators to take the oath, declaring that it was impossible to refuse it any longer. Metellus Numidicus now alone resisted, and shewed a determination of character which was greater than his Numidian victories. Saturninus had him dragged out of the senate-house. The year passed away amidst the greatest atrocities. But fortunately Saturninus and his followers carried their excesses so far, that Marius abandoned their cause. When the time of the new elections came on, Glaucia offered himself as a candidate for the consulship, and with him a noble Roman, C. Memmius, probably the same man who had been tribune in the time of the war with Jugurtha. The adversaries of Memmius did not scruple to attack and murder him in the public market<sup>14</sup>. This was too glaring a crime, and Marius was applied to to put an end to these atrocities, and he at once resolved to do so. He received from the senate the command, *videret, nequid res publica detrimenti caperet*. He forthwith summoned all the citizens, and the knaves retreated to the capitol, where they were besieged. There

<sup>12</sup> Appian De Bell. Civil. i. 29; Cicero, pro Balbo, 21; Livy, Epit. lib. 69.

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch, Mar. 29.

<sup>14</sup> Cicero, in Catilin. iv. 2; Appian, De Bell. Civil. i. 32.



is in the capitol a very ancient well, which I have discovered, and which at that time must have been in the same condition as it is at present, otherwise the besieged would have been able to satisfy their thirst<sup>15</sup>. This well is now in the most wretched condition, and it is impossible to drink the water. At length the besieged surrendered at discretion, and were all put to death. This act reconciled the minds of the people to Marius, who now took a second step towards a better course, by causing Metellus to be recalled from his exile. He then retired to the station of a private man, for he had never entertained the idea of making himself tyrant.

The republic was shaken to its very foundations. The equites, from their jealousy and hatred of the senate and of the governors in the provinces, had abused their judicial powers in such a way that they were looked upon as tyrants, and parties again began to apply to the senate. The great farmers of the public revenues had amassed the most exorbitant treasures, and their extorting far greater portions than the laws permitted brought them into collision with the consuls. In the Bible we see the manner in which the *τελώναι*, the agents of the publicani, carried on their proceedings. When a consul himself oppressed the provincials, he might be accused of malversation, *repetundarum*; but when one of the publicani was accused, he had only to write to one of his colleagues at Rome, and request them to deal gently with him, and he was sure to escape. As soon as the equites had once established the system of regarding only their own interest, every attempt on the part of the provincials to obtain justice was useless.

<sup>15</sup> Plutarch, Mar. 30; Aurel. Victor, De Vir. Illustr. 73; Appian, l. c. Compare, vol. III. p. 306. notes, 524 and 529.

## LECTURE XXXII.

INTERNAL CONDITION OF ROME. — THE LEX DOMITIA DE SACERDOTIIS. — THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE EQUITES. — THE QUESTION ABOUT THE FRANCHISE OF THE ITALIANS. — M. LIVIUS DRUSUS, AND HIS LEGISLATION. — HIS ASSASSINATION. — THE LAW OF Q. VARIUS.

THE happy termination of the war against the Cimbri and Teutones and the suppression of the disturbances of Saturninus were followed by a period of precarious tranquillity, during which no reflecting man could be mistaken as to the internal condition of the republic and its prospects, although the great mass undoubtedly continued to live on quietly and heedlessly. The condition of the rich and powerful was brilliant, but those who saw deeper cannot have overlooked the state of disease, and even the decomposition which was taking place; they must have seen the necessity of coming to a determination respecting the Italian subjects of Rome. But no one seems to have thought of a reform calculated to avert the threatening evil; various things were undertaken, but not carried out. It is a characteristic sign of those times, that those who wanted to get power began by making themselves popular, and after having obtained their ends they went over to the opposite party. Thus Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus deprived the college of pontiffs of the right of filling up the vacancies which occurred in the college, and transferred it to the tribes in such a manner that only seventeen tribes (the smaller half of thirty-five,) were chosen by lot to elect the priests<sup>1</sup>. In former times

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *De leg. Agrar.* 11. 7 ; Vell. *Patercul.* 11. 12.

the pontiffs had been chosen from among the patricians, and by them in their curiae; and when subsequently the plebeians were admitted to share the pontificate with the patricians, they naturally took part in the elections also; but when this custom ceased, and when the curiae had become something quite different from what they had been originally, the college of pontiffs itself naturally acquired the right of co-optation. Now, how was it that Cn. Domitius transferred this right to seventeen out of the thirty-five tribes? The origin of the measure must have been that Cn. Domitius attributed a different meaning to an ancient expression, according to which the Luceres had been called the *minor pars populi*, and which he applied to the seventeen tribes. This Domitian law is the latest instance of an occurrence in which we can trace any of the characteristics of the primitive constitution of Rome.

The great question, which was now brought forward on all occasions, was that concerning the judicial power of the equites, because, as I said yesterday, it had become more and more evident every year that they exercised their right no better than the senators had done before, and that they were just as accessible by bribes. Their courts of justice had reduced the senate to a real state of dependence, and the senate and the government, the best among them as well as the worst, must have felt the urgent necessity of a remedy. Among the best we may mention Q. Mucius Scaevola, who shewed such an exemplary conduct in Asia<sup>2</sup>, that had the publicani, against whom he protected the provincials, been able to find any pretext for accusing him, he would have been condemned like a guilty criminal<sup>3</sup>. Here then was a case in which the necessity of a reform must have been generally felt; but it is a misfortune which Rome suffered in common with all other free states, that although every

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, c. Verrem, 11, 10; Pseudo-Asconius in Verr. 11. p. 210, in Divinat. p. 122, ed. Orelli.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, pro Plancio, 14.

one may be convinced of the necessity of a reform, yet no one appears to see the way in which it is to be effected.

The second important question was that respecting the civic franchise of the Italians, so similar to the present Catholic emancipation question in Great Britain. Every one was convinced that the franchise must be granted, and every one was inclined to grant it; but then again, so soon as private interests were consulted, the affair appeared in a different light; and while thus the Romans were one year willing to bestow the franchise upon the Italians, another year they refused to do so. There had hitherto been a good understanding between the Romans and the Italians, but a great bitterness now began to spread, and the Italians came forward, and resolutely demanded the Roman franchise. The men who had before inspired the Italians with hopes were now driven to the adoption of measures which exasperated the Italians. Such a measure was the *lex Mucia Licinia*<sup>4</sup>, which did not indeed forbid the allies to reside in Rome, but deprived them of the privileges connected with the residence at Rome, and thus took from them rights which they had acquired by custom. The lists of citizens were revised, and the names of allies were expunged, so that at the very time when they demanded more than they possessed, the little which they did possess was taken from them. The degree of exasperation produced by this measure may easily be imagined. Under these circumstances the tribune, M. Livius Drusus, a son of the opponent of C. Gracchus, came boldly forward with a remedy for the distressed state of Rome. He was a man of extraordinary talents, and of a better nature than his father. The eyes of the whole nation were directed towards him, and the leading men of the republic joined him in his endeavours to prevent a revolution by introducing the necessary re-

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, pro Cornel. fragm. 10. p. 449; Asconius in Cornel. p. 67 ed. Orelli; De Officiis, III. 11; De Oratore, II. 64.

forms. It is a strange thing that, in the history of this late period, there are more things which we can only guess at than in the early times of Roman history. In regard to the latter, the traditionary forms are firmly established, and we may draw conclusions from them as evident as those drawn from mathematical premises, and say: "if such or such a thing took place, this or that other thing must of necessity have taken place likewise." But in these later times, when all institutions had lost their stability, we can no longer draw such inferences. It is for this reason that the changes introduced by M. Livius Drusus are so very obscure. To me, however, it appears probable that the account given by Appian<sup>5</sup> is correct. It is acknowledged on all hands that the main object of Drusus was to introduce a mixture in the composition of the courts of justice<sup>6</sup>. Had he attempted to give them back entirely into the hands of the senators, the consequence would have been a revolution. The number of senators amounted to three hundred, and to these he wished to add three hundred equites, who were to be received into the senate; and out of these six hundred the jury<sup>7</sup> were to be taken, half of whom would undoubtedly be senators. As he thus admitted the equites into the senate, he offered them an advantage which might be a compensation for their loss of the exclusive possession of the judicial power. A clause was added to this bill, that quaestiones concerning judges who had accepted bribes should be instituted before the same tribunal: an awful symptom of the times!

<sup>5</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* I. 35. Compare Livy, *Epit. lib.* 71; Aur. Victor, *De Vir. illustr.* 66.

<sup>6</sup> Vell. Patercul. II. 13; Cicero, *pro Rabir. Postumo*, 7; *pro Cluent.* 56; Livy, *Epit. lib.* 70.

<sup>7</sup> From the time of the Gracchi the judices at Rome may be looked upon as analogous to our jury, a term which some English scholars have improperly applied to a much earlier period. But previous to the time of the Gracchi we read only of single judices, or of popular courts.—N.

This clause determined the equites to oppose the bill, as we clearly see from a passage in Cicero<sup>8</sup>. Many of the equites also had no wish to enter the senate, and preferred a position in which they were lords and masters of the state, and which enabled them to censure others, to one which imposed upon them a moral responsibility, and exposed them to the danger of being censured and accused. It moreover appears that it was not the intention of the law of Drusus constantly to keep up the number of three hundred equites in the senate by filling up any vacancy that might occur, and the addition of three hundred equites seems to have been only a temporary measure. The equites may therefore have said, "the consequence of this bill will be, that in the end the judicial power will again fall into the hands of a senate of 600 nobles, and vacancies will be filled up at the discretion of the senate, as if we did not exist at all: the bill therefore is only a scheme to deceive us." But, notwithstanding all this, the measure of Drusus seems to me the best that could have been devised, because it was not his intention to stop short there, but, at the same time, to confer the franchise upon the Italians. This reform was intended to impart fresh life and energy to the higher classes of the Romans, and to extend the body of Roman citizens, so as to make them a nation with a new aristocracy. His agrarian laws<sup>9</sup>, on the other hand, respecting which scarcely anything is recorded, aimed at raising the lower and restoring the middle classes, and were intended to benefit both the Italians and the Romans. The divisions among the Italians, Umbrians, and Etruscans, became as manifest on this occasion, as those among the Italians, Latins, and Romans, had been in the time of C. Gracchus. In what manner such divisions spread fur-

<sup>8</sup> Pro Rabirio Postumo, 7 ; comp. pro Cluentio, 56.

<sup>9</sup> Aurel. Victor, De Vir. illustr. 66 ; Scholia Bobiens. pro Milone, p. 282 ed. Orelli ; Diodorus, Excerpt. Vatic. p. 128 ed. Dindorf ; Vell. Patercul. 11. 14.



ther and further, may be seen in the history of the internal disputes of other free states, with which our scholars are so seldom acquainted<sup>10</sup>. Thus the tribuneship of Drusus has been a real *crux historicorum*, and people have asked "how could the bitter hostility between Drusus and the consul L. Marcius Philippus have arisen? Drusus was popular, and would not his laws have strengthened the aristocracy? Where then was the difference?" The answer to these questions must be looked for in the nature of the circumstances. We know that Drusus was hated by the senate as well as by the equites, and that in the end he was murdered by assassins. Philippus was his sworn enemy, and when he pronounced the awful word preserved by Cicero<sup>11</sup>, revealing the secret that there were no more than 2000 families whose property was unimpaired, we at once catch a glimpse of the abyss of destruction, and of the forlorn state of the republic. It is natural enough, that the stupid ruling party should have been exasperated against Drusus, and have thought it degrading that they, the three hundred senators who were in possession of the power, should allow three hundred equites to be placed on a footing of equality with them. In such

<sup>10</sup> In Geneva, for instance, there was a long dispute between the *bourgeois* and the *citoyens*, the latter claiming the rights of the former; and after the two parties were placed on a footing of equality, the *Natives*, being the sons of foreign parents, but born at Geneva, supported the party of the *Représentants* in their dispute with the *Négatifs*; and when the demands of the *Représentants* were satisfied in 1789, the resident aliens or *Habitants*, came forward and made the same claims. Such is always the case in free states, and in this and similar instances we may see clearly, how impossible it is for a scholar like Freinsheim, though he was a learned and industrious man, to form a clear notion of the real condition of the ancient republics. Freinsheim might have had an accurate knowledge of many things, if he had concerned himself about the history of the constitution of his own native city of Strassburg; but he knew nothing but his library, and thus, whenever he touched upon the living reality of ancient history, he saw nothing but hollow words. It is only when we conceive ancient history as something actual and real that it has any meaning.—N.

<sup>11</sup> De Officiis, II. 21.

circumstances oligarchs exhibit a degree of stupidity and obstinacy which excites our amazement: they *will* make no concessions and no improvements. Such was the real state of things in those times, and we cannot wonder how it happened that the unfortunate Drusus found himself abandoned by both parties. He was an impetuous man, and had undertaken the dangerous part of a mediator between the Romans and Italians, whom we must conceive of as a free Italian nation, not including, however, the Greeks, Umbrians, Etruscans, and the Latin colonies, for the last of these were sure to be the first to obtain the Roman franchise. Things went so far that the Italians swore an oath of allegiance to Drusus, which in the *Excerpta Vaticana* of Diodorus<sup>12</sup> is absurdly called ὄρκος Φιλίππου. This oath is extremely remarkable, for it shews an association of a peculiar kind, such as existed in Ireland thirty years ago. The Italians swore that they would obey him unconditionally, and endeavour to persuade others to undertake the same obligation to him. During this period Drusus was really in a feverish state: he was not in full possession of his own free will: he knew not what he was doing. Had he been supported by the ruling party, he might have still been able to solve the difficulties, and the war between Marius and Sulla would perhaps not have broken out. But after being irritated to the extreme—Philippus may have reduced him to despair—he was assassinated by a wound in his side, which he received while he was walking up and down in the hall of his house, and conversing with the people<sup>13</sup>. The perpetrator of the crime was never discovered.

<sup>12</sup> p. 128 ed. Dindorf.

<sup>13</sup> (Vell. Patercul. ii. 14; Appian, De Bell. Civil. i. 36; Livy, Epit. lib. 71.) In the great houses of the Romans, as in the baths of Titus, there were spacious halls without windows, which were lighted only by torches. In these halls numbers of persons, both known and unknown, used to assemble, to obtain an audience of the master of the house, for the noble Romans were in reality more like princes than anything else.—N.

The Italians were now in a state of the greatest excitement; for the best prospects had been held out to them, and there was now no one to realize them. At Rome, the disinclination to grant them the franchise was as general as, for instance, it was in England to grant independence to the Americans, and as it is at the present moment to grant the emancipation of the Roman Catholics. The Italians were, in fact, looked upon as rebels. The party of Drusus was now in the senate itself. Crassus died about this time. The wisest men, such as M. Antonius and the Scaevolas, did not know what to do. As the storm had not been averted in the proper time, the Romans now threw themselves right in its way. It was chiefly the equites who accused the senators as traitors. They had gained over the tribune Q. Varius, a Spaniard by birth<sup>14</sup>, whom Cicero calls *homo vastus et foedus*<sup>15</sup>. This uncouth fellow, with whom impudence supplied the place of talent, brought forward a bill, that a commission should be appointed for the purpose of inquiring who had had any public or private communication with the Italians about their emancipation<sup>16</sup>. The lower classes at Rome, although they had nothing to lose by the laws of Drusus, were most furious against the Italians, and the equites condescended to make common cause with the populace to support the bill of Q. Varius. It was carried, notwithstanding the greatest opposition of the senate; for, as the people appeared in the forum in arms, the rational opposition of the ruling party was soon overwhelmed. This law gave rise to a great many lawsuits, and several noble senators were condemned. The Italian allies, in the meanwhile, had already been in arms some time.

<sup>14</sup> His father was a Roman, but his mother was a Spanish woman.—N. (Cicero, Brutus, 62; Appian, De Bell. Civil. i. 37.)

<sup>15</sup> De Oratore, i. 25.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, l. c.; Val. Maximus, viii. 6. 4.

## LECTURE XXXIII.

THE SOCIAL OR MARSIC WAR.—THE LEX JULIA—DIVISION OF THE SCENE OF WAR INTO THREE REGIONS.—OUTLINE OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS.

WE have now come to a period during which the scantiness of our information is particularly painful to us. Livy had devoted four books to the two years of the Social war, and nearly all we know about it is contained in the meagre narrative of Appian, who not unfrequently makes statements which are incredibly one-sided. The passions, the exertions, the various changes of fortune, and the excellent conduct on both sides, warrant the assertion that this war is one of the greatest in all antiquity. The first symptoms of the tendency of the Italian allies to separate themselves from Rome and form a new kind of Roman state had been manifested as early as the second Punic war<sup>1</sup>. Subsequently Fregellae had revolted against Rome. Those who had been the first to determine on beginning the war were not those who afterwards actually took the field. We do not know which nations were the first that resolved to take up arms, but it is certain that before this it had been the intention of the Latins to emancipate themselves, during the celebration of the *Feriae Latinae*, and to put the Roman consuls to death<sup>2</sup>. It was their plan on that occasion to throw Rome into a state of anarchy, and then to put to death as many persons as they could. This conspiracy was shared in by the Tiburtines and several of the neighbouring towns, and the Italians who flocked to the festival in great numbers, had undoubt-

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 212.

<sup>2</sup> Florus, III. 18.

edly taken a part in it. Drusus heard of the intention of the Latins and informed the consuls of it<sup>3</sup>, for he was a Roman, and what he wanted to do for the allies was merely intended to strengthen Rome. The conspiracy was manifest. After the murder of Drusus, the Italians formed an association among themselves, and secured their mutual fidelity by giving hostages to one another. But the Romans sent proconsuls into several districts, in order to keep the allies within the bounds of their duty, as they called it, and to thwart their undertaking. There was at this time a day of assembly of the Picentians at Asculum, and the proconsul Servilius Caepio came forward with his legate Fonteius on this occasion to address the assembly, and deter them by threats from their undertaking; but he and his legate were murdered in the theatre of Asculum. The Italians, who had at first only wished to obtain the Roman franchise, were now bent upon destroying Rome, and establishing an Italian republic, of which they themselves were to be the centre. The exasperation at Asculum rose to such a pitch, that all the Romans who happened to be in the place were seized and put to death<sup>4</sup>. The insurrection now broke out everywhere, but not everywhere with the same cruelty as at Asculum; and it is highly probable that such nations as the Marsians, who were not inferior to the Romans in point of civilization, did not make themselves guilty of such atrocities as the Picentians, who were a contemptible people. In the Epitome of the seventy-second book of Livy the following people are mentioned as having joined in the war:—the

<sup>3</sup> Aur. Victor, *De Vir. illustr.* 66.

<sup>4</sup> I will here make a remark merely because I want to mention to you a conjecture which I have made. In one of the newly discovered fragments of Diodorus (p. 129 ed. Dindorf.) we read that a Latin was nearly killed at Asculum, because he was believed to be a Roman. His name, according to my conjecture, was not Saunion, but San-nion.—N.

Picentians, Vestinians, Marsians, Pelignians, Marrucini-ans, Samnites, and Lucanians. Appian<sup>5</sup> adds the Apulians, but it is not probable that they had any share in the Italian state. All the other peoples of whom the state was to consist, were Sabellians; and the Apulians, who belonged to the Oscan race, merely joined them out of hostility towards Rome. These confederate Italian nations are said by Diodorus to have established a senate of five hundred, and to have appointed two annual consuls and twelve praetors, thus imitating the forms of the Roman senate and magistrates. Their first consuls were Q. Popaedi-*us* Silo, a Marsian, and C. Aponius Mutilus, a Samnite. Popaedi-*us* had been a friend of Livius Drusus, and had carried on the negotiations peaceably, but he was now determined to obtain his objects by force. The senate of five hundred was entrusted with the care of providing the armies with all that was necessary. Among themselves, these nations were actuated by very different feelings. The Samnites still bore their old grudge against Rome: hence the implacable hatred of Pontius Telesinus, who declared in the battle at the Colline Gate, that, unless the den of the wolf was destroyed, Italy could never be safe against her ravages<sup>6</sup>. He probably belonged to the gens Pontia which is so prominent in the second Samnite war. The Marsians and Samnites were still as heterogeneous as before: they also differed from each other in language; the Marsians spoke Oscan, but in writing they used the Latin characters. The Samnites used the Oscan language, because the ruling class among them were Sabines. The seat of the Italian government was Corfinium, in the country of the Pelignians, and its name was changed into Italica. It is not improbable that here, too, the differences among the confederates had their influence.

When the war broke out, the advantage was decidedly

<sup>5</sup> De Bell. Civil. i. 39. Compare also Diodorus, xxxvii. Eclog. 1, p. 538 foll.

<sup>6</sup> Vell. Patercul. ii. 27.



on the part of the allies ; and the only thing which saved Rome was the fact, that the Latin colonies remained faithful to her. Immediately after the commencement of the war, the Romans made up their minds to reward them with all the rights of Roman citizens<sup>7</sup>. This decree is the *lex Julia*, proposed by L. Julius Caesar, which is so often spoken of in works on Jurisprudence. It is a very common but erroneous opinion that the *lex Julia* conferred the privileges of Roman citizens upon the Italians, who, in fact, never acquired those privileges by any one law, but gained them successively one by one. It is quite certain that the *lex Julia* affected the Latins only ; its benefits extended over fifty Latin colonies, and not only to such as were established in Italy, but also to *Aquae Sextiae* in *Gallia Narbonensis*. The old Latin towns of *Tibur* and *Praeneste* also, and all the other parts of *Latium*, which had not yet received the full franchise, were unquestionably included among the places which now received it. We may further take it for granted that it was bestowed upon the *Hernican* towns, and perhaps also on those places which, until then, had been *praefecturae*, such as *Atina*, and several others. This prudent law greatly increased the number of Roman citizens ; for even previous to the *Hannibalian* war the number of Latin citizens amounted to 80,000, all of whom spoke Latin, and were more or less mixed up with Romans. Here then the Romans had a people on whom they could rely, and it is only to be lamented that the rights of Roman citizens had not been granted to them before. The Roman armies were considerably increased by the numbers of Latins ; and none of the places that were tributary to Rome were overlooked, but all had to send reinforcements. Hence we find in the Roman armies Gauls, Mauretanians, Numidians, and Asiatics, so that in point of numbers the Italians were surpassed by the Romans. Another very great advantage possessed by

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* 1. 49 ; Cicero, *pro Balbo.* 8 ; Gellius, *IV.* 4.

Rome was its central position and its colonies, which, being scattered all over Italy, tore the countries of the enemy asunder, and obliged them to leave every where strong garrisons as protections against those colonies.

If we had sufficient materials, I might describe to you this war in such a manner as to lay before you the great masses into which it must be divided ; but as things are, I will, as far as I can, give you only brief outlines. The scene of the war must be divided into three regions : the southern, the middle, and the northern. The southern field of operation was Campania as far as the river Liris ; the middle comprised the banks of the Liris and the country of the Sabines as far as Picenum ; and the northern was in Picenum itself. The Bruttians are not mentioned in this war, a circumstance which shews how nearly they must have been annihilated in the Hannibalian war. The colony of Venusia remained faithful to Rome, although the population had become entirely Apulian and Lucanian. The army of the south was under the command of C. Papius Mutilus, and was opposed by the Romans under L. Julius Caesar. Mutilus conquered a number of towns, and transferred the scene of war to Campania ; but Capua was maintained by the Romans, and the war became concentrated around Acerræ<sup>8</sup>. Towards the close of the year the advantage was still on the side of the allies. P. Rutilius Lupus, Marius, and Sulla, commanded the middle army, and were opposed by Popaedi Silo, who displayed the qualities of a very great general. The Roman consul, Rutilius Lupus, was personally by no means able to cope with him, and Rome had to thank Marius and Sulla alone for checking the progress of the enemy. Aesernia, a Roman colony in Samnium, was conquered after a vigorous defence, and not until it was compelled to surrender by the most fearful famine, probably because its citizens relied too much on the good fortune of the Roman arms.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 42.

The first Roman who gained a brilliant advantage was Cn. Pompeius Strabo, who conducted the war as proconsul in Picenum. He was a man who, although marked by all the profligacy of the times, was nevertheless a distinguished general. After he had been beaten by the Picentians, the hostile armies, 70,000 Italians and 65,000 Romans, faced each other near Asculum<sup>9</sup>. The Romans gained a decided victory; Asculum was taken by the sword, and the fate of its inhabitants was fearful. Pompeius now penetrated into the country of the enemy from the north; and some of the allies, seeing that fortune did not favour them, already began to abandon the cause of their friends. The first who did so were the Vestinians. The Romans, who perceived the wavering spirit of some of the allies, tried to gain them over, by granting peace and the Roman franchise to those who were willing to lay down their arms. On what terms the franchise was given in these cases is not known; but what these allies received must have been more than the mere *civitas sine suffragio*, for we afterwards hear of disputes as to the real meaning of the franchise of these people.

Velleius Paterculus, who, whatever may be said against him, is an ingenious writer and master of his subject, says<sup>10</sup> that in this war upwards of 300,000 Italians lost their lives. The course of the war during the second year can be traced even with less accuracy than during the first. The northern Sabellians, the Marsians, Pelignians, and Marrucinians had, like the Vestinians, concluded a separate peace for themselves; and after their abandonment of the cause of the Italians, the seat of the Italian government was removed to Aesernia, and Italica again received its old name, Corfinium.


The Samnites now formed the centre of the war, which they carried on with the same perseverance as in former times; they would not hear of peace. The Romans, in

<sup>9</sup> Appian, l. c. 48; Vell. Patercul. 11. 21.

<sup>10</sup> 11. 15.

their usual way, marched into Apulia and surrounded the Samnites, who, at the close of the year 663, still maintained their ground; but besides them only a part of the Lucanians continued to be in arms, and these people persevered only out of despair. They either reckoned upon the movements of Mithridates in Asia<sup>11</sup>, or they were determined to perish sword in hand. In the course of the second year, the Umbrians and Etruscans also took up arms, but soon became reconciled to the Romans. The history, as I have related it here, is not contained in any ancient author; it can only be gathered from a careful examination of the circumstances—a source of information which is too much neglected. A Roman praetor conquered the Etruscans, and the Roman franchise was immediately granted to them. The ambition of the noble Romans had very dangerous rivals in the Marsians, who did not differ from them more than, for example, the inhabitants of lower from those of upper Germany. But the Etruscans and Romans were quite distinct, and hence it was less repugnant to the feelings of the proud Romans to grant the rights of equality to the Etruscans, than to the Marsians and others.

<sup>11</sup> Diodorus xxxvii. Eclog. 1. p. 538, foll.



## LECTURE XXXIV.

C. MARIUS AND L. CORNELIUS SULLA.—THE KINGDOM OF PONTUS.—MITHRIDATES VI.—FIRST WAR AGAINST MITHRIDATES.—CIVIL WAR BETWEEN MARIUS AND SULLA.—VICTORY OF SULLA, AND HIS DEPARTURE FOR GREECE.—THE TRIBES OF THE NEW CITIZENS.

PLUTARCH has raised the fame of Sulla to the highest pitch. In the year 664 he was forty-nine years old<sup>1</sup>, while Marius was upwards of seventy. Sulla and Marius were men of two different generations, and this circumstance completed the mutual aversion which existed between them. While the former was a man of noble birth, the latter was a soldier, who had risen by his talents and by fortune. Sulla was intimately acquainted with Greek literature; he spoke and wrote Greek in a masterly manner, and entertained the greatest partiality for Greek refinements and for Greeks of literary pursuits. In the war against Jugurtha he had been the quaestor of Marius, and had taken a prominent part in the transactions with king Bocchus. He therefore looked upon the termination of that war as his own work. Fortune accompanied him everywhere, and it was especially this good fortune which drew the attention of the people towards him. Marius acquired great merits in the Italian war, but Sulla eclipsed his fame, and it may be said that in that war he was the only general who displayed brilliant qualities. Marius was under the influence of the sad feeling which must be particularly painful to an old man, that the rising sun outshone him, and made him invisible. Sulla thus called

<sup>1</sup> Vell. Patercul. ii. 17

forth in Marius a spirit of opposition, and in others of envy. We know that Marius endeavoured to keep him down, even at the time of the war against Jugurtha; and a man like Sulla must have owned to himself that he would have done the same, if he had been in the place of Marius. Thus the old man, by his wish to crush the younger one, gave rise to the bitter feelings which afterwards vented themselves in so fatal a manner.

Marius was insatiable in his ambition and his love of power, and he was now anxious to obtain the command in the war against Mithridates. As I have been led by circumstances to mention this war, I will here relate its origin. The cause of it was, as far as Mithridates was concerned, the most just; whereas, the conduct of the Romans was the most glaring injustice. The kings of Pontus belonged to one of the seven great families of the Persians, and had maintained their government over those parts ever since the time of the kings of Persia. The ancestors of Mithridates had been powerful, and in the possession of Pontus, as early as the time of Antiochus the Great<sup>2</sup>. The nation consisted of Syrians, though they must originally have been Armenians until the mighty empire of Assyria sent its colonies into those quarters. Hence the inhabitants of Pontus are called Syrians, or Assyrians. The kingdoms of Pontus and Cappadocia had been left untouched by Alexander of Macedonia; and the father of the present monarch, Mithridates V., had afforded the Romans considerable assistance against Aristonicus. The Romans had rewarded him, as they said, with Great Phrygia; but, from a fragment of a speech by C. Gracchus<sup>3</sup>, we see that he bought it at Rome with his own money. He left these dominions to his son, Mithridates VI., who was yet under age, and the Romans unceremoniously took Phrygia from him<sup>4</sup>. But the young

<sup>2</sup> Appian, *De Bello Mithrid.* 8 and 9; Florus, III. 5.

<sup>3</sup> In Gellius, XI. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Mithrid.* 13.



monarch, who shewed a great mind while he was growing up, prepared himself quietly, and endeavoured to extend his dominions, wherever he could do so without coming in contact with the Romans. He subdued the country about the Bosphorus and the Crimea, so that in the end his empire extended as far as the Ukraine and the river Dniester. It might seem wonderful that the Romans did not interfere to check his progress; but Mithridates availed himself of the favourable time during which the Romans were at war with their allies. But the fact of the Romans being nevertheless fully aware of what was going on, shews that nothing escaped their notice. The family of the kings of Cappadocia had become extinct, and Mithridates gave the throne to Ariarathes, his son or brother; but the Romans set up an opposing king against him. Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, had been incited by the Romans to attack Mithridates, but was defeated; and Mithridates set up Nicomedes' own brother against him. The Romans now openly interfered, and spoke to the Pontic king in a tone as if he had been the offender. Nothing could be more unjust. They collected three armies against him, in which there were scarcely any Romans<sup>5</sup>, but which were composed of the effeminate inhabitants of Asia Minor: they were to act against the well-disciplined troops of Mithridates, and the issue of the undertaking accordingly was such as it deserved to be. Two Roman armies were defeated, and the king met with scarcely any resistance to his progress. The whole continent of Asia Minor recognised Mithridates as their sovereign, and Mitylene and Chios likewise submitted to him. As he had received a Greek education, he had rejected the doctrines of the Magi, and the Greeks looked upon him as a Greek, and placed all their hopes in him. This induced him to advance even into Greece, and he was everywhere received with joy. Athens allowed itself to be persuaded by sophists to open its gates to him; the

<sup>5</sup> Appian, l. c. 17.

consequence of which was, that the sophists themselves usurped the government<sup>6</sup>. Peloponnesus and Boeotia, and in short nearly the whole of Greece, submitted to Mithridates. The Lycians and Rhodians alone remained faithful to Rome. The Rhodians foresaw the issue of the war, and were actuated only by prudence, for they could not possibly feel any attachment to Rome. Most of the Greek towns in Lydia and Caria, which in reality were not inhabited originally by Greeks, were provoked by the Romans; and, being encouraged by Mithridates, they put to death on one day all the Romans and Italians within their several territories. Their number is stated to have amounted to 80,000<sup>7</sup>, which seems almost incredible, if we recollect that on the whole it was only the wealthy that went to Asia. This act demanded vengeance, and called forth the utmost exertions on the part of the Romans.

The senate, in whose power it was to appoint a general for conducting the war, gave the command to Sulla. Marius, impelled by his irresistible desire to humble his adversary, induced the tribune P. Sulpicius to make a plebiscitum, by which the command was taken from Sulla and given to Marius<sup>8</sup>. It needs hardly to be said, that this act of Sulpicius was unjustifiable, and no one can believe that he had any noble motives for it. But it is nevertheless inconceivable to me that this Sulpicius, whom Cicero loved so tenderly, should have deserved the severe censure passed upon him by Appian and Plutarch. According to Cicero<sup>9</sup>, he was a man of genius. It is true, that a man ever so great may be placed in circumstances in which he would act in the way that Sulpicius did; but

<sup>6</sup> Appian, l. c. 28 &c.; Plutarch, Sulla, 13; Athenaeus, v. p. 211 foll.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, l. c. 22 and 23; Val. Maximus, ix. 2. Exter. 3; Vell. Paternul. 11. 18; Cicero, pro Flacco, 24; Florus, 111. 5.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch, Sulla, 8; Marius, 35; Appian, De Bell. Civil. 1. 55. foll.

<sup>9</sup> Brutus, 55, and several other passages.

I cannot believe that Cicero would have spoken so favourably of him had he seen his actions in the light in which they appeared to Greek writers. We must also remember that the Memoirs of Sulla were almost the only source from which those Greek writers derived their information; and that Sulla should speak of him in a derogatory manner cannot be surprising. Sulla was exasperated in the highest degree at this injustice; and his rising against it is a circumstance which, however formidable its consequences were, must not be censured too severely, if we consider the spirit of the times. He had wished, before setting out for the war against Mithridates, to put an end to the war with the Samnites, an army of whom was still assembled in the neighbourhood of Nola. Here he was informed of the measure of Sulpicius. He immediately took six legions, and marched with them against Rome. His adversaries were surprised at this step, which they had not anticipated, and closed the gates of the city against him. But the gates were in a state of decay, and houses had been built close up to them, as in the old towns of our own country; the walls were also, in some parts, so much decayed that it was easy to step over them. In the Hannibalian war, it had still been possible to defend Rome; but now, after an interval of more than a century, when fortifications had ceased to be thought necessary, a great part of the city lay open, and the rest could not be defended. Sulla thus entered the city without any difficulty, and marched down the Via Sacra to the forum. He used his victory with moderation. Marius with his son, Sulpicius, and nine others of his followers fled, and were outlawed, but Sulpicius was overtaken and killed. Marius fled to Ostia, and thence along the sea-coast, in the greatest danger of being delivered up to his enemy. At length, he was found in the marshes in the neighbourhood of Minturnae, and thrown into prison. The inhabitants of Minturnae, not venturing to put him to death, sent a public slave to kill

him. But the barbarian was daunted by the sight of the aged warrior, and was unable to fulfil the command of the magistrates. As fortune thus seemed to declare in his favour, he was put on board a vessel and transported to Africa, where, for a time, he lived quietly, watching the course of events.

Sulla used his victory with such moderation that he contented himself with making some peaceful regulations, the particulars of which are not known. He was so little tyrannical that he even allowed the election of the consuls for the year to take place without any interference on his part. The men who obtained the consulship belonged to different parties: Cn. Octavius to that of Sulla, and L. Cornelius Cinna to that of Marius. It is rather strange to find that Cinna and L. Valerius Flaccus, although descended of noble patrician families, were now at the head of the demagogues. Towards the end of the year, when Sulla thought that he had made all the necessary arrangements, he went over to Greece, and there carried on the war against Archelaus, about whom I shall say more hereafter. The senate gave to Q. Pompeius Rufus, the colleague of Sulla in the consulship, Italy as his province for the year following, that he might counteract Cinna and support Cn. Octavius. Cn. Pompeius Strabo, the father of Pompey the Great, commanded at this time his army on the coast of the Adriatic and in Apulia. This man possessed more malice and artfulness than we can conceive: he cared about no party, and only calculated how in the end he might gain the greatest power from the general confusion. The senate ordered him to resign the command of his army to Q. Pompeius; but in secret Pompeius Strabo incited his troops against Quintus, and while the latter was administering to them their military oath, he was murdered by them<sup>10</sup>. Cn. Pompeius assumed the appearance of


<sup>10</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 63; Vell. *Patercul.* ii. 20.

intending to institute an investigation of the matter, but he soon forgot it. He was now at the head of the army in Italy. Sulla had led his into Greece, and the Samnites had thus again obtained breathing time. But this state of tranquillity did not last long, for early in the year following the rupture between Cinna and Cn. Octavius became complete. The Romans had adopted the system of forming new tribes to contain the Latins, for if they had distributed them among the existing tribes, the Latins would, on all occasions, have far outvoted the Romans, and the old citizens would have sunk into insignificance<sup>11</sup>. To prevent the old citizens being completely overruled by the new ones, it was necessary to follow the same plan which had been adopted in earlier times with regard to the Volscians and others. Respecting the number of the new tribes which were added to the thirty-five old ones, we have two different accounts, the one in Velleius Paterculus, and the other in Appian. The former states their number to have been eight; but in Appian we read δεκατεύοντες ἀπέφηναν ἑτέρας (they formed ten new tribes). The word δεκατεύοντες in this passage is an absurdity, and I believe that we must read δέκα πέντε ἀπέφηναν ἑτέρας. What induces me to make this conjecture, is a feeling of symmetry. If fifteen new tribes were added, the total number was fifty, against which number nothing can be said, whereas forty-five would have been a very awkward one. Moreover the number 15 bears the same proportion to 35, that 3 bears to 7; thus the number of the fifteen new tribes is a little less than half the number of the old ones. The different statement of Velleius presents, in my opinion, no difficulties; and I account for it by the supposition, that at first the Latins were formed into eight new tribes, to which afterwards seven others were added, which were formed of Etruscans and Umbrians. The custom at Rome henceforth

<sup>11</sup> Appian, De Bell. Civil. i. 49; Vell. Patercul. ii. 20.

was, that the fifteen new tribes did not give their votes until the old ones had given theirs. P. Sulpicius had promised the new citizens that they should be distributed among the old tribes<sup>12</sup>, which was a manifest injustice towards the old ones. Most of the *Romani rustici* lived at a great distance from the city, and it was an important advantage to those who lived in the city to be inscribed in the rustic tribes.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, Epit. lib. 77 : Appian, l. c. i. 55.





## LECTURE XXXV.

CINNA AND CN. OCTAVIUS.—STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PARTIES OF MARIUS AND SULLA. — Q. SERTORIUS. — ROME BESIEGED AND TAKEN BY THE MARIAN PARTY. — SULLA'S EXPLOITS IN ACHAIA AND ASIA.

CINNA came openly forward as the head of the party of Marius. Cn. Pompeius Strabo had displayed a very equivocal conduct, in remaining quite passive after the murder of Q. Pompeius Rufus. The divisions among the Italians were almost as great as those among the parties at Rome. The party of Cinna consisted of the old Latin towns from Tibur to Capua, comprising Tibur, Praeneste, the towns of the Hernicans, and several places between the Liris and Volturnus. He demanded that the tribes formed out of these places should be dissolved, and be distributed among the thirty-five old ones<sup>1</sup>. I cannot conceive why Sulla did not adopt this very same measure, as it was the only method of forming a strong and powerful aristocracy. Multitudes of the new citizens now flocked to Rome, in order to carry Cinna's measure by their superiority in numbers. Cinna's colleague declared against it, and a fierce contest arose within the city, in which Cinna was defeated. The number of new citizens who are said to have been killed in this struggle is exaggerated, and cannot be believed. The senate now committed an illegal act in declaring, by a *senatusconsultum*, the consular dignity of Cinna to be forfeited. Such a power might in former times have been exercised by the *curies* and *centuries*, but never by the senate alone.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 64; Vell. *Patercul.* ii. 20.

The war against the Samnites was still carried on in the neighbourhood of Nola, where an army of the Samnites must have been stationed. Thither Cinna now repaired. The soldiers, who had learned from Sulla that they held the fate of the republic in their hands, supported him, and requested him to reassume the ensigns of the consular dignity, and to lead them against Rome to humble the pride of the rulers. This he did; and in order to raise his authority he recalled the aged Marius and the other exiles. They sailed from Libya to the coast of Etruria, where they were joined by Etruscan cohorts. Marius was not at all delicate in collecting troops, and even restored slaves to freedom on condition of their taking up arms for him. Q. Sertorius had another army. This man had joined the party of Marius, chiefly on account of his aversion to the rulers, and had no share whatever in the tyrannical feelings of the demagogues. He is one of the best Romans of those times: he was noble-minded, humane, free from the narrow prejudices of his countrymen, and endowed with all the qualities requisite to make a great general. He was in that position in which, at the outbreak of a revolution, excellent men so often find themselves: they are not aware of what will take place, and in their innocence they allow themselves to be led away. Afterwards they cannot get out of the connexions into which circumstances have thrown them, and thus they share the disgrace and crimes with those by whom they are surrounded. Sertorius was innocent, although he had been an eye-witness of the horrors which had taken place at Rome. We often cannot avoid pronouncing unjust opinions upon men, if we judge of them merely from the observation that they are connected with such or such persons. Cinna advanced with a third army from Campania, on the same road which Sulla had taken when he marched against Rome. Carbo, an accomplice of Cinna, joined his army. Marius advanced against Rome from Etruria. The senate had called upon Cn. Pompeius Strabo for assistance, and

he had accordingly given up the war on the Adriatic, and proceeded to Rome. Cn. Octavius was encamped on the Janiculus, and Cn. Pompeius at the Colline gate. The conduct of the latter was for a time so suspicious that the senate began to fear treason<sup>2</sup>. But at last he commenced an engagement with Cinna, which is much exaggerated in some accounts<sup>3</sup>, and which seems in reality to have been only an insignificant skirmish. Its issue, however, was advantageous to the rebels. After this a pestilence began to rage in both armies, by which many thousands were carried off. Cn. Pompeius Strabo fell, according to some accounts, a victim to it; but according to others, he was killed by a flash of lightning<sup>4</sup>. The people, rejoiced at his death, gave vent to their exasperation against him, and tore his body from the bier, for he had been the object of general hatred of all parties. One army was encamped near Albano, at the foot of Monte Cavo, and was opposed to one of the rebels. Latium, which, after suffering dreadful devastations, had been in the enjoyment of peace for some centuries, now received its death-blow; and the condition in which we find it under Augustus must be traced to the effects of this war. Ostia, Antium, Aricia, Lanuvium, and other places, were taken by storm and laid waste. Four camps enclosed the city; and though they were not strong enough to take it by storm, still the effect which they produced in the city was a complete famine. Negotiations were at last resorted to, and the deputies of the senate were obliged to comply with all the demands that were made. Cinna was recognised in his dignity of consul, and Marius stood by the side of the curule chair with contemptuous smiles<sup>5</sup>. It was stipulated that no blood should be shed; but Cinna made a very equivocal promise, and no

<sup>2</sup> Vell. Patereul. II. 21; Livy, Epit. lib. 79; Appian, De Bello Civil. I. 67.

<sup>3</sup> Vell. Patereul. I. c.

<sup>4</sup> Compare Livy, Epit. lib. 79; Appian, I. c. I. 68.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, I. c. I. 70.

sooner had the rebels entered the city than Cn. Octavius was slain; and the flamen dialis, L. Merula, bled himself to death in the vestibule of the Capitoline temple, in order to escape a similar fate. Marius caused himself to be made consul for the seventh, and Cinna for the second time, without any elections. This was the point after which Marius had always been striving, in order to realize a prophecy which had been made to him, in consequence of an eagle's nest, with seven young ones, having fallen into his lap from an oak tree, when he was yet a child. He had often consoled his friends with his prospect of seven consulships when they began to despair of his fortune, for he was extremely superstitious<sup>6</sup>.

The victory which the rebels had thus gained was followed by the wildest cruelties. Marius had a body-guard of slaves, whom he sent out to murder those whom he wished to get rid of. In this manner the most distinguished persons were despatched, especially his personal enemies. Among these unhappy victims was the celebrated orator M. Antonius. Q. Catulus who had once been the colleague of Marius, put an end to his own life. No proscription took place, but the butchery was carried on to such an extent that at length even Cinna himself could bear it no longer; and he was induced, by the advice of Sertorius, to put to death the band of servile assassins kept by Marius. On the sixteenth day after Marius had entered on his seventh consulship, he died, in the middle of January. The shedding of blood now ceased, but not the bitter spirit of the parties<sup>7</sup>.

At the time when Cinna approached the city, the senate had given Q. Metellus full power to conclude peace with the Samnites on whatever terms he might

<sup>6</sup> It is not improbable that his Syrian prophetess, Martha, may have suggested to him the number *seven*, which was a sacred number among the Jews and Phoenicians, as *three* was among the Romans.—N.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, l. c. 75; Vell. Patereul. ii. 23; Plutarch, Marius, 45.

think proper<sup>s</sup>. The Samnites abused the favourable moment, and demanded the Roman franchise, not only for themselves, but also for their allies; and that all their captives and deserters should be given up to them, whereas the Romans were not to have theirs restored to them. Metellus concluded the peace on these conditions, and the Samnites became Roman citizens. The new tribes of the Italians were now broken up, and the new citizens were distributed among the old tribes; but we do not know whether this was the case with all of them. In whatever manner, however, it may have been done, it gave the new citizens a dangerous numerical preponderance. At the time of Cicero, it would seem as if all the Italians collectively had formed only one tribe; and if so, it was, in my opinion, one of the changes introduced by Sulla, in order to render their numerical preponderance harmless.

The death of C. Marius was followed by a period of three years, during which Sulla was conducting the war in Achaia and Asia, and Italy was completely in the hands of the party of Cinna. But the latter soon found that he had reason to mistrust his own followers: the plunder of his soldiers had made them so averse to him that he found it necessary to demand hostages, which however were refused. His colleague, L. Valerius Flaccus, the successor of C. Marius, was commissioned to undertake the war against Sulla, but was murdered in Asia by C. Flavius Fimbria. In his fourth consulship, Cinna was at Ariminum, forming a numerous army to attack Sulla in Greece—a very sensible plan. But the soldiers refused to embark, and slew Cinna in his camp. Cn. Papirius Carbo, whom Cinna had chosen for his colleague after the death of L. Valerius Flaccus, now remained consul alone for a whole year. These men retained indeed the name of consuls, but they were in fact true tyrants.

In the year 665 Sulla had gone over to Thessaly.

<sup>s</sup> Appian, l. c. 1. 68, who however gives a somewhat different account.

Archelaus and Taxiles were at the time the generals of Mithridates, and in possession of Peloponnesus and southern Greece, as far as Thermopylae. Sulla gained the battle of Chaeronea against an innumerable host of barbarians — whom he himself probably did not call barbarians, in order to raise his military glory—who were as cowardly as the Persians or the Indian chiefs. They had the phalanx, and were armed as Macedonians, but a Scipio or a Hannibal would have said of them that, notwithstanding all this, they were like fish prepared by a clever cook, in various ways and under various names, but were after all nothing but fish. Sulla himself lost only a few of his soldiers<sup>9</sup>. Archelaus defended himself in Piraeus. The long walls connecting the city of Athens with the port-town, may have been destroyed by Demetrius Poliorcetes; but Piraeus, as well as the city, was still protected by the strong walls which had been restored by Conon<sup>10</sup>. Piraeus was occupied by a Pontic garrison, and the city was defended by the tyrant Aristion, to whom Archelaus had entrusted it. Archelaus also did all he could to introduce provisions from Piraeus into the city, but with no success; for Sulla was watchful, and superior in every respect. The distress in the city rose to such a degree that the inhabitants were at last completely exhausted. The city was taken by storm, and the massacre which followed was enormous; as if the conqueror had acted under the influence of an implacable hatred of Athens,<sup>11</sup> for which there was no reason. Few of the buildings of the city were destroyed; but when Piraeus was taken soon after, the walls of this place were pulled down, and the magnificent arsenal was burnt to ashes: in short, Piraeus was completely destroyed, so that from this time it resembled the decayed

<sup>9</sup> Plutarch, Sulla, 19 foll.; Appian, *De Bell. Mithrid.* 42, foll.

<sup>10</sup> Appian, l. c. 30.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, l. c. 38; Plutarch, Sulla, 13, foll.; Vell. Patercul.



towns in the north of Holland, where grass grows in the streets. In the time of Pausanias it was only a small village near the port. Athens itself was almost depopulated. The Pontic commander was driven back into Asia.

I mentioned above that before this time L. Valerius had led an army to Asia, but that he was murdered by his legate C. Fimbria, who assumed the command of the army and destroyed Ilium<sup>12</sup>. Sulla concluded a peace with the king of Pontus, on conditions which appear scarcely credible<sup>13</sup>: the king gave up Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Cappadocia, and withdrew to his former dominions; he paid a contribution of war of 2000 talents, and surrendered seventy ships of war. It was impossible to make more moderate terms, and Sulla did not even demand the surrender of the king's advisers.

Sulla now began to press C. Fimbria with all his energy, and the latter, who saw himself deprived of every hope of success, put an end to his life. His soldiers went over to Sulla, who however mistrusted them, as men who had been corrupted by the contagion of their general. They were Italians, and had been regularly trained against Sulla in the time of Marius<sup>14</sup>. It had been the wish of Cinnna that C. Fimbria should conclude peace with Mithridates, and enter into an alliance with him. But this plan had not been realized. Sulla settled the affairs of Asia, and punished the Greeks, Lydians, and Carians, in whose dominions the Romans had been murdered before the outbreak of the war. They were compelled to pay down at once five years' tribute, and in

<sup>12</sup> Appian, l. c. 53.

<sup>13</sup> Appian, l. c. 55, foll.; Plutarch, Sulla, 22.

<sup>14</sup> These soldiers remained in Asia for many years, and were known under the name of the Valeriani down to the time of Lucullus and Pompey. After the battle of Cannae, such a corps of soldiers had been sent out to Sicily.—N.—(Sallust, ap. Non. XVIII. 7.)


addition to it so heavy a war contribution that those beautiful countries were ruined for a long time. The first generation after these events was so completely borne down that recovery was impossible; but still they gradually gained new strength, and in the time of the Roman emperors we find them in the most flourishing condition<sup>15</sup>. Nearly five millions of our money were raised there within a very short time. We have seen similar things under Napoleon, who did not trouble himself much about their practicability. The Roman equites, who formed the retinue of the general, advanced the money for the towns on interest at the rate of 24, or 36, or even 48 per cent., and afterwards raised their capital together with the interest on it, with the aid of Roman soldiers. This was a horrible tyranny, but Sulla wanted money to carry on the war. During all this time he had shewn an extraordinary greatness of character. His house at Rome had been pulled down, his property had been wasted, his friends put to death, his family driven into exile, and all of them begged and entreated him to come back and take vengeance upon his enemies. But he was resolved to bring the war in Asia to a close before returning. If he had not been a great man, he might have concluded a peace with Mithridates at an earlier period, and the king would have been glad of it. But Sulla acted differently, and wished to fulfil his duties towards the republic, before he thought of occupying himself with his private affairs<sup>16</sup>. And this was indeed the wisest course, for he was now in a condition to

<sup>15</sup> Caria, Lydia, and Ionia, form a true earthly paradise. These countries, after having suffered the greatest ravages, and even under a bad government—unless it be like that of the Turks—such as that of the Byzantines or Persians, may be restored to the highest degree of prosperity in the course of a few generations. If they were without any population and were colonized by Europeans, they would, within fifty years, be in a very flourishing condition. This is the unanimous opinion of all travellers, to whatever nation they belong: all declare that they do not know a finer country in the world.—N.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, l. c. 51; Vell. Patercul. 11. 24.

return with a victorious army which was attached to him, and with large sums of money at his disposal. But the undertaking on which he now entered, was nevertheless one of extreme boldness; for he had no more than 30,000 men, while his enemies had at their command an army of 450 cohorts, that is 189,000 men, including such brave soldiers as the Samnites<sup>17</sup>. From the time of Marius military forces are always counted by cohorts or small batallions, each containing 420 men. Sulla's troops had to fight against these hosts for their existence, and he attacked them boldly, with confidence in his good fortune and his own strength.

<sup>17</sup> Vell. Patercul. II. 24, who states the number of his enemies to have been 200,000. Comp. Appian, De Bell. Civil. I. 79



## LECTURE XXXVI.

SULLA'S RETURN TO ITALY. — THE CONSULSHIP OF C. MARIUS THE YOUNGER, AND CN. PAPIRIUS CARBO. — BLOCKADE OF PRAENESTE. — SULLA AT ROME, AND HIS VICTORY AT THE COLLINE GATE. — HIS PROSCRIPTION AND HIS MILITARY COLONIES. — HIS REFORMS OF THE CONSTITUTION, &c. — ABDICATION AND DEATH.

THE consuls of the year, in which Sulla led his army back to Italy, were L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Julius Norbanus, who, like the rest of the few surviving patricians, were disposed to favour the democratical party. If superiority in numbers had decided the issue, or if one of the consuls had been invested with dictatorial power, and had known what use to make of it, Sulla could not possibly have met with success. But the republic was in a state of dissolution, and its leaders were no better than the Directoire in 1799, when the disgust with the government was so general in France, and the government itself was in such a state of decay, that the whole fabric would have broken down, if Napoleon had not returned from Egypt. Rebellions are multiplied under such circumstances, as the people cannot help expecting more from a change than from a continuation of the actual state of things. At the time of Sulla's return even the majority of the new citizens were disgusted with the rulers, who, had they been able to rely on the new citizens, might have thwarted all the attempts of Sulla. But the cohorts consisting of new citizens went over to him, and concluded a treaty with him, in which he confirmed their newly-acquired privileges—an occurrence resembling those which

had taken place in earlier times between patricians and plebeians.

Sulla landed at Brundisium, and if the account be true, he had an engagement with Norbanus near Canusium<sup>1</sup>; but however this may be, we know that he found his enemies encamped near Capua at the foot of mount Tifata, where Norbanus was defeated, and many of his soldiers deserted to Sulla. The latter had commenced negotiations while yet in Greece, and he now did the same with the consul Scipio. A truce was concluded, and hostages exchanged. But the negotiations, which were protracted by Sulla with a view to seduce the troops of the consul, were interrupted, perhaps intentionally, by Q. Sertorius, who saw that the soldiers were gradually deserting their consul. The truce was broken when Sertorius occupied Suessa. The desertion among Scipio's troops became so general that at length he found himself completely left alone. Towards the end of the year, when Sulla had gained such advantages, and was extending his power in southern Italy, many of his supporters took up arms in various parts of Italy. Among these were Metellus Pius in the modern Romagna, and Cn. Pompey, then twenty-three years of age, in Picenum, where he had great influence, for that country which had been subdued by his father stood in a sort of clientship to him. M. Lucullus and several others likewise took up arms for Sulla. Their party, and the forces with which they carried on the war, consisted of new citizens, with the exception of the army of Metellus.

The beginning of the year following, the second of the war, is marked by the most bloody and decisive occurrences. C. Marius the younger, then twenty-six years old, was consul, with Cn. Papirius Carbo. The latter had the command in the northern districts in the neighbourhood of Ariminum, against Metellus, Pompey, and Lucullus; young Marius was stationed on the frontiers of Latium.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *De. Bell. Civil.* i. 84.

Sulla seems to have passed the winter in Campania. Here a decisive battle was fought near Sacriportus (it was not a town), where Marius had concentrated his forces to protect Rome against Sulla. Marius was defeated, and a part of his troops deserted to the enemy, whose loss was very slight. These districts and Etruria were the real seats of the party of Cinna, and both countries were passionately interested in the cause. The rest of Italy, with the exception of Samnium and Lucania, was foreign to this party, or at least indifferent towards it. After the defeat of Sacriportus, Marius fled to Praeneste, which was at that time a very large town<sup>2</sup>. Sulla followed him, and blockaded the place; but he soon after led his army towards Rome, and left behind him Q. Lucretius Ofella to continue the blockade of Praeneste, whose inhabitants were, for the most part, old Roman citizens. While Rome was yet in the hands of the party of Marius, the praetor, L. Junius Brutus Damasippus, caused a great massacre among the opposite party, in which the pontiff, Q. Mucius Scaevola was murdered, because he relied on his innocence and disdained to flee<sup>3</sup>. The perpetrators of these horrors now escaped, and Sulla entered the city: he promised moderation, but his indulgence was meant in an awful sense. He then followed Carbo into Etruria, which was now the scene of the war—so far as Etruria was concerned, a real national war. Carbo was at Clusium. The history of this war is wrapped in deep darkness, and very perplexing. Carbo, who had still a considerable army, made two attempts to relieve Praeneste, but he failed in both. In the meantime he made some other undertakings; but one against Picenum, which was conducted by Carinas, likewise failed, and his troops deserted to the enemy. The war was brought to a decision by Pontius Telesinus, whose brother com-

<sup>2</sup> The modern town of Palestrina, which contains about 6000 inhabitants, occupies only a part of the ancient citadel, that is, the space of the ancient temple of Fortune and its precincts.—N.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 88; Vell. *Patercul.* ii. 26.



manded the Samnites in Picenum. He and the Lucanian general, C. Lamponius, made an attempt to relieve Praeneste; but not being able to effect any thing against the line of fortifications by which the place was surrounded, they hastened towards Rome, which they hoped to take by surprise. But Sulla, who was informed of their movement, threw himself into the city. The decisive battle was fought at the Colline gate. The Samnites and their allies are said to have amounted to 40,000 men<sup>4</sup>. Had they succeeded, Rome, according to the expressed intentions of Pontius Telesinus, would have been razed to the ground. The fear excited by the presence of such an enemy at the very gates of the city must have made many of the partizans of Marius inclined to become reconciled with Sulla. Towards the evening of the day of battle, Sulla succeeded in breaking the lines of the Samnites; and their defeat was so great that Telesinus, in despair, put an end to his life. After this loss Marius, and the brother of Telesinus too, began to despond: they endeavoured to escape by subterraneous passages which led through the rocks into the fields, but finding that their flight was discovered, they killed each other mutually<sup>5</sup>. Marius the younger cannot claim to be called a man of any extraordinary greatness: he had all the faults of his father; but of his father's great qualities we cannot discover any but his perseverance; and this cannot excite our admiration, as it was commanded by necessity. Carbo also despaired, and fled to Africa. Thus ended this civil war. Italy was now cleared of all hostile armies; and only a few isolated towns, of which I shall speak presently, continued to offer resistance.

In the battle of the Colline gate, 8000 Samnites had been taken prisoners, all of whom were surrounded and cut down in the field of Mars by the command of Sulla<sup>6</sup>. After the death of Marius, Praeneste surrendered at dis-

<sup>4</sup> Vell. Patercul. II. 27.

<sup>5</sup> Vell. Patercul. l. c.; Appian, De Bell. Civil. I. 94.

<sup>6</sup> Appian, l. c. I. 93. Compare Plutarch, Sulla, 29.

cretion to Lucretius Ofella: it received no capitulation; Sulla divided all its inhabitants into three great masses—the old Roman citizens, the Praenestines, and Samnites; and, sparing the lives of the first, he put all the rest to the sword. The towns of Etruria surrendered one by one, and the inhabitants of most of them experienced the same fate as the Praenestines. Praeneste itself, however, was not destroyed, while most of the Etruscan towns, such as Clusium, Arretium, Populonia, Volaterrae, which had defended itself for two years, and Faesulae, were razed to the ground. The last of these places may have been restored afterwards. At Rome, Sulla acted with absolute tyranny, and set the first example of a proscription, that is, he made out a list of those whom any one was at liberty to kill, and for whose heads prizes were offered; and it is said that, in this manner, no less than 1600 equites lost their lives<sup>7</sup>. Whether the names of all of them were in the proscription list may be doubted. Twenty-three, or, according to other but incorrect accounts, forty-seven legions, had military colonies assigned to them in Italy<sup>8</sup>. In former times, no such colonies had been founded: the first colonies were simple settlements, serving as garrisons, to which a third of the territory of the town they occupied was assigned, and one member of each gens went out as *colonus*<sup>9</sup>. As each colonist did not receive more than two jugers of land, they must have had some other advantages besides<sup>10</sup>; we know that they bore arms, which the old citizens of those towns did not. At a later period, we find the Latin colonies, in which Romans and Latins had equal shares; but both kinds of colonies must be considered as garrisons to protect the frontiers, and we may take it for granted that in most cases the colonists were soldiers, who had fought in the legions. But there

<sup>7</sup> Appian, l. c. 1. 95.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, l. c. 100; Livy, Epit. lib. 89.

<sup>9</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 45.

<sup>10</sup> Compare vol. II. p. 47 foll.; vol. III. p. 176.

existed no relation between colonization and military service, and the former was by no means a reward for the latter. Bononia is the only colony in which we discern some analogy with such a system, in so far as that the allotments given to the equites differed from those of the other colonists, the former receiving seventy, and the latter fifty jugers<sup>11</sup>. But the colonies of Sulla were real military colonies, the meaning of which is this: a certain legion, when dismissed from service, was constituted as the body of citizens of a certain town, the whole territory of which was given up to the legionaries. If its extent did not come up to what the imperator had promised, pieces were cut away from neighbouring districts, and added to the colony. We do not know all the places which were thus colonized; that Florence and Fiesole were made military colonies is certain; but, in regard to other places, it cannot be proved satisfactorily. New Arretium was built by Sulla. It was these colonies which formed the firm basis of his power. The nation of the Samnites had been so far reduced by Sulla that nearly the whole country of the Hirpini was changed into a wilderness. Wherever he did not establish colonies, he gave the land, which in former times would have become *ager publicus*, to his favourites.

He now began to change the laws, and to constitute the senate. It had been expected that, according to the principles of the party for which he had declared himself, he would complete the senate out of the old nobility, but such was not the case: with a curious inconsistency, which shews how much even he, with all his absolutism, was under the influence of circumstances, he filled up the vacancies in the senate not only with equites, but even with centurions of quite vulgar descent, who, however, were ready to do anything that he might wish<sup>12</sup>. So he forgot the device of his party.

The Cornelian laws, when looked into attentively, are

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxxvii. 57.

<sup>12</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 301 foll.

a highly remarkable instance of the conduct of a short-sighted and obstinate man, who imagines that he can restore by-gone times by restoring the ancient forms, and that nations can be made to assume any shape or form, like inanimate matter. The number of patricians was so much reduced that, for the last four or five years, both the consuls had been plebeians ; but from henceforth, and so long as Sulla lived, the consulship was regularly divided between a patrician and a plebeian,—further he could not have gone without driving the people to madness—a change which in those times was perfectly childish, although many others besides Sulla himself may have looked upon it as a very salutary measure. He might have done many other things, which would have been far more profitable. He reduced the tribunician power to what it had been previous to the Publilian law, and thus undid the work of centuries. The tribunes accordingly were deprived of the power of proposing laws, which became now the exclusive privilege of the consuls and the senate. I almost wonder that he did not try to restore the curies ; but he may have been prevented by the circumstance, that the curies had become something quite different, and were altogether plebeian. This also accounts for the fact that Dionysius saw in them something quite different from what they had been originally. Sulla neglected everything that he ought to have done, and did everything that was foolish. His depriving the tribunes of their power was a measure, however revolting it may be, for which much might be said. There are things which are necessary and salutary, but which cannot be done without the greatest caution, because they run counter to the common prejudices. As Sulla remembered that the tribunes had originally been only a protecting magistracy, and that they had not been allowed to hold any of the curule magistracies, which were reserved for the patricians, he again went back and ordered that no tribune, after the year of his office, should be admitted to any office leading into the senate. In

order to secure his own person, he deprived the children of those who had been proscribed of the right of holding any office whatsoever<sup>13</sup>. This shameful law remained in force, until it was abolished by Julius Caesar. Sulla's greatest change, however, was that by which he restored the *judicia* to the senate<sup>14</sup>. The senators ought now to have endeavoured to exercise their judicial power as impartially as possible; but very far from it!—justice had never been so venal as it was now; and the system of bribery was carried on in so intolerable and detestable a manner, that the senators themselves appeared to be purposely undermining their own power; and, had it not been for the military colonies of Sulla, severe punishment would have been the well-deserved fruit of their proceedings.

Sulla also increased the numbers of magistrates and pontiffs. In early times there were only four pontiffs and the *pontifex maximus*, all of whom were taken from the two most ancient tribes. The number of augurs was likewise four in those times, and when subsequently the plebeians were admitted to a share in these dignities, each of these two colleges consisted of nine members, so that each of the three old tribes was represented in each college by three members<sup>15</sup>. At that time it was the intention to divide the priestly dignity equally between the two orders; when this ceased to be observed is uncertain, but it was probably before the Domitian law. Sulla did not think of dividing the augurate and pontificate between the patricians and plebeians, but he abolished the Domitian law, and restored to the colleges the right of co-optation, increasing at the same time the number of priests in each college to fifteen<sup>16</sup>. This number was a multiplication of three by five, whereas it had before been by three, for

<sup>13</sup> Velleius Paterc. II. 28; Plutarch, Sulla, 31.

<sup>14</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* XI. 22; Vellej. Paterc. II. 32; Cicero, *c. Verr.* I. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Compare, vol. III. p. 351 foll.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, *Epitom.* lib. 89; Pseudo-Ascon. in *Divinat.* p. 102 ed. Orelli.

we must remember that the pontifex maximus was included in either case. This change had no great influence upon the state, but the increase of the number of praetors to eight, and of that of the quaestors to twenty, was of great importance; to the latter he gave the *quaestiones perpetuae*. The number of offices which possessed the curule dignity was increased by the praetorship. The quaestors became members of the senate by virtue of their office, so that the twenty quaestors, who were elected every year, were almost sufficient to keep up the regular number of 600 senators<sup>17</sup>. The arbitrary power of the censors to create new members of the senate was entirely done away with. The senate was now a body representing the people, as in the early times it had represented the burghers; for the yearly election of twenty quaestors, who became at the same time members of the senate, gave to the senate the character of an elective assembly: whether the people elected every year twenty new senators, or whether they appointed the same number of magistrates, who completed the senate, is one and the same thing<sup>18</sup>.

Sulla was very active as a legislator, and senseless as he shewed himself in most matters connected with the political constitution, he must have had very superior advisers in his criminal legislation; for it was he who first introduced any tolerable arrangements in the criminal laws, which had before been in a dreadful state. The particulars of this part of his legislation belong to a history of the Roman law.

He kept a kind of body-guard of freedmen under the name of the Cornelians: freedmen were, on the whole, the most powerful persons in his retinue. The state of Italy, especially in country towns, after the first storm was over, may be best learnt from the excellent speech

<sup>17</sup> There is no direct authority for this number of senators, but see Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 100; Tacitus, *Annal.* xi. 22; Cicero, *ad Attic.* i. 14.

<sup>18</sup> Compare vol. III. p. 551 foll.



of young Cicero for Roscius of Ameria, and from that for Cluentius. A person like Chrysogonus, a freed-man and favourite of Sulla, might rob and murder with impunity: no one was safe from such persons, not even at the very gates of Rome. The condition of Italy was frightful.


Sulla gave his laws as dictator, for after the death of Marius and Carbo he had caused himself to be made dictator for an indefinite space of time, by the interrex L. Valerius Flaccus<sup>19</sup>, and with this title he governed the republic for two years. No one expected that he would resign his dictatorship, but he was probably exhausted by his long struggles; he may have felt that he was too old to carry on wars in foreign countries, or he may not have wished to do so: he may have believed that in the republic itself all the necessary reforms were effected, or else he may have despaired of their successful working: in short, he laid down his power to the surprise and astonishment of every one. This was by no means a bold step, as Appian justly observes<sup>20</sup>, for he had his military colonies and the senate to rely upon, and his opponents were crushed into the dust. He retired to Puteoli, where he is said to have been attacked by a most disgusting disease: his body was covered with ulcers and vermin. I believe that the fact of his having had this disease cannot be denied, and he deserved it. It occurs chiefly in the case of tyrants, such as Philip II., and also in the history of the Jews. It is also said to have befallen a rich land-owner, who had been guilty of brutal conduct towards his tenants. At Puteoli he played with the legislation of Italian towns, and insisted upon his wishes being carried into effect, although he pretended to live as a simple citizen like everybody else<sup>21</sup>. He died at the age of sixty of a hæmorrhage, arising from his having gone into a rage

<sup>19</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* I. 98.

<sup>20</sup> *De Bell. Civil.* I. 103.

<sup>21</sup> Plutarch, *Sulla*, 37.

with a young man. Had he lived ten years longer, he would have died as quietly as he now died, and no one would have ventured to do anything against him. The pomp of his burial was not less magnificent than that of Augustus, a fact which shews that his influence did not depend upon his person alone, and that the attempts of Lepidus were senseless.



## LECTURE XXXVII.

THE LITERATURE AND MANNERS OF THE ROMANS AT THIS TIME.—ATTEMPT OF M. AEMILIUS LEPIDUS TO RESCIND THE ACTS OF SULLA.—SERTORIUS.

BEFORE proceeding with the political history, let us cast a glance at the state of literature and the manners of the Romans in that period. The *Historiae* of Sallust began with the consulship of M. Aemilius Lepidus and Q. Lutatius Catulus. If we may judge of its importance from the speeches and letters which formed part of the work, and are still extant, its loss is one of the most painful that we have to lament in antiquity; though, perhaps, less on account of its historical value than on account of its merits as a work of art, as a masterly specimen of historical composition. The Social war and the period of Sulla had been described by Sisenna, a contemporary and early acquaintance of Cicero, who does not judge very favourably of his work as a literary production<sup>1</sup>. But we ought not to receive Cicero's opinion on this point as absolute truth; for he disliked the style of Sisenna because it was the *antiquum et horridum*, and an imitation of the *exile genus* of the Greek historian Clitarchus. Although the whole aspect of literature underwent, at that time, a great change, just as was the case in Germany after the Seven years' war, yet there were some who would not abandon the old style and manner; and the opinion of Cicero upon writers of this class must be received with great caution, though we cannot deny that Sisenna must have shewn great awkward-

<sup>1</sup> De Legibus, l. 2, Brutus, 64. Compare De Divinat. l. 44, and Sallust, Jugurth. 95.

ness and a want of refinement. Pacuvius, of whom I have already spoken, ranks very high among the Roman poets; and if his works were still extant they would undoubtedly excite our high admiration. He wrote only tragedies<sup>2</sup>. At the beginning of the seventh century, Terence introduced quite a new style; and if we compare him with Plautus, Ennius, and Pacuvius, he is entirely modern. Caecilius Statius was somewhat younger than Terence: his skill as a comic writer is praised by the ancients<sup>3</sup>, but his language is censured<sup>4</sup>. L. Attius lived to a very old age; he was a true genius in tragedy, the subjects of which he partly borrowed from the Greeks. He chiefly followed Aeschylus, and the fragments we still possess of his pieces are so beautiful that they will bear a comparison with the works of the Greek poet. But he was not a mere imitator; he also composed original works; and besides him no one has written *praetextatae* of the character of Shakespeare's historical dramas, which are not bound by any restrictions as to time and place, though Attius approached nearer to the Greek tragedies. In his tragedies he seems to have chiefly used the *senarius* and the *anapaestic* verse of four feet, in which, however, he did not strictly conform to the laws laid down by the Greeks; but his choruses were composed with the greatest strictness according to the Greek rules of versification. In his *anapaestic* metres he displays greater freedom even than Terence; for his *anapaests* are metrical and no longer rhythmical. His *praetextatae* were written in long *trochaic* and *iambic octenarii* according to rhythm, but were more refined than those of his predecessors. Attius may serve as a proof to shew how much more refined the ears of the Romans had become in his time. His contemporary, C. Lucilius, of Suessa Aurunca, was not so distinguished in

<sup>2</sup> Fulgentius, *Exposit. Sermon. Antiq.* p. 562, however, mentions a comedy of Pacuvius entitled "Pseudo."

<sup>3</sup> Horat. *Epist.* II. 1, 59; Vell. *Paterc.* I. 17; Charisius, *lib.* II. in fin.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, *ad Attic.* VII. 3; Brutus, 74.

this respect; he used the hexameter verse with licenses, which sometimes exceed anything that Ennius had ventured upon. He was either unacquainted with the laws of versification, or else he despised them. A remark which, I believe, no one has yet made is that most of his books of satires were written in hexameter, but not all<sup>5</sup>. His satires must have been spirited and witty; and if we possessed them we should not, like Horace, *naso adunco suspendere*, but we should read his cutting and biting satires with pleasure. It must have been about the same time that Laevius<sup>6</sup>, the lyric poet, lived, who perhaps attained the highest possible degree of euphony in the old Roman style. But however great may have been the care that was bestowed upon poetry down to the time of Sulla, the cultivation of a refined and elegant prose was completely neglected. A fragment, which has lately been discovered, shews that the prose written during this period was even harsher and ruder than in the time of Cato. C. Gracchus was the only one whose prose was distinguished for its *numerus*. The men of the sixth century, who were great as orators, were not great as writers; and the historians of that same period can claim as little merit for the style of their productions, as our old knights Götz von Berlichingen, Schärtlin, and others of the same class.

As regards the manners and mode of life of the Romans, their great object at this time was the acquisition and possession of money. Their moral conduct, which had been corrupt enough before the Social war, became still more so by their systematic plunder and rapine; immense riches were accumulated and squandered upon brutal pleasures. The simplicity of the old manners and mode of living had been abandoned for Greek luxuries and frivolities, and

<sup>5</sup> Dunlop, History of Roman Literature (published in 1824), vol. i. p. 362, says "Twenty books of his Satires, from the commencement, were in hexameter verse, and the rest, with the exception of the thirtieth, in iambs or trochaics."

<sup>6</sup> Ausonius, Cent. Nupt. p. 181, ed. Scalig.

the whole household arrangements had become altered. L. Crassus, the orator, was the first who had four large saloons built in his house. The Roman houses had formerly been quite simple, and were built either of bricks or peperino, but in most cases of the former material: now, on the other hand, every one would live in a splendid house and be surrounded by luxuries. The condition of Italy after the Social and Civil wars was indescribably wretched. Samnium had become almost a desert; and as late as the time of Strabo<sup>7</sup> there was scarcely any town in that country which was not in ruins. But worse things were yet to come.

At the time of Sulla's death, Cicero was twenty-eight years old; he had already spoken several times and excited great attention. Q. Hortensius was older than he, and not free from envy, but he was in no way to be compared with Cicero. He had his share of all the depravities of his age; and it is an undoubted fact that he sold his own convictions, a thing from which Cicero was altogether free. Such dreadful times as those were, generally produce a great mental excitement. All studies and philological learning were destroyed in France during the time of the League, but the great commotion of the same time roused the intellectual and mental energies. The 'Thirty years' war produced no such effect in Germany, but the Seven years' war gave a fresh impulse to every thing. Owing to similar circumstances the time of Cicero was rich in talented men, but none among his contemporaries could stand the comparison with him. Sallust was considerably younger than Cicero, and at this time only a boy; and when he had grown to manhood Cicero was still shining in his undiminished glory.

The movement of M. Aemilius Lepidus was one of those convulsions which so often follow after great commotions. He was blind to the fact that the present state of things was the result of the shocks which the republic had experienced, and he wanted to rescind the acts of

<sup>7</sup> vi. p. 253.



Sulla, and to make a counter-revolution. But in order to effect this he had to do away with the military colonies of Sulla, to dismiss a number of senators, and to fill up their places with sons of the proscribed. His whole undertaking was impracticable, for the victory of Sulla had been as decisive as possible, and Lepidus himself was not qualified, either by his intellect or his character, to carry such a plan into effect. From a fragment of Sallust's *Historiae*<sup>8</sup> we see that he had belonged to the party of Sulla, and had derived considerable advantage from the plunder which was carried on so long as Sulla was in power<sup>9</sup>. His colleague, Q. Lutatius Catulus, was an honest man, and had not enriched himself; he possessed great experience, and was considered a wise man. He thus enjoyed a great reputation, whereas Lepidus had none. Fuel for a new conflagration was not wanting. In all the towns which had received military colonies the whole of the old population had been expelled and reduced to beggary, unless they farmed their former estates as tenants of their new lords, and thus had an opportunity of waiting till the licentious soldiers were reduced to the necessity of selling their property. All these unfortunate creatures, as well as many of the military colonists who had already squandered their newly-acquired fortunes, were ready to take up arms. It would thus have been very easy to form an army of desperadoes. In order to prevent any outbreak, the senate made the consuls, Lepidus and Catulus, swear not to take up arms against each other, and this precaution did good so long as they were consuls and at Rome. It was at that time the custom, probably introduced by Sulla, for the consuls to remain at Rome during the year of their office, and then to go to their provinces. But after the termination of his consulship,

<sup>8</sup> The speech of L. Philippus against Lepidus.

<sup>9</sup> During the French revolution many persons were compelled to purchase confiscated estates; in like manner Sulla obliged many thousands to purchase estates of the proscribed, and Lepidus had acquired many such estates which Sulla had offered for sale.—N.

when Lepidus went to his province of Gaul, the war broke out. Catulus had taken wise precautions; and after an insignificant engagement, Lepidus himself lost all hopes, and embarked for Sardinia, where he died shortly after. His soldiers, after having maintained themselves for a time under Perperna, went to Spain to join the army of Sertorius. M. Junius Brutus, who had endeavoured to arm the Cisalpine Gauls, for the purpose of supporting Lepidus, was defeated by Pompey and put to death<sup>10</sup>.

The war of Sertorius is of infinitely greater importance. We should be glad, if we could read the detailed account which Sallust had written of it<sup>11</sup>. Sertorius, by no means a man of noble birth, was a Sabine of the praeecture of Nursia, subsequently the birth place of Polla, the mother of the emperor Vespasian. The whole district was proverbial among the Romans for its clinging to the old manners and discipline<sup>12</sup>. It forms a sort of Alpine valley in the Apennines, and it is a singular fact that the place preserved its freedom throughout the middle ages, and never lost it until the time of the French revolution<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 105—108; Livy, *Epit. lib.* 90; Plutarch, *Pomp.* 16; Florus, *III.* 23.

<sup>11</sup> We cannot say of how many books the *Historiae* of Sallust consisted. We have many fragments of the first five books, and from these fragments, as well as from the speeches extracted from the work, we must infer, that it comprised the period from the consulship of Lepidus down to the end of the war of Pompey in Asia. He was here perhaps obliged to adopt the annalistic form which he otherwise despised. The work belongs to a late period of his life: his earliest production was the *Catiline* which was followed by the *Jugurtha*, and his last work was his *Histories*. That they commenced with the consulship of Lepidus and Catulus, is attested by evidence, and may also be inferred from the fact that this was the point to which Sisenna had carried his historical work.—N.

<sup>12</sup> *Nursina duritia*. Fronto, p. 242 ed. Niebuhr.

<sup>13</sup> Down to the French revolution several places within the papal dominions had their own constitutions and jurisdiction, and even small places had their own criminal jurisdiction without any appeal to a higher court. Very few persons have any correct notion of the

The inhabitants of the Valle Norcia are still considered as robust and free mountaineers, but have not always made the best use of their love of liberty, for they have often been notorious as banditti and criminals<sup>14</sup>. But among the Romans the Nursians had the reputation of having, like the Marsians, Marrucinians, and Vestinians, preserved their old Sabellian manners in their purity. Sertorius was a child of his own creation, and he owed his elevation to none but himself. He had first delivered Rome from the freedmen of Marius, and afterwards, when Sulla came to Italy, Sertorius was legate of the consul L. Cornelius Scipio. In the year after, when Carbo conducted his affairs in Etruria so wretchedly that all hope was lost, Sertorius obtained a commission for Spain, which he was to maintain for his party. The manner in which he acted in Spain did not arise by any means from mere policy, but from his noble disposition, and could not fail to win for him the affections of the Spaniards. He paid attention to their just complaints, afforded relief whenever he could, and treated the Spaniards not as contempt-

state of Italy previous to the revolution, and there is no work from which we could derive any satisfactory information upon it. I was therefore greatly surprised at the results of my inquiries in Italy. Tivoli, to mention one instance, was almost free, and the interference of the papal nuntio in its affairs was like that of a Roman proconsul, who arbitrarily encroached upon the liberties of a free town. This, and similar phenomena, were remnants of the times of the Romans. (Compare upon this subject an interesting letter of Niebuhr to Savigny in *Lebensnachrichten von B. G. Niebuhr*, vol. II. p. 402 foll.) While thus some places had a republican constitution, others were oppressed, and within the Ecclesiastical state alone there were, perhaps, no less than a hundred petty constitutions and states, which were kept together only by the pope. During the French revolution, however, all of them were abolished and supplanted by *préfectures*. I have discovered and collected several of those old constitutions. The country was often in a very flourishing, but at times also in quite a deplorable condition.—N.

<sup>14</sup> I am indebted for my knowledge of the Valle Norcia to a Roman Abbé.—N.

ible provincials, but tried to amalgamate them as much as possible with the Romans<sup>15</sup>. The plan of maintaining himself in Spain arose as early as that time, for Italy was almost entirely lost to his party. An army which he sent against C. Annius allowed itself to be treacherously seduced on the road towards Perpignan; and after Julius Salinator, the legate of Sertorius, had been killed, Sertorius, deserted by his troops, could only save his life, and with a few attached followers he cruised for some time in the Mediterranean. He met everywhere with great confidence, and was welcomed by the Lusitanians; but he could not hold out anywhere and embarked for Mauretania, where he maintained himself for some time, and took part in a war between two pretenders in that kingdom<sup>16</sup>. After having made rich booty in Africa, he wished to sail to the Canarian islands and to spend his life there in freedom and independence; but at that moment he was invited by the Lusitanians, for his success in Mauretania had made him still more popular; and the Roman governors in Lusitania, who belonged to the party of Sulla, had indulged, in the meanwhile, in plunder and in the persecution of the friends of Sertorius. Sulla himself had died; the belief that the edifice, which the dictator had built up, would now fall to pieces, very naturally took root in the mind of Sertorius, who lived at so great a distance, and he gladly accepted the invitation of the Lusitanians. Wherever he appeared, both the Spaniards and the Romans declared for him. He found his elements of power in that part of the population which consisted of the children of Roman soldiers and Spanish women: they spoke both languages, and considered themselves as Romans; they formed the mediators between him and the Spaniards. Proscribed Romans also sought refuge with him, and the Celtiberians, who became enthusiastic for him, took up arms to support him.

<sup>15</sup> Plutarch, Sertor. 6.

<sup>16</sup> Plutarch, Sertor. 9

## LECTURE XXXVIII.

PROCEEDINGS OF SERTORIUS IN SPAIN.—HIS WAR AGAINST Q. METELLUS PIUS AND POMPEY.—POMPEY.—M. PERPERNA.—SERTORIUS MURDERED.—WAR AGAINST SPARTACUS.—SECOND WAR AGAINST MITHRIDATES, AND CAUSE OF THE THIRD WAR.

As soon as Sertorius had made such progress that he could look upon himself as the chief general of Spain, he began acting upon a well considered plan: he wished to blend the Spaniards and Romans together in such a manner, that Roman civilisation should give to the nation its real character, without however their ceasing to be Spaniards. He thus constituted a Rome out of Rome, and formed a senate of three hundred members, consisting partly of proscribed Romans and partly of distinguished Spaniards. This senate is known in history as the *senatus Hispaniensis*<sup>1</sup>. At Osca, the modern Huesca, he established an academy, and collected the sons of the most distinguished families, whom he had instructed in the Latin and Greek languages and literature. They were also dressed like the sons of noble Romans, and wore the bulla and praetexta, at which their parents felt not a little pleased<sup>2</sup>. These boys were at the same time a sort of hostages to him—a necessary precaution against the fickleness of the Spaniards, who, however, were also distinguished for their personal attachment to eminent men, which gave rise to the noble custom of warriors generally vowing not to survive their general. Sertorius remarked with pleasure, that the number of those who

<sup>1</sup> Appian, De Bell. Civil. i. 108.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Sertor. 14.

gathered around him and vowed to die with him was greater than ever before with any other general. He also worked upon their imagination. It may be that the story about the white fawn, by which he gained so much confidence, was, as Plutarch<sup>3</sup> says, a piece of imposition on his part; but I do not see why he should not, like his master, Marius, have been susceptible of such notions himself; and it seems to me not at all improbable that he himself entertained the same views on this point as the Spaniards.

Reckoning from the time when Sertorius first appeared in Spain, the war lasted eight years, but if we calculate from the time when, after the fall of his party, he placed himself at the head of Spain, it lasted only six years<sup>4</sup>. Q. Metellus Pius—the surname refers to his filial affection for his father, Q. Metellus Numidicus,—was sent into Baetica, and entrusted with the conduct of the war against Sertorius; but the latter soon gained more and more decided advantages over him, and things went at last so much backward that the senate sent out Cn. Pompey with a fresh army. Pompey was then yet an eques<sup>5</sup>, that is, he had not yet been invested with any office that conferred upon him the right of appearing in the senate. He was about thirty years old, and in the prime of life. It is very difficult to pronounce a decided opinion upon Pompey; he is not one of those characters whose outlines are clear and indisputable, as in the case of Marius, Sulla, Sertorius, and Caesar; and it is even difficult to say whether he was a great general or not, or whether he was one of those who do not possess sufficient strength to act consistently throughout life, and to be the same under all circumstances. There can be no doubt that he had distinguished himself very much in the war of Sulla, for Sulla treated him with marked respect; nor that in the

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Sertor. 11. Comp. Appian, De Bell Civil. i. 110.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, De Bell. Civil. i. 108; Livy, Epit. lib. 96; Eutrop. vi. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Vell. Patere. ii. 30.



war against Sertorius he very far excelled Metellus; he conducted it with great skill, though in point of generalship Sertorius surpassed him. The war against the pirates was well planned and happily concluded; that against Mithridates was indeed not difficult, but Pompey shewed himself resolute and active in employing the means which he had at his command. If, on the other hand, we consider him in his civil proceedings, especially during the period from his triumph to the war against Caesar, it cannot be denied that he had a cowardly fear of the Clodian party, and that he had a mean jealousy of Caesar, whom he designedly wished to keep down, and to whose superiority he *would* be blind, although he knew it. In the accusation of Cicero he behaved in a cowardly way; he was, in fact, never a trustworthy friend. In the time of Sulla, when he was yet a young man, he was cruel, and Cicero himself does not doubt that, if the civil war had taken a different turn, Pompey would have displayed the same cruelty as Sulla<sup>6</sup>. In eloquence and acquirements he was below mediocrity. His head in statues and busts shews a considerable degree of vulgarity and rudeness, whereas Caesar's head displays all his great intellectual activity. I will not deny that I have a dislike for Pompey, for I know that he was a different man at different periods of his life, and that in his later years there was a great falling off in his character, which cannot have been the consequence of old age, since, at the time of his death, he was not above fifty-six or fifty-seven years old.

Sertorius succeeded in two campaigns so far as to compel Metellus to withdraw into Andalusia and Pompey to retreat across the Pyrenees. Had the Spaniards been unanimous among themselves, Sertorius might have defied the whole power of Rome, and have annihilated his two opponents; but he had unfortunately to struggle against the rebellious attempts of the Spaniards, as well as against the Roman legions. He fought two battles in Andalusia

<sup>6</sup> Ad. Attic. ix. 10 and 11. Compare x. 4.

against the united Roman proconsuls, in both of which one wing of each army gained a victory, so that they were not productive of any considerable advantage<sup>7</sup>. But, as the Spaniards did not remain faithful, Sertorius in the end fell into difficulties, notwithstanding the immense resources of his mind. Some towns remained faithful to the last, such as Pallantia, but others deserted him; and these disappointments roused his indignation, under the influence of which he committed an act which is the only stain on his character: he sold the hostages assembled at Huesca as slaves<sup>8</sup>. This would have been quite natural with any other general, but Sertorius was of too noble a character, and should not have done it.

M. Perperna<sup>9</sup>, probably a son of the consular M. Perperna, had led the remainder of the army of Lepidus from Sardinia to Spain, wishing, however, to carry on the war in his own name; but his soldiers compelled him to submit to Sertorius. To take vengeance for this he, in conjunction with a number of Romans, formed a conspiracy against him. Sertorius had several of them put to death, but he was murdered at a repast<sup>10</sup>. Those Spaniards who had remained faithful to him shewed their attachment by killing themselves at his burial. Perperna compelled the Spaniards to recognise him as their general, but he lost the first battle he fought against Pompey, and he was put to death.

Pompey now returned to Rome to sue for the consul-

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 110; Plutarch, *Sertor.* 18 foll.; *Pomp.* 19.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch, *Sertor.* 25.

<sup>9</sup> He was a noble Roman, probably of an Etruscan family, for the termination *na* is Etruscan. It has been said that all gentile names must terminate in *ius*, and that consequently Perperna must be a mere cognomen; but the Etruscan *na* answers to the Roman *ius*. We cannot think of Ernesti without loving and respecting him, but he was mistaken in a great many things; for example, when he said that Caecina was an agnomen.—N. Compare vol. i. notes 344, 922.

<sup>10</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 113; Plutarch, *Sertor.* 26; Vell. Paterc. ii. 30.

ship. The people admired him with enthusiasm, and he was their favourite to an unprecedented degree, a fact for which I cannot account. In Caesar there were indeed reasons for such an enthusiasm, though I do not mean to say that his conduct was altogether praiseworthy, but men could not help loving him, and Cicero, in reality, always loved him. Pompey had not yet held any curule office, and had been invested with proconsular power without having had a magistracy. He was now made consul, together with M. Licinius Crassus, to whom he was so hostile that the Romans trembled with fear lest they should take up arms against each other. But at the request of the senate they made a reconciliation, and behaved honourably<sup>11</sup>; they were never after false towards each other, though they lived together for nineteen years. Sometimes it even appeared as if they were good friends, but this appearance sometimes vanished again. Crassus has acquired his historical importance mainly by his conquest of Spartacus.

About five years after the death of Sulla, a Thracian of the name of Spartacus had broken forth from a barrack of gladiators at Capua, with about seventy other gladiators<sup>12</sup>. The number of gladiators had increased at that time to an immense extent, and the rage of the Romans for this kind of public spectacles spread more and more every day; ambitious persons availed themselves of this mania as a means of gaining popularity. Spartacus, after having broken forth with his fellow-prisoners, took his po-

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 121.

<sup>12</sup> (Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 116; Livy, *Epit. lib.* 95; Plutarch, *Crass. S.*) There is at Pompeii an edifice similar to a barrack; it has parapets and a number of arms have been found in it. At first I thought the building might have been a barrack, but I could not conceive why the Romans should have had barracks in that place, and on a closer examination I found that the arms were those of the Samnites, which were, as Livy (ix. 40) says, afterwards given to the gladiators in Campania. Hence I believe that the above-mentioned edifice might be called a *ludus gladiatorius* instead of a barrack.—N.

sition on mount Vesuvius, which then formed an old decayed crater and was difficult of access. Many have acknowledged that Spartacus must have been a great man. He and his followers concealed themselves in the crater, and a great number of runaway slaves joined them. Spartacus and his associates at first formed a band of robbers, and not only escaped the regular troops that were sent against them, but made great havoc among them, and thus acquired arms and ammunition, with which they must have been provided very scantily at the beginning. Spartacus proclaimed the freedom of the slaves, and numbers flocked to him from all parts of southern Italy. The consequences of Sulla's devastations in those districts now became visible at once, for there were no freemen to defend themselves. It is surprising to find that Germans are also mentioned among those slaves<sup>13</sup>: it may be that there were among them some of the Teutones, but it is more probable that they were Germans who had been sold as slaves by the Gauls. Crixus, a Gaul, and Oenomaus were the generals of Spartacus, who ruled over his men with dictatorial power. The war lasted upwards of two years: three praetors and two consular armies were completely defeated, a great number of towns, such as Nola, Thurii, Grumentum in Lucania, and perhaps Compsa in the country of the Hirpinians, were taken and ravaged, and in fact few places escaped destruction. At length, however, Crassus baffled the slaves. They possessed large establishments for the manufacture of arms, and they firmly believed that they might conquer and govern the greater part of Italy, though they would not, perhaps, destroy Rome. This plan of theirs would not indeed have been impossible, had it not been thwarted by Crassus and their own divisions. They were divided into three armies, and it was this circumstance alone that enabled Crassus to defeat them. His last victory was gained near Petelia in Lucania, and he made the same cruel use of it as the German princes did of their victory in the Peasant

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch, Crass. 9.

war in the sixteenth century. The bodies of the conquered or their limbs were seen impaled along the high road from Capua to Rome<sup>14</sup>.

Italy was thus delivered from the most fearful of all dangers, but the ravages in the south were so great that the country has never been able to recover the state of prosperity which it enjoyed before the outbreak of this war: its condition was in fact more wretched than in the worst periods of the Roman empire. This is evident from the few monuments of this time, and from the small number of towns occurring in the itineraries of the emperors; and these towns were scarcely anything more than places for changing horses. The free population was extirpated, and the country was cut up into large estates, which served as pasture for cattle and horses.

At the time when these events took place in Italy, a war was carried on in Asia against Mithridates, which is sometimes called the second, but more properly with Appian<sup>15</sup>, the third Mithridatic war. It arose out of the negotiations which had been carried on between Sertorius and Mithridates. After Sulla had left Asia, Mithridates fulfilled the greater part of the terms on which peace had been concluded: he gave up Bithynia and Paphlagonia, but of Cappadocia he gave only a portion back to Ariobarzanes, and kept the rest for himself. No one, surely, can blame him for this, for the peace had never yet received the sanction of the Roman senate and people, and as he had signed it, he demanded of the Romans to do the same. Sulla himself was not dishonest in this affair, but the senate of Rome was dishonest, and Mithridates was unable to get any document. L. Murena, a Roman general, marched into Cappadocia, invaded the territory of Mithridates, plundered the rich temple of Comana, and carried his aggressions so far that at length an open war broke out. Murena was defeated. As Mithridates had merely acted

<sup>14</sup> Appian *De Bell. Civil.* i. 120; Plutarch, *Crass.* 11.

<sup>15</sup> *De Bell. Mithrid.* 68.

on the defensive in this whole affair, and as at the end of it he shewed himself willing to renew the peace, the Romans readily agreed: they left him in possession of a part of Cappadocia, and he engaged himself to one of the daughters of Ariobarzanes<sup>16</sup>.

The great and last war against Mithridates, which lasted for nearly twelve years, was brought about, as I have already remarked, by his negotiations with Sertorius, who sent two proscribed Romans, L. Magius and L. Fannius, to Mithridates and concluded an alliance with him. Mithridates was to assist Sertorius with his fleet; and it was especially stipulated that he should induce the Cilician pirates, who were under his influence, to support the interest of Sertorius. Mithridates was to have the sovereignty of Asia in case of their being successful against the Romans<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Mithrid.* 64—67.  
Mithrid. 68; Plutarch, *Sertor.* 23 and 24.

<sup>17</sup> Appian, *De Bell.*







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